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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL WALTER RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant.
Case No.: 17-CR-00215-GPC
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
COMPASSIONATE RELEASE
[ECF Nos. 100, 101, 107]
Before the Court is Defendant Michael Walter Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”)’s motion
for compassionate release. ECF Nos. 100, 101, 107. On August 8, 2025, the Government
filed an opposition. ECF No. 113. On September 2, 2025, Rodriguez filed a reply. ECF
No. 118. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Rodriguez’s motion for
compassionate release.
BACKGROUND
I. 	Rodriguez’s Imprisonment
On July 11, 2017, Rodriguez pled guilty to Count I, Distribution of
Methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and Count II, Conspiracy to
Launder Monetary Instruments under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and (h). ECF Nos.
21 and 41. On November 20, 2017, this Court sentenced Rodriguez to 180 months on
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Count I and 120 months on Count II to run concurrently, followed by five years of
supervised release. ECF No. 41 at 2-3.1 Rodriguez has been in custody since his arrest on
March 16, 2017 and is currently serving his term in BOP custody with a projected release
date of December 24, 2028.2 ECF No. 23 at 2.
Rodriguez is currently 53 years old. ECF No. 23 at 3. His lengthy criminal history
began as a juvenile and continues to his most recent offense. Id. at 11-18. When
Rodriguez was 28 years old, he was introduced to methamphetamine and developed a
serious addiction to the substance, smoking an estimated 4 to 7 grams per day. Id. at 24.
He began experiencing auditory and visual hallucinations in his early thirties and used the
substance as self-medication. Id. at 23. He has since been diagnosed with schizophrenia,
depression, and bipolar disorder. Id. at 23-24. Prior to his incarceration, he was
prescribed Risperdal, Cymbalta, and Benadryl to minimize his paranoia and
hallucinations. Id.
Rodriguez has not received consistent treatment for his mental illness in prison.
ECF No. 88 at 7 (sealed). In one of his prior motions, Rodriquez reported he waited a
year to receive his Risperidone prescription when he was transferred to Federal
Correctional Institute Fort Dix (“FCI Fort Dix”). ECF No. 107 at 4. Additionally, in April
2024, Rodriguez was transferred from FCI Fort Dix to Duluth Federal Prison Camp
(“Duluth FPC”), and he has not received any medication for his schizophrenia since then.
Id.
While imprisoned, Rodriguez has completed educational and vocational training
courses including Anger Management, Life Skills, Finding a Job, Interview Process,
Customer Service, Geography, HIV Education, Suicide Companion Training, Business,
Financial Planning, Spanish, Parenting, and Drug Education. ECF No. 107-1 at 1-2. In
1 Page numbers reflect CM/ECF pagination.
2 Find an Inmate, Federal Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc (last visited
January 23, 2026).
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2022, he also earned his GED. ECF No. 83-1 at 6.
II. 	Rodriguez’s Previous Motions
On January 20, 2023, while incarcerated at FCI Fort Dix, Rodriguez filed his first
motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). ECF No. 71. On
September 18, 2023, Rodriguez made a request to the Warden at FCI Fort Dix for a
sentencing reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A). ECF No. 83-4 at 2-3. Then, on October 31,
2023, with the assistance of counsel, Rodriuez requested a reduction in sentence based on
the disparity in his sentence due to the Ninth Circuit’s later interpretation of safety valve
eligibility in United States v. Lopez, 998 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 2021), his mental health, the
conditions of his confinement during the COVID-19 pandemic, and his rehabilitation
efforts during incarceration. ECF No. 83 at 5-6. It was undisputed that Rodriguez met his
administrative exhaustion requirement because he filed the motion thirty days after
requesting the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) file on his behalf. See ECF No. 83-4 at 2-3
(letter to warden); ECF No. 89 at 5 (government response). Nonetheless, on March 25,
2024, this Court denied Rodriguez’s motion because he failed to demonstrate
extraordinary and compelling circumstances under § 3582(c)(1)(A). ECF No. 91.
III. 	Rodriguez’s Current Motion
Rodriguez initially filed two pro se motions for compassionate release on
November 1, 2024 and December 2, 2024 respectively. ECF Nos. 100, 101. On June 2,
2025, he filed a supplement to his renewed motion with the assistance of counsel. ECF
No. 107. Prior to filing, Rodriguez had not filed a new request with his warden for
compassionate release. ECF No. 118 at 2-4. Rodriguez asks the Court to reduce his
sentence to time served. ECF No. 107 at 8-9. He seeks these modifications pursuant to
the “compassionate release” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) based on the above-
mentioned lack of mental health treatment and his rehabilitation. See id. at 5-9.
LEGAL STANDARD
Generally, a federal court “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has
been imposed,” United States v. Keller, 2 F.4th 1278, 1281 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 18
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U.S.C. § 3582(c)), except “in limited circumstances set out by federal statute,” United
States v. King, 24 F.4th 1226, 1228 (9th Cir. 2022). Rodriguez seeks to modify his
sentence under the “compassionate release” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) as
amended by the First Step Act (“FSA”). In relevant part, § 3582(c)(1)(A) permits a court
to modify a term of imprisonment:
the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon
motion of the defendant after defendant has fully exhausted all
administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a
motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of
such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier,
may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation
or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the
unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the
factors set forth in § 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds
that—
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction;
…
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]
Previously, the Ninth Circuit held that policy statement U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13
governed only § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions brought by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”). United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (finding
the “current version of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 is not an ‘applicable policy statement’ for 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions filed by defendant”). However, amendments to
§ 1B1.13, effective November 1, 2023, reflect that the policy statement is now applicable
to motions filed by defendant and the BOP. United States v. Garcia Nava, 2024 WL
221439, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2024); see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a) (“Upon motion of the
Director of Bureau of Prisons or the defendant…”) (emphasis added). Therefore, policy
statement § 1B1.13 is binding on this Court’s consideration of Rodriguez’s motion for
compassionate release.
Under § 1B1.13, as amended, extraordinary and compelling circumstances include:
(1) medical conditions of the defendant, whether terminal or chronic, that substantially
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diminish the defendant’s ability to provide self-care within a correctional facility; (2) age
when the defendant is at least 65 years old; (3) family circumstances rendering defendant
the only available caretaker for a family member; (4) defendant, while in custody, was a
victim of abuse by a BOP employee; (5) other reasons not specifically enumerated that,
when considered by themselves or together, are of a similar gravity as those described in
(1)-(4); and (6) a change in law that has created a gross disparity between the sentence
being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed, but
only where the defendant has served at least 10 years of an unusually long sentence.
Lastly, § 1B1.13(a)(2) instructs that prior to granting a motion for compassionate
release, a court must determine that “the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any
other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).”
DISCUSSION
The Court must first determine whether Rodriguez has satisfied the administrative
exhaustion requirement set forth in § 3582(c)(1)(A). If he has, the Court must next decide
whether Rodriguez has established “extraordinary and compelling” reasons consistent
with the policy statement to justify a reduction of his sentence. Lastly, the Court must
determine whether the requested modification would be consistent with the factors set
forth in § 3553(a) and whether Rodriguez is a danger to others or the community.
I. 	Exhaustion Requirement
The Government argues that Rodriguez failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies because he did not submit a new request to the warden at his new facility in
Duluth FPC. ECF No. 113 at 7-8. The Government maintains that no legal doctrine
permits Rodriguez to use his prior request from FCI Fort Dix as the basis for the motion
of his current confinement at a different facility. Id.
In turn, Rodriguez argues his request at FCI Fort Dix is sufficient to meet the
exhaustion requirements for the current motion because Rodriguez is not required to
submit a renewed request if moved between BOP facilities. Thus, this Court’s previous
finding that he had met the administrative exhaustion requirements on his prior motion is
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sufficient. ECF No. 118 at 2-4; see ECF No. 91 at 4 n.4.
Section 3582(c)(1)(A) contains a statutory exhaustion requirement, compelling a
defendant to fully exhaust all administrative rights to appeal before a defendant may
move for compassionate release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). As enumerated, the
exhaustion requirement may be satisfied by “the lapse of thirty days from the receipt [of a
request for compassionate release] by the warden of the defendant’s facility.” Id. This
language “imposes a mandatory claim-processing rule that must be enforced when
properly invoked” by the government. United States v. Keller, 2 F.4th 1278, 1282 (9th
Cir. 2021).
This exhaustion requirement must be completed for each renewed motion for
compassionate release based on changed circumstances. See id. at 1283 (“Keller asserts
that he fully exhausted his administrative remedies for his second motion because 30
days had passed since he lodged his first administrative request with the warden in July
2020. But the July 2020 request served as the predicate for Keller's first motion in the
district court, which was denied in September 2020, and could not have initiated the
administrative process for his January 2021 motion, which was itself premised on Keller's
claim of changed circumstances.”). This claim-processing rule “promotes good policy”
and “allows the government to ‘implement an orderly system for reviewing
compassionate-release applications,’ rather than one ‘that incentivizes line jumping.’” Id.
at 1282 (quoting United States v. Alam, 961 F.3d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 2020)).
Here, Rodriguez failed to meet the exhaustion requirements set forth in §
3582(c)(1)(A). Prior to filing this instant motion on June 2, 2025, Rodriguez had not sent
a request for compassionate release to his warden at Duluth FPC. ECF No. 113 at 7.
Instead, he relied on his September 18, 2023 request to the warden at FCI Fort Dix as the
basis for his compassionate release motion with this Court. See ECF No. 107 at 6, n.3.
Although it was undisputed that Rodriguez met the exhaustion requirements on his prior
motion, the exhaustion requirement is motion specific. Thus, because Rodriguez’s prior
motion was fully adjudicated and denied by this Court, the administrative request
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underlying that motion cannot serve as the predicate for his current motion when it relies
on changed circumstances. See Keller, 2 F.4th at 1283. Accordingly, Rodriguez failed to
initiate the administrative process for his current motion and, thus, failed to meet the
exhaustion requirement.
Rodriguez attempts to refute this conclusion, arguing that (1) transfer between
facilities does not nullify a defendant’s exhaustion requirement and (2) exhaustion can be
satisfied using the same facts from a previous motion. ECF No. 118 at 3. However, both
arguments are unavailing. Rodriguez’s first argument only applies to cases where a
defendant sent a letter to the warden at their facility and was subsequently transferred to a
new facility after filing their motion for compassionate release with the court. See United
States v. Hamidu, No. 2:18-CR-00058-6, 2021 WL 2808721, at *2 (S.D. Ohio July 6,
2021) (“[D]istrict courts have also found the First Step Act's statutory exhaustion
requirement to be satisfied where an individual submits a request for compassionate
release, is transferred to a new facility, and then does not file a subsequent request at the
new facility.”); United States v. Doan, No. 14-CR-225-MMA-4, 2021 WL 4819317, at *2
(S.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2021); United States v. Porter, No. CR 18-68, 2021 WL 5989142, at
*2 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2021). In those circumstances, a defendant need not send a new
letter to the warden at their new facility to meet the exhaustion requirement. Here,
Rodriquez sent his letter in support of his original motion to the warden at FCI Fort Dix,
filed a motion for compassionate release, was transferred to Duluth FCI, and then had the
original motion denied. Afterwards, he filed his renewed motion for compassionate
release without sending a new letter. While Rodriguez’s cited cases allow him to meet the
exhaustion requirement for his original motion, they are not sufficient for his renewed
motion.
In terms of the second argument, the cases Rodriquez cites only involve situations
where the government did not oppose the exhaustion requirement being met. See
Unopposed Renewed Motion, United States v. Lehn, No. 22-CR-1538-DMS (S.D. Cal.
Dec. 20, 2024) (granting unopposed renewed motion considering that the parties’ agreed
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to exhaustion being met and defendant’s cancer diagnosis); see also United States v.
Lopez-Ontiveros, No. 15-CR-575-GPC-1, 2025 WL 1115052, at *2 n. 3 (S.D. Cal. Apr.
15, 2025) (finding the exhaustion requirement met when it was undisputed); United
States v. Santiago, No. 4:17-CR-17, 2025 WL 842807, at *1 (E.D. Va. Mar. 18, 2025).
While the “claim-processing rule may be ‘mandatory’ in the sense that a court must
enforce the rule if a party ‘properly raise[s] it,’ … the objection ‘may be forfeited’” if not
timely asserted. United States v. Keller, 2 F.4th 1278, 1282 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Fort
Bend County, Texas v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 542 (2019)). Here, unlike the cases cited in
Defendant’s motion, the government properly raised its opposition that Rodriguez failed
to meet the exhaustion requirement. ECF No. 113 at 6-8.
Accordingly, in light of the statutory language of § 3582(c), the Court finds
Rodriguez failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
II. 	Request for Stay of Proceedings
In the alternative, Rodriguez asks for the Court to stay proceedings for thirty days,
based on a renewed letter for compassionate release sent to the warden at Duluth FPC as
of September 2, 2025. ECF No. 118 at 7. Rodriguez argues that granting stay would not
unduly prejudice the parties because both parties have fully briefed the merits of the case.
Id.
Federal district courts possess inherent authority to stay proceedings as part of its
case management powers. Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).
“How this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgement, which must weigh
competing interests and maintain an even balance.” Id. at 254-55.
Here, granting a stay of proceedings because of the renewed letter would be
contrary to the statutory text and policy goals behind § 3582(c). The claim-processing
rules of § 3582(c) “allow the executive branch to carefully evaluate a claim in the first
instance and possibly obviate the need for litigation before it begins.” Keller, 2 F.4th at
1283 (quoting Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011))
(emphasis in original); see also United States v. Franco, 973 F.3d 465, 468 (5th Cir.
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2020) (“Congress used clear language: all requests for compassionate release must be
presented to the [BOP] before they are litigated in the federal courts.”). Although
Rodriguez technically initiated the administrative process by filing a new request with the
warden at Duluth FPC, this request cannot serve as the basis for his current motion. To
comply with § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s requirements, Rodriguez must “exhaust his administrative
remedies with the BOP before seeking relief in the district court.” Keller, 2 F.4th at 1281
(emphasis in original). However, in commencing the administrative process with his
September 2025 request, Rodriguez has now sought relief in district court before
exhausting any administrative remedies.3 Thus, even if the current proceedings were
stayed, the government still has a valid objection that Rodriguez did not comply with the
statute’s requirements.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Rodriguez’s request for stay of proceedings. 4
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Rodriguez’s motion for
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 23, 2026
3 Rodriguez’s conduct in filing a new administrative request also undermines the
argument that his September 18, 2023 request should serve as the predicate for his
current motion. See Keller, 2 F.4th at 1283.
4 Should Rodriguez fully exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to § 3582(c), the
Court invites him to file a renewed motion.
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