Black v. Portfolio Recovery Associates LLC et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Jeremy Black,
Plaintiff,
v.
Portfolio Recovery Associates LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-00655-RCC-EJM
No. CV-25-00670-JAS-BGM
No. CV-25-00671-JGZ
ORDER
In 2025, Plaintiff Jeremy Black filed three cases against Defendant Portfolio
Recovery Associates, LLC (“PRA”)1 in the small claims division of the Pima County
Consolidated Justice Court. Each complaint alleges violations of the Fair Debt Collection
1 Plaintiff’s complaints name unknown John Does I–X, Jane Does I–X, ABC
Corporations I-X; and XYZ Limited Partnerships I-X. There are no allegations as to any
specific act of these Defendants giving rise to liability. See Marcilis v. Township of
Redford, 693 F.3d 589, 596 (6th Cir. 2012) (upholding dismissal where plaintiff failed to
“allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did . . . .’” (quoting
Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008))); see also Robbins v. Oklahoma,
519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Given the complaint’s use of either the collective
term ‘Defendants’ or a list of the defendants named individually but with no distinction as
to what acts are attributable to whom, it is impossible for any of these individuals to
ascertain what particular unconstitutional acts they are alleged to have committed.”).
Additionally, there has been no service on these parties, which is unsurprising as it is
“virtually impossible” to serve a Doe Defendant. See Woodbeck v. United States, No.
07-1235-PHX-RCB, 2008 WL 312104, at *3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 31, 2008) (quoting Dugay v.
JPMorgan Chase, No. CIV 06-1663-PHX-RCB, 2006 WL 3792043, at *5 (D. Ariz. Dec.
20, 2006)). Thus, the Court dismisses the fictitious Defendants.
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Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and includes the same underlying factual allegations “stemming
from PRA’s failure to verify and validate the debt and continued inaccurate reporting.”
(Doc. 37 at 5 in CV-25-00655-TUC-RCC-EJM) (“Lead Case”).) The only difference
between complaints is to whom PRA furnished credit reports (Experian, Equifax, or
TransUnion). PRA removed the three cases and now asks the Court to consolidate them.
Plaintiff acknowledges that consolidation is appropriate. (Doc. 32 at 1 in Lead Case.)
However, he argues this Court has no jurisdiction over the cases because (1) PRA
improperly consolidated the cases upon removal, and (2) removal was untimely. PRA filed
Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim in each case, arguing Plaintiff’s claims are
barred by the doctrine of res judicata and are untimely.
For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants PRA’s Motion to Consolidate (Doc.
32 in Lead Case), denies Plaintiff’s Motions to Remand (Doc. 23 in Lead Case; Doc. 19 in
CV-25-00670-JAS-BGM; Doc. 17 in CV-25-00671-JGZ), and grants PRA’s Motions to
Dismiss (Doc. 26 in Lead Case; Doc. 20 in CV-25-00670-JAS-BGM; Doc. 18 in CV-25-
00671-JGZ).
I. MOTIONS TO REMAND
a. Original Jurisdiction
“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to
the district court of the United States . . . [i]f a civil action includes . . . a claim arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), a plaintiff may move to remand a case back to state court
on the ground that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
“[T]he removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction.” Ethridge v.
Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1988). In other words, there is a “strong
presumption” against removal, and “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any
doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564,
566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th
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Cir. 1979)). Thus, “[t]he party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of proving all
jurisdictional facts.” Indus. Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir.
1990).
Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims arise under federal law. 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. In
addition, Plaintiff has conceded that the cases were removable. Therefore, the Court has
original jurisdiction over all three cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
b. Procedural Deficiency
Plaintiff alleges the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the cases because the
notice of removal in the Lead Case was procedurally deficient. Plaintiff claims PRA
erroneously included all three complaints in its removal documents in the Lead Case.
Plaintiff asserts that instead, PRA should have filed the motion for consolidation prior to
removal from state court. Plaintiff argues that PRA’s subsequent removal of the two other
cases confirms that the initial removal was defective.
Plaintiff admits that he served all three complaints in the same FedEx package. He
also concedes that PRA subsequently removed the two other cases separately and—apart
from timeliness—Plaintiff makes no argument these cases could not be independently
removed. Instead, Plaintiff argues that PRA’s subsequent removals did not remedy PRA’s
initial removal error.
While under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a), a federal court cannot
consolidate actions before another tribunal, see Schoppenhorst v. Schultz, No. 3:24-cv-
00209-SLG, 2025 WL 1652147, at *6 (D. Ala. June 10, 2025) (slip copy) (citing Or. Egg
Producers v. Andrew, 458 F.2d 382, 383 (9th Cir. 1972)), Plaintiff has not demonstrated
that consolidation of separate actions must occur in state court prior to removal.
That said, “[i]f a case is improperly removed, the federal court must remand the
action because it has no subject-matter jurisdiction to decide the case.” ARCO Envtl.
Remediation, L.L.C. v. Dep’t. of Health and Envtl. Quality of Mont., 213 F.3d 1108, 1113
(9th Cir. 2000). Therefore, “the defendant must state the basis for removal jurisdiction in
the petition for removal. Furthermore, the petition must be filed within thirty days of
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receiving the complaint.” O’Halloran v. Univ. of Wash., 856 F.2d 1375, 1381 (9th Cir.
1988). “[A] defendant may amend the Notice of Removal after the thirty day window has
closed to correct a ‘defective allegation of jurisdiction,’” but an amended Notice of
Removal is not permitted “to add a new basis for removal jurisdiction.” ARCO Envt’l.
Remediation, 213 F.3d at 1117. Meaning, the amended notice must “clarif[y] the factual
underpinnings of the previously asserted basis’ for removal.” DeFiore v. SOC LLC, 85
F.4th 546, 559 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Kinetic Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Fin. Bank, 895 F. Supp.
2d 983, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2012)).
Plaintiff is correct that since the cases were not consolidated, PRA’s notice of
removal in CV-25-00655 only properly removed the Lead Case, not all three. However, all
cases were removable because this Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s FDCPA
claims. Furthermore, PRA remedied any deficiency in removal by filing the subsequent
notice of removal in the two other actions, reiterating that the basis for jurisdiction was the
same, but clarifying that the cases were separate. Because any procedural defect has been
remedied, any alleged improper removal does not prevent the Court from consolidating
these cases.
c. Timeliness
Plaintiff next claims that removal was untimely because Plaintiff served PRA’s
registered agent by Federal Express on October 28, 2025, and the removal was beyond the
statutory time limit. A notice of removal must be filed within 30 days from service of the
complaint. 18 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). PRA removed the Lead Case on November 26, 2025,
and Case Nos. CV-25-00670 and CV-25-671 on December 4, 2025. Therefore, regardless
of whether service was proper, PRA’s notice of removal in the Lead Case was within the
30-day window.
State law governs service of process prior to removal. Lee v. City of Beaumont, 12
F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff filed his cases in the small claims division of the
Pima County Consolidated Justice Court; therefore, Plaintiff’s service requirements are
governed by Arizona Rules of Small Claims Procedure and the Arizona Revised Statutes.
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17B A.R.S. Rules Small Claims Proc., Rule 1, AZ ST SM CL Rule 1(b)(2). As applicable
here, “the plaintiff may serve the defendant [with the summons and complaint] by
registered or certified mail, with a ‘return receipt requested.’” AZ ST SM CL Rule 5(b)(1).
Likewise, under the Arizona Revised Statutes, “[i]n addition to any other available methods
of service, the plaintiff may serve the summons and complaint by registered or certified
mail.” A.R.S. § 22-513(A). Certified and registered mail are distinct U.S. Postal Service
delivery methods, and delivery through a private carrier is not sufficient. Cachet
Residential Builders, Inc. v. Gemini Ins. Co., 547 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1030–31 (D. Ariz.
2007); Brown v. China Integrated Energy, No. CV 11-2559 MMM (PLAx), 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 196471, at *10 (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2012). Moreover, a defendant’s actual
notice of a suit does not trigger the 30-day deadline for removal. Cachet, 547 F. Supp. 2d
at 1030–31; Cooke v. Masterpharm, Inc., No. Cv-10-845-PHX-GMS, 2010 WL 2490536,
at *1 (D. Ariz. June 16, 2010); see cf. Murphy Bros. Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.,
526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) (“[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action
in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure
stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.”).
Service by Federal Express does not constitute service by certified or registered
mail. Therefore, PRA was not properly served on October 28, 2025. In turn, the 30-day
time limit to file a notice of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) was not triggered.
Consequently, PRA’s notices of removal in Case Nos. CV-25-00670 and CV-25-00671 are
not untimely. As such, the Court does not address PRA’s second argument that Plaintiff
waived his challenge to jurisdiction by litigating his claims in federal court.
II. MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE
Under Local Rule 42.1(a), two cases may be consolidated into a single case when
the cases “(1) arise from substantially the same transaction or event; (2) involve
substantially the same parties or property; . . . (4) call for determination of substantially the
same questions of law; or (5) for any other reason would entail substantial duplication of
labor if heard by different judges.” LRCiv 42.1(a).
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These cases involve the same parties, arise from PRA’s reporting of the same
account, and raise the same questions of law. Furthermore, litigating these cases before
three separate judges would cause substantial duplication of labor. The Court finds that
consolidation is appropriate.
III. MOTIONS TO DISMISS
a. Res Judicata
First, PRA argues Plaintiff’s claims are barred by res judicata and the statute of
limitations. Plaintiff previously filed three Arizona state court cases against PRA in 2024,
which—like here—included allegations of violations of the FDCPA for PRA’s failure to
verify debt. All of the 2024 cases were in reference to the same account as the 2025 cases.
The 2024 cases include the same parties, same legal theory, and factually identical
allegations, except that Plaintiff’s first amended complaints in the 2025 cases added claims
under 1692e and 1692f of the FDCPA. The 2024 cases were consolidated in state court,
and PRA resolved the suits when Plaintiff accepted a $3,000.00 offer of judgment. PRA
claims Plaintiff should and could have brought the additional statutory bases for relief in
his 2024 cases, and he is now precluded from raising them piecemeal here.
“Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, bars litigation in a subsequent action
of any claims that were raised or could have been raised in the prior action.” GP Vincent
II v. Estate of Beard, 68 F.4th 508, 514 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Owens v. Kaiser Found.
Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001)). The doctrine “serves to promote
judicial efficiency by preventing multiple lawsuits and to enable the parties to rely on the
finality of adjudications.” Dodd v. Hood River Cnty., 136 F.3d 1219, 1224–25 (9th Cir.
1998). “Res judicata applies when there is: ‘(1) an identity of claims; (2) a final judgment
on the merits; and (3) identity or privity between parties.’” Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297
F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002).
i. Identity of Claims
Identity of claims requires a court to evaluate “(1) whether the rights or interests
established by the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the
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second action, (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions,
(3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right, and (4) whether the two
suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.” GP Vincent II, 68 F.4th at 515
(citing Mpoyo v. Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 2005)). The Court
addresses these factors in reverse.
“Whether two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus depends upon
whether they are related to the same set of facts and whether they could conveniently be
tried together.” ProShipLine Inc. v. Aspen Infrastructures Ltd., 609 F.3d 960, 968 (9th Cir.
2010) (cleaned up). Thus, “where claims arise from the same factual circumstances, a
plaintiff must bring all related claims together or forfeit the opportunity to bring any
omitted claim in a subsequent proceeding.” Turtle Island Restoration Network v. U.S.
Dep’t of State, 673 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2012).
Here, Plaintiff’s claims in the 2025 actions arise out of the same nucleus of operative
facts as those asserted in the 2024 actions. A comparison of the 2024 and 2025 complaints
confirms that both matters concern the same account, the same disputes, and the same
course of conduct. In both actions, Plaintiff challenges PRA’s alleged failure to validate a
disputed debt associated with Plaintiff’s account ending in 7194 and its continued reporting
of that debt to credit reporting agencies. The complaints rely on the same core facts and
overlapping time periods and differ only in the statutory labels applied to those facts.
Plaintiff’s reliance on different FDCPA provisions does not alter the analysis.
“[N]ewly articulated claims based on the same nucleus of facts may still be subject to a res
judicata finding if the claims could have been brought in the earlier action.” Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1078 (9th
Cir. 2003). A plaintiff “cannot avoid the bar of res judicata merely by alleging conduct by
the defendant not alleged in his prior action or by pleading a new legal theory.” McClain
v. Apodaca, 793 F.2d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Costantini v. Trans World Airlines,
681 F.2d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087 (1982)). Nor does seeking a
different remedy for violation of the same primary right create a new cause of action. Id.
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(citing Sawyer v. First City Financial Corp., 124 Cal.App.3d 390, 400 (1981)).
Plaintiff’s attempt to characterize this action as involving new conduct is
unpersuasive. The 2024 actions encompassed the same course of conduct, including PRA’s
alleged reporting of the debt following Plaintiff’s disputes. The 2025 complaints rely on
that same course of conduct rather than discrete, subsequent acts. Because these claims
arise from the same series of transactions, they could have been brought in the 2024 actions.
See United States ex rel. Barajas v. Northrop Corp., 147 F.3d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1998).
The remaining factors confirm this conclusion. The two actions also rely on
substantially the same evidence—Plaintiff’s dispute communications, credit reports, and
PRA’s reporting activity—and involve the same alleged injury. Allowing Plaintiff to
proceed in this action would impair the rights established by the prior judgment, which
resolved claims arising from PRA’s handling of the same account through an offer of
judgment and dismissal with prejudice. Accordingly, this element is satisfied.
ii. Final Judgment on the Merits
The second element requires that the prior action “reached a final judgment on the
merits.” Mpoyo, 430 F.3d at 987 (citation omitted).
Plaintiff’s 2024 actions were resolved through a Rule 68 offer of judgment, which
Plaintiff accepted, and the cases were subsequently dismissed with prejudice. A dismissal
with prejudice is considered a decision on the merits for res judicata purposes. Id. at 988
(citing Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005)).
Accordingly, this element is satisfied.
iii. Identity of Parties
The final element requires that the parties in the two actions be identical or in privity.
Mpoyo¸430 F.3d at 988.
Here, there is no dispute that the parties are the same. Plaintiff litigated as plaintiff
in both the 2024 and 2025 cases, and PRA was a defendant in each of those actions.
Because the same parties are involved in both proceedings, this element is satisfied. See
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1081
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(9th Cir. 2003) (“[S]everal parties in both actions are identical, and therefore quite
obviously in privity.”).
Because all elements of res judicata are satisfied, Plaintiff’s claims are barred and
must be dismissed.
iv. Statute of Limitations
Because the Court finds Plaintiff’s claims are barred under res judicata, it need not
reach PRA’s second argument that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the one-year statute of
limitations.
IT IS ORDERED:
1. PRA’s Motion to Consolidate is GRANTED. (Doc. 32 in CV-25-00655-TUC-RCC-
EJM.) The Clerk of Court shall reassign CV-25-00670-JAS-BGM and CV-25-
00671-JGZ to the undersigned.
2. Plaintiff’s Motions to Remand for Untimely Removal are DENIED. (Doc. 23 in
CV-25-00655-RCC-EJM; Doc. 19 in CV-25-00670-JAS-BGM; Doc. 17 in CV-25-
00671-JGZ).
3. PRA’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which
Relief Can be Granted are GRANTED and these cases are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. (Doc. 26 in CV-25-00655-TUC-RCC-EJM; Doc. 20 in CV-25-
00670-JAS-BGM; Doc. 18 in CV-25-00671-JGZ.) The Clerk of Court shall docket
accordingly and close the case files in these matters.
Dated this 31st day of March, 2026.
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