Ruben v. SV Super Sale Bin Store Incorporated et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Randall Ruben,
Plaintiff,
v.
SV Super Sale Bin Store Incorporated, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-00228-TUC-JGZ
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Conditional Certification. (Doc.
42.) For the following reasons, the Court will grant the Motion.
I. Background
Plaintiff brought this action on behalf of himself and other similarly situated
individuals to recover unpaid wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29
U.S.C. §§ 201–219, and the Arizona Minimum Wage Statute (“AMWS”), A.R.S. §§ 23-
362–23-364. (See Doc. 22 ¶¶ 2–5.) On December 31, 2025, the Clerk of Court entered
default against Defendants Ahmad Alzfifah, GV Super Sale Bin Store Incorporated, and
Super Sale Bin Store LLC. (Doc. 37.) On April 22, 2026, the Court granted counsel for
Defendants SV Super Sale Bin Store, Inc. (“SV Super”) and Sameer Qasem’s Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel. (Doc. 53.)1 In its April 22 Order, the Court extended the deadline
for Defendants Qasem and SV Super to respond to Plaintiff’s Motion for Conditional
1 Defendant Qasem now proceeds pro se. Because corporations may appear in federal court
only through licensed counsel, the Court provided SV Super with 30 days to obtain new
counsel. (Doc. 53 at 1–2.) SV Super failed to obtain counsel by the deadline, and on June
5, 2026, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike SV Super’s Answer. (Doc. 55.)
Case 4:25-cv-00228-JGZ Document 57 Filed 06/09/26 Page 1 of 5

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Certification to May 20, 2026 and warned that “failure to serve and file a response to the
motion ‘may be deemed a consent to the . . . granting of the motion and the Court may
dispose of the motion summarily.’” (Id. at 3 (quoting LRCiv 7.2(i)).) Defendants have not
responded to the Motion.
“[W]hen a party fails to respond to a motion, this District’s Local Rules allow a
court to deem the non-responsiveness as consent to the relief sought and summarily grant
the motion.” Next League Exec. Bd. LLC v. Biden, 758 F. Supp. 3d 1029, 1036–37 (D.
Ariz. 2024). In light of Defendants’ failure to respond, good cause exists to summarily
grant Plaintiff’s Motion for Conditional Certification. Nevertheless, the Court briefly
addresses the merits of Plaintiff’s Motion.
II. Conditional Certification
The FLSA authorizes collective actions where the workers: (1) claim a violation of
the FLSA; (2) are similarly situated; and (3) affirmatively opt in to the joint litigation in
writing. See Harrington v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 142 F.4th 678, 682–83
(9th Cir. 2025) (citing Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir.
2018)). In the Ninth Circuit, courts follow a two-step certification procedure. Id. at 683
(explaining that the two-step approach has been “endorsed” and “approved” for use in this
circuit).
As this process most often functions, plaintiffs will, at some point around the
pleading stage, move for “preliminary certification” of the collective action,
contending that they have at least facially satisfied the “similarly situated”
requirement. See 1 McLaughlin on Class Actions § 2:16. Later, after the
necessary discovery is complete, defendants will move for “decertification”
of the collective action on the theory that the plaintiffs’ status as “similarly
situated” was not borne out by the fully developed record. Id.
Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1100. The sole consequence of a successful motion for preliminary
certification is the sending of court-approved written notice to workers who may wish to
join the litigation. Id. at 1101 (citing Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66,
75 (2013)).
Members of the proposed collective action are similarly situated to the extent they
share a similar issue of law or fact material to the disposition of their FLSA claims. Id. at
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1114, 1117. The plaintiffs’ burden is light at this stage, and motions for conditional
certification are typically granted. Colson v. Avnet, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 2d 914, 925 (D. Ariz.
2010). Plaintiffs need only make substantial allegations that members are similarly
situated, and the “district court’s analysis is typically focused on a review of the pleadings
but may sometimes be supplemented by declarations or limited other evidence.” Wilkerson
v. Walgreens Specialty Pharmacy LLC, 637 F. Supp. 3d 718, 732 (D. Ariz. 2022) (citing
Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1109, 1115).
Plaintiff has met his burden of showing members of the potential collective action
are similarly situated at the preliminary certification stage. Plaintiff defines members of the
proposed collective class as:
All store workers (or similar job titled); who work[ed] for Defendant SV
Super Sale Bin Store, GV Super Sales Bin Store, Super Sale Bin Store,
Ahmad Alzfifah and/or Sameer Qasem; within the past three years; who
work[ed] over 40 hours in any given workweek, or were paid below Arizona
minimum wage for any workweek; as a past or present worker are known as
(the “Collective Members”).
(Doc. 22 ¶ 123; Doc. 42 at 1.) Plaintiff alleges he and the Collective Members have
substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions, routinely worked over 40 hours
in a given workweek, and were not compensated for hours worked over 40 in a week at a
rate of one and one-half times their regular rate, in violation of Section 207 of the FLSA.
(Doc. 22 ¶¶ 127–35); see 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Thus, Plaintiff and the Collective Members
appear to share issues of law and fact that are material to the disposition of their FLSA
claims. See Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1117.
Plaintiff’s Motion is supported by his declaration and the declaration of another
former employee, Alexa Hawkins. (See Docs. 42-1, 42-2.) Plaintiff avers that while
working for Defendants he did not punch in or out, his paystubs would reflect only 40 hours
per week even though he worked more than 40 hours per week, and he was paid in cash
for hours worked over 40 at his regular hourly rate or sometimes not paid at all. (Doc. 42-
1 ¶¶ 15–20.) Plaintiff states he personally witnessed two other employees with the same
job title and duties, Jamal Ahmad and Nicholas Kochenderfer, work similar schedules and
also not receive overtime pay. (Id. ¶¶ 21–24.) Hawkins avers she worked at Super Sale Bin
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Store LLC for approximately four months, routinely worked more than 40 hours per week,
did not punch in or out, was paid by cash, and was paid straight time or sometimes nothing
at all for hours worked over 40 hours per week. (Doc. 42-2 ¶¶ 2–9.) Hawkins states she
personally witnessed another employee with the same job title, job duties, and
compensation as her, Isabella Stewart, work a similar schedule and not receive time and
half for overtime. (Id. ¶¶ 11–12.) Plaintiff has raised substantial allegations that he and
other employees of Defendants worked overtime and were not paid time and a half for
overtime hours, pursuant to the same practices and policies. See Colson, 687 F. Supp. 2d
at 926 (“The evidence must only show that there is some factual nexus which binds the
named plaintiffs and the potential class members together as victims of a particular alleged
policy or practice.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Conditional Certification (Doc. 42) is
granted. The Court conditionally certifies this matter as a collective action under 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) with respect to all current and former employees as described in Plaintiff’s Motion
for Conditional Certification, who worked for Defendants (“Collective Members”).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, to the extent applicable,2 Plaintiff’s proposed
opt-in procedures and form of notice are authorized. (See Doc. 42 at 10–13; Doc. 42-3.)
Defendants shall provide Plaintiff’s counsel within three (3) days of this Order the names,
all known addresses, all known email addresses (work and personal), employee
identification number, last four digits of social security numbers, dates of employment, and
phone numbers for all Collective Members, (“Class List”).
Defendants shall provide such information in a computer-readable format.
Plaintiff’s counsel shall mail a copy of the “Notice of Collective Action” and “Consent
Form,” via regular U.S. Mail and via electronic mail to all persons contained on the list
within seven (7) days of receiving the list from Defendants. Collective Members shall also
2 As noted above, the Clerk of Court has already entered default as to Ahmad Alzfifah,
GV Super Sale Bin Store Incorporated, and Super Sale Bin Store LLC, and the Court struck
SV Super Sale Bin Store, Inc.’s answer after it failed to obtain new counsel.
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be given the option to execute their Consent Forms electronically online. In the body of the
email notice, Plaintiff’s counsel shall provide a link for electronic execution of the Consent
form. All consent forms shall be returned to Plaintiff’s counsel who in turn will be
responsible for filing them with the Court.
Defendants shall post the Notice of Collective Action and Consent Form in a
conspicuous place at each of their businesses for the full 90-day opt in period. Defendants
shall also include the Notice of Collective Action and Consent Form on the first regular
payday after the Court grants this motion with all current workers’ paystubs.
The Collective Members shall have ninety (90) days from the date of the mailing of
the Notice and Consent Form to file their Notice of Consent opting-in to this lawsuit as
plaintiffs, unless good cause can be shown as to why the consent was not postmarked prior
to the deadline.
Forty-five (45) days before the deadline to opt in, Plaintiff’s counsel shall send the
Notice of Collective Action and Consent Form to those class members who have not yet
joined the lawsuit in the same manner described above.
Further, Defendants are hereby prohibited from retaliating, directly or indirectly,
against any potential Collective Member. Defendants shall instruct all of its owners and
managers of this prohibition.
Dated this 8th day of June, 2026.
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