Sidor #356561 v. Thornell et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
John Joseph Sidor,
Petitioner,
v.
Ryan Thornell, et al.,
Respondents.
No. CV-25-08141-PCT-DWL
ORDER
This is a habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On October 24, 2025,
Magistrate Judge Fine issued a 33-page report and recommendation (“R&R”) concluding
that Petitioner’s habeas petition should be dismissed and denied with prejudice. (Doc. 13.)
Afterward, Petitioner filed an objection to the R&R (Doc. 14) and Respondents filed a
response (Doc. 15).
Petitioner’s objections implicate 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), which provides that when,
as here, a magistrate judge has issued an R&R regarding a dispositive matter and a party
has thereafter filed timely written objections, “[a] judge of the court shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the [R&R] or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.
The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge
with instructions.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2)-(3). As the
Ninth Circuit has explained, “[i]n providing for a de novo determination . . . Congress
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intended to permit whatever reliance a district judge, in the exercise of sound judicial
discretion, chose to place on a magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations. . . .
[D]istrict courts conduct proper de novo review where they state they have done so, even
if the order fails to specifically address a party’s objections.” United States v. Ramos, 65
F.4th 427, 433 (9th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). See also id. at 434 (“[T]he district court ha[s]
no obligation to provide individualized analysis of each objection.”). Additionally, district
courts are not required to review any portion of an R&R to which no specific objection has
been made. See, e.g., Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985) (“It does not appear
that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate’s factual or legal
conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to those
findings.”); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he
district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo
if objection is made, but not otherwise.”). Thus, district judges need not review an
objection to an R&R that is general and non-specific. See, e.g., Warling v. Ryan, 2013 WL
5276367, *2 (D. Ariz. 2013) (“Because de novo review of an entire R & R would defeat
the efficiencies intended by Congress, a general objection ‘has the same effect as would a
failure to object.’”) (citations omitted).
Here, even though there is a colorable argument that Petitioner’s objections are
insufficient to trigger any need for further review—they essentially restate arguments that
Petitioner previously raised and do not purport to identify specific errors in the R&R’s
analysis regarding Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), and regarding exhaustion and
procedural default—the Court has, in an abundance of caution, performed a de novo review
of the R&R and fully agrees with its analysis and conclusions.
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Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. The R&R (Doc. 13) is adopted.
2. Petitioner’s objections (Doc. 14) are overruled.
3. The petition (Doc. 1) is dismissed and denied with prejudice.
4. A certificate of appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on
appeal are denied because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right and because the denial of the petition is justified by a plain procedural
bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling debatable.
5. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this action.
Dated this 25th day of November, 2025.
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