Diaz-Gonzalez v. Unknown Party et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Jaime Diaz-Gonzalez,
Petitioner,
v.
Eric Rokosky, Warden, Eloy Detention
Center, United States Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Todd Blanche, US
Attorney General
Respondent.
No. CV 26-03523 PHX SPL (CDB)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
A 221 324 988
TO THE HONORABLE STEVEN P. LOGAN:
Petitioner Jaime Diaz-Gonzalez proceeds pro se and is detained at the Eloy
Detention Center in Eloy, Arizona. Petitioner seeks relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
I. Background
Petitioner, a native of Mexico, alleges he entered the United States without
inspection on or about January 1, 2005. (ECF No. 1 at 9). Petitioner has continuously
resided in the United States since 2005. (Id.). Petitioner asserts he has no criminal history,
that he has “worked hard to support himself and his family” and has a “stable work history”
since entering the United States, and that he has established “deep and substantial ties to
this country over the course of nearly two decades.” (ECF No. 1 at 6-7, 11-12). Petitioner
alleges that on or about October 20, 2025, he was “detained by immigration authorities
after being stopped while driving to work at approximately 6 a.m.” (ECF No. 1 at 10).
Petitioner states he has “pending immigration proceedings, including a pending appeal
related to his asylum case.” (ECF No. 1 at 11). Respondents state that “Petitioner has an
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ongoing appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and other proceedings in
Immigration Court,” and that Petitioner is not under a final order of removal. (ECF No. 8
at 1, 2).1 Petitioner asserts he has never been given an individualized custody determination
and that he is not a flight risk or a danger to the community. (ECF No. 1 at 11-12).
II. Claims for Relief
Petitioner contends his continued detention without an individualized bond hearing
is not mandatory, is “unlawful,” and violates his right to due process.
Respondents assert that because Petitioner is not under a final order of removal and
because he was not inspected at the border before arriving in the United States his detention
is mandatory pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), citing Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi,
166 F. 4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026). (ECF No. 8 at 3). Respondents note the Fifth Circuit’s
“position” in Buenrostro-Mendez was adopted in Chavez v. Noem, No. 26-cv-00323 PHX-
MTL (D. Ariz. Feb. 9, 2026), but allow that a majority of the United States District Courts
have held to the contrary, citing Echevarria v. Bondi, 819 F. Supp. 3d 958 (D. Ariz. 2025)
and Barco Mercado v. Francis, 811 F. Supp. 3d 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2025). (ECF No. 8 at 4).
Respondents note that Barco Mercado collects “350 decisions that found for the habeas
petitioner).” (Id.). Respondents also argue that the Central District of California’s decision
in Bautista v. Santacruz, 813 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2025) “is a legal nullity outside
that District.” (ECF No. 8 at 7).
III. Analysis
The vast majority of federal courts across the country—analyzing the language,
structure, agency application, and legislative history of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226 and 1225(b)—
have concluded that § 1225(b) (providing that a particular category of noncitizens whose
removal proceedings are not final “shall” be detained pending the finality of those
proceedings) does not apply to individuals, like Petitioner, who were arrested in the interior
1 The Executive Office of Immigration Review’s case information website indicates that
Petitioner was ordered removed on December 1, 2025, and that his appeal to the Board of
Immigration review is pending. The deadline for briefing in the appeal has expired with no briefs
being filed. See https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation, last visited June 23, 2026.
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of the United States after having been present in the United States for some time. See, e.g.,
Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1060-62 (7th Cir. 2025);
Bautista, 813 F. Supp. 3d at 1077-1078; Rodriguez v. Bostock, 802 F. Supp. 3d 1297 (W.D.
Wash. 2025).
The Court has previously concluded in a similar case that although the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals’ stay of the Central District of California’s class certification and final
judgment in Bautista are not enforceable “insofar as they extend beyond the Central
District of California,” the stay did not “affect the Court’s independent determination that
Petitioner is entitled to relief in the form of release or a bond hearing.” Funes Vargas v.
Credio, No. 26-cv-02274-PHX-SPL, ECF No. 11 at 1-2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 8, 2026). And as
Respondents allow, the majority of the federal district courts that have considered the issue,
including a majority of the District of Arizona judges, and two federal Circuit Courts of
Appeals, have continued to follow the reasoning of Bautista v. Santacruz and Rodriguez v.
Bostock regarding the proper interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) as applied to noncitizens
who entered the United States without inspection and have been residents of the United
States for a period of years without committing any crimes. As the Court held in Funes
Vargas, 8 U.S.C. § 1226, rather than § 1225, applies to individuals such as Petitioner who
resided in the United States for a period of years and were taken into custody well within
the border, as opposed to those arrested at the border at the time they sought entry into the
United States. Accord Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713, 734-35 (6th Cir. 2026);
Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Mia., 175 F.4th 1258, 1280-85 (11th Cir.
2026) (Ҥ 1226 supplies the default rule of detention for an alien arrested and detained in
the interior”); Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, 175 F.4th 61 passim (2nd Cir. 2026) (holding
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) governed the petitioner’s detention when the petitioner was arrested
within the interior of the United States after living in the United States for over twenty
years); Castañon-Nava, 161 F.4th at 1061 (holding that, generally, “ICE’s authority to
detain a noncitizen discovered within the country derives from § 1226(a) and not from
§ 1225(b)”). See also, e.g., Perez v. Lyons, 823 F. Supp. 3d 1102, 1110 (E.D. Cal. 2026)
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(collecting cases); Dias da Silva v. Moniz, 822 F. Supp. 3d 224, 226 (D. Mass. 2026)
(noting the “many other courts across the country” that have followed Rodriguez v.
Bostock); Suarez-Lugo v. Bondi, 819 F. Supp. 3d 653, 668-69 (S.D. Tex. 2026); Elias v.
Knight, 817 F. Supp. 3d 970, 982-84 (D. Idaho 2025); Requejo Roman v. Castro, 816 F.
Supp. 3d 1267, 1280 (D.N.M. 2026) (“The vast majority of federal courts who have
examined this particular issue in recent months—including one circuit court—have
rejected the Government’s interpretation of sections 1225 and 1226,” citing Castañon-
Nava); Mokara v. DeRosa, No. 26-cv-01653, 2026 WL 1354780, at *4 (D. Ariz. Apr. 23,
2026), report and recommendation adopted, No. 26-cv-01653, 2026 WL 1352087 (D.
Ariz. May 14, 2026); Rodriguez v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-03917, 2025 WL 4058331, at *2 n.2
(D. Ariz. Nov. 6, 2025) (collecting cases). As numerous federal courts have concluded,
including quite eloquently the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Barbosa da Cunha,
Respondents’ proposed interpretation of the relevant statutes “(1) disregards the plain
meaning of section 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) disregards the relationship between sections 1225
and 1226; (3) would render a recent amendment to section 1226(c) superfluous; and (4) is
inconsistent with decades of prior statutory interpretation and practice.” Lepe v. Andrews,
801 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (collecting cases so concluding). Contra Avila
v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026) (holding individuals who have never been
formally admitted into the United States and who are arrested in the interior of the country
are properly subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)); Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at
502 (same).
As the Court previously concluded in Funes Vargas, in accordance with the vast
majority of federal district courts to consider the issue and the Sixth, Eleventh, and Second
Circuit Courts of Appeal, Petitioner’s detention is not pursuant to §1225(b) and is not
mandatory and, accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to release from detention or a bond
hearing.
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IV. Conclusion
Petitioner’s detention without a bond hearing, under the circumstances and equities
of this case, is unlawful because it is not mandated by statute. Petitioner is entitled to release
from detention or a prompt and individualized bond hearing, at which Respondents must
justify Petitioner’s continued detention by a showing of clear and convincing evidence that
Petitioner would likely flee or pose a danger to the community if released.
Accordingly,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that the petition for habeas relief pursuant to § 2241
(ECF No. 1) be granted, and the Court order that Respondents either release Petitioner or
bring him before an immigration judge within seven days for a bond hearing where the
government must show that he is a flight risk or danger to the community. It is further
recommended that Petitioner be given at least three days notice of such hearing. If the Court
orders a bond hearing, it is recommended that it further order that the adjudicator prepare
a written, explained decision, reflecting consideration of all evidence properly submitted
by Petitioner and the factors announced in In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37 (BIA 2006),
rather than issuing a decision by checking boxes on a form.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment.
Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that the parties shall have
fourteen (14) days from the date this Report and Recommendation is docketed to file
specific written objections with the Court. However, given the length of time that Petitioner
has been detained and that Respondents’ interpretation of the relevant statutes purportedly
authorizing his detention have been repeatedly been rejected by the federal courts,
IT IS ORDERED that the parties shall have seven (7) days after being served
with this Report and Recommendation to docket any objections. Although this period
is shorter than that provided by Rule 72(b)(2), the adjustment is warranted given the nature
of Petitioner’s harm and because Respondents have extensively briefed the issues involved
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in numerous other § 2241 cases recently presented to the District of Arizona. It is noted
that in numerous similar cases Respondents have not objected to a report and
recommendation reaching the same conclusion presented herein.
Pursuant to Rule 7.2(e)(3) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the United
States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections to the Report and
Recommendation may not exceed ten (10) pages in length. Failure to timely file objections
to any factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver
of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration of the issues. See United States v.
Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
Dated this 23rd day of June, 2026.
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