Lovejoy v. Transdev Services, Inc. et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CHERISHA LOVEJOY, an individual, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
TRANSDEV SERVICES, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
Case No.: 23-cv-00380-AJB-MMP
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO STAY PARALLEL
CALIFORNIA STATE COURT
PROCEEDINGS
(Doc. No. 85)
Before the Court is a motion to stay five California Superior Court proceedings1
pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, filed by Plaintiff Cherisha Lovejoy
(“Plaintiff”). (Doc. Nos. 85; 102.) Defendant Transdev Services, Inc. (“Defendant”)
opposes the motion. (Doc. Nos. 96; 107.) For the reasons set forth herein, the Court
DENIES Plaintiff’s motion.
1 	The five actions are: (1) Reese v. Veolia Transportation, et al., No. 21STCV29413 (Cal. Super.
Ct.); (2) Diaz v. Transdev North America, Inc., et al., No. 22STCV32496 (Cal. Super. Ct.); (3) Reese v.
Veolia Transportation, et al., 21STCV36076 (Cal. Super. Ct.); (4) Diaz v. Transdev North America, Inc.,
et al., No. 22STCV38405 (Cal. Super. Ct.); and (5) Brown v. Transdev, No. 23AHCV02160 (Cal. Super.
Ct.).
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I. 	BACKGROUND
On February 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant wage and hour class action, alleging
that Defendant, a private operator of California municipal buses, violated various
California labor laws with regard to Bus Driver/Operator employees like Plaintiff.2
(Doc. No. 1.) After Defendant filed an answer (Doc. No. 4), the parties attended an Early
Neutral Evaluation Conference (“ENE”) before U.S. Magistrate Judge Barbara Lynn
Major. (Doc. No. 10.) When the parties failed to settle, Judge Major issued a Scheduling
Order, and the parties began to engage in discovery regarding class certification. (Doc. No.
11.)
On August 11, 2025, the Court granted in part Plaintiff’s initial motion for class
certification and certified Plaintiff’s first, second, third, fourth, seventh and eighth causes
of action.3 (Doc. No. 72.) After full briefing on Plaintiff’s renewed motion, the Court
certified the fifth and sixth causes of action.4 (Doc. No. 87.)
On October 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to stay. (Doc. No. 85.) Three
days later, Plaintiff filed a proposed class notice plan for the Court’s approval (Doc. No.
91), which Defendant opposed (Doc. No. 92). The Court rejected Plaintiff’s notice for
violating the Civil Local Rules and issued a briefing schedule for any future class notice
plan. (Doc. No. 95.)
///
2 	Specifically, Plaintiff alleges: (1) failure to pay all regular, minimum and overtime wages; (2)
failure to pay split shift wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to provide rest periods;
(5) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (6) failure to timely pay wages due; (7) violation
of California’s Unfair Competition Law; and (8) conversion. (See generally Compl.)
3 	For these causes of action, the certified class is defined as: “All current and former California Bus
Driver/Operator employees of Transdev Services, Inc. who drove routes with stops in California during
the period from February 27, 2019 through the present[.]” (Doc. No. 72 at 28.)
4 	The certified class for the fifth cause of action is defined as: “All current and former California
Bus Driver/Operator employees of Transdev Services, Inc. who drove routes with stops in California
during the period from February 27, 2022 through the present[.]” (Doc. Nos. 87 at 8.) For the sixth cause
of action, the certified class is defined as: “All former California Bus Driver/Operator employees of
Transdev Services, Inc. who drove routes with stops in California during the period from February 27,
2020 through the present[.]” (Id.)
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On October 21, 2025, Defendant filed an opposition to the instant motion (Doc. No.
96), which was subsequently joined by David Reese, Isaac Kharaud, Patricia Brown, and
Victor Diaz, the named plaintiffs in the parallel state court actions (Doc. No. 101). Plaintiff
filed a reply (Doc. No. 102), and Defendant filed a sur-reply with leave of the Court (Doc.
No. 107).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
The All Writs Act authorizes district courts to “issue all writs necessary or
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles
of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). “The All Writs Act is limited by the Anti–Injunction Act,
which prevents a federal court from enjoining the ‘proceedings in a State court except as
expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgments.’” Sandpiper Vill. Condo. Ass’n. v. Louisiana-Pac.
Corp., 428 F.3d 831, 842 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2283). “[Because] the
statutory prohibition against such injunctions in part rests on the fundamental constitutional
independence of the States and their courts, the exceptions should not be enlarged by loose
statutory construction.” Atl. Coast Line R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281,
287 (1970); see also Sandpiper Vill. Condo. Ass’n., 428 F.3d at 842 (“Rooted firmly in
constitutional principles, the Act is designed to prevent friction between federal and state
courts by barring federal intervention in all but the narrowest of circumstances.”).
“The Act creates a presumption in favor of permitting parallel actions in state and
federal court.” Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 806 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended
on denial of reh’g (May 15, 2002). As such, “[d]oubts as to the appropriateness of an
injunction should be ‘resolved in favor of permitting the state courts to proceed in an
orderly fashion to finally determine the controversy.’” Bechtel Petroleum, Inc. v. Webster,
796 F.2d 252, 253 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Vendo Co. v. Lektra-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623,
630 (1977) (plurality opinion)). “[A] decision whether to enjoin a state court proceeding
pursuant to the narrow exceptions in the Anti-Injunction Act is committed to the discretion
of the district court.” Id.
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III. 	MOTION TO STAY PARALLEL STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS
Arguing the jurisdictional necessity exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, Plaintiff
asks this Court to “issue an injunction . . . carefully tailored to prevent the plaintiffs in the
parallel state court actions from moving to certify or certify for settlement purposes classes
of Defendant Transdev’s California employees––unless the state plaintiff putative class
representative’s motions specifically exclude Lovejoy’s Class’s absent members from any
requested certification order.” (Doc. No. 85-1 at 12.) In support of her stance, Plaintiff
argues that this action is further along than the previously filed actions, specifically this is
the only action with a certified class so far, and that the imminent settlement of the other
actions would “threaten this Court’s class certification Order and ensuing Orders.” (Id. 8,
13, 15; see also Doc. No. 102 at 3–4.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that “comity calls for the
dismissal of the first-filed action when the second-filed matter has proceeded far beyond a
first-filed matter[.]” (Doc. No. 85-1 at 14–15.)
In opposition, Defendant argues that none of the exceptions to the Anti-Injunction
Act apply. (See generally Doc. No. 96.) With regard to the second exception, Defendant
asserts that because “this case is not an MDL case, discovery is not complete, and no class
settlement is imminent” application of the exception “would expand the reach of the All
Writs Act[.]” (Id. at 13–15.) Additionally, Defendant asserts that “consideration of comity
and federalism weighs in favor of honoring the state court proceeding” and that the first-
to-file rule exception applies between federal courts, which is not the case here. (Id. at 18–
19.)
“The second exception to the Anti–Injunction Act authorizes injunctive relief ‘to
prevent a state court from so interfering with a federal court’s consideration or disposition
of a case as to seriously impair the federal court’s flexibility and authority to decide that
case.’” Sandpiper Vill. Condo. Ass’n., 428 F.3d at 843 (quoting Atl. Coast Line, 398 U.S.
at 295); see also Bennett, 285 F.3d at 806 (“Parallel in personam actions in state court
seriously impede a federal court’s ability to adjudicate a case only where the state court
proceeding threatens to render the exercise of the federal court’s jurisdiction nugatory.”).
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“Thus, there are only very limited circumstances where such a threat exists in personam
cases.” 	Id. (collecting cases). “In general, the necessary-in-aid-of-jurisdiction exception
applies to in rem proceedings where the federal court has jurisdiction over the res and the
state court proceedings might interfere with that[, b]ut that principle does not authorize
interference with parallel in personam state actions merely because the state courts might
reach a conclusion before the district court does.” Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N.
Am., 523 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2008).
In Negrete, the Ninth Circuit surveyed “the considerations that have induced courts
to issue injunctions despite the strictures of the Anti-Injunction Act[.]” Id. at 1103. There
the Circuit found an injunction tailored to prevent settlement of a state court action that
could “draw the fangs from at least of portion of the class action case that [the district court]
was then considering” was improper because “[the action] was not an MDL case; discovery
was not complete; no class settlement was imminent, in fact, as far as the record shows no
serious settlement progress had been made; and, finally, there was no evidence of collusive
procedures, reverse auction or otherwise, even assuming that the existence of those would
justify an injunction of state proceedings.” Id.
The crux of Plaintiff’s justification for why this instant action warrants protection is
this Court’s certification orders. However, to achieve certification, Plaintiff had to
demonstrate that “a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy,” considering (1) the interest of class members
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (2) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against
members of the class; (3) the desirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in this
particular forum; and (4) the manageability of the action as a class. Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3)(A)–(D). The Court in its certification order noted that “[t]hough light on analysis,
Plaintiff assert[ed] that one trial resolving all claims, instead of hundreds of trials, is
superior and that a class-wide action would be manageable because damages will be
assessed based on Transdev’s own time and pay records,” while “Defendant d[id] not
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dispute superiority.” (Doc. No. 72 at 27 (citations omitted).) This Court then made a finding
of superiority on the basis that “[t]here is no indication that the putative class members
have brought related litigation against Defendant or have any interest in asserting
these claims on an individual basis” and “these claims are well-suited for class
adjudication through use of schedules, policies, data and records in Defendant’s possession
as common sources of proof.” (Id. (emphasis added).)
At the time Plaintiff filed for certification, she was clearly aware of the parallel state
court actions she here seeks to enjoin. For example, in her reply, Plaintiff delineates
discussions with Defense Counsel regarding the status of the other actions dating back to
at least September 18, 2023. (See Doc. No. 102 at 8.) Moreover, Plaintiff proffers evidence
that her ex parte application to intervene prior to mediation in the Reese action was denied
on May 3, 2024, by the Honorable Carolyn B. Kuhl. (Doc. No. 102-1.) Defendant states
that it “alerted Plaintiff to efforts to resolve the overlapping cases, including Reese, in July
2023. (Doc. No. 107 at 3.) The existence of first-filed actions that have now preliminarily
reached settlement undermine the Court’s finding of superiority and call into question
Plaintiff Counsel’s candor to the tribunal. Due to Plaintiff’s misrepresentation through
omission of facts that may have had an effect on whether Plaintiff met her burden to
demonstrate certification is proper in this case, the Court declines to consider certification
of the instant action as evidence of its comparatively advanced stage of litigation.
As noted by Defendant (see Doc. No. 96 at 16–17) and based on the Court’s own
review, typically “[t]he only circumstance in which federal courts typically enjoin their
state counterparts on jurisdictional grounds is when a final disposition of a complex
litigation is imminent, and injunction of the state action is necessary to effectuate the
settlement or judgment.” In re Lendingclub Sec. Litig., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1191 (N.D.
Cal. 2017) (collecting cases); see e.g., Bennett, 285 F.3d at 806 (injunctions found proper
where necessary to effectuate a settlement agreement over which the district court has
jurisdiction, to preserve the integrity of exclusive federal question jurisdiction, in multi-
district litigation, and in school desegregation case); In re Manufacturers Life Ins. Co.
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Premium Litig., No. 96-CV-00230-BTM-AJB, 2008 WL 4950939 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18,
2008) (enjoining state court plaintiffs from pursuing claims released by a class action
settlement approved by the district court in order to protect or effectuate its judgment);
McCormick v. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., No. 205CV06735CASMANX, 2016 WL
850821, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2016) (same).
Notwithstanding the certification, this action is nowhere near as advanced as
litigation in which courts have found it proper to issue an injunction pursuant to the aid-of-
jurisdiction exception. See Negrete, 523 F.3d at 1102 (“[I]n less advanced cases, courts
have been more chary about issuing injunctions, as, indeed, they should have been.”)
(collecting cases). No class settlement is imminent in this action (see Doc. Nos. 96 at 13;
102 at 7–10), it is not an MDL case, and discovery is not yet complete (see Doc. No. 90 at
1).
For the first time in reply, Plaintiff argues that there are indicia of underhanded
activity 	and 	evidence 	of 	collusion 	that 	raise 	concerns 	about
Defendant’s purpose in claiming to seek a global settlement with all parties,” that raise the
specter of a “reverse auction,” and that make “protection of this [C]ourt’s jurisdiction . . .
most necessary and appropriate to protect this Court’s Order regarding the certified Lovejoy
class.” (Doc. No. 102 at 9–10.) There is no case law that the Court is aware of in which
“evidence of collusive procedures, reverse auction or otherwise, . . . justify an injunction
of state proceedings.” Negrete, 523 F.3d at 1103.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the “principles of comity and federalism militate in
favor of” an injunction. (Doc. No. 85-1 at 14–15 (relying on an exception to the first-to-
file rule and the purpose of the Class Action Fairness Act).)5 As noted by Defendant (see
Doc. No. 96 at 18), the first-to-file rule is inapplicable to these circumstances. Moreover,
5 The Court notes that Plaintiff inaccurately asserts that “[t]he instant case is older than several of
the parallel proceedings[.]” (Doc. No. 85-1 at 15.) Of the five state actions Plaintiff seeks enjoined, the
instant federal action is older than only one (Brown).
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the principles of comity and federalism necessitate that this Court tread cautiously and
demonstrate restraint in interfering with state court actions. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407
U.S. 225, 243 (1972) (“[T]he principles of equity, comity, and federalism . . . must restrain
a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding.”); Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (“[T]he notion of ‘comity,’ that is, a proper respect for state functions,
a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state
governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best
if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their
separate ways.”).
Considering the stage of the instant litigation, especially in light of the Court’s
concerns regarding propriety of certification, the Court finds that the second exception to
the Anti-Injunction Act does not apply. Moreover, on the instant record, even if the
exception were to apply, the Court would in its discretion decline to issue an injunction
considering its doubts as to the appropriateness of such a measure, see Bechtel Petroleum,
Inc.¸796 F.2d at 523, and the principles of comity and federalism, see Atl. Coast Line R.
Co., 398 U.S. 286–87. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to stay the
parallel state court proceedings.
IV. 	ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
“Even after a certification order is entered, the judge remains free to modify it in the
light of subsequent developments in the litigation.” United Steel, Paper & Forestry,
Rubber, Mfg. Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v.
ConocoPhillips Co., 593 F.3d 802, 809 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v.
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C) (“An order that
grants or denies class certification may be altered or amended before final judgment.”). In
fact, “[a] district court may decertify a class at any time.” Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp.,
563 F.3d 948, 966 (9th Cir. 2009).
“To certify a class, plaintiffs bear the burden of satisfying each of the four
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)—numerosity, commonality,
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typicality, and adequacy—and at least one requirement of Rule 23(b).” Small v. Allianz
Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 122 F.4th 1182, 1197 (9th Cir. 2024). Relevant here, pursuant to
Rule 23(b)(3), “[a] class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if . . . the
court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3). To determine superiority, courts consider (1) the interest of class members
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (2) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against
members of the class; (3) the desirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in this
particular forum; and (4) the manageability of the action as a class. Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3)(A)–(D).
As discussed supra § IV, the Court questions whether the superiority prong of Rule
23(b)(3) is met in light of the five parallel state court actions. Accordingly, the Court
ORDERS the parties to show cause as to whether the class should be decertified. See, e.g.,
True Health Chiropractic Inc. v. McKesson Corp., No. 13-CV-02219-HSG, 2021 WL
4461585, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2021).
V. 	MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Plaintiff requests the Court take judicial notice of the following court records from
the parallel state court actions which Plaintiff filed in support of her motion to stay:
1. 	First Am. Class Action Compl., Reese v. Veolia Transportation,
et al., No. 21STCV29413 (Cal. Super. Ct. March 8, 2023);
2. 	Compl. 	for 	Enforcement 	under 	PAGA, 	Reese 	v. 	Veolia
Transportation, et al., No. 21STCV36076 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2021);
3. 	First Am. Class Action Compl., Diaz v. Transdev Services, Inc.,
et al., No. 22STCV32496 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 20, 2024);
4. 	First 	Am. 	PAGA 	Representative 	Action 	Compl., 	Diaz 	v.
Transdev Services, Inc., et al., No. 22STCV38405 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 20,
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2024);
5. 	Compl. for Enforcement under PAGA, 	Brown v. Transdev
Services Inc., et al., No. 23AHCV02160 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 18, 2023);
6. 	Docket 	Sheet, 	Reese 	v. 	Veolia 	Transportation, 	et 	al., 	No.
21STCV29413 (Cal. Super. Ct. Retrieved Oct. 3, 2025);
7. 	Docket Sheet, 	Diaz v. Transdev Services, Inc., et al., No.
22STCV32496 (Cal. Super. Ct. Retrieved Oct. 3, 2025); and
8. 	Joint Notice of Settlement, Reese v. Veolia Transportation, et al.,
No. 21STCV29413 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2025) (lead case) and Diaz v.
Transdev Services, Inc., et al., No. 22STCV32496 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 30,
2025). (See Doc. No. 86.)
A court may take judicial notice of court filings. Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa
USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006). “However, while the authenticity and
existence of a particular order, motion, pleading or judicial proceeding, which is a matter
of public record, is judicially noticeable, veracity and validity of its contents are not.”
Esparza v. Kohl’s, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 3d 934, 940 (S.D. Cal. 2024) (internal punctuation
and citation omitted).
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request (Doc. No. 86)6 pursuant to Rule
201(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence and takes judicial notice of the identified state
court records.
///
///
///
///
///
6 	Plaintiff initially requested judicial notice of records (1), (3), and (8) only. (See Doc. No. 85-3.)
Having granted the amended request for judicial notice (Doc. No. 86), the Court DENIES as moot
Plaintiff’s initial request.
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VI. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to stay the parallel
state court actions and GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice. In light of the five
parallel state court actions, the Court further ORDERS:
1. 	The Hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion for Order Approving Class Notice and
Notice Plan and related briefing schedule are VACATED, to be reset when appropriate.
(See Doc. Nos. 106; 108.)
2. 	A Show Cause Hearing is SET for January 29, 2026, at 2:00 PM, in
Courtroom 4A before the undersigned.
3. 	Cross responses to this Order to Show Cause addressing the issue of
superiority must be filed no later than December 11, 2025. Responses must be no more
than ten pages, exclusive exhibits.
4. 	Cross replies must be filed no later than December 18, 2025. Replies must be
no more than five pages, exclusive exhibits.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 17, 2025
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