(PC) Porter v. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LARRY JAMES PORTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
L. YANG, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 1:25-cv-00311-JLT-BAM (PC)
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
TO CONDUCT LIMITED DISCOVERY AS
PREMATURE
(ECF No. 18)
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
REGARDING DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN
CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS
(ECF No. 1)
FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE
I. Background
Plaintiff Larry James Porter (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
On November 3, 2025, the Court screened the complaint and found that Plaintiff stated a
cognizable claim against Defendant Sergeant Jane Doe for deliberate indifference to medical need
and conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment and against the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) for violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, but he failed to state any other cognizable claims for relief against any other
defendant. (ECF No. 10.) The Court ordered Plaintiff to either file an amended complaint or
notify the Court of his willingness to proceed only on the cognizable claims identified by the
Court. (Id.) On January 29, 2026, Plaintiff notified the Court that he does not wish to amend his

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complaint and is willing to proceed only on his cognizable claims. (ECF No. 18.)
II. Motion for Limited Discovery
In his January 29, 2026 notice, Plaintiff also requests that the Court either (1) order CDCR
to provide Defendant Sergeant Jane Doe’s name for service; or (2) allow his suit to proceed to
discovery to allow him to secure Defendant Sergeant Jane Doe’s name so she may be served by
the Marshal. (ECF No. 18.) The Court construes Plaintiff’s request as a motion to conduct
limited discovery for the purpose of identifying Defendant Sergeant Jane Doe.
Plaintiff’s motion for discovery is premature and is denied without prejudice. Although
the Court has screened Plaintiff’s complaint and found that it states cognizable claims against
Defendant Sergeant Jane Doe and CDCR, the Court has not yet ordered that this action proceed
on those cognizable claims. If the Court orders that this action proceed on the cognizable claims,
then service on Defendant CDCR will proceed and the Court will set a separate deadline for
Plaintiff to provide the Court with further information as to the identity and location of Defendant
Sergeant Jane Doe. Further, any discovery request directed at another party, such as CDCR, may
be sent after service is ordered and discovery is opened in this case.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to conduct limited discovery, (ECF No. 18), is HEREBY
DENIED, without prejudice, as premature.
III. Findings and Recommendations
A. Screening Requirement and Standard
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous
or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not
required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell

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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as
true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires
sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret
Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully
is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility
standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
B. Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff is currently housed at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego,
California. The events in the complaint are alleged to have occurred while Plaintiff was housed at
California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (“SATF”). Plaintiff names as Defendants: (1) L.
Yang, correctional officer, (2) Jane Doe, correctional ADA Sergeant, (3) California Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). The individual defendants are sued in their
individual and official capacities.
Plaintiff alleges deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and health and safety.
Plaintiff also allege violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, violation of
the Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”) and Cal. Constitution Art. 1, §7(a) equal protection.
Defendant Yang is a correctional officer assigned as Floor Officer #2 in Building #1 in
Facility B. Defendant Yang was responsible for securing and collecting Plaintiff’s personal
property, separating all durable medical equipment (DME) and supplies consistent with 15 CCR §
3999.392 and the ADA as defined by the Armstrong Remedial Plan. Defendant Jane Doe is a
correctional Seargeant assigned to the Restricted Housing Unit (RHU) and the designated ADA
compliance Sergeant. This responsibility is to ensure subordinates and staff comply with
established guidelines regarding disability policies and procedures as required by CDCR and the
Clark and Armstrong Remedial Plan. Defendant Jane Doe was responsible for supervision of
subordinate Defendant L. Yang and for the care and control of Plaintiff’s safety and health.

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The CDCR is legally responsible for its employees’ failure to comply with established
Plans, and policies that allow prisoners with disability to obtain and keep necessary assistive
devices (DMEs and equipment). This includes tracking and investigating and disciplining
employees of CDCR when members of Plaintiff’s class are not receiving access to services,
programs, activities under the Armstrong Remedial Plan and the ADA. Under Title II of the
ADA, CDCR is liable for the vicarious acts of its employees.
The deliberate refusal of Defendants L. Yang and Jane Doe Sergeant to accommodate
Plaintiff’s disability-related needs such as medical care is a denial of the benefits of the prison’s
services and programs or activities, from August 17, 2024 - September 3, 2024. Defendants acted
in accordance with CDCR policy with intentionally discrimination against Plaintiff and CDCR
failed to correct the discriminatory conduct.
Plaintiff alleges compliance with the Government Tort Claims Act.
Medical Needs and Disability
Plaintiff is a permanently disabled state prisoner in the Disability Placement Program
(DPP). Plaintiff’s disability is from severe back injuries while performing his assigned duties in
Vocational Masonry on July 6, 2021. Plaintiff has an Orthopedic, Neurological or medical
condition that substantially limits his ambulation, walking 100 yards and requires a lower bunk
and no stairs.
On January 21, 2024, Plaintiff was afforded disability accommodations, including a cane,
walker, disability vest, pressure reducing mattress, incontinence supplies, among other things.
Plaintiff suffers from hypertension, dry eyes syndrome causing pain, irritation and vison loss, skin
rashes and eczema and incontinent issues. Plaintiff is prescribed various medications for his
conditions. (ECF No. 1 at 16 of 30.) Plaintiff requires uninterrupted medical care and
management to avoid severe complications.
Events
On August 17, 2024, after an unrelated assault on Plaintiff by an inmate, Plaintiff was
reassigned to RHU. Defendant Yang was contacted and directed to collect and secure Plaintiff’s
personal property. Plaintiff contends a discriminatory intent and motive existed to deviate from

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departmental policy. Defendant Yang was assigned to the same building, and is in allegiance and
camaraderie, with a Defendant (O. Rivas) in Plaintiff’s previous lawsuit (1:22-cv-105 KES CDB).
There is a culture existing at SATF to discriminate against those with disabilities. Defendant
Yang had prior knowledge of the previous lawsuit. Other unrelated incidents of hostility and acts
of partisanship towards Plaintiff, infers that Yang made a conscious decision to deprive Plaintiff
of his DME, medical supplies and medications.
Defendant Yang accessed Plaintiff’s DPP disability/accommodation summary through the
department’s strategic offender management systems (SOMS) prior to securing Plaintiff’s
personal property. Yang confiscated Plaintiff’s property and failed to separate and inventory all of
Plaintiff’s DME, medical supplies and medication to determine what Plaintiff would be allowed
to retain, in violation of CDCR policy
Plaintiff continuously complained he needed his DME, medical supplies and medications
but was ignored by staff including Yang. During an 18-day period, when deprived of his
supplies, Plaintiff suffered and had extreme pain, including vomiting, loss of 28 lbs., depression
and anxiety and hypertension, among other things. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 53.) Defendant Yang was
aware, through training provided to employees by the Armstrong Remedial Plan to act in
accordance with the CDCR policy.
Once in RHU after August 20, 2024, Plaintiff was interviewed by Defendant Jane Doe,
ADA Sergeant, compliance Sergeant. During the interview Plaintiff complained that Defendant
Yang deprived Plaintiff of his DME, medical supplies, and mediations on August 17, 2024 and
Plaintiff was in pain and other medical conditions he was feeling. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 60-64.)
Defendant Jane Doe dismissed Plaintiff’s complaints and said that Plaintiff needed to wait 10
days until he could receive his medications. She laughed and walked away concluding the
interview.
On September 3, 2024, Plaintiff talked again to Defendant Jane Doe and complained to
her again that nothing was being done to resolve his issues. She said “I haven’t forgot about
you!” and walked away laughing. She continued to ignore Plaintiff’s pleas for help, because he is
an old black man. Plaintiff suffered pain and incontinence, not able to get off the bunk for meals

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and falling on the ground numerous times and reinjuring his back, and had an increase in blood
pressure. She did not summon medical staff to assist Plaintiff. Plaintiff lost 28 pounds in an 18-
day period.
Defendant Jane Doe failed to remedy the violations committed by her subordinate Yang
and directly participated in the violation by refusing to locate and secure Plaintiff’s DME,
medical supplies and medications. Defendant Doe’s duties as the ADA compliance Sergeant in
the RHU required that all DME and medical supplies were provided to Plaintiff. Defendant Jane
Doe knew Plaintiff was going to be transferred out of SATF on September 3, 2024 when she told
Plaintiff she had not forgotten about him. Plaintiff was sent to North Kern State Prison for an
overnight layover. Plaintiff was seen in R&R and Plaintiff complained about not having his
DME, medical Supplies and medications. Sister Merlin Alexander contacted the RHU
correctional counselor and complained of mistreatment and severity of Plaintiff’s hypertension.
Plaintiff eventually received his blood pressure medication about 12 days after he was placed in
the RHU. Plaintiff got his personal medical property once he arrived at RJD Correctional Facility
on Sept. 4, 2024. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 81.) Plaintiff was intentionally discriminated based on ADA
status. He was excluded from the feeding program, he was denied his incontinence related
services and supplies and had hypertension episodes and extreme weight loss.
Defendant CDCR is the State agency and through its plans and policies must comply with
ADA. The Armstrong remedial Plan and the Disability Placement Program implement the
guidelines to ensure nondiscrimination against inmates with disability. Disability Placement
Program applies to all institutions including SATF. Plaintiff contends that Defendants Yang and
Doe in their individual capacities acted in accordance with CDCR policy when they intentionally
discriminated against Plaintiff on account of his disabilities and CDCR failed to correct the
discriminatory conduct. The Armstrong Remedial Plan defines categories of disability and
issuance of Durable Medical Equipment. Section 3999.392 provides that an inmate transferred
from one institution to another shall be allowed their medical equipment and medical supplies.
During the period of August 17, 2024 through September 3, 2024, Plaintiff was denied
incontinence-related services and supplies. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 94.) Plaintiff complained to Defendant

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Seargent Doe who should have provided a remedy. Both Yang and Doe failed to take Plaintiff’s
need for his equipment serious and took no alternative steps to at least summon medical staff.
Plaintiff asks for the Court to take judicial notice of the Armstrong Remedial Plan, and
this case of Porter v. Rivas, Case no. 1:22-cv-105 KES CDB.
Plaintiff alleges that based on these facts he states an Equal Protection claim against both
Yang and Doe Sergeant and also a state law Equal Protection claim. Plaintiff alleges that
intentional treatment was different for those who were not black and were not elderly. Plaintiff
alleges that he was discriminated against because he is black and elderly and sued defendant’s
coworker just months earlier.
Plaintiff alleges he was denied adequate food to maintain health when he complained that
he could not get off the bunk without dizzy spells, having fainting spells and fell down numerous
times trying to get meals. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 117.) Plaintiff contends he lost 28 pounds in 18 days and
was denied access by Defendants to its feeding program, service or activity while housed at RHU
during August 17-September 3, 2024. Defendant Doe Sergeant knew as the ADA coordinator,
that an inmate housed in the RHU, being mobility impaired, had a substantial risk of serious harm
by being deprived of food and was losing excessive weight in a short period of time.
Plaintiff alleges the following claims: (1) Eighth Amendment violation of deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs, (2) Eighth Amendment violation of deliberate indifference
to health and safety, (3) Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, (4) violation of the
ADA, (4) Cal. Constitution Art. I, §7(a) equal protection.
Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
C. Discussion
Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and fails to
state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, except as noted below.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
Pursuant to Rule 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Detailed factual allegations
are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

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conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must
set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations
are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57; Moss,
572 F.3d at 969.
Plaintiff’s complaint is not short. As explained below, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a
claim. Many of Plaintiff's allegations are conclusory and do not state what happened, when it
happened, or which defendant was involved. Plaintiff includes legal argument and citations in his
complaint, and it is difficult to follow. Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory allegations of medical
care provide no factual basis for this Court to draw a reasonable inference which of the named
defendants are liable for any misconduct alleged. A plaintiff suing multiple defendants must
allege the basis of his claim against each defendant to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2).
Eleventh Amendment
“The Eleventh Amendment grants a State immunity from suit in federal court by citizens
of other States, and by its own citizens as well.” Lapides v. Bd. Of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 616
(2002) (citation omitted); see Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1065–66 (9th Cir. 2010)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). While “[t]he Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits
against a state official for prospective relief,” Wolfson, 616 F.3d at 1065–66, suits against the
state or its agencies are barred absolutely, regardless of the form of relief sought, e.g., Pennhurst
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Buckwalter v. Nevada Bd. of
Medical Examiners, 678 F.3d 737, 740 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2012).
A state agency is entitled to the same Eleventh Amendment immunity enjoyed by the
State when a judgment against the agency “would have had essentially the same practical
consequences as a judgment against the State itself.” Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401 (1979). Accordingly, the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation is a state agency, it generally is entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suit for damages.
Plaintiff may not pursue his claims for monetary damages against the named defendants in

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their official capacities. “The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal
court against a state, its agencies, and state officials in their official capacities.” Aholelei v. Dep’t.
of Pub. Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). However, the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar suits seeking damages against state officials in their personal capacities,
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 (1991); Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 491 (9th Cir. 2003), or
suits for injunctive relief brought against state officials in their official capacities, Austin v. State
Indus. Ins. Sys., 939 F.2d 676, 680 n.2 (9th Cir. 1991). Thus, Plaintiff may only proceed in this
action for monetary damages against defendants in their individual capacities.
Supervisory Liability
Insofar as Plaintiff is attempting to sue Defendant Jane Doe Sergeant, or any other
defendant, based solely upon his/her supervisory role, he may not do so. Liability may not be
imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of their subordinates under the
theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77; Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609
F.3d 1011, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir.
2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).
Supervisors may be held liable only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or
knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045
(9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v.
Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). “The requisite causal connection may be established
when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably
should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional harms.” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d at
570. Supervisory liability may also exist without any personal participation if the official
implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of the constitutional
rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Redman v. Cty. of San Diego, 942
F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and quotations marks omitted), abrogated on other
grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970). When a defendant holds a supervisory
position, the causal link between such defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be
specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld,

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589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement
of supervisory personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents,
673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
Plaintiff has not alleged factual support that any supervisor participated in or directed any
constitutional violation or that he “implemented a policy so deficient that it was the moving force
of any constitutional violation.”
Americans With Disabilities Act
The Americans with Disabilities Act provides, “no qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The ADA defines “qualified individual with a disability” as “an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or
practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision
of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of
services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” Id. § 12131(2).
The Supreme Court has held that “public entity” includes state prisons. United States v. Georgia,
546 U.S. 151, 154 (2006) (citation omitted). To state a claim under the ADA, the plaintiff must
have been “improperly excluded from participation in, and denied the benefit of, a prison service,
program, or activity on the basis of his physical handicap.” Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019,
1023 (9th Cir. 1997). In addition, “[t]o recover monetary damages under Title II of the ADA ... a
plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination on the part of the defendant,” and the standard for
intentional discrimination is at least deliberate indifference. Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d
1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001).
To the extent Plaintiff intends to sue the individual named defendants for violation of his
rights under the ADA, he may not “bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a State official
in her individual capacity to vindicate rights created by Title II of the ADA.” Vinson v. Thomas,
288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002) (a plaintiff cannot sue state officials in their individual
capacity under § 1983 to vindicate rights created by Title II of the ADA or Section 504 of the

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Rehabilitation Act). Instead, the proper defendant in an ADA action is the public entity
responsible for the alleged discrimination. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 154, 126
S. Ct. 877, 163 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006). In order to recover monetary damages, the plaintiff must
allege intentional discrimination under the “deliberate indifference” standard. Duvall v. Cty. of
Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001) (as amended). “Deliberate indifference requires both
knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is substantially likely, and a failure to act
upon ... the likelihood.” Id. at 1139. This standard is not met “where a duty to act may simply
have been overlooked,” but rather “a failure to act must be a result of conduct that is more than
negligent[.]” Id.
Liberally construing the allegations in the complaint, as the Court must at this stage,
Plaintiff states a cognizable claim based on his allegation that he was denied access to “food
service” by Defendant Sergeant Doe, who Plaintiff told he was unable to attend food service and
Defendant Sergeant Doe saw Plaintiff was losing weight from not being able to attend food
service. See, e.g., Orr v. Cal. Highway Patrol, No. 2:14–585 WBS EFB, 2015 WL 848553 at *16
(E.D. Cal. Feb.26, 2015) (“Public entities are vicariously liable for the acts of their employees
under both acts.”).
Plaintiff fails to state any other claim. Plaintiff alleges that he did not get certain medical
equipment or medication, but he does not allege facts that show he was excluded from
participation in, or denied the benefits of, any service or programs offered by the prison because
of his disability. Plaintiff’s allegations that he was subjected to any type of discrimination by
reason of his disability are conclusory. Further, any allegations of inadequate medical care do not
state a claim under the ADA. Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The ADA
does not create a remedy for medical malpractice.”); Simmons v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011,
1022 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The ADA prohibits discrimination because of disability, not inadequate
treatment for disability.”), overruled in part on other grounds, Castro, 833 F.3d 1060; Bryant v.
Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[The ADA] would not be violated by a prison's
simply failing to attend to the medical needs of its disabled prisoners.... The ADA does not create
a remedy for medical malpractice.”).

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Eighth Amendment – Deliberate Indifference to Medical Care and Conditions of
Confinement
A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment where the mistreatment rises to the level of “deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). The two-part test for deliberate
indifference requires Plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that failure
to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately
indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.
A defendant does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the defendant “knows
of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
837 (1994). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard,” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051,
1060 (9th Cir. 2004), and is shown where there was “a purposeful act or failure to respond to a
prisoner’s pain or possible medical need” and the indifference caused harm. Jett, 439 F.3d at
1096. In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a
prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be
substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this
cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle,
429 U.S. at 105–06). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990).
Further, a “difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner—or between
medical professionals—concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to
deliberate indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Sanchez v.
Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989)), overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard,
744 F.3d 1076, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122–23 (9th Cir.
2012) (citing Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1986)). Rather, Plaintiff “must

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show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the
circumstances and that the defendants chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive
risk to [his] health.” Snow, 681 F.3d at 988 (citing Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The Eighth Amendment also protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment
and from inhumane conditions of confinement. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994);
Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, no matter where they are
housed, prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food,
clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th
Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted). However, prison officials are liable under the
Eighth Amendment only if they demonstrate deliberate indifference to conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate; and it is well settled that deliberate indifference
occurs when an official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious
harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 841; Clem, 566 F.3d at 1181; Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1040
Plaintiff states a cognizable claim against Defendant Jane Doe Sergeant for deliberate
indifference to medical care, while Plaintiff was in RHU and deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s
conditions of confinement regarding Plaintiff’s inability to get food and losing 18 lbs.
Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against Defendant Yang. Plaintiff’s conclusory
allegations that Defendant Yang knew Plaintiff needed his medical supplies and medication is
insufficient. The allegations do not demonstrate that, unlike Defendant Jane Doe Sergeant, Yang
saw Plaintiff while Plaintiff was housed in RHU and spoke with Plaintiff about Plaintiff’s
medical needs or food requirements.
Equal Protection -Fourteenth Amendment and California Constitution
The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated
alike. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, (1985); Shakur v.
Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008). An equal protection claim may be established by
showing that defendants intentionally discriminated against a plaintiff based on his membership
in a protected class, Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690,

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702– 03 (9th Cir. 2009); Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071,1082 (9th Cir. 2003), or that similarly
situated individuals were intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to a
legitimate state purpose, Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 601–02 (2008); Village
of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580,
592 (9th Cir. 2008).
The Court finds that Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable equal protection claim. “[T]he
disabled do not constitute a suspect class” for equal protection purposes. Does 1–5 v. Chandler,
83 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249).
While Plaintiff uses the word “discrimination” in his complaint, Plaintiff has not shown that he
was discriminated against because of his membership in any protected class. Nor has Plaintiff
shown that he was intentionally treated differently than other similarly situated inmates without a
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Plaintiff offers that he is elderly and black, but
he does not support discrimination on these bases. Plaintiff’s conclusory statements about
discrimination do not suffice. Therefore, he has not stated any claim for a violation of his
Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Article I, Section 7(a) of the California Constitution, much like the Fourteenth
Amendment, provides that a “person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.” California's Due Process Clause is “identical in scope with the federal due
process clause.” Owens v. City of Signal Hill, 154 Cal.App.3d 123, 127 n. 2, 201 Cal.Rptr. 70
(1984); Botello v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 3918930 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 18, 2009)
(treating California Constitution's due process clause as identical to federal Constitutional due
process protection for purposes of evaluating a “danger creation” cause of action).
In an extensive and detailed opinion, the California Supreme Court has held that Article 1,
Section 7(a) does not create a private right of action for damages. Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of
California, 58 P.3d 339, 342-58 (Cal. 2002). Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to
bring a claim for monetary damages directly under that provision of the California Constitution,
his claim fails. Navarrette v. Wren, No. 3:22-CV-0006-LL-AHG, 2023 WL 3397382, at *5 (S.D.
Cal. May 11, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 22CV006-LL-AHG, 2023 WL

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8176084 (S.D. Cal. June 1, 2023).
Violation of Title 15
Most of Plaintiff’s claims are for violation of CDCR policies and procedures. To the
extent that any Defendant has not complied with applicable state statutes or prison regulations,
these deprivations do not support a claim under § 1983. Section 1983 only provides a cause of
action for the deprivation of federally protected rights. See, e.g., Nible v. Fink, 828 Fed. Appx.
463 (9th Cir. 2020) (violations of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations do not create a
private right of action); Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009) (section 1983
claims must be premised on violation of federal constitutional right); Prock v. Warden, No. 1:13-
cv-01572-MJS (PC), 2013 WL 5553349, at *11–12 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2013) (noting that several
district courts have found no implied private right of action under title 15 and stating that “no §
1983 claim arises for [violations of title 15] even if they occurred.”); Parra v. Hernandez, No.
08cv0191-H (CAB), 2009 WL 3818376, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2009) (granting motion to
dismiss prisoner's claims brought pursuant to Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations);
Chappell v. Newbarth, No. 1:06-cv-01378-OWW-WMW (PC), 2009 WL 1211372, at *9 (E.D.
Cal. May 1, 2009) (holding that there is no private right of action under Title 15 of the California
Code of Regulations).
Due Process – Deprivation of Property
Prisoners have a protected interest in their personal property. Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d
728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). An authorized, intentional deprivation of property is actionable under
the Due Process Clause. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 n.13 (1984) (citing Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435–36 (1982)); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th
Cir. 1985). However, “an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee
does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful post deprivation remedy for the loss is available.”
Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533.
Plaintiff contends that Defendant Yang took his property in violation of remedial orders
and CDCR policy. As Defendant Yang’s conduct was an unauthorized deprivation of property,

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due process is satisfied if there is a meaningful post-deprivation remedy available to Plaintiff. Id.
Plaintiff has an adequate post-deprivation remedy available under California law. Barnett v.
Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816–17 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 810–95). Therefore,
Plaintiff fails to allege a cognizable due process claim for the alleged deprivation of his property.
Conspiracy
It is unclear if Plaintiff is attempting to allege a conspiracy. To state a claim for
conspiracy under section 1983, Plaintiff must show the existence of an agreement or a meeting of
the minds to violate his constitutional rights, and an actual deprivation of those constitutional
rights. Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 592 (9th Cir.2010); Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th
Cir. 2001). “[T]o state a claim for conspiracy under § 1985, a plaintiff must first have a
cognizable claim under § 1983.” Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 930 (9th Cir.
2004) (citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff’s fails to state a claim for conspiracy. Plaintiff has not adequately alleged a
meeting of the minds or a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff conclusory and
speculative allegation the Defendant Yang acted as he did because his colleague was named in a
prior lawsuit by Plaintiff is insufficient to support a claim.
Armstrong Remedial Plan
A remedial plan or consent decree does not create a substantive right entitling Plaintiff to
sue. Rather, to the extent that plaintiff wishes to pursue an equitable claim based on defendants’
violation of the Armstrong Remedial Plan, Plaintiff must pursue such claim through the consent
decree or class counsel. Frost v. Symington, 197 F.3d 348, 358–59 (9th Cir.1999); Crayton v.
Terhune, No. C 98-4386 CRB(PR), 2002 WL 31093590, *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept.17, 2002). If
Plaintiff wishes to pursue a damages claim, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to support a
claim that Defendants violated federal law, not merely that Defendants violated a remedial plan.
See Frost, 197 F.3d at 353.
Doe Defendants
Plaintiff names one doe defendant. “As a general rule, the use of ‘John Doe’ to identify a
defendant is not favored.” Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff is

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advised that John Doe or Jane Doe defendants (i.e., unknown defendants) cannot be served by the
United States Marshal until Plaintiff has identified them as actual individuals and amended his
complaint to substitute names for John Doe or Jane Doe.
IV. Conclusion and Recommendation
Based on the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint states a cognizable claim
against Defendant Jane Doe Sergeant for deliberate indifference to medical need and conditions
of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment and a claim against CDCR for violation of
the Americans with Disabilities Act. However, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any other
cognizable claims for relief against any other defendant.
Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
1. This action proceed on Plaintiff’s complaint, filed March 4, 2025, (ECF No. 1),
against Defendant Jane Doe Sergeant for deliberate indifference to medical need and
conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment and against
Defendant CDCR for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act; and
2. All other claims and defendants be dismissed based on Plaintiff’s failure to state
claims upon which relief may be granted.
***
These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District
Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within
fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may
file written objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to
Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Objections, if any, shall not exceed
fifteen (15) pages or include exhibits. Exhibits may be referenced by document and page
number if already in the record before the Court. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page
limit may not be considered. Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the
specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual
findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter

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v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 4, 2026 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE