Santaniello-Townsend v. Arizona Healthcare Cost Containment System et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Theresa Angela Santaniello-Townsend,
Plaintiff,
v.
Arizona Healthcare Cost Containment
System, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-00583-TUC-RCC
ORDER
After this case was removed from Pima County Superior Court in October 2025
(Doc. 1), Plaintiff filed a Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 40), a Notice of
Supplemental Evidence and Supplemental Declaration (Doc. 42), a Notice and Declaration
in Support of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Docs. 43–44), and a Notice of
Supporting Authority for the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 49). Defendants Arizona
Complete Health (“AzCH”), City of Tucson, Community Bridges, Inc. (“CBI”), Marana
Healthcare, and Arizona Healthcare Cost Containment System (“AHCCCS”) responded,
and filed five motions to dismiss and separate replies. (Docs. 50–58, 79–84.) Plaintiff
responded and replied. (Docs. 58, 62–66, 68–78.) Plaintiff also filed several supplemental
exhibits to her Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Docs. 85–90, 92.) Again, Defendants
responded (Docs. 94–96, 98) and Plaintiff replied (Doc. 99).
Now, after fifty-some filings, Plaintiff asks this Court to hasten its decision on her
Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. 100.) She claims, “compliance is required
by April 25, 2026, or eviction paperwork will be filed” and that “[w]ithout Court
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intervention, Plaintiff faces the imminent start of eviction proceedings.” (Id. at 1.)
Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction asks the Court to order that Defendants:
1. Provide Plaintiff with nondiscriminatory police protection and public
safety services;
2. Cease all retaliation against Plaintiff for protected activity;
3. Produce all requested medical, behavioral health, crisis, SMI, and
housing records;
4. Provide reasonable disability accommodations and engage in an
interactive process;
5. Restore and protect Plaintiff’s grievance and appeal rights; and
6. Refrain from initiating or pursuing involuntary psychiatric detention
or evaluation absent lawful, non-retaliatory grounds.
(Doc. 40 at 4.) The Court will expedite its decision, deny the request for preliminary
injunction, and grant the motions to dismiss.
I. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD
“A preliminary injunction is ‘an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should
not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.’”
Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520
U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)); see also Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555
U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted) (“[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy
never awarded as of right”). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must show that
(1) she is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) she is likely to suffer irreparable harm without
an injunction, (3) the balance of equities tips in her favor, and (4) an injunction is in the
public’s interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. “But if a plaintiff can only show that there are
‘serious questions going to the merits’—a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the
merits—then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the ‘balance of hardships tips
sharply in the plaintiff’s favor,’ and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.” Shell
Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Alliance
for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011)). The movant “has
the burden of proof on each element of the test.” See Envt’l Council of Sacramento v.
Slater, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1027 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff sues AHCCCS, AzCH, Community Bridges, Marana Health, and the City
of Tucson. She brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Americans with Disabilities Act
Title II, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. (Doc. 39.) Plaintiff claims she qualifies
as seriously mentally ill (“SMI”). (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants AHCCCS,
AzCH, CBI, and Marana Health Center provide services for mentally ill individuals,
maintain medical records, and handle corresponding grievances and appeals. (Id. at 1–3.)
In addition, Defendant City of Tucson acts through Tucson Police Department (“TPD”),
Housing and Community Development, and other entities for law enforcement, housing
administration, and crisis coordination. (Id. at 3.)
Plaintiff claims that she repeatedly sought help from TPD for “stalking, harassment,
domestic violence,” assaults, and theft. (Id. at 4.) She claims TPD failed to meaningfully
respond to her reports, denying her police protection. (Id.) She alleges she “requested
medical, behavioral health, crisis, SMI, and housing records from AHCCCS, AzCH, CBI,
MHC, and City of Tucson,” which were necessary to secure housing, social security, and
continued medical care, and to pursue grievances. (Id. ¶¶ 17–18.) Plaintiff alleges
Defendants either did not provide the records or provided altered records. (Id. ¶ 19.)
Plaintiff filed grievances related to the failure to provide records. (Id. ¶ 22.) Defendants
retaliated against Plaintiff because of her grievances “by delaying services, obstructing
appeal process, withholding records, and escalating adverse actions.” (Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff
claims CBI, City of Tucson, and Marana Health Care “initiated additional retaliatory
petitions for inpatient psychiatric evaluation” without cause, resulting in a February 2024
involuntary psychiatric detention. (Id. at ¶ 26; see also Doc. 65 at 3.) Plaintiff claims “CBI
again petitioned Plaintiff on or about March 5, 2024.” (Doc. 65 at 3.)
Plaintiff claims the City of Tucson also “failed to provide Section 8 documentation,
relocation notices, and housing records required for recertification and appeals.” (Doc. 39
¶ 28.) Because of the City’s failure, Plaintiff believes she may lose her housing benefits.
(Id. ¶ 29.)
Finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendants maintained her medical, mental health, and
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disability records, unlawfully transmitted her records “through unsecured and
inappropriate communication methods” and disclosed them to “law enforcement, housing
entities, and other non-treating third parties without authorization or necessity.” (Id. ¶¶ 34–
35.) She claims the inappropriate disclosure was used to support her involuntary detention.
(Id. ¶ 38.)1
After the Motion for Preliminary Injunction had been fully briefed, Plaintiff
submitted a Supplement to Motion for Preliminary Injunction on February 16, 2026,
allegedly notifying the Court of “material and time-sensitive changes”; addressing
AHCCCS eligibility termination; noting SNAP/Lifeline disruptions; including Section 8
housing communications, disability documentation, accommodation requests, utility bills
allocation notices, and grievance filings. (Docs. 85, 86–91.) The exhibits include an
AHCCCS termination notice ending coverage effective January 31, 2026 for failure to
verify income, DES and Lifeline records reflecting benefit interruptions, City of Tucson
communications stating a fixed $203 utility allowance not adjusted for individual usage,
property manager notices explaining common-area utility allocation and increased
electricity after a chiller replacement, and Conservice bills reflecting rising monthly
charges in 2025–2026. (Id.) Plaintiff later filed a Third Supplemental Notice on February
26, 2026, again asserting escalating harm tied to Medicaid coverage and disability status
and repackaging prior arguments. (Doc. 92.)
III. STANDARD MOTION TO DISMISS
A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8 does not require detailed
factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[A] complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The
1 Plaintiff makes more specific allegations in her supplemental filings, however, for the
motion to dismiss, the Court considers only the allegations properly considered in the
Second Amended Complaint. See Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
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complaint must contain more than “a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of]
a legally cognizable right of action.” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. Moreover, conclusory
and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ.
of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); Hill v. Kernan, No. 19-16759, 2021 WL
4870832, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 19, 2021).
“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a
context–specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. So, although a plaintiff’s specific factual
allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there
are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. In determining
the sufficiency of the complaint, the court takes a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, and
makes any reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Caltex Plastics, Inc. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 824 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 2016).
“In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court may generally consider only allegations
contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject
to judicial notice. . . . [A] court may consider a writing referenced in a complaint but not
explicitly incorporated therein if the complaint relies on the document and its authenticity
is unquestioned.” Brown, No. CV-19000025-TUC-JGZ, 2019 WL 3838983, at *1 (D. Ariz.
Aug. 15, 2019) (quoting Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007)); see
also Biltmore Assocs., LLC v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 572 F.3d 663, 665 n.1 (9th Cir.
2009) (“A court may consider documents, such as the insurance policies, that are
incorporated by reference into the complaint.”).
IV. AHCCCS
Plaintiff’s motion and supplements seek a preliminary injunction compelling
“police protection and public safety services,” the production of records, disability
accommodations to aid communication with AHCCCS, and access to AHCCCS’s grievance
and review processes, as well preventing retaliation and any pursuit of future involuntary
psychiatric detention. (Doc. 40 at 4; Doc. 77 at 2.)
In the Second Amended Complaint, the factual allegations against AHCCCS are
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minimal. Plaintiff claims she “requested medical, behavioral health, crisis, SMI, and
housing records from AHCCCS,” (Doc. 39 ¶¶ 17, 33–35), that AHCCCS conceded
Plaintiff’s medical information had not been securely protected from disclosure, (id. ¶ 36),
and that she requested accommodations to assist her with access to services (id. ¶ 21).
First, AHCCCS is not considered a person under § 1983 and has not consented to
being sued. Wennihan v. AHCCCS, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1049 (D. Ariz. 2005) (finding
AHCCCS is a state entity subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity). Moreover, Plaintiff
has not sued any individual AHCCCS employees nor included individual actions. See Va.
Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 255 (2011) (concluding the limitation
on sovereign immunity stated in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), only applies where
a state official is sued for their individual conduct, not “when the state is the real, substantial
party in interest”) (citations omitted). Because Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for monetary,
injunctive, and declaratory relief are against an arm of the state, as a matter of law, Plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claims against AHCCCS fail in their entirety.
Second, Plaintiff’s claims under the ADA and RA are not sufficiently plead and
cannot withstand a 12(b)(6) motion. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint lacks
allegations of specific AHCCCS conduct that violated the RA and ADA and caused Plaintiff
injuries. Insofar as there are any facts alleged against AHCCCS, her conclusory statements
do not provide enough information for AHCCCS to meaningfully respond, nor do the
conclusory statements show how granting the preliminary injunction would prevent any
harm. See Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Ent. Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1250 (9th Cir.
2013).
Third, because Plaintiff’s assertions of harm at the hands of AHCCCS are advanced
in generalized and conclusory terms, she has not shown a likelihood of irreparable injury
attributable to AHCCCS. Issuing a preliminary injunction based on conclusory allegations
is not in the public’s interest and the balance of equities does not weigh in favor of an
injunction. Therefore, a preliminary injunction is not appropriate.
V. CITY OF TUCSON
Plaintiff alleges on October 28, November 17 & 20, December 10 & 18, 2025, she
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was denied services relating to housing assistance, food assistance, and documentation
required for food-stamp eligibility were denied or withheld. (Doc. 43 ¶ 3; Doc. 39 ¶ 17.)
“These denials involved actions by . . . City of Tucson” including “refusals or failures to
provide support or documentation” to maintain her benefits. (Doc. 43 ¶ 3.) The City of
Tucson “failed to provide Section 8 documentation, relocation notices, and housing records
required for recertification and appeals.” (Doc. 39 ¶ 28.) In addition, on December 18,
2025, City of Tucson employees discussed Plaintiff’s confidential medical information
during an Adult Recovery Team meeting. (Doc. 43 ¶ 18.) As a result of the disclosure and
failure to provide records, Plaintiff claims she lost her housing benefits. (Doc. 39 ¶ 28.)
The City argues that Plaintiff’s filings do not identify specific actions by the City
that, if true, would entitle her to relief. (Doc. 83 at 1.) Moreover, the City claims Plaintiff
has not pleaded a viable Monell claim. (Id.)
Upon dismissal of the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff was warned that her
Second Amended Complaint must contain:
short, plain statements telling the Court: (1) the right Plaintiff believes was
violated; (2) the name of the Defendant who violated the right; (3) exactly
what that Defendant did or failed to do; (4) how the action or inaction of that
Defendant is connected to the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional right; and
(5) what specific injury Plaintiff suffered because of that Defendant’s
conduct. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371–72, 377 (1976).
(Doc. 38 at 3.) Plaintiff has no facts surrounding her request for records, nor has she
explained how the City’s discussion in the Adult Recovery Team meeting resulted in her
losing her housing. Like the allegations against AHCCCS, those against the City are
conclusory, and the Court is “not ‘required to accept as true allegations that are merely
conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.’” Doe v. City of
Concord, 22-15384, 2024 WL 62949, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 5, 2024) (quoting Sprewell v.
Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001), opinion amended on denial of
reh'g, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001)). Because of this, Plaintiff has not shown that she will
suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction, and it is not in the public’s interest
to grant one here.
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In addition, Plaintiff asserts the City had an unconstitutional policy, but fails to
elaborate. Under Monell, a governmental entity may be sued when an “official policy [is]
the moving force of the constitutional violation . . .” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City
of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). This barren assertion cannot withstand a motion
to dismiss.
VI. ARIZONA COMPLETE HEALTH
The facts alleged against AzCH in the Second Amended Complaint are equally
lacking. Plaintiff claims only that she requested records from AzCH, and there was some
sort of breach and her medical information was not secured. (Doc. 39 ¶ 17, 36.) The Court
cannot discern how these events are related to any harm Plaintiff suffered. Although pro se
pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972),
conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action, Ivey v. Bd. of Regents
of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
VII. COMMUNITY BRIDGES, INC.
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint contains no factual allegations as to
Defendant Community Bridges. While she has added allegations in response to
Community Bridges’ Motion to Dismiss, the Court will not consider facts presented outside
of the Second Amended Complaint. See Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th
Cir. 2007). Again, conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action.
Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
VIII. MARANA HEALTHCARE
Likewise, there are no allegations against Marana Healthcare in the Second
Amended Complaint, and the Court will dismiss these claims. This Court is not “required
to parse the complaint searching for allegations . . . that could conceivably form the basis
of each of [the complainant’s] claims.” Ferrell v. Durbin, 311 F. App'x 253, 259 (11th Cir.
2009).
IX. SUPPLEMENTARY FILINGS
First, the Court will not consider the supplementary filings for the Preliminary
Injunction Motion because, when filed, the preliminary injunction motion was already fully
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briefed. Second, Plaintiff’s submissions operate as improper, renewed requests restating
previous arguments and injecting materials outside the operative pleadings and proper
evidentiary scope. Third, the supplements include conclusory factual and legal assertions
and compilations of miscellaneous notices and correspondence that do not satisfy
Plaintiff’s heavy burden for extraordinary injunctive relief. Fourth, it is not incumbent upon
the Court to parse through thousands of pages of documents to locate Plaintiff’s claims—
under Rule 8, Plaintiff must present “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added); see Indep.
Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[J]udges are not like
pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”) (quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955,
956 (7th Cir. 1991)).
In conclusion, Plaintiff has not viably pleaded her § 1983, RA, or ADA claims
against any Defendant. Moreover, Plaintiff cannot sue AHCCCS under § 1983. Because
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against any Defendant, she has not demonstrated either
that (1) there is a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the balance of equities weighs in
her favor, or (3) an injunction is in the public’s best interest. Therefore, a preliminary
injunction is unwarranted.
X. LEAVE TO AMEND
If the plaintiff “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the district
court must dismiss. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). However, if the pleading can be
remedied through the addition of facts, the claimant should be granted an opportunity to
amend the complaint prior to final dismissal. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127–29 (9th
Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir.
2000).
If Plaintiff files a Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff must clearly designate on the
face of the court-approved form that it is the “Third Amended Complaint.” The Third
Amended Complaint must be retyped or rewritten in its entirety on the court approved
form and may not incorporate any part of the original, First Amended Complaint, or Third
Amended Complaint by reference. In it, Plaintiff must write short, plain statements telling
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the Court: (1) the right Plaintiff believes was violated; (2) the name of the Defendant who
violated the right; (3) exactly what that Defendant did or failed to do; (4) how the action or
inaction of that Defendant is connected to the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional right;
and (5) what specific injury Plaintiff suffered because of that Defendant’s conduct. See
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371–72, 377 (1976). Plaintiff must repeat this process for
each person Plaintiff names as a defendant. If Plaintiff fails to affirmatively link the
conduct of each named defendant with the specific injury suffered by Plaintiff, the
allegations against that defendant will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Conclusory
allegations that a defendant or group of defendants violated a constitutional right are not
acceptable and will be dismissed.
IT IS ORDERED:
1) Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction is DENIED. (Doc. 40.)
2) Defendant Arizona Complete Health’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. (Doc. 50.)
3) Defendant City of Tucson’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. (Doc. 52.)
4) Defendant Community Bridges, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. (Doc. 54.)
5) Defendant Marana Health Care’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. (Doc. 56.)
6) Defendant Arizona Healthcare Cost Containment System’s Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED. (Doc. 57.) Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against AHCCCS are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
7) Plaintiff has 30 days from the date this Order is filed to file a Third Amended
Complaint in compliance with this Order. If Plaintiff fails to file a Third Amended
Complaint within 30 days, the Clerk of Court must enter a judgment of dismissal of
this action without prejudice and deny any pending unrelated motions as moot.
Dated this 24th day of April, 2026.
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