(HC) Leukhumphan v. Warden of the Golden State Annex Detention Facility et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Petitioner is an immigration detainee proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Petitioner filed the instant petition on December 5, 2025. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner challenges his
continued detention by the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). He claims his
prolonged detention without a bond hearing violates his procedural due process rights under the Fifth
Amendment. He claims he should be immediately released, or alternatively, provided a bond hearing
before an immigration judge (“IJ”) at which the Government must justify his continued detention by
clear and convincing evidence.
For the reasons discussed below, the Court will recommend the petition be dismissed without
prejudice.
ENG LEUKHAMPHAN,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE
ANNEX DETENTION FACILITY, et al.,
Respondents.
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Case No.: 1:25-cv-01750-JLT-SKO (HC)
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO
SUMMARILY DISMISS PETITION
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I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner is an immigration detainee who was detained and placed in custody by the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) on November 13, 2025. (Doc. 1 at 3.) He states he is
currently in removal proceedings. (Doc. 1 at 3-4.)
II. DISCUSSION
A. Summary Dismissal
Habeas corpus petitions are subject to summary dismissal pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. The provisions of Rule 4, which
are applicable to § 2241 petitions under Rule 1(b), provide in pertinent part: “If it plainly appears from
the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the
judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” The Advisory Committee
Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus, either on its
own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the
petition has been filed.
B. Jurisdiction
A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner “is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
“[D]istrict courts retain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas challenges to
immigration detention that are sufficiently independent of the merits of [a] removal order.” Lopez-
Marroquin v. Barr, 955 F.3d 759, 759 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1211–12
(9th Cir. 2011)). Pertinent here, the Supreme Court specifically directed that federal courts have
jurisdiction to review a constitutional challenge to a non-citizen’s detention. See Demore v. Kim, 538
U.S. 510, 517 (2003).
C. Petitioner’s Detention is not Unreasonably Prolonged
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that “[n]o person shall be ... deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” “It is well established that the Fifth Amendment
entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings,” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306
(1993), and “[a] statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional
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problem,” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). The Supreme Court nevertheless has
recognized that “[d]etention during deportation proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of
[the deportation] process.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003); see also Carlson v. Landon, 342
U.S. 524, 538 (1952) (“[d]etention is necessarily a part of this deportation procedure”).
Petitioner states he has been in continuous detention since approximately November 13, 2025.
He contends that the approximately one-month period is prolonged and indefinite, and he should be
given a bond hearing, or in the alternative, released from custody. Petitioner’s short period of
detention to date does not qualify as unreasonably prolonged.
In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that a detention period less than six months is
presumptively reasonable as to aliens detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(6). 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
Beyond that six-month period, the alien must “provide[] good reason to believe that there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 701. As to aliens
detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2), the Supreme Court has held that no such 6-
month time limit is proscribed, whether implicit or explicit. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 300-
01 (2018). In Demore v. Kim, the Supreme Court noted that shorter detention periods during removal
proceedings lasting roughly between a month and a half to five months are a “constitutionally
permissible part of [the removal] process.” 538 U.S. 510, 530 (2003).
Several circuit and district courts have found that unreasonably long detention periods with no
allowance for a bond hearing may violate the due process clause. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Marin
(“Rodriguez IV”), 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018) (the Ninth Circuit asserted “grave doubts that any
statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is constitutional....”); Diop v.
ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 235 (3d Cir. 2011) (detention of an alien for a period of nearly
three years without further inquiry into whether it was necessary to ensure his appearance at the
removal proceedings or to prevent a risk of danger to the community, was unreasonable, and,
therefore, a violation of the Due Process Clause”); German Santos v. Warden Pike, 965 F.3d 203 (3d
Cir. 2020) (reversing and remanding to district court to order bond hearing while detained under §
1226(c)); Diep v. Wofford, 1:24-cv-01238-SKO, 2025 WL 604744 (E.D. Cal Feb. 25, 2025) (ordering
bond hearing for noncitizen detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) for 13 months); A.E. v. Andrews, 1:25-
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cv-00107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025) (ordering bond hearing for
noncitizen detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) for 20 months). However, these cases involved detention
periods substantially longer than 6 months. Here, Petitioner’s short detention period of less than 1
month is well within the 6-month presumptively reasonable period contemplated in Zadvydas and
does not implicate those constitutional concerns. See, e.g., De Oliveira Viegas v. Green, 370 F. Supp.
3d 443, 448–49 (D.N.J. 2019) (“As a general matter, courts in this District have found detention for a
year, or just over a year, insufficient to support an as-applied challenge to a § 1226(c) detention post-
Jennings.”); Muse v. Sessions, 2018 WL 4466052, at *4 (D. Minn. Sept. 18, 2018) (collecting cases
re: the same) (“[a]s detention continues past a year, courts become extremely wary of permitting
continued custody absent a bond hearing”).
The Court finds that Petitioner’s relatively short detention period does not qualify as
unreasonably prolonged as to violate his Fifth Amendment due process rights. Petitioner’s continued
detention, however, may violate due process at some point in the future. At this juncture, however, the
Court finds that Petitioner fails to demonstrate that his less than one-month detention without a bond
hearing constitutes a violation of due process. As previously noted, the Supreme Court has held that
“[d]etention during deportation proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of [the deportation]
process.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 531.
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that the petition be DISMISSED
without prejudice.
This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge
assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local
Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within twenty-
one (21) days after being served with a copy of this Findings and Recommendation, a party may file
written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Id. The document should be
captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation” and shall not exceed
fifteen (15) pages, except by leave of court with good cause shown. The Court will not consider
exhibits attached to the Objections. To the extent a party wishes to refer to any exhibit(s), the party
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should reference the exhibit in the record by its CM/ECF document and page number, when possible,
or otherwise reference the exhibit with specificity. Any pages filed in excess of the fifteen (15) page
limitation may be disregarded by the District Judge when reviewing these Findings and
Recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file
objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v.
Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014). This recommendation is not an order that is
immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule
4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court's
judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 9, 2025 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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