(HC) Uulu v. Warden of the Golden State Annex Detention Facility et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
----oo0oo----
KANATBEK ALMAZBEK UULU,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN, ET AL.,
Respondents.
No. 1:25-cv-01812-WBS-CKD
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
----oo0oo----
Petitioner, a citizen of Kyrgyzstan, entered the United
States unlawfully on December 24, 2024, was stopped by border
officials and taken into custody, and has since been detained.
(See Docket No. 1 at 5-7.) 	Upon his arrival to the United
States, petitioner also raised an asylum claim that is currently
pending. 	(See Docket No. 14 at 1.)
On February 2, 2026, petitioner filed the instant
motion for temporary restraining order, in which he argues that
his continued detention violates the protections conferred by the

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Due Process Clause. 	(See Docket No. 12.) 	The court held oral
argument in the matter on February 12, 2026. 	(See Docket No.
18.)
Standard for Temporary Restraining Order
“The standard for a [temporary restraining order] is
the same as for a preliminary injunction.” 	Rovio Entm't Ltd. v.
Royal Plush Toys, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1092 (N.D. Cal.
2012) (citing Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co.,
240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001)). 	Typically, “[a]
plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he
is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the
balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is
in the public interest.” 	Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 	The last two factors “merge when the
Government is the opposing party.” 	Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418,
435 (2009).
Likelihood of success on the merits is “the most
important factor in determining whether a preliminary injunction
is warranted.” 	Garcia v. County of Alameda, 150 F. 4th 1224,
1230 (9th Cir. 2025) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). 	“[P]laintiffs seeking a preliminary injunction face a
difficult task in proving that they are entitled to this
extraordinary remedy.” 	Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton, 626 F.3d
462, 469 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation omitted). 	A mere
possibility of success is insufficient to satisfy this factor;
instead, a petitioner must demonstrate “a strong likelihood of

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success on the merits.” 	Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 408
F. 3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2005).
The court wishes to clarify once more that the proper
test to apply here is the Winter test, not the so-called “serious
questions” test, under which a petitioner may be awarded a
preliminary injunction if they demonstrate “serious questions
going to the merits” and a “hardship balance that tips sharply
towards [them],” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632
F. 3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011).
In Winter, the Supreme Court set forth a four-part test
for determining when the grant of a preliminary injunction is
warranted. 	See 555 U.S. at 20. 	Three years later, despite the
Supreme Court’s admonition, the Ninth Circuit held that the
“serious questions” test survived Winter. 	See Cottrell, 632 F.
3d at 1131-32. 	But just last year, the Supreme Court went back
and held that, “absent a clear command from Congress, courts must
adhere to the traditional four-factor test” for granting a
preliminary injunction articulated in Winter. 	Starbucks Corp. v.
McKinney, 602 U.S. 339, 346 (2024). 	Thus, although the Ninth
Circuit has not directly confronted the continued viability of
the “serious questions” test post-Starbucks, the Supreme Court’s
command is clear: 	because there is no “clear command from
Congress” to the contrary, the “serious questions” test may not
be used. 	See id.
Moreover, even assuming that the “serious questions”
test remains viable after Winter and Starbucks, it would
nevertheless be inapplicable here, where petitioner is seeking a

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mandatory injunction.
“A mandatory injunction orders a responsible party to
take action.” 	Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH &
Co., 571 F. 3d 873, 878-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted). 	It is subject to a “doubly
demanding” standard and requires the moving party to “establish
that the law and facts clearly favor [his] position, not simply
that []he is likely to succeed.” 	Garcia v. Google, Inc., 796 F.
3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original). 	“In plain
terms, mandatory injunctions should not issue in doubtful
cases.” 	Id. (citation omitted).
Other judges in this circuit have found that the
serious questions test is inapplicable when a petitioner seeks a
mandatory injunction. 	See, e.g., Cruz Uitz v. Noem, No. cv-25-
06420 MWF (AJRX), 2025 WL 2995008 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025)
(declining to adopt the serious questions test in immigration
detention context because a mandatory injunction was
requested); Jamgotchian v. Ferraro, No. 822-cv-01893 FWS KES,
2023 WL 2396352, at *3 n.3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2023) (“The Court
observes that some district courts decline to apply the ‘serious
questions’ test in cases seeking a mandatory injunction on the
basis that it is inconsistent with the heightened standard
applicable to such relief.”) (collecting cases), rev’d on other
grounds, 93 F. 4th 1150.
Here, petitioner asks the court to order his release
from custody or that respondents afford him a bond
hearing. (Docket No. 12 at 2.) 	In similar circumstances, courts

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have acknowledged that “direct[ing] the government to
affirmatively hold new hearings it would not otherwise have held”
may constitute a mandatory injunction. 	Hernandez v. Sessions,
872 F. 3d 976, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Doe v. Becerra,
787 F. Supp 3d 1083, 1090 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (acknowledging
uncertainty regarding whether custody release and bond hearing
requests in the immigration detention context may constitute a
mandatory injunction); Salazar v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-cv-01017 JLT
SAB, 2025 WL 2456232, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2025) (same).
The court finds that ordering respondents to release
petitioner or to provide him with a bond hearing that respondents
would not have otherwise provided constitutes a mandatory
injunction. 	Petitioner does not merely seek to “freeze[] the
positions of the parties,” Heckler v. Lopez, 463 U.S. 1328, 1333
(1983); rather, petitioner asks the court to compel respondents
to affirmatively alter the status quo by providing him with
additional procedural protections.
Accordingly, the court declines to apply the “serious
questions” test and therefore analyzes petitioner's motion under
the test articulated in Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.
Background
This case, like the dozens of substantially similar
cases this court has adjudicated in the last few months,
“involves [the] pressing national problem . . . [of] unlawful
aliens residing in our country,” Certain Named & Unnamed Non-
Citizen Child. & Their Parents v. Texas, 448 U.S. 1327, 1331
(1980). 	The Supreme Court has long “noted” the “dimensions” of

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this “problem.” 	I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 223 (1984)
(Powell, J., concurring). 	In 1984, then-recent estimates placed
the number of unlawful noncitizens residing in the United States
between 2 and 12 million, see id.; the government estimates that
number has increased to “at least 15 million people” as of last
year, Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo, 146 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2025) (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring).
Additionally, prior to 1996, “an ‘anomaly’ existed
‘whereby immigrants who were attempting to lawfully enter the
United States were in a worse position than persons who had
crossed the border unlawfully.’” 	Chavez v. Noem, 801 F. Supp. 3d
1133, 1140 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (quoting Torres v. Barr, 976 F. 3d
918, 928 (9th Cir. 2020)). 	Specifically, the provisions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) were structured such that
“non-citizens who had entered without inspection could take
advantage of the greater procedural and substantive rights
afforded in deportation proceedings, while non-citizens who
presented themselves at a port of entry for inspection were
subjected to more summary exclusion proceedings.” 	Hing Sum v.
Holder, 602 F.3d 1092, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010).
Against this troubled backdrop, Congress enacted the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of
1996 (“IIRIRA”). 	See Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (Sept.
30, 1996). 	IIRIRA “substantially amended the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 (‘INA’) and established a new summary
removal process for adjudicating the claims of aliens who arrive
in the United States without proper documentation.” 	Smith v.

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U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 785 F. Supp. 2d 962, 965 (W.D. Wash.
2011), aff'd, 741 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted).
Relevant here, IIRIRA provides that “[a]n alien present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the
United States . . . shall be deemed . . . an applicant for
admission,” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), and that such “applicant[s]
for admission” are subject to mandatory detention, id. §
(b)(2)(A). 	Thus, among other things, “IIRIRA amended the INA to
make admission, not entry, the relevant criterion for removal
procedures,” Garibay-Robledo v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-177-H, 2025 WL
3264482, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2025), putting an end to the
above-described “anomaly,” Chavez, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 1140.
“For many years” after the enactment of IIRIRA, “the
understanding — shared by the Executive and the Supreme Court —
was that [8 U.S.C. §] 1226, not [8 U.S.C. §] 1225, governed
immigration arrests conducted within the interior of the United
States.” 	Bernal v. Albarran, No. 25-cv-09772 RS, 2025 WL
3281422, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025). 	The government
endeavored to correct this understanding on July 8, 2025, when
the Departments of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and Justice issued a
policy memorandum “requiring all ‘applicants for admission’ . . .
to be mandatorily detained during removal proceedings pursuant to
[8 U.S.C.] § 1225(b)(2).” 	Garcia v. Noem, --- F. Supp. 3d ----,
2025 WL 2549431, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025) (citation
omitted). 	This memorandum further clarified that such
noncitizens were “ineligible” for “bond hearing[s] before an
immigration judge and may not be released for the duration of

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their removal proceedings absent a parole by DHS.” 	Id. (citation
modified). 	The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)
“subsequently” adopted DHS’ new approach in a “reasoned opinion”
concluding that “the practice of conducting bond hearings for
aliens who entered the United States without inspection was not
supported by the plain language or any reasonable interpretation
of the INA.” 	Liang v. Almodovar, No. 1:25-cv-09322 MKV, 2025 WL
3641512, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2025) (citation modified); see
Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) (BIA
decision).
DHS was entitled to change its interpretation of 8
U.S.C. § 1225 as it did last July. 	Cf. Encino Motorcars, LLC v.
Navarro, 579 U.S. 211, 221 (2016) (“Agencies are free to change
their existing policies as long as they provide a reasoned
explanation for the change.”). 	This change appears to have been
precipitated by circumstances which made it a practical
necessity. 	Approximately two months before issuing the policy
memorandum, DHS noted that a “mass influx of aliens” was
occurring, and that “[w]ithout controls in place . . . 	to stem
the influx,” it would “lose[] its capacity to hold all aliens as
required by the INA.” 	Finding a Mass Influx of Aliens, 90 Fed.
Reg. 13622, 13623 (Mar. 25, 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)).
This influx “present[ed] urgent circumstances requiring an
immediate federal response,” id., and the policy memorandum
issued shortly thereafter served precisely the function called
for by those circumstances.
Statutory Framework

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The court acknowledges at the outset the fluctuating
and complex tangle of issues presented by DHS’ recent shift in
its approach to detention. 	See, e.g., Echevarria v. Bondi, No.
cv-25-03252 PHX DWL (ESW), 2025 WL 2821282 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3,
2025) (noting application of the statutes “as presenting a
complicated and debatable question”); cf. Torres v. Barr, 976 F.
3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2020) (“The complex provisions of the INA
have provoked comparisons to a ‘morass,’ a ‘Gordian knot,’ and
‘King Minos’s labyrinth in ancient Crete.” (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted)).
Here, recent decisions of other judges in the Eastern
District of California have largely rejected the government’s
interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2) as applicable to all
“applicants for admission.” 	See, e.g., Velasquez v. Chestnut,
No. 1:26-cv-00576 DJC JDP, 2026 WL 263363, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb.
2, 2026); Crispin M. C. v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-01487 KES HBK (HC),
2026 WL 70553, at *4-7 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2026); Singh v.
Chestnut, No. 1:26-cv-00330 (HC), 2026 WL 249530, at *2 (E.D.
Cal. Jan. 30, 2026).
Many decisions of district court judges elsewhere have
also reached the conclusion that Section 1226(a), not Section
1225(b), provides the appropriate framework for noncitizens
already residing in the United States. 	See, e.g., Perez v.
Walsh, No. 1:25-cv-14995, 2026 WL 44777 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 2026);
Llanes Tellez v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-08982 PCP, 2025 WL 3677937, at
*8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025); Ambroladze v. Maldonado, No. 26-cv-
0473 (PKC), 2026 WL 295405, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2026).

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The undersigned, however, has repeatedly found that
respondents’ new interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225 comports with
that statute’s plain text, whereas petitioner’s interpretation
(i.e. respondents’ prior interpretation) does not. 	See, e.g.,
J.E.P.M v. WOFFORD, et al., No. 1:26-cv-00316 WBS CKD, 2026 WL
125270, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2026) (collecting this court’s
such cases). 	In a thorough opinion, the only circuit court to
have confronted this issue thus far recently arrived at the same
conclusion. 	See Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, --- F.4th ----,
2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026) (opinion of Jones, J.).
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) requires mandatory detention
of “an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is
not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.”
A neighboring provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1),
clarifies that “[a]n alien present in the United States who has
not been admitted ... shall be deemed for purposes of this Act an
applicant for admission.” 	The term “admission” is in turn
defined “with respect to an alien” as “the lawful entry of the
alien into the United States after inspection and authorization
by an immigration officer.” 	Id. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (emphasis
added). 	The inclusion of the word “lawful” in the foregoing
definition is critical: 	it expressly clarifies that an
individual may only be considered “admitted” to the United States
if their presence therein is with permission.
This definition comports with the plain meaning of the

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word “admit,” which is defined in Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary as
“to allow entry (as to a place, fellowship, or privilege).”
Admit, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/admit (last visited Feb. 3, 2026)
(emphasis added). 	To construe the statute otherwise -- “that the
mandatory detention provision of 1225 categorically does not
apply to aliens who are present in the United States as a result
of their illegal entry into the country” -- would “fl[y] in the
face of defined statutory text” and contravene the plain meaning
of the word “admit.” 	See Chen v. Almodovar, No. 1:25-cv-8350
MKV, 2025 WL 3484855, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2025) (emphasis
added).
By contrast, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) states that “[o]n a
warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested
and detained” pending their final removal decision. 	“Thus, one
express requirement to fall within § 1226(a) — and the critical
one here — is that the alien was arrested on a warrant issued by
the Attorney General.” 	Vargas Lopez, 802 F. Supp. 3d 1132, 1139
(D. Neb. 2025). 	Further, pursuant to the Laken Riley Act (the
“Act”), subsection (c) of 8 U.S.C. § 1226 was amended to mandate
detention for specific categories of noncitizens who have been
charged with certain crimes. 	See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E); Pub.
L. No. 119-1, § 2, 139 Stat. 3, 3 (Jan. 29, 2025) (Laken Riley
Act).
The term “applicant for admission” in 8 U.S.C. § 1225
“functions as a legal designation -- describing an individual's
legal status for purposes of the removal scheme.” 	Alonzo v.

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Noem, No. 1:25-cv-01519 WBS SCR, 2025 WL 3208284, at *4 (E.D.
Cal. Nov. 17, 2025) (collecting cases). 	And petitioner is
subject to this legal designation because he is an “alien,” 8
U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), who is “present in the United States,” id.,
and who “has not been admitted,” id., since his entry into the
United States was not a “lawful entry . . . after inspection and
authorization by an immigration officer,” id. 	§ 1101(a)(13)(A).
See Mejia Olalde v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-00168 JMD, 2025 WL 3131942,
at *3 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025). 	Petitioner may not “elide[]”
this legal designation as an “‘applicant for admission’ merely
because he has already entered the United States.” 	Alonzo, 2025
WL 3208284, at *4; see also Chen, 2025 WL 3484855, at *4 (same
conclusion).
Petitioner argues further that 8 U.S.C. § 1225 is
inapplicable to him now because he was initially released on
parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (see Docket No. 8 at 6). 	This
argument is unavailing because the fact “that prior
Administrations decided to use less than their full enforcement
authority under § 1225(b)[] does not mean they lacked the
authority to do more.” 	Buenrostro-Mendez, 2026 WL 3233330, at
*8. 	“In contrast to past administrations, the current
Administration has chosen to exercise a greater portion of its
authority by treating applicants for admission under the
provision designed to apply to them.” 	Id. at *9.
Petitioner was not “require[d]” to have initially been
released on parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226; he was, in fact,
“prohibit[ed]” from receiving such relief under the proper

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interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225 and therefore cannot “turn back
the clock to a time when such relief was available as a matter of
practice.” 	Martinez v. Villegas, No. 1:25-cv-256-H, 2026 WL
114418, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 15, 2026) (citation modified).
Any reliance to the contrary on Jennings v. Rodriguez,
538 U.S. 281 (2018), is also misplaced. 	Jennings did not declare
unequivocally that 8 U.S.C. § 1225 does not apply in cases such
as petitioner's. 	Rather, the Supreme Court stated that 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2) “serves as a catchall provision that applies to all
applicants for admission not covered by” the more specific
categories of § 1225(b)(1). 	Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287; see also
Vargas Lopez, 802 F. Supp. 3d at 1142 (“The Court concludes that
the plain language of § 1225(b)(2) and the ‘all applicants for
admission’ language of Jennings permit the DHS to detain
[petitioner] under § 1225(b)(2).”) 	Moreover, the Court's
introductory language in Jennings dispenses with any remaining
doubt by clarifying that “an alien who ‘arrives in the United
States,’ or ‘is present’ in this country but ‘has not been
admitted,’ is treated as ‘an applicant for admission.’” 	Id.
This court’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225 also
does not render the Laken Riley Act superfluous. 	First,
“Congress often takes a ‘belt and suspenders’ approach to
legislation.” 	Mejia Olalde, 2025 WL 3131942, at *4 (quoting Atl.
Richfield Co. v. Christian, 590 U.S. 1, 14 n.5 (2020)).
Second, the Laken Riley Act could not have been passed
to affect the application of § 1225, for the simple reason that
the Act was passed before respondents’ current interpretation of

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8 U.S.C. § 1225 was even issued. 	The Act “could not therefore
‘perform the work’ of the [more] expansive reading of Section
1225, because that work had not yet been done.” 	Valencia v.
Chestnut, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3205133, at *4 (E.D. Cal.
Nov. 17, 2025). 	See Buenrostro-Mendez, 2026 WL 323330, at *7
(noting that the Laken Riley Act was passed “at a time when the
Executive was still declining to exercise its full enforcement
authority under the INA”).
Third, and regardless, DHS’ current interpretation of
the phrase “applicant for admission” as it appears in 8 U.S.C. §
1225 does not render the Act superfluous because “[t]he Attorney
General may still exercise her detention discretion under §
1226(a) for any other aliens falling under that subsection who
are not charged with the specific crimes carved out by” the Act.
Chavez, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 1141.
“[A]n administrative agency is permitted to change its
interpretation of a statute, especially where the prior
interpretation is based on error, no matter how longstanding.”
Chisholm v. F.C.C., 538 F.2d 349, 364 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 	For that
matter, “[y]ears of consistent practice cannot vindicate an
interpretation that is inconsistent with a statute's plain text.”
Buenrostro-Mendez, 2026 WL 323330, at *8 (emphasis added).
Rectifying prior error is precisely what occurred here. 	For the
above reasons, the court again concludes that 8 U.S.C. § 1225
applies to petitioner.
Procedural Due Process
Petitioner argues that his ongoing detention, which has

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spanned approximately fourteen months thus far, violates the Due
Process Clause because it has no definite termination point.
(See Docket No. 12 at 6.)
The factual circumstances of petitioner’s detention are
relevant to this claim. 	Since his detention commenced on
December 24, 2024, petitioner has requested that his immigration
court hearings be continued no fewer than nine times. 	(See
Docket No. 14 at 7-8.) 	While some of these requests may be
excused on the grounds that they were made to obtain counsel or a
language interpreter, petitioner nevertheless requested five
continuances over approximately four months to “obtain additional
evidence.” 	(See id. at 7.)
As petitioner observes, and respondents appear to
agree, “[a] statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien
would raise a serious constitutional problem.” 	Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). 	To date, however, every
appellate court to have considered the constitutionality of a
petitioner’s prolonged detention has found that the length of
such detention did not violate the Due Process Clause. 	See G.P.
v. Garland, 103 F. 4th 898, 902 (1st Cir. 2024) (collecting
cases). 	In each of those cases, the length of detention was
significantly longer than petitioner’s detention here. 	See id.
at 899 (detention for approximately four years); Soberanes v.
Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1308 (10th Cir. 2004) (detention for
approximately two years); Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F. 3d 1053,
1056 (9th Cir. 2008) (detention for approximately three years);
Castaneda v. Perry, 95 F. 4th 750, 753 (4th Cir. 2024) (detention

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for approximately five years); Martinez v. Larose, 968 F.3d 555,
558 (6th Cir. 2020) (detention for approximately two-and-a-half
years).
Review of those cases reveals that, to determine if a
petitioner’s detention appears to be indefinite, courts look to
whether: 	(1) the petitioner’s immigration proceedings have been
infected with “bad faith or undue delay by the agency,” G.P., 103
F. 4th at 902; (2) the petitioner’s detention is “directly
associated with a judicial review process that has a definite and
evidently impending termination point,” and is thus “akin to
detention during the administrative review process [that] was
upheld [by the Supreme Court] in Demore v. Kim,” Soberanes, 388
F.3d at 1311; see also Castaneda, 95 F. 4th at 759 (same); and
(3) there is “evidence that [the petitioner] is unremovable
because the destination country will not accept him or his
removal is barred by our own laws,” Prieto-Romero, 534 F. 3d at
1063 (9th Cir. 2008).
The record here does not support that the delays in
petitioner’s immigration proceedings have been either “undue” or
infected by “bad faith.” 	See G.P., 103 F. 4th at 902. 	Rather,
petitioner, by repeatedly requesting continuances to obtain
additional evidence, is responsible for at least four months of
his alleged delay. 	(See Docket No. 14 at 7.) 	Petitioner’s
proceedings before immigration court appear to be moving forward
in due course, as evidenced by the fact that he has a hearing
before that court scheduled for February 25, 2026. 	(See Docket
No. 14 at 8.)

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Further, petitioner’s detention is “directly associated
with [the] judicial review process” of his application for
asylum, and is thus akin to “detention during the administrative
review process, which was upheld [by the Supreme Court] in
Demore v. Kim.” 	Soberanes 388 F.3d at 1311. 	Finally, there is
no evidence that petitioner is stuck in a “‘removable-but-
unreviewable limbo,’” as the petitioners in Zadvydas were.”
Prieto-Romero, 534 F. 3d at 1063. 	To the contrary, although
petitioner’s “detention lacks a certain end date, . . . this
uncertainty alone does not render his detention indefinite in
the sense the Supreme Court found constitutionally problematic
in Zadvydas.” 	Id. (emphasis in original).
For the above reasons, petitioner has failed to
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his
procedural due process claim. 	Thus, the court “need not consider
the other preliminary injunction factors.” 	California v. Azar,
911 F.3d 558, 575 (9th Cir. 2018).
Conclusion
It bears reiterating once more that Congress has given
DHS the very difficult task of ensuring that the millions of
aliens who are unlawfully within the United States are detained
and removed as prescribed by law. 	Indeed, “the Department of
Justice Inspector General found in 1997 that when aliens are
released from custody, nearly 90 percent abscond and are not
removed from the United States,” a “situation” that “exists today
on a much larger scale.” 	Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 2026 WL
323330, at *9 (citation modified). 	It is not the courts’ role to

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“judge the wisdom or desirability” of how DHS remedies that
incongruence. 	Cf. Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319
(1993). 	The methods and procedures by which noncitizens are
detained undoubtedly involve intricate details which the courts
lack the Constitutional authority or practical resources to
dictate.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that petitioner’s motion for
temporary restraining order (Docket No. 12) be, and the same
hereby is, DENIED.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local General
Order No. 262, the case is referred to the assigned magistrate
judge for further proceedings.
Dated: 	February 13, 2026