Hoffman, as Liquidating Trustee of SCI Bankruptcy v. Adelman et al

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES DIVISION
In re: ) Case No. 2:11-bk-15975-PC
)
SCI REAL ESTATE INVESTMENTS, ) Adversary No. 2:13-ap-01175-PC
LLC, a Virginia limited liability company, )
)
SECURED CALIFORNIA )
INVESTMENTS, INC., a California )
corporation; )
)
Debtors. ) Chapter 11
)
)
WILLIAM HOFFMAN, not individually ) MEMORANDUM DECISION
but solely as Liquidating Trustee of the )
SCI Bankruptcy Liquidating Trust, )
) Date: April 16, 2013
Plaintiff, ) Time: 9:30 a.m.
) Place: United States Bankruptcy Court
v. ) Courtroom # 1468
) 255 East Temple Street
JOEL D. and FAY S. ADELMAN, et al., ) Los Angeles, CA 90012
)
Defendants. )
)
This matter comes before the court on a motion by Defendants, Joel D. Adelman, et al.,
(collectively, the “Defendants”) seeking a dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint for: (1) Avoidance
and Recovery of Actual Fraudulent Transfers [11 U.S.C. §§ 544(B), 550(A), 551 and California
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Cal. Civ. Code Sections 3439.01 – 3439.12]; (2) Avoidance
and Recovery of Constructive Fraudulent Transfers [11 U.S.C. §§ 544(B), 550(A), 551 and
FILED & ENTERED
MAY 01 2013
CLERK U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT
Central District of California
BY DEPUTY CLERK	egarcia
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California Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Cal. Civ. Code Sections 3439.01 – 3439.12]; and
(3) Second Omnibus Objection to and Disallowance of Claims Held by Defendants [See
Attached Exhibit 1 for List of Defendants’ Proofs of Claim] [11 U.S.C. §§ 502(B)(1) and
502(D)] (“Complaint”) pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).1 William Hoffman, Liquidating Trustee
of the SCI Bankruptcy Liquidating Trust (“Hoffman”) opposes the motion. Appearances were
stated on the record. The court, having considered the pleadings and arguments of counsel,
makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 52(a)(1), as
incorporated into FRBP 7052 and applied to adversary proceedings in bankruptcy cases.
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 11, 2011, SCI Real Estate Investments, LLC (“SCI LLC”) and Secured
California Investments, Inc. (“SCI Inc.”) filed voluntary petitions under chapter 11 of the Code
in Case Nos. 2:11-bk-15975-PC and 2:11-bk-15987-BR, respectively, in the United States
Bankruptcy Court, Central District of California, Los Angeles Division. By order entered on
March 4, 2011, the SCI Inc. case was reassigned to Judge Peter H. Carroll to be jointly
administered with SCI LLC under Case No. 2:11-bk-15975-PC. On June 15, 2012, the court
confirmed the First Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Liquidation for SCI Real Estate
Investments, LLC and Secured California Investments, Inc. dated April 19, 2012. Under the
confirmed plan, Hoffman is authorized as the Liquidating Trustee to prosecute and settle all
causes of action owned by the trust.
On February 15, 2013, Hoffman filed his four-count Complaint against the Defendants in
this adversary proceeding. According to the Complaint, SCI Inc. and SCI LLC (collectively, the
“Debtors”) operated approximately 60 limited liability companies engaged in the business of real
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all “Code,” “chapter” and “section” references are to the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 after its amendment by the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). “Rule”
references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“FRBP”), which make applicable
certain Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“F.R.Civ.P.”). “LBR” references are to the Local
Bankruptcy Rules of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California
(“LBR”).
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estate investment. Each of the Debtors’ limited liability companies would acquire equity in one
or more commercial real estate properties and offer co-ownership interests in those properties to
individual investors. One of the Debtors’ limited liability companies was SCI Ft. Myers Fund,
LLC (“SCI Ft. Myers”). SCI Ft. Myers and Naples Realty Group, LLC formed Ft. Myers
Property Investment Co. to acquire and operate three apartment communities in Ft. Myers,
Florida. SCI Inc. owned an 8.8% interest in SCI Ft. Myers. Each of the Defendants invested
with SCI Inc. in SCI Ft. Myers and, as an SCI Ft. Myers Fund Investor, received an SCI Ft.
Myers Membership Interest. Defendants’ initial investments in SCI Ft. Myers ranged from
$1,000 to $1,021,000 each, according to Exhibit 1 to the Complaint.
When the Ft. Myers Property Investment Co. proved unprofitable, SCI Ft Myers sent a
letter to each of the Defendants offering to acquire their respective SCI Ft. Myers Membership
Interests. By Assignment Agreement dated November 1, 2008, the Defendants each transferred
their respective SCI Ft. Myers Membership Interests to SCI Inc. and released SCI Inc. and its
affiliates from any liability arising out of SCI Ft. Myers in exchange for SCI Inc.’s promise
evidenced by a promissory note (“Ft. Myers Note”) to reimburse each Defendant for the Initial
Investment, less any amounts already received. Hoffman alleges that the Debtors were insolvent
at the time of this transfer, and thereafter, did not make any payments on the Ft Myers Notes
given to the Defendants in conjunction with the transfer. Hoffman objects to the Defendants’
respective proofs of claim and seeks to avoid and recover the transfers pursuant to § 544(b) as
either actually or constructively fraudulent under state law.
On March 21, 2013, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss seeking a dismissal of
Hoffman’s Complaint with prejudice pursuant to F.R.Civ.P 12(b)(6) on the following grounds:
First, the Complaint fails to describe any “fraudulent scheme” of the
Debtors, let alone with the particularity that is required for allegations of fraud.
Second, the fraudulent conveyance allegations are premised on the unsupportable
allegation that the SCI Ft. Myers Membership Interests were “worthless” or “had
negligible value”. . . , even though, at no point, does the Complaint assert the
value of the underlying Portfolio Properties. Third, based on the assumption that
the SCI Ft. Myers Membership Interests had little value, the Complaint
summarily concludes that the Ft. Myers Notes given in exchange for the SCI Ft.
Myers Membership Interests (and the Defendants’ Releases) were not of “a
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reasonably equivalent value,” without any factual basis to make such claim
“plausible.” Finally, the Complaint does not contain any factual allegation to
support the conclusion that the Debtors were insolvent at the time of, or were
made insolvent by, the SCI Ft. Myers Membership Interest Transfer – which was
27 months before the Petition Date.2
On April 2, 2013, Hoffman filed opposition to Defendants’ Motion and Defendants replied on
April 9, 2013. After a hearing on April 16, 2013, the court took the matter under submission.3
II. DISCUSSION
This court has jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
157(b) and 1334(b). This matter is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (H) &
(O). Venue is appropriate in this court. 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a).
A. Standard for Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the court, upon motion of the defendant, to dismiss a complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.4 F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Under Rule
8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.”5 F.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not
require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
` 2 Motion to Dismiss (“Defendants’ Motion”) 6:21 to 7:8.
3 At the conclusion of oral argument, the court advised counsel for the parties of its
intention to grant Defendants’ motion and dismiss Hoffman’s Complaint with leave to amend.
The court notes that Defendants “do not consent to entry of final orders or judgment by the
bankruptcy judge in this adversary proceeding.” Defendants’ Motion 1:18-21. Absent consent
or waiver, this court lacks constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a fraudulent
transfer claim against a person or entity that has not filed a proof of claim against the bankruptcy
estate. See Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc.), 702
F.3d 553, 565 (9th Cir. 2012). Dismissal with leave to amend, however, does not implicate Stern
v. Marshall because it does not end the litigation on the merits. See Goodman v. H.I.G. Capital,
LLC (In re Gulf Fleet Holdings, Inc.), 2013 WL 1342751 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2013).
4 Rule 12(b)(6) is applicable to adversary proceedings by virtue of FRBP 7012(b).
5 Rule 8(a) is applicable to adversary proceedings by virtue of FRBP 7008(a).
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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007)). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s
liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, although a court must
accept as true all factual allegations contained in a complaint, a court need not accept plaintiff’s
legal conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555).
In the bankruptcy context, Twombly means that a plaintiff can no longer simply recite the
statutory language of the particular Code section under which a claim is brought and expect the
complaint to give sufficient notice to a defendant of the plaintiff’s claim for relief. To pass
muster under Twombly, a plaintiff must state a plausible claim for relief by identifying the
specific facts upon which the plaintiff relies to support a finding on each element of the
plaintiff’s claim. Only then will a defendant have sufficient notice of plaintiff’s claim under
Rule 8(a). See, e.g., Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (“the non-
conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content . . . [must] plausibly
[suggest] a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.”); Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, Ill.,
520 F.3d 797, 802-03 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that Twombly “teaches that a defendant should not
be forced to undergo costly discovery unless the complaint contains enough detail, factual or
argumentative, to indicate that the plaintiff has a substantial case”).
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B. Hoffman’s Complaint Fails to State a Plausible Claim for Avoidance and Recovery of an
Actual Fraudulent Transfer
Rule 9(b) states that, “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” F.R.Civ.P. 9(b). Rule 9(b)’s heightened
pleading standard applies to allegations of fraud and allegations sounding in fraud, including
false misrepresentations. See Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106-07 (9th Cir.
2003); Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., N.A., 290 F.Supp.2d 1101, 1141 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
Allegations under Rule 9(b) must be stated with “specificity including an account of the time,
place, and specific content of the false representations as well as the identities of the parties to
the misrepresentations.” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007). “To comply
with Rule 9(b), allegations of fraud must be specific enough to give defendants notice of the
particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so that they can defend
against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.” Bly-Magee v.
California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir.2001) (citations/ internal quotations omitted).
Moreover, where a plaintiff pleads allegations of fraud against more than one defendant, Rule
9(b) “requires that a plaintiff plead with sufficient particularity attribution of the alleged
misrepresentations or omissions to each defendant.” In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970
F.Supp. 746, 752 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
To state a claim for fraud, the plaintiff must also plead knowledge of falsity, or scienter.
See In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1546 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc). The
requirement for pleading scienter is less rigorous than that which applies to allegations regarding
the “circumstances that constitute fraud” because Rule 9(b) states that “[m]alice, intent,
knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” F.R.Civ.P. 9(b).
However, the plaintiff must “set forth facts from which an inference of scienter could be drawn.”
Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 628 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1546).
Under California law, a transfer made with the actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud
any creditor of the debtor violates California’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”). Cal.
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Civ. Code § 3439.04; see Mejia v. Reed, 31 Cal.4th 657, 664 (2003). To prevail under
California’s UFTA § 3439.04(a)(1), Hoffman must establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the Debtors transferred the Ft. Myers Notes and releases in exchange for the SCI Ft. Myers
Membership Interests with the actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor. See
Wolkowitz v. Beverly (In re Beverly), 374 B.R. 221, 235 (9th Cir. BAP 2007) (“Whether there is
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud under UFTA is a question of fact to be determined by a
preponderance of evidence.”). Because a debtor rarely admits to such a transfer, the evidence of
intent “must of necessity consist of inferences drawn from the circumstances surrounding the
transaction and the relationship and interests of the parties.” Neumeyer v. Crown Funding Corp.,
56 Cal.App.3d 178, 183 (1976); see Beverly, 374 B.R. at 235 (“Since direct evidence of intent to
hinder, delay or defraud is uncommon, the determination typically is made inferentially from
circumstances consistent with the requisite intent.”). The UFTA identifies 11 non-exclusive
factors, or “badges of fraud,” that may be applied by a court to divine fraudulent intent:
1. Whether the transfer or obligation was to an insider.
2. Whether the debtor retained possession or control of the property after the
transfer.
3. Whether the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed.
4. Whether the debtor was sued or threatened with suit before the transfer
was made or obligation incurred.
5. Whether the transfer was of substantially all of the debtor’s assets.
6. Whether the debtor absconded.
7. Whether the debtor removed or concealed assets.
8. Whether the value of the consideration received by the debtor was
reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or obligation incurred.
9. Whether the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the
transfer was made or obligation incurred.
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10. Whether the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial
debt was incurred.
11. Whether the debtor transferred essential assets of the business to a
lienholder who then transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.
Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.04(b). The UFTA factors are intended “to provide guidance to the trial
court, not compel a finding one way or another.” Filip v. Bucurenciu, 129 Cal.App.4th 825, 834
(2005). As the court observed in Beverly:
The UFTA list of “badges of fraud” provides neither a counting rule nor a
mathematical formula. No minimum number of factors tips the scales toward
actual intent. A trier of fact is entitled to find actual intent based on the evidence
in the case, even if no “badges of fraud” are present. Conversely, specific
evidence may negate an inference of fraud notwithstanding the presence of a
number of “badges of fraud.”
374 B.R. at 236.
In this case, Hoffman’s Complaint describes SCI Inc.’s acquisition of each of the
Defendants’ SCI Ft. Myers Membership Interests in exchange for a Ft. Myers Note and a release.
Hoffman’s Complaint identifies the date of the transfer and alleges that the transfer “was in
connection with, and in furtherance of, the Debtors’ on-going fraudulent scheme.”6 According to
Hoffman, “the Debtors needed to appease their most prized investors, and did so, by acquiring
Defendants’ worthless SCI Ft. Myers Membership Interests in exchange for the Ft. Myers Notes
– in order to ensure that the Defendants would continue to invest in SCI TIC Real Estate
Investments.”7 Hoffman’s Complaint does not, however, sufficiently allege facts that would
form the basis for a finding that the exchange itself hindered, delayed or defrauded a creditor of
the Debtors or that the Debtors intended the exchange to do so on the date of the transfer.
6 Complaint 13:13-14; 13:15-16.
7 Id. 13:16-19.
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In paragraph 63 of the Complaint, Hoffman alleges three “badges of fraud” from which
the court is asked to divine the requisite actual intent.8 However, the allegations in Hoffman’s
Complaint “set forth [few] facts from which an inference of scienter [can] be drawn.” See
Cooper, 137 F.3d at 628. Each of the allegations in paragraph 63 is a legal conclusion “which
may not [be] substitute[d] for well-pleaded facts allowing the Court to reasonably infer that those
conclusions are true.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 842 F.Supp.2d 1216, 1226
(C.D. Cal.2012).
Absent the following facts, Hoffman’s Complaint fails to state a plausible claim to
recover an actual fraudulent transfer under § 544(b) and Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.04(a)(1):
1) The value of the SCI Ft. Myers Membership Interest conveyed by each Defendant to
SCI Inc. on the date of the transfer, together with facts forming the basis for such
valuation;
2) The value of the Ft. Myers Note and release conveyed to each Defendant by SCI Inc.
on the date of the transfer, together with facts forming the basis for such valuation;
3) Facts that form the basis for Hoffman’s assertion that “the Debtors were insolvent as
of December 31, 2007.”9 [A debtor is insolvent when “the sum of such entity’s debts
is greater than all of such entity’s property, at fair valuation.” 11 U.S.C. §
101(32)(A)].
4) Facts that form the basis for Hoffman’s assertion that “[t]he Defendants knew that the
value of the consideration received by the Debtors in exchange for the Ft. Myers
Notes was not of a reasonably equivalent value.”10
5) Facts that form the basis for Hoffman’s assertion that “the Debtors were (i) insolvent
when the Actual Fraudulent Transfers were made to the Defendants, or became
insolvent as a result of the Actual Fraudulent Transfers made to the Defendants; or
(ii) engaged in business or a transaction, or were about to engage in a business or a
transaction, for which the property remaining with the Debtors after the Actual
Fraudulent Transfers were made constituted unreasonably small capital; or, in the
alternative, (iii) at the time the Actual Fraudulent Transfers were made, the Debtors
8 Id. 14:24 – 15:4.
9 Id. 12:14-15.
10 Id. 14:19-20.
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intended to incur, or believed they would incur, debts that would be beyond the
Debtors’ ability to pay as they matured.”11
For these reasons, Hoffman’s first cause of action to avoid and recover actual fraudulent
transfers must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
C. Hoffman’s Complaint Fails to State a Plausible Claim for Avoidance and Recovery of a
Constructively Fraudulent Transfer
Courts do not generally apply the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) to
constructive fraud claims. The 1849 Condominiums Assoc., Inc. v. Bruner, 2010 WL 2557711
(E.D. Cal. 2010), citing Cendant Corp. v. Shelton, 474 F.Supp.2d 377, 380 (D. Conn. 2007).
Rule 9(b) is inapplicable because constructive fraud claims “are not based on actual fraud but
instead rely on the debtor’s financial condition and the sufficiency of the consideration provided
by the transferee.” In re Careamerica, Inc., 409 B.R. 737, 755-56 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2009). Still,
a constructive fraud claim must satisfy Rule 8(a) and contain sufficient facts to establish that the
claim is plausible.
Under California law, constructive fraud may be found as to any present or future
creditor when a debtor does not receive a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for a transfer,
and either
(A) [w]as engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which
the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the
business or transaction, [or]
(B) Intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he or
she would incur, debts beyond his or her ability to pay as they became due.
Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.04(a)(2). Similarly, constructive fraud can be found under Cal. Civ. Code
§ 3439.05, “as to an existing creditor if the debtor does not receive reasonably equivalent value
and ‘was insolvent at that time or ... became insolvent as a result of the transfer” Mejia v. Reed,
31 Cal.4th at 670, quoting Cal Civ. Code § 3439.05.
11 Id. 14:24 – 15:4.
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Here, Hoffman’s constructive fraud claims are insufficiently stated and must be
dismissed. At its core, “a constructive fraudulent transfer has two elements: reasonable
equivalent value and insolvency.” Allstate Ins. Co., 842 F.Supp.2d at 1224. As previously
stated, Hoffman’s Complaint does not state sufficient facts to plausibly show that on the date of
the transfer the Debtors were actually insolvent or received less than was given to the
Defendants. Absent the following facts, Hoffman’s Complaint fails to state a plausible claim to
recover a constructive fraudulent transfer under § 544(b) and Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.04(a)(2) or §
3439.05:
1. The value of the SCI Ft. Myers Membership Interest conveyed by each
Defendant to SCI Inc. on the date of the transfer, together with facts forming
the basis for such valuation;
2. The value of the Ft. Myers Note and release conveyed to each Defendant by
SCI Inc. on the date of the transfer, together with facts forming the basis for
such valuation;
3. Facts that form the basis for Hoffman’s assertion that “the Debtors were
actually insolvent at the time the Constructive Fraudulent Transfers were
made to each of the Defendants.”12
4. Facts that form the basis for Hoffman’s assertion that “the Debtors were (i)
insolvent when the Constructive Fraudulent Transfers were made to the
Defendants, or became insolvent as a result of the Constructive Fraudulent
Transfers made to the Defendants; or (ii) engaged in business or a transaction,
or were about to engage in a business or a transaction, for which the property
remaining with the Debtors after the Constructive Fraudulent Transfers were
made constituted unreasonably small capital; or, in the alternative, (iii) at the
time the Constructive Fraudulent Transfers were made, the Debtors intended
to incur, or believed they would incur, debts that would be beyond the
Debtors’ ability to pay as they matured.”13
For these reasons, Hoffman’s second cause of action to avoid and recover constructive fraudulent
transfers must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
12 Id. 16:23-24.
13 Id. 16:25 – 17:5.
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D. Hoffman’s Complaint Fails to State a Plausible Claim for Disallowance of Defendants’
Proofs of Claim Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) or 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1)
Having failed to sufficiently plead the actual fraudulent transfer claims and constructive
fraudulent transfer claims, Hoffman’s third and fourth causes of action must be dismissed.
E. Leave to Amend
Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[t]he court should freely
give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” F.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2).14 If a complaint lacks
facial plausibility, a court must grant leave to amend unless it is clear that the complaint’s
deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 898 (9th
Cir. 2002). It is not clear to the court at this juncture whether the deficiencies in Hoffman’s
Complaint cannot be cured by amendment.
CONCLUSION
As Hoffman fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted with respect to each of
the counts in the Complaint, Defendants’ motion to dismiss under F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) will be
granted with leave to amend. Hoffman shall file and serve Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint
not later than June 3, 2013, to cure the deficiencies identified above and to state a plausible claim
for relief on each of his four causes of action. Defendants must file and serve a response to
Hoffman’s First Amended Complaint not later than June 28, 2013.
A separate order will be entered consistent with this opinion.
###
14 Rule 15(a)(2) is applicable to adversary proceedings by virtue of FRBP 7015.
Date: May 1, 2013
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NOTICE OF ENTERED ORDER AND SERVICE LIST
Notice is given by the court that a judgment or order entitled (specify): Memorandum Decision was
entered on the date indicated as AEntered@ on the first page of this judgment or order and will be served in
the manner stated below:
1. SERVED BY THE COURT VIA NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING (NEF) B Pursuant to controlling
General Orders and LBRs, the foregoing document was served on the following persons by the court via
NEF and hyperlink to the judgment or order. As of (date) 05-1-2013 , the following persons are currently
on the Electronic Mail Notice List for this bankruptcy case or adversary proceeding to receive NEF
transmission at the email addresses stated below.
Kay S Kress kressk@pepperlaw.com, alexsym@pepperlaw.com
Christine M Pajak cpajak@stutman.com
Penelope Parmes pparmes@rutan.com
United States Trustee (LA) ustpregion16.la.ecf@usdoj.gov
Service information continued
on attached page
2. SERVED BY THE COURT VIA UNITED STATES MAIL: A copy of this notice and a true copy of this
judgment or order was sent by United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, to the following persons
and/or entities at the addresses indicated below:
Service information continued
on attached page
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