Lopez v. County of San Joaquin et al

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
----oo0oo----
EMMANUEL LOPEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, a
California municipal
corporation; CITY OF STOCKTON, a
California municipal
corporation; PETER DEVENCENZI;
GENEVIEVE VALLOTTON, PHIRUN VAR,
Defendants.
No. 2:25-cv-01792 WBS CSK
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
----oo0oo----
This action originated from a series of gang-related
shootings between September and December 2015 in Stockton,
California. (Docket No. 1 (“Compl.”) at 4.) Plaintiff Emmanuel
Lopez is an individual and resident of Los Angeles County,
California. (Id. at 2.) Defendants Peter Devencenzi and
Genevieve Vallotton were, at the times relevant to this action,
prosecutors for the County of San Joaquin. (Id. at 3.)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2
Defendant Phirun Var was, at the times relevant to this action, a
police officer of the Stockton Police Department. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that defendants knew that he did not
commit any of the crimes that occurred during these shootings.
(Id. at 4-5.) Yet, plaintiff claims, that did not deter them
from attempting to indict him via grand jury by violating his
constitutional rights. (Id. at 5.)
Specifically, plaintiff brings the following claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”): (1) a claim against
Devencenzi and Vallotton for failing to disclose exculpatory
evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963);
(2) a claim against all defendants for conspiring to deprive him
of his constitutional rights as established by Brady; (3) a claim
against Devencenzi and Vallotton for utilizing unreliable
eyewitness identifications in violation of Manson v. Braithwaite,
432 U.S. 98 (1967) and Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); (4)
a claim against Devencenzi and Vallotton for conspiring to
deprive him of his constitutional rights as established by
Manson/Biggers; (5) a claim against all defendants for conspiring
to deprive him of his constitutional right to not have false
evidence used against him; and (6) a claim against the City of
Stockton (the “City”) for failing to adequately train, supervise,
and control its officers regarding the investigation and
questioning of eyewitnesses and duty to disclose exculpatory
information1. (See generally Compl.)
1 At oral argument and in their briefs, the parties
disputed whether plaintiff alleged his Monell claim against the
County of San Joaquin or the City of Stockton. The complaint
unambiguously provides that the Monell claim is brought against

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
3
Defendants now move to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint.
(Docket Nos. 8, 8-1.)
I. Motion to Dismiss
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows for
dismissal when the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
The inquiry before the court is whether, accepting the
allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, the complaint has stated “a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id.
An affirmative defense may be raised by motion to
dismiss when “the defense raises no disputed issues of fact.”
Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984). “In
other words, dismissal based on an affirmative defense is
permitted when the complaint establishes the defense.” U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Monex Credit Co., 931 F.3d
966, 973 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasis in original).
Correspondingly, “a complaint that otherwise states a claim” may
be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) “[o]nly when the plaintiff
the City (see Compl. at 15-16), so the court construes the claim
as such. See Steen v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 609 F. Supp. 3d 1066,
1071 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (courts are “generally limited to the
pleadings” when deciding a motion to dismiss). Since the City
has not moved to dismiss this claim, the court does not address
it.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
4
pleads itself out of court—that is, admits all the ingredients of
an impenetrable defense.” Jensen v. Brown, 131 F.4th 677, 691
(9th Cir. 2025) (citation modified).
II. Claims Against Devencenzi and Vallotton
The parties dispute multiple aspects of plaintiff’s
claims against Devencenzi and Vallotton, including whether a
Brady violation could have occurred absent plaintiff being
convicted at trial; whether plaintiff’s right to a fair trial
under Manson/Biggers could have been violated by the usage of
allegedly unreliable eyewitness identifications absent a trial;
whether Devencenzi fabricated evidence to be used against
plaintiff; and whether Devencenzi and Vallotton are entitled to
absolute immunity.2 (See generally Docket Nos. 8-1, 12, 14.)
Because the court finds that Devencenzi and Vallotton
are entitled to absolute immunity, it need not address the
remainder of the parties’ dispute regarding these claims. See,
e.g., Peterson v. Sutter Med. Found., 615 F. Supp. 3d 1097, 1107
(N.D. Cal. 2022), aff'd, No. 23-2911, 2025 WL 1823959 (9th Cir.
July 2, 2025) (because defendants “[we]re entitled to
prosecutorial or quasi-judicial immunity,” there was “no need to
address the adequacy of the claims” against them).
Absolute immunity “appl[ies] with full force” to
actions of prosecutors that are “intimately associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
2 In his opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss,
plaintiff argues that Devencenzi and Vallotton are not entitled
to qualified immunity, either. (See Docket No. 12 at 17-18.)
But plaintiff does not cite a single case in which a prosecutor
was found to not be protected by qualified immunity for their
conduct before a grand jury. (See id.)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
5
U.S. 409, 430 (1976). These actions include ones undertaken “in
pre paring for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for
trial, and which occur in the course of [the prosecutor’s] role
as an advocate for the State,” such as the assembly and
presentation of evidence “before a grand jury after a decision to
seek an indictment has been made.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509
U.S. 259, 273 (1993).
“Intent should play no role in the immunity analysis.”
Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F. 2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc);
see also Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427 (acknowledging that absolute
prosecutorial immunity could “leave the genuinely wronged
defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose
malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty.”). As
such, the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have found that
absolute immunity shields prosecutors who knowingly use false
testimony and suppress exculpatory evidence at trial, Imbler, 424
U.S. at 431; conspire with a judge to “predetermine the outcome
of a judicial proceeding,” Ashelman, 793 F. 2d at 1078; and
evaluate a witness in a manner that is “harsh, unfair or clouded
by personal animus,” Roe v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 109
F.3d 578, 584 (9th Cir. 1997).
Devencenzi and Vallotton’s actions are covered by
absolute immunity, regardless of the intent governing them, see
Ashelman, 793 F. 2d at 1078. Regarding whether Devencenzi and
Vallotton failed to disclose exculpatory evidence and knowingly
used false testimony, the Ninth Circuit has established that
absolute immunity extends to “the knowing use of false testimony
at trial” and “the suppression of exculpatory evidence.”

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
6
Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2001); see also
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431. This immunity applies equally to such
conduct when undertaken before a grand jury. See Herb Hallman
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Nash-Holmes, 169 F.3d 636, 643 (9th Cir. 1999)
(citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490 n.6 (1991)). As for
whether these defendants conducted eyewitness identifications
tainted by improper suggestion or influence, although this
“alleged conduct was performed out of court, said conduct was
nevertheless in preparation for the criminal proceedings against
[plaintiff]” and therefore entitled to absolute immunity. Pierre
v. Treasury Dep't, No. 18-cv-3443 JLL, 2018 WL 5801549, at *8
(D.N.J. Nov. 5, 2018) (citing Burns, 500 U.S. at 485); see also
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 272 (“[A]cts undertaken by a prosecutor in
preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for
trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate
for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute
immunity.”).
Accordingly, the court will dismiss plaintiff’s claims
against Devencenzi and Vallotton.3
III. Conspiracy Claims
Plaintiff brings three conspiracy claims against
various defendants. (See Compl. at 11-15.) “To state a claim
for conspiracy to violate one’s constitutional rights under §
3 Plaintiff also appears to bring claims one and three
against the County. (See Compl. at 9, 12.) But plaintiff has
not offered any theory under which the County may be held liable
for the actions of Devencenzi and Vallotton or any other theory
for why the County may be held liable under these claims.
Accordingly, the court will dismiss claims one and three against
the County, too.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
7
1983, the plaintiff must state specific facts to support the
existence of the claimed conspiracy.” Burns v. Cnty. of King,
883 F. 2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989). This includes, among other
things, “alleg[ing] facts with sufficient particularity to show
an agreement or a meeting of the minds to violate the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.” Davis v. Powell, 901 F. Supp. 2d 1196,
1217 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (collecting Ninth Circuit cases).
Plaintiff’s allegations for his conspiracy claims do
little but recite the elements of a conspiracy under Section
1983. (See Compl. at 11-15.) Indeed, these allegations are
devoid of any facts demonstrating a “meeting of the minds to
violate [his] constitutional rights.” Davis, 901 F. Supp. 2d at
1217. Accordingly, because “[v]ague and conclusory allegations
of official participation in civil rights violations are not
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss,” the court will
dismiss plaintiff’s conspiracy claims. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
III. Conclusion
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to
dismiss (Docket No. 8-1) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.
Counts I, II, III, IV, and V are DISMISSED as against defendants
Devencenzi, Vallotton, and the County.
Plaintiff has twenty-one (21) days from the date of
this Order to file an amended complaint if he can do so
consistent with this Order.
Dated: December 9, 2025