Lopez v. Ronneberg et al

4:24-cv-04212Cand24 de nov. de 2025

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United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ANDREW LOPEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
RONNEBERG, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 24-cv-04212-HSG
ORDER OF PARTIAL SERVICE
Plaintiff, an inmate currently at San Quentin Rehabilitation Center (“SQRC”), has filed a
pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In this order, the Court screens Plaintiff’s complaint
(Dkt. No. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff has paid the filing fee. Dkt. No. 5.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks
redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims
that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),
(2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See United States v. Qazi, 975 F.3d
989, 993 (9th Cir. 2020).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not
necessary; the statement need only “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted).
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While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009).
A pleading that offers only labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement does not suffice. Id.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a
right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged
violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
B. Complaint
In Section II of the complaint, the following SQRC correctional officials are named as
defendants: segreants Ronnenberg and Real; lieutenant Campbell; correctional officers Alvarado
and Morales who were assigned to the SQRC gym; correctional officer Michael who was assigned
to the SQRC “Mack Shack;” and correctional officers Dotts, Burns, and Malikian, who were
assigned to SQRC Badger Unit. Dkt. No. 4 at 2. In the body of the complaint, Plaintiff identifies
two additional defendants: Investigative Services Unit officer Pushilk and sergeant Giacomozzi.
As detailed below, the complaint alleges that Defendants retaliated against him on seven
different occasions, and that defendants Malikian, Alvarado, and Morales were deliberately
indifferent to him when defendants Alvarado and Morales moved the microwave and refrigerator
to the gym loft and when defendant Malikian moved him to a fifth floor cell. Plaintiff also alleges
that these acts of retaliation and deliberate indifference violated California’s Bane Act.
July 7, 2021 – defendant Ronnenberg. On May 4, 2021, Plaintiff was transferred from
Pelican Bay State Prison to SQRC. On July 7, 2021, defendant Ronnenberg called Plaintiff to the
unit officer’s desk, referred to Plaintiff as “the Lopez that filed 19 complaints against Officer Lee
in Pelican Bay,” and then told Plaintiff, “We won’t be having that shit here! We won’t be having
that 602 filing shit! You got that!?” In late 2022, Defendant Ronnenberg transferred away from
SQRC, presumably to another correctional facility.
April 8, 2021 – defendant Michael. On April 8, 2021, Plaintiff was on his way to his job
when defendant Michael began loudly “disrespecting” Plaintiff. When Plaintiff told the nurse
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standing next to defendant Michael that he would call the nurse as a witness, defendant Michael
told the nurse, “Now he’s gonna 602 me for being racist.” Defendant Michael then retaliated
against Plaintiff by summoning Plaintiff to the Mack Shack for a search. Defendant Michael
roughly searched Plaintiff and told him “Line up with the rest of the idiots, I got plenty of 602s
against me – nothing ever happens, you think you’re tough.”
September 2021 to October 2022 – defendants Morales and Alvarado. Plaintiff was
assigned to work as a clerk in the SQRC gymnasium. Plaintiff chose to work at a ground floor
desk because he has a spinal/nerve condition that makes it painful to climb stairs. There is a
microwave on the ground floor that Plaintiff used daily to make coffee and meals. Defendant
Morales created a hostile work environment for Plaintiff because defendant Morales lacks social
skills. In retaliation for Plaintiff trying to reason with defendant Morales, defendant Morales
(1) prohibited Plaintiff from using the stationary bike despite Plaintiff receiving authorization
from the SQRC gym coach, (2) prohibited Plaintiff from washing his clothes at work; (3) moved
the microwave to the gym loft; (4) would not allow Plaintiff to make phone calls from the inmate
gym phones yet allowed other inmates to make calls from the phone in the gym loft; (5) removed
Plaintiff’s book shelves; and (6) moved the refrigerator to the gym loft; and both defendants
Morales and Alvarado replaced the good chairs in Plaintiff’s work area with broken chairs and
allowed theft of Plaintiff’s work fan. On August 29, 2022, defendant Alvarado told other inmates
that the reason the microwave had been taken was because Plaintiff had filed a grievance.
August 19, 2022 – defendant Malikian. On August 17, 2022, Plaintiff submitted a
reasonable accommodation request, requesting that the microwave and refrigerator be moved back
to the ground floor so that he could access them. On August 19, 2022, defendant Malikian
ordered Plaintiff to move from his first floor cell to a fifth floor cell. Plaintiff protested the move,
stating that he had serious spinal related injuries and that climbing stairs would cause him severe
and unnecessary pain. A fifth floor cell requires Plaintiff to ascend and descend stairs between
four to nine times a day (breakfast, work, shower, dinner, phone, appeal interviews, COVID tests,
visits, legal mail pickup, etc.). Defendant Malikian responded, “Move or get a writeup,” knowing
that a writeup would affect Plaintiff’s parole chances. On August 29, 2022, defendant Alvarado
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told other inmates that the reason Plaintiff had been moved to the fifth floor was because Plaintiff
had filed a grievance.
October 6, 2022 – defendant Dotts. On October 6, 2022, defendant Dotts denied Plaintiff
his shower. When Plaintiff threatened to file a grievance, defendant Dotts said “Since you’re
gonna 602 me – I’m gonna write you up.”
November 3, 2022 – defendants Dotts and Real. On November 3, 2022, when Plaintiff
went to sign up for his worker call, defendant Dotts yelled at him: “Oh, it’s you, the guy [who’s]
602ing me. You ain’t getting shit! Get the fuck out of here! Get your ass to work! You ain’t
getting a call.” Defendant Real did not discipline defendant Dotts, or otherwise address defendant
Dotts’ retaliatory behavior. Defendant Real refused to let Plaintiff make his worker call. Plaintiff
asked defendant Real, “I’m not getting my worker call? But all other workers are getting theirs –
this is because of my 602?” Defendant Real responded, “Yes.”
September 2023 to February 2024 – defendants Burns, Campbell, Pushlik,
Giocomazzi. In late September 2023, defendant Burns harassed Plaintiff on two separate
occasions as follows. After cell doors were locked and Plaintiff was in bed, defendant Burns
summoned Plaintiff out of bed to report to the front of the cell for no reason. The first time,
defendant Burns asked Plaintiff about a blanket hanging on the outside tier bars of another cell,
asking “What’s this.” Plaintiff responded, “I don’t know. My cellie and I don’t do that,” meaning
that Plaintiff and his cellie do not hang stuff on the bars. The second time, defendant Burns
simply stared at Plaintiff for ten seconds. Plaintiff turned to return to his bed, and defendant Burns
commented, “Nice boxers.” On October 4, 2024, defendant Burns again summoned Plaintiff to
the cell front. Plaintiff felt harassed and told defendant Burns that he was aware that defendant
Burns had been kicked out of Alpine Unit and H Unit for harassing minorities, and Plaintiff would
not tolerate defendant Burns’ harassment and would be filing a grievance against defendant Burns.
The same day, defendant Burns “(allegedly) rough drafted a disciplinary against [Plaintiff],
charging that [Plaintiff] obstructed a peace officer in performance of their duty[ . . . specifically
that] Plaintiff had a sheet covering the entire side of his bed, obstructing [defendant Burns’] view
of [Plaintiff].” This disciplinary report was false and was in retaliation for Plaintiff stating his
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intent to file a grievance regarding defendant Burns’ harassment. Defendant Campbell served as
hearing officer on the disciplinary writeup. Plaintiff escorted defendant Campbell to his cell to
show that defendant Burns’ allegation was false. There is a barrier on Plaintiff’s bunk that
prevents him from hanging things from the bunk. Upon seeing that the allegation was false,
defendant Campbell looked around the cell and changed the violation to having too much
property. When Plaintiff attempted to redirect defendant Campbell to the falsity of defendant
Burns’ allegation, defendant Campbell told Plaintiff that she was doing Plaintiff a favor by
reducing the charge from “disrespect” to “administrative.” The reviewing chief disciplinary
officer found no disrespect. Plaintiff appealed the disciplinary writeup and defendant Campbell’s
actions. On February 21, 2024, defendant Pushilk came to Plaintiff’s cell to take pictures of
Plaintiff’s property for defendant Campbell. Defendant Pushilk refused to photograph the barrier
on Plaintiff’s bunk. On March 1, 2024, defendant Giacomozzi told Plaintiff that defendant
Campbell wanted Plaintiff’s property reduced or Plaintiff would receive a disciplinary write-up.
Plaintiff asked defendant Giacomozzi, “Only me?” and defendant Giacomozzi responded, “For
now.” On March 6, 2024, defendant Giacomozzi issued Plaintiff a CDCR 128-B, informing that
Plaintiff that if he did not downsize his property, he would receive a disciplinary writeup. On
March 13, 2024, defendant Giacomozzi visited Plaintiff’s cell to ensure that Plaintiff had
downsized his property. No other inmates were directed to downsize their property despite many
inmates having more property than Plaintiff.
The complaint seeks the following relief: declaratory relief, compensatory and punitive
damages; fees and costs; and injunctive relief, including but not limited to enforcement of the rule
of spoliation, specifically that CDCR should indefinitely retain all recordings related to his claims,
including but not limited to audio, video, and phone related records and data.
C. Order of Partial Service
Liberally construed, the complaint states a cognizable First Amendment retaliation claim
against defendant Ronnenberg for his comments on July 7, 2021; against defendant Michael for
searching Plaintiff on April 8, 2021 after Plaintiff stated that he would file a grievance against
defendant Michael for disrespecting him; against defendants Morales and Alvarado for moving the
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microwave to the gym loft because Plaintiff filed a grievance; against defendant Malikian for
moving Plaintiff to the fifth floor on August 19, 2022, for filing a grievance; against defendant
Dotts for, on October 6, 2022, telling Plaintiff that he would issue Plaintiff a disciplinary violation
because Plaintiff was going to file a grievance on him; against defendant Real for denying Plaintiff
his worker call on November 3, 2022 because of his grievance activity; and against defendant
Burns for issuing Plaintiff a disciplinary writeup on October 4, 2023, in response to Plaintiff
stating that he would file a grievance against defendant Burns for harassment. Rhodes v.
Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Within the prison context, a viable claim of
First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took
some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and
that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action
did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.”) (footnote omitted).1
However, the First Amendment retaliation claims violate the joinder rule set forth in Fed.
R. Civ. Proc. 20(a)(2). Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) provides that all persons “may be joined in one
action as defendants if: (A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the
alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will
arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). The upshot of these rules is that “multiple claims
against a single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with
unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).
Whether defendant Ronnenberg engaged in retaliatory behavior is a legal and factual question
independent of whether the other defendants engaged in retaliatory behavior. The alleged
retaliation by the other correctional officials was in response to different incidents, and therefore
did not arise out of the same series of transactions or occurrences. Defendant Ronnenberg
allegedly retaliated for Plaintiff’s July 7, 2021 comments, whereas defendant Michael allegedly
1 The complaint does not state a First Amendment retaliation claim against defendants Campbell,
Pushilk, or Giacomozzi because there is no allegation that defendants Campbell, Pushilk, or
Giacomozzi acted because of Plaintiff’s protected activity.
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retaliated for comments made prior to the April 8, 2021 search, and defendants Morales and
Alvarado allegedly retaliated for a grievance that was filed. The alleged retaliatory acts arise out
of separate occurrences. Accordingly, the Court SERVES the claim against defendant
Ronnenberg, and DISMISSES the claims against the remaining defendants. This dismissal is
without prejudice to Plaintiff filing separate civil rights actions raising his claims against the
remaining correctional officers. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue his claims against the other
correctional officers, the Court offers the following guidance. As directed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 20,
in each action, a plaintiff should only sue regarding one transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences, and should only name as defendants the individuals involved in the
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.
The complaint fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against defendants Alvarado and
Morales for moving the microwave and refrigerator to the gym loft or against defendant Malikian
for moving Plaintiff to a fifth floor cell. A prison official is deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s
serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment if he knows that a prisoner faces a
substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate
it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The prison official must not only “be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but
he “must also draw the inference.” Id. A claim of medical malpractice or negligence is
insufficient to make out a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Toguchi, 391 F.3d. at 1060. The
Court DISMISSES the Eighth Amendment claim against defendants Alvarado and Morales
because Plaintiff’s inability to use the microwave and refrigerator did not expose him to a
substantial risk of serious harm. The Court dismisses this claim with prejudice because
amendment would be futile. The Court DISMISSES the Eighth Amendment claim against
defendant Malikian because housing Plaintiff on a non-ground floor cell did not expose him to
substantial risk of serious harm. There is no allegation that prison doctors or administration have
determined that Plaintiff has a medical need to be housed on the first floor. The fact that Plaintiff
finds it painful to ascend and descend stairs does not establish that he faced a serious risk of
substantial harm by not being housed on the first floor, and does not establish that defendant
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Malikian was aware that Plaintiff faced a serious risk of substantial harm by not being housed on
the first floor. Although it is possible that the deficiency in this Eighth Amendment claim against
defendant Malikian could be cured, this claim also violates Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)’s joinder
requirement. This action is proceeding on the retaliation claim against defendant Ronnenberg.
The Eighth Amendment claim against defendant Malikian does not arise out of the same incident
as the First Amendment retaliation claim against defendant Ronnenberg, and the two claims do not
have a common question of law or fact. This dismissal of this Eighth Amendment claim against
defendant Malikian is without prejudice to Plaintiff filing a separate civil rights action raising this
claim and correcting the identified deficiency.
The Court DISMISSES with prejudice Plaintiff’s Bane Act claims. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1,
known as the Bane Act, “protects individuals from conduct aimed at interfering with rights that are
secured by federal or state law, where the interference is carried out ‘by threats, intimidation or
coercion.’” Reese v. Cty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2018). The elements of a
Bane Act claim are: (1) the defendant interfered with or attempted to interfere with the plaintiff’s
constitutional or statutory right by threatening or committing violent acts; (2) the plaintiff
reasonably believed that if he exercised his constitutional right the defendant would commit
violence against him; (3) the defendant injured the plaintiff to prevent him from exercising his
constitutional right; (4) the plaintiff was harmed; and (5) the defendant’s actions were a substantial
factor in causing the plaintiff's harm. Austin B. v. Escondido Union Sch. Dist., 149 Cal. App. 4th
860, 882 (2007) (citing California’s model Bane Act instruction, CACI Instruction No. 3066).
Here, there is no allegation that defendant Ronnenberg threatened or committed violent acts or that
defendant Ronnenberg injured Plaintiff.
The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief as vague, as it is unclear
what injunctive action is sought. Moreover, defendant Ronnenberg is no longer a correctional
officer at SQRC, meaning that any request for injunctive relief regarding defendant Ronnenberg
would likely be moot. The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s request for compensatory damages as
Plaintiff has not suffered a physical injury. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (PLRA provides that prisoners
may recover for mental or emotional injuries suffered while incarcerated only if they first show
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physical injury).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court orders as follows.
1. The following defendant(s) shall be served: former San Quentin Rehabilitation
Center sergeant Ronnenberg.
2. Service on the listed defendant(s) shall proceed under the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (“CDCR”) e-service program for civil rights cases from prisoners
in the CDCR’s custody. In accordance with the program, the Clerk is directed to serve on the
CDCR via email at CDCR_OLA_Service_of_Process@cdcr.ca.gov the following documents: the
operative complaint (Dkt. No. 4), this order of service, a CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver form
and a summons. The Clerk also shall serve a copy of this order on the Plaintiff.
No later than 40 days after service of this order via email on the CDCR, the CDCR shall
provide the court a completed CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver advising the court which
defendant(s) listed in this order will be waiving service of process without the need for service by
the United States Marshal Service (“USMS”) and which defendant(s) decline to waive service or
could not be reached. The CDCR also shall provide a copy of the CDCR Report of E-Service
Waiver to the California Attorney General’s Office which, within 21 days, shall file with the Court
a waiver of service of process for the defendant(s) who are waiving service.
Upon receipt of the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver, the Clerk shall prepare for each
defendant who has not waived service according to the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver a
USM-205 Form. The Clerk shall provide to the USMS the completed USM-205 forms and copies
of this order, the summons, and the operative complaint for service upon each defendant who has
not waived service. The Clerk also shall provide to the USMS a copy of the CDCR Report of E-
Service Waiver.
The Court DISMISSES the remaining defendants from this action without prejudice to
Plaintiff filing separate civil rights actions raising his claims against these correctional officers.
The Clerk is directed to TERMINATE from this action the following defendants: segreant Real;
lieutenant Campbell; correctional officers Alvarado, Morales, Michael, Dotts, Burns, and
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Malikian; and Investigative Services Unit officer Pushilk and sergeant Giacomozzi. The Clerk is
directed to send Plaintiff two copies of the Court’s civil rights complaint form.
3. The Court DISMISSES with prejudice the Eighth Amendment claim against
defendants Alvardo and Morales and the Bane Act claim against all Defendants.
4. As detailed above, the complaint states a cognizable First Amendment retaliation
claim against defendant former San Quentin Rehabilitation Center sergeant Ronnenberg.
5. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows:
a. No later than 91 days from the date this order is filed, Defendant must file
and serve a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. If Defendant is of the
opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, Defendant must so inform the
Court prior to the date the motion is due. A motion for summary judgment also must be
accompanied by a Rand notice so that Plaintiff will have fair, timely, and adequate notice of what
is required of him in order to oppose the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir.
2012) (notice requirement set out in Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998), must be
served concurrently with motion for summary judgment).2
b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive motion
must be filed with the Court and served upon Defendant no later than 28 days from the date the
motion is filed. Plaintiff must bear in mind the notice and warning regarding summary judgment
provided later in this order as he prepares his opposition to any motion for summary judgment.
Defendant shall file a reply brief no later than 14 days after the date the opposition is filed. The
motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No hearing will be held on
the motion.
6. Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you must
2 If Defendant(s) assert(s) that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as
required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), Defendant(s) must raise such argument in a motion for
summary judgment, pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th
Cir. 2014) (en banc) (overruling Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), which
held that failure to exhaust available administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, should be raised by a defendant as an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion).
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do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be
granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact – that is, if there is no real dispute about
any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing
makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn
testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out
specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents,
as provided in Rule 56(c), that contradict the facts shown in the defendants’ declarations and
documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit
your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you.
If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand v.
Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962–63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (App. A). (The Rand notice above does
not excuse Defendants’ obligation to serve said notice again concurrently with a motion for
summary judgment. Woods, 684 F.3d at 939).
7. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be served on Defendant’s
counsel by mailing a true copy of the document to Defendant’s counsel. The Court may disregard
any document which a party files but fails to send a copy of to his opponent. Until Defendants’
counsel has been designated, Plaintiff may mail a true copy of the document directly to Defendant
but once Defendant is represented by counsel, all documents must be mailed to counsel rather than
directly to Defendant.
8. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16 is required
before the parties may conduct discovery.
9. Plaintiff is responsible for prosecuting this case. Plaintiff must promptly keep the
Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely
fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Plaintiff must file a notice of change of address in every
pending case every time he is moved to a new facility.
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Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than the deadline sought to be
extended and must be accompanied by a showing of good cause. Plaintiff is cautioned that he
must include the case name and case number for this case on any document he submits to the
Court for consideration in this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 24, 2025
______________________________________
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
United States District Judge
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