Tellez v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Debra Kay Tellez,
Plaintiff,
v.
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
No. CV-25-00263-TUC-AMM (JR)
ORDER
Plaintiff Debra Kay Tellez (“Tellez”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and
1383(c)(3), seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration (the “Commissioner”). (Doc. 1.) This matter, on referral to the
undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for Report and Recommendation, is ripe for
decision. (Docs. 12, 13, 15, 19, 20.) Tellez seeks remand for immediate calculation and
award of benefits, or in the alternative, remand for further hearing. (Doc. 1 at 2.) As set
forth below, the undersigned recommends the district court dismiss the complaint.
BACKGROUND
Procedural Background
On March 30, 2022, Tellez filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits
(“DIB”) pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act alleging disability beginning on
November 25, 2016. (AR 315-21, 388.) Tellez’s application was denied initially on
October 20, 2020, and on reconsideration on July 14, 2021. (AR 79-94, 96-113 ). On
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November 14, 2022, Administrative Law Judge Laura Speck Havens (“ALJ”) issued an
unfavorable decision. (AR 117-27.) On July 26, 2023, the Social Security Administration
Appeals Council remanded the case back to the ALJ to “Obtain updated queries to verify
the claimant's date last insured and give further consideration to whether the claimant is
disabled, as defined in the Social Security Act” and “Further consider whether the claimant
has past relevant work that can be performed.” (AR 135-36.) A hearing was held on April
17, 2024, before the ALJ. (AR 42.) On May 2, 2024, the ALJ issued an unfavorable
decision on remand. (AR 21-32.) On April 3, 2025, the Social Security Administration
Appeals Council denied Tellez’s request for review and adopted the ALJ’s unfavorable
decision as the agency’s final decision. (AR 1-3.)
Relevant Factual Background1
Plaintiff was born in 1960, has some college education, and worked as an
interviewer. (AR 384, 389.) Plaintiff alleges she stopped working on November 25, 2016,
due to fibromyalgia, hypertension, cataracts, hypothyroidism, irritable bowel syndrome
(IBS), and costochondritis. (AR 388.)
Summary of Relevant Opinion Evidence
On July 23, 2020, state agency medical consultant (“SAMC”) Dr. E. Wavak, MD
completed a Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment during the initial stage of
Plaintiff's claim. (AR 92-93.) Dr. Wavak opined that Plaintiff could occasionally lift and/or
carry twenty-five pounds on an occasional basis and twenty pounds on a frequent basis.
(AR 91.) Additionally, Plaintiff can sit, stand, and/or walk for a total of six hours of an
eight-hour workday. (AR 91-92.) Lastly, Dr. Wavak determined that Plaintiff should avoid
concentrated exposure of noise and fumes, odors, dust, gases, and poor ventilation. (AR
92.)
On July 12, 2021, SAMC Dr. P. Ombres, MD completed a Physical Residual
Functional Capacity Assessment during the initial stage of Plaintiff's claim. (AR 108-11.)
Dr. Ombres opined that Plaintiff could occasionally lift and/or carry twenty pounds on an
1 The factual background is primarily taken from Plaintiff’s opening brief to which no
objection has been made.
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occasional basis and ten pounds on a frequent basis. Tr. 108. Additionally, Plaintiff can sit,
stand, and/or walk for a total of six hours of an eight-hour workday. (AR 108.) Also,
Plaintiff can occasionally crawl, crouch, kneel, stoop, balance, and climb ramps, stairs,
ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. (AR 109.) Lastly, Dr. Ombres determined that Plaintiff
should avoid concentrated exposure of noise and fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and poor
ventilation. (AR 110.)
Summary of Hearing Testimony
During the hearing on April 17, 2024, the ALJ presented the vocational expert
(“VE”) with a hypothetical identical residual functional capacity determination (“RFC”)
detailed below. (AR 58.) In response, the VE testified that all of Plaintiff's past relevant
work as a supervisor of benefits request, benefits clerk II, and production were available as
these positions were not precluded by the hypothetical’s limitations. (AR 59.) Plaintiff's
attorney asked if the same work would be available should occasional manipulative
limitations be considered, to which the VE responded in the negative. (AR 59.)
Additionally, the VE reported that no work would be available should a person be off task
due to their impairments and symptoms for at least fifteen percent of an eight-hour
workday. (AR 59.)
Summary of the ALJ’s Decision
For the purposes of the Social Security Act, a claimant is disabled if she is unable
“to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted
or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). To determine whether a claimant meets this definition, the ALJ employs a
five-step sequential evaluation. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). The ALJ
considers: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether
the claimant has a “severe, medically determinable physical or mental impairment ... or a
combination of impairments that is severe” and that has lasted for more than 12 months;
(3) whether such impairment “meets or equals” one of the listings in the regulations; (4)
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whether the claimant can still do his or her “past relevant work” given their residual
functional capacity; and (5) whether the claimant “can make an adjustment to other work.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). At steps four and five,
the ALJ determines a claimant's RFC. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1011 (9th Cir.
2014). The burden of proof is on the claimant at steps one through four but shifts to the
Commissioner at step five. Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th
Cir. 2009).
Here, the ALJ applied the five-step sequential framework to determine that Tellez
is not disabled. Before step one, the ALJ determined Tellez last met the insured status
requirements to be entitled to Title II benefits on December 31, 2022. (AR 24.) At step one,
the ALJ determined that Tellez did not engage in substantial gainful activity from her
alleged onset date of November 25, 2016 through her date last insured of December 31,
2022. (AR 24.) At step two, the ALJ determined that through the date last insured Tellez
had the severe impairments of fibromyalgia; COPD; irritable bowel syndrome (IBS);
hypertension; hypothyroidism; and costochondritis. (AR 25.) At step three, the ALJ
determined that through the date last insured Tellez did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled a listed impairment. (AR 25.)
After step three but before step four, the ALJ determined Tellez’s RFC as follows:
[T]hrough the date last insured, the claimant had the residual
functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR
404.1567(b) except she could sit 6 hours out of 8 hour day;
stand 6 hours out of an 8 hour day; walk 6 hours out of an 8
hour day; occasionally lift and carry 20 pounds and frequently
lift and carry 10 pounds; occasionally climb, stoop, kneel,
crouch, and crawl; and have only occasional exposure to
heights, moving machinery, dust, fumes, and smoke.
Occasional is defined as very little to 1/3 of the time. Frequent
is defined as 1/3 to 2/3 of the time.
(AR 26.) At step four, the ALJ determined that Tellez has past relevant work as “Supervisor
of benefits request,” “Benefits clerk II,” and “Production work.” (AR 31.) At step five, the
ALJ determined that Tellez could perform her past relevant work. (AR 32.) Accordingly,
the ALJ determined that Tellez “was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security
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Act, at any time from November 25, 2016, the alleged onset date, through December 31,
2022, the date last insured.” (AR 32.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the ALJ's
decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). In reviewing the
decision of the ALJ, the Court will not overturn the ALJ's decision “unless it is either not
supported by substantial evidence or is based upon legal error.” Luther v. Berryhill, 891
F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018). “Substantial” evidence means “more than a mere scintilla,”
but it is “less than a preponderance.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007)
(internal citation omitted). That is, “substantial evidence” is “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Burch v. Barnhart,
400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted). In determining whether
substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, the Court considers “the administrative
record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts
from the” ALJ's conclusions. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). “If the
evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the Secretary's conclusion,
the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary.” Id. at 720-21. The
“court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a
specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 630 (internal quotations and
citations omitted). The Court reviews “only the reasons provided by the ALJ in the
disability determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not
rely.” Id.
ISSUES ON REVIEW
Tellez raises two issues for review. (Doc. 15 at 1.) First, Tellez claims that the ALJ
improperly evaluated the medical opinion evidence. (Id.) Second, Tellez claims the ALJ’s
RFC determination is incomplete and unsupported by substantial evidence because the ALJ
did not properly account for Tellez’s severe IBS. (Id.)
//
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ANALYSIS
1. Any error attributable to the ALJ’s analysis of the medical opinion evidence
was harmless
Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical opinion evidence of
the SAMCs, Drs. Wavak and Ombres, on three grounds. (Doc. 15 at 6.) First, Plaintiff
asserts that the ALJ failed to address the “supportability and consistency” factors of the
SAMCs’ medical opinions as required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1). (Id. at 7.) Next,
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to reconcile the differences between the two SAMC
opinions as required. (Id. at 9.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to discuss why
she did not incorporate all limitations proposed by the SAMCs into the RFC. (Id. at 8.) The
Commissioner does not dispute that the ALJ erred but argues Plaintiff has failed to show
the requisite harm stemming from such errors. (Doc. 19 at 4.) For the reasons below, the
undersigned agrees with the Commissioner.
A. Legal Standard – Harmless Error
Where harmlessness is clear and not a “borderline question,” remand for
reconsideration is not appropriate. McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 413 (2009)). “The burden is on the party
claiming error to demonstrate not only the error, but also that it affected [her] ‘substantial
rights,’ which is to say, not merely [her] procedural rights.” Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d
1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2012). If the error “does not negate the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate
conclusion,” the error does not support remand. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359
F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004).
B. The ALJ’s Discussion of the Prior Administrative Findings
The ALJ evaluated Drs. Wavak and Ombres’s prior administrative findings as
follows:
The prior administrative medical findings of the State agency
medical consultants, who evaluated the record at the initial and
reconsideration levels of the administrative review process, are
partially persuasive because [Plaintiff] had a change in her date
last insured to December 31, 2022 and they determined their
findings up to only December 31, 2020. At the initial level on
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July 23, 2020, E. Wavak, M.D., found [Plaintiff] to be limited
to the light residual functional capacity with attendant
restrictions only in sitting, standing, walking, lifting (25
pounds occasionally and 20 pounds frequently), and
environmental due to COPD, and history of headache despite
no consistent treatment with a neurologist, no prescribed
medication, and no allegation of headache (Ex. 2A). At the
reconsideration level on July 12, 2021, P. Ombres, M.D., found
[Plaintiff] to be limited to the light residual functional capacity
with attendant restrictions only in standing/walking, lifting (20
pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently), climbing,
balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, and no
concentrated exposure to noise, fumes, odors, dusts, gases,
poor ventilation, etc., due to COPD and history of headache
(Ex. 4A). Notably, [Plaintiff] did not allege disability due to
headache in her Disability Report or in her hearing testimony.
(AR 30-31.)
C. Failure to address Supportability and Consistency factors
An ALJ must “articulate ... how persuasive” she finds “all of the medical opinions,”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b), and “explain how [she] considered the supportability and
consistency factor” in making those findings, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). Here, the ALJ
failed to address the supportability and consistency factors when addressing the opinions
of the SAMCs. The ALJ found the opinions “partially persuasive” because their reviews
covered the time period through December 31, 2020, not through Plaintiff’s date last
insured—nearly two years later on December 31, 2022. (AR 30.) The ALJ did not address
any other factors or otherwise explain directly how those opinions are inconsistent with the
underlying medical evidence. (See id.)
While finding those opinions only partially persuasive, the ALJ ultimately
incorporated most2 of the restrictions opined by the SAMCs, and in fact adopted the more
restrictive limitations assessed by Dr. Ombres. (See id. at 26, 30-31.) Here, the Plaintiff
fails to articulate how the ALJ’s failure to address the supportability and consistency
factors when adopting those limitations prejudiced her substantial rights. See Ludwig, 681
F.3d at 1054. Notably, upon review of the record, Plaintiff did not proffer any other medical
opinions, let alone one that would otherwise controvert Dr. Ombres’s assessed limitations,
2 To the extent the ALJ did not incorporate all limitations assessed by Drs. Wavak and
Ombres, the Court addresses those specific omissions infra.
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nor does Plaintiff argue that Dr. Ombres’s opinion is otherwise inaccurate. (See Doc. 13-
2.) Finally, the Plaintiff does not explain how the ALJ’s adoption of those limitations,
regardless of if the supportability and consistency factors were addressed, would have
altered the ultimate disability determination. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1197. Accordingly,
the Court finds that the ALJ’s error of failing to address the supportability and consistency
factors when finding the SAMCs’ opinions “partially persuasive” is harmless error.
D. Failure to reconcile
Where two competing medical opinions are of equal persuasive value, but are not
exactly the same, ALJs are required to reconcile those opinions. Here, however, the ALJ
did not reconcile the SAMCs’ opinions, but where conflicting ultimately adopted the more
stringent limitations of Dr. Ombres. The Plaintiff does not explain how the ALJ adopting
the more stringent limitations prejudiced her substantial rights. See Ludwig, 681 F.3d at
1054. The Plaintiff does not explain how the ALJ reconciliation of those opinions would
have altered the ultimate disability determination. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1197.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ’s error of failing to reconcile the SAMCs
opinions is harmless error.
E. Failure to incorporate
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to incorporate all of the limitations assessed by
the SAMCs. (Doc. 15 at 8.) During the hearing, the ALJ posited the following hypothetical
to the VE:
The hypothetical person can sit to six hours out of an
eight-hour work day, stand six hours out of an eight-hour day,
walk six hours out of an eight-hour day. Can occasionally lift
and carry 20 pounds. Frequently lift and carry 10 pounds. Can
only occasionally climb, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl.
Can have only occasional exposure to heights, moving
machinery, loud noise, dust, fumes, and smoke. Occasionally
is defined as very little to one-third of the time.
(AR 58.)
First, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ committed error by not incorporating the
SAMCs’ opinion that Plaintiff should avoid concentrated exposure of noise and fumes,
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odors, dust, gases, and poor ventilation. (Doc. 15 at 8.) However, “avoiding concentrated
exposure does not mean avoiding all exposure.” Salazar v. O'Malley, 2025 WL 1682891,
at *11 (S.D. Cal. June 16, 2025), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Carlos S.
v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2025 WL 1920150 (S.D. Cal. July 10, 2025). In fact, courts have
held that the limitation to “avoid concentrated exposure” to environmental conditions can
be consistent with even frequent exposure. See Renee S. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2021 WL
12177933, at *2-3 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 12, 2021) (citing Hamadi v. Kijakazi, 2021 WL
3772181 at * 3 (D.N.M. Aug. 25, 2021) (citing forms utilized by agency physicians, which
indicate that “avoiding concentrated exposure” is a technical term used by the Social
Security Administration with a meaning equivalent to “permitting occasional exposure”
and that the term “avoid concentrated exposure” falls somewhere in between “no
restriction” and “moderate restrictions.”); Bernier v. Saul, 2019 WL 5296846 at *7-8 (D.
Conn. Oct. 18, 2019) (finding that “avoid concentrated exposure” is the “least restrictive
limitation,” unlike “occasional” exposure, and an RFC limitation to “avoid concentrated
exposure” is compatible with performing jobs that require “frequent” environmental
exposure); Alexy X. M. v. Saul, 2019 WL 3772189 at *8 (N.D. Cal. August 12, 2019)
(finding that there “seems to be a tension” between an RFC requirement that a claimant
must avoid concentrated exposure to hazards and a job requiring occasional exposure to
hazards, because the term “concentrated” seems to refer to the intensity, rather than the
frequency, of exposure). Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ sufficiently
incorporated the environmental condition limitations to the hypothetical posited to the VE
during testimony.
Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to incorporate the assessed
limitation for balancing. (Doc. 15 at 8.) The Plaintiff asserts “Where an ALJ accords
substantial or great weight to a physician's opinion, he must either incorporate their
findings into the RFC or offer an explanation for why he chose not to accept them.” (Id.
(quoting Sahyoun v. Saul, 2020 WL 1492661, *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2020).) This assertion
is inapposite because, as described above, the ALJ only found the SAMCs’ opinions as
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partially persuasive, stating “the undersigned cannot defer or give any specific evidentiary
weight, including controlling weight, to any prior administrative medical finding(s)[.]”
(AR 30.)
Assuming arguendo that the ALJ had given the medical opinions of the SAMCs
substantial or great weight, the Plaintiff still has failed to show such error was prejudicial.
As pointed out by the Defendant, two of the jobs identified by the VE that exist in
substantial numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform do not have a
balancing requirement. (See Doc. 19 at 7-8.) Here the VE testified that Plaintiff could
perform her past relevant work as a supervisor of benefits request and benefits clerk II.
(AR 31.) The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) listing for supervisor of benefits
request (DOT No. 249.137-026), balancing is “Not Present – Activity or Condition does
not exist.” 1991 WL 672308. The DOT listing for benefits clerk II (DOT No. 205.567-010)
also lists balancing as “Not Present – Activity or Condition does not exist.” 1991 WL
671728. All that is required for a nondisability finding at step five is a single job that exists
in substantial numbers that the claimant can perform. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(b) (“Work
exists in the national economy when there is a significant number of jobs (in one or more
occupations) having requirements which you are able to meet ....”) (emphasis added).
Again, “we have only found only found harmless error when it was clear from the record
that an ALJ's error was ‘inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination’ ....”
Robbins v. Social Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting Stout v. Comm’r,
Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2006)). Accordingly, if the ignored
limitation is credited, the proper hypothetical would still result in the determination that
Plaintiff could be a supervisor of benefits request and benefits clerk II, and therefore any
error excluding such limitation is nondeterminative to the VE’s recommendation on which
the ALJ relied. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 886.
In her reply, Plaintiff argues that such determination is a “post-hoc rationalization”
and makes the conclusory assertion that the harm lies in the error itself. (Doc. 20 at 3-5.)
However, it is Plaintiff’s burden to prove “not only the error, but also that [such error]
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affected [her] ‘substantial rights,’ which is to say, not merely [her] procedural rights.”
Ludwig, 681 F.3d at 1054. Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not met her burden to
show that the error committed by the ALJ as to the exclusion of the opined balancing
limitation was harmful to her substantial rights.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons the undersigned recommends the district
court, after its independent review of the record, deny Ground One of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
2. The RFC determination adequately accounts for Plaintiff’s IBS symptoms
which are supported by the record
Plaintiff argues the ALJ committed harmful error because his RFC determination
failed to include restrictions for unscheduled breaks, frequent absenteeism, or off-task
behavior. (Doc. 15 at 10.) Plaintiff contends that it was the ALJ’s duty to further develop
the record regarding her IBS and determine “the nature and extent” of her alleged
limitation. (Id. (quoting Carr v. Kijakazi, 2025 WL 240821, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 17,
2025).)
The ALJ “has an independent duty to fully and fairly develop the record.”
Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citations and
quotations omitted). “The ALJ’s duty to supplement a claimant’s record is triggered by
ambiguous evidence, the ALJ’s own finding that the record is inadequate or the ALJ’s
reliance on an expert’s conclusion that the evidence is ambiguous.” Webb v. Barnhart, 433
F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150). However, the ALJ’s
duty to develop the record cannot be used to shift the burden of proving disability to the
ALJ. See Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting it is the claimant’s
“duty to prove she was disabled” and she cannot “shift her own burden” to the ALJ by
virtue of the ALJ’s duty to develop the record). It is the claimant who is “responsible for
providing the evidence used to make the RFC determination” and for ultimately proving
she is disabled. Gray v. Comm'r. of Soc. Sec. Admin., 365 Fed.Appx. 60, 63 (9th Cir. 2010);
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(3), 416.945(a)(3); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5) (“An individual shall
not be considered to be under a disability unless he furnishes such medical and other
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evidence of the existence thereof as the Commissioner of Social Security may require.”);
20 C.F.R. § 404.1512 (“In general, you have to prove to us that you are blind or disabled.
You must inform us about or submit all evidence known to you that relates to whether or
not you are blind or disabled.”).
Here, Plaintiff did not testify about her need for additional breaks due to IBS. (See
AR 27 (ALJ summary of Plaintiff’s testimony); 53-55 (Plaintiff discussing inability to sit
for long periods due to fibromyalgia).) Further, upon review of the administrative record,
the Court finds no other form of evidence supporting the assertion that IBS plays a role in
the limitations which Plaintiff now asserts.
Further, Plaintiff has failed to point to either medically determinable evidence or
testimony of her need for unscheduled breaks, frequent absenteeism, or off-task behavior—
nor any ambiguous evidence in the record. Accordingly, the ALJ’s duty to further develop
the record regarding Plaintiff’s IBS was not triggered. See Webb, 433 F.3d at 687. “To
require the ALJ to further develop the record here would improperly shift [Plaintiff’s]
burden of proving disability to the ALJ.” Acosta v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 1304442, at *2
(W.D. Wash. Mar. 24, 2017) (citing Mayes, 276 F.3d at 459).
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons the undersigned recommends the district
court, after its independent review of the record, deny Ground Two of Plaintiff’s
Complaint.
//
//
//
//
//
//
//
//
//
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RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the district court DISMISS
the complaint with prejudice. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any
party may serve and file written objections within fourteen days of being served with a
copy of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party’s
objections within fourteen days. No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is
granted by the district court. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived.
If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: 4:25-cv-263-
AMM.
Dated this 18th day of May, 2026.
Case 4:25-cv-00263-AMM Document 21 Filed 05/20/26 Page 13 of 13