Vicas v. Bondi et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Florin Vicas,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, et al.,
Respondents.
No. CV-26-01706-PHX-SPL (MTM)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO THE HONORABLE STEVEN P. LOGAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE:
Petitioner Florin Vicas, who is represented by counsel, has filed a Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus Under § 2241. (Doc. 1.)
I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION
Petitioner is subject to detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) by the Department
of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement and has been detained since
August 22, 2025. Petitioner requested a bond hearing. The bond was denied because the IJ
found Petitioner a danger and a flight risk. Petitioner appealed the bond denial and the
appeal remains pending. On October 23, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
dismissed Petitioner’s direct appeal regarding his removal. Petitioner filed an appeal with
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that remains pending. On February 12, 2026, Petitioner
requested a custody redetermination based on new evidence. His second bond request was
denied. Petitioner appealed the IJ’s denial and the appeal remains pending. Petitioner
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claims that his prolonged detention violates his Fifth Amendment rights to due process and
seeks a bond hearing and release. However, because Petitioner has received two
individualized bond determinations and he remains a danger and a flight risk, Petitioner is
not constitutionally entitled to another bond hearing. The Court will recommend that the
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.
II. BACKGROUND
Petitioner entered the United States on or about March 7, 2002, with a B2 tourist
visa. (Doc. 1 at 3.) On February 28, 2003, Petitioner was granted asylum by U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). (Doc. 7-1, Exh. A.) On June 8, 2015,
USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Terminate Asylum Status due to evidence received by
the USCIS indicating “fraud in [his] application such that [he was] not eligible for asylum
at the time it was granted.” (Id.) Petitioner was subsequently issued a Notice to Appear
charging him for obtaining asylum status by fraud under Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”) § 237(a)(1)(B). (Doc. 1 at 3-4.)
On April 9, 2020, the Immigration Court terminated Petitioner’s asylum status,
sustained the charge of removability, denied relief, and ordered Petitioner removed to
Romania. (Doc. 1 at 4.) Petitioner filed an appeal to the BIA. (Id.) On August 22, 2025,
Petitioner was taken into U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody. (Id.)
Petitioner received a bond hearing pursuant to INA § 236(a) on August 29, 2025, that was
denied by an IJ due to a finding of both flight risk and danger.1 (Id.) Petitioner’s appeal of
1 The court’s August 29, 2025 reasoning for finding Petitioner a danger was based on the
following:
The Court’s primary concern is the Respondent’s criminal history in
Romania. The Respondent was convicted of Deceit on May 24, 2013, under
Article 215, Parts 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the Criminal Code of Romania, and was
sentenced to eleven years of imprisonment. There is a Romanian Warrant for
Enforcement of Custodial Sentence related to the Respondent’s conviction,
singed by the presiding judge of the Criminal Court of Bihor County in
Romania. The forensic report identifies a loss equaling $145,599.01 United
States Dollars (USD) as of the date of the Respondent’s conviction. Based
on Respondent’s criminal conviction and outstanding warrant, the Court
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that decision is pending before the BIA. (Id.)
On October 23, 2025, the BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal of the removal order
and affirmed the IJ’s decision. (Id.) Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals that same day. (Id.) On February 25, 2026, the IJ denied
Petitioner’s second bond request finding the following:
The Court finds the record insufficient to support a finding that there has
been a material change in Respondent’s circumstances related to
dangerousness. Nor does the record reflect a material change in the
circumstances of Respondent’s flight risk, as the current posture of his
removal proceedings does not provide him with a changed incentive to
appear for future hearings; thus, such evidence does not further mitigate
against his risk of flight. In other words, the danger and flight risk presented
by Respondent remain unchanged. The Court therefore finds the record
insufficient to demonstrate that Respondent’s circumstances have materially
changed since his first custody hearing held on August 29, 2025, such that a
second custody hearing is warranted. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e). The Court
must therefore deny Respondent’s request for a second custody
redetermination hearing and a change in custody status.
(Doc. 7-2, Exh. B.) Petitioner’s appeal of that decision is pending before the BIA. (Doc. 1
at 5.)
III. PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
In his Petition, Petitioner claims that his prolonged detention violates his Fifth
Amendment rights to due process. Petitioner seeks an individualized bond hearing and
release from custody.
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finds that the seriousness of Respondent’s criminal behavior reflects that he
poses a danger to the community, as his past behavior is highly indicative of
future dangerousness.
(Doc. 7-2, Exh. B) (internal citations omitted).
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Respondents filed a Response on April 12, 2026, and Petitioner filed a Reply on
April 17, 2026. (Docs. 7, 8.)
IV. DISCUSSION
The district court is empowered to issue a writ of habeas corpus where an individual
is held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States .
. . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The language of § 2241 and “the common-law history of the
writ” makes clear “that the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody
upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is to secure
release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 484 (1973) (noting that
the writ of habeas corpus “was early recognized by [the Supreme] Court as a ‘great
constitutional privilege’”). The Supreme Court has made clear that § 2241 applies to
noncitizens challenging their immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
687-88 (2001).
Because Petitioner challenges his prolonged civil detention, the Court has
jurisdiction to address the instant Petition. See Lopez-Marroquin v. Barr, 955 F.3d 759,
759 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[D]istrict courts retain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider
habeas challenges to immigration detention that are sufficiently independent of the merits
of the removal order . . . .”).
Section 1226(a) establishes the default framework governing discretionary
immigration detention pending removal proceedings. Under that provision, DHS may
arrest and detain a noncitizen and may release the individual on bond or conditional parole.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288 (2018). Unlike other
immigration detention statutes, § 1226(a) provides substantial procedural protections.
Specifically, Section 1226(a) and its implementing regulations “provide several layers of
review of the agency’s initial custody determination, an initial bond hearing before a
neutral decisionmaker, the opportunity to be represented by counsel and to present
evidence, the right to appeal, and the right to seek a new hearing when circumstances
materially change.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1202-03 (9th Cir. 2022).
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These multiple layers of review distinguish § 1226(a) from other detention provisions and
significantly reduce the risk of erroneous detention.
Although neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has definitively held that
the balancing test announced in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), governs due
process challenges to immigration detention, the Ninth Circuit has assumed, without
deciding, its applicability in the § 1226(a) context. Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1206-07.
Under Mathews, courts balance: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous
deprivation under the procedures employed and the probable value of additional
safeguards; and (3) the Government’s interest, including the burdens associated with
additional procedures. 424 U.S. at 335.
Applying the three-factor balancing test set forth in Mathews, the Court concludes
that Petitioner’s continued detention does not violate the Due Process Clause and that an
additional bond hearing is not constitutionally required at this time.
As to the first factor, Petitioner’s private interest in freedom from physical restraint
is unquestionably substantial. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that freedom
from imprisonment lies at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, and
the Ninth Circuit has similarly characterized this interest as “fundamental.” Hernandez v.
Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017). Petitioner has remained in ICE custody since
August 22, 2025, and his detention has therefore extended for approximately ten months.
The Court recognizes that prolonged detention weighs in Petitioner’s favor. However, the
length of detention cannot be considered in isolation. Unlike detainees who have never
received an individualized custody determination, Petitioner received an initial bond
hearing shortly after entering ICE custody on August 29, 2025. Following a consideration
of the evidence, the IJ determined that Petitioner presented both a danger to the community
and a flight risk. Thereafter, Petitioner sought a second custody redetermination hearing
that the IJ denied on February 25, 2026, after concluding that Petitioner failed to
demonstrate a material change in circumstances as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e).
Specifically, the IJ found that neither Petitioner’s dangerousness nor his incentive to flee
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had materially changed and that both grounds supporting continued detention remained
intact. Although Petitioner’s liberty interest is significant, these relatively recent custody
determinations diminish the weight of his claim that due process presently requires yet
another hearing.
The second Mathews factor – the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty and the
probable value of additional procedural safeguards – also weighs in Respondents’ favor.
Petitioner has not been detained without process. Rather, he received an individualized
bond hearing within one week of entering ICE custody, during which an IJ considered
whether he posed a danger and flight risk. When Petitioner later requested a second custody
redetermination, the IJ again reviewed his circumstances and determined that no material
change justified reopening the custody determination. Petitioner’s appeals of both custody
decisions remain pending before the BIA, providing an additional layer of administrative
review. Thus, the risk that Petitioner is being erroneously detained is substantially reduced
because his detention and requests for release have been repeatedly considered. Moreover,
beyond the existence of an approved I-130 petition and his petition for review currently
pending before Ninth Circuit – factors that were both present during his second custody
redetermination request – Petitioner has not identified any newly developed evidence or
changed circumstances suggesting that another bond hearing would likely produce a
different result. Consequently, the probable value of an additional hearing at this juncture
is minimal.
Finally, the third Mathews factor likewise favors Respondents. The Government
possesses legitimate and compelling interests in ensuring Petitioner’s appearance at future
immigration proceedings and protecting the public from individuals determined to pose a
danger. Those interests are particularly strong here because on two separate occasions
Petitioner has been found to present both a flight risk and a danger to the community. While
the administrative burden of conducting an additional hearing may be relatively modest,
the Government has already afforded Petitioner the procedural protections provided under
INA § 236(a), including an individualized bond hearing and consideration of a subsequent
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request for custody redetermination. Requiring successive bond hearings absent a material
change in circumstances would diminish and undermine the finality of prior custody
determinations. Under these circumstances, the Government’s interests remain significant.
Balancing the Mathews factors, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s continued
detention does not violate due process. Although Petitioner’s liberty interest is substantial
and the duration of his detention is not insignificant, he has already received the process
constitutionally due through an individualized bond hearing, a subsequent custody
redetermination request, and ongoing administrative review.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that Petitioner is not constitutionally
entitled to another bond hearing at this point. The Court will recommend that the Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.
Accordingly,
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The
parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and
Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days
within which to file a response to the objections.
Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the
district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,
1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the
Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the
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findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report
and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.
Dated this 29th day of June, 2026.
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