Moslehi v. Bondi et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Amin Moslehi,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, et al.,
Respondents.
No. CV-26-01244-PHX-JJT (MTM)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO THE HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
On January 30, 2026, Petitioner Amin Moslehi, who is confined in the Eloy
Detention Center, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. §
2241. (Doc. 1.) Counsel for Petitioner subsequently filed a notice of appearance on June 4,
2026. (Doc. 10.)
I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION
Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) by
the Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement and has
been detained since January 24, 2025. On April 25, 2025, an Immigration Judge denied
Petitioner bond and he appealed that decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals. The
BIA stayed removal pending appeal. Petitioner claims he is “entitled to a constitutionally
protected due process right against unreasonably prolonged detention” and is entitled to a
bond hearing. However, because Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b), and Petitioner is not constitutionally entitled to a bond hearing, the Court
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will recommend that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with
prejudice.
II. BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Iran who was taken into Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody on January 24, 2025, after presenting himself for
inspection at the border of Mexico and the United States. (Doc. 1 at 4.) Petitioner requested
review of his custody. (Id.) On April 25, 2025, an Immigration Judge denied Petitioner
bond because Petitioner was an “applicant for admission” and an arriving alien under 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b). (Id.) On October 30, 2025, Petitioner appealed “the decision of the IJ”
to the Board of Immigration Appeals. (Id. at 4-5.) The BIA stayed removal pending appeal.
(Id. at 5.) Petitioner has been detained 13 months without “a bond hearing before a neutral
adjudicator to evaluate whether his prolonged detention remains justified.” (Id. at 4.)
III. PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
In his Petition, Petitioner raises one ground for relief in which he claims that he is
“entitled to a constitutionally protected due process right against unreasonably prolonged
detention.” (Doc. 1 at 5.) In his prayer for relief, Petitioner seeks an individualized bond
hearing. (Doc. 1 at 11.)
Respondents filed a Response on March 23, 2026, and Petitioner filed a Reply on
April 3, 2026. (Docs. 8, 9.)
IV. DISCUSSION
The district court is empowered to issue a writ of habeas corpus where an individual
is held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States .
. . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The language of § 2241 and “the common-law history of the
writ” makes clear “that the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody
upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is to secure
release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 484 (1973) (noting that
the writ of habeas corpus “was early recognized by [the Supreme] Court as a ‘great
constitutional privilege’”). The Supreme Court has made clear that § 2241 applies to
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noncitizens challenging their immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
687-88 (2001).
Because Petitioner challenges his prolonged civil detention, the Court has
jurisdiction to address the instant Petition. See Lopez-Marroquin v. Barr, 955 F.3d 759,
759 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[D]istrict courts retain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider
habeas challenges to immigration detention that are sufficiently independent of the merits
of the removal order . . . .”).
A. Detention Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)
“A noncitizen’s place within this statutory scheme can affect whether his detention
is mandatory or discretionary, as well as the kind of review process available to him if he
wishes to contest the necessity of his detention.” Avilez v. Garland, 69 F.4th 525, 529 (9th
Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). “An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted
or who arrives in the United States . . . shall be deemed . . . an applicant for admission.” 8
U.S.C. § 1225(a). “[I]n the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the
examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly
and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained[.]” 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A). An alien falling within the scope of § 1225(b) must be detained until the
conclusion of the alien’s removal proceedings; the statute contains no limit upon the length
of detention nor any bond hearing requirement. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281,
297 (2018).
Accordingly, because Petitioner is statutorily subject to mandatory detention
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) until the conclusion of his removal proceedings, the
Court will proceed to Petitioner’s due process argument.
B. Due Process
Petitioner argues he is “entitled to a constitutionally protected due process right
against unreasonably prolonged detention” and is entitled to a bond hearing. In response,
Respondents argue Petitioner is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and the Due
Process Clause does not require an individualized bond hearing. Respondents state that,
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under binding precedent, inadmissible aliens have only those due process rights as have
been prescribed by statute.
Although the limited record before the Court reflects that Petitioner has spent a
significant period in immigration detention while pursuing his claims, the Court finds that
the governing precedent concerning arriving aliens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)
presents substantial obstacles to his due process challenge.
Petitioner argues that his continued mandatory detention without an individualized
bond hearing violates the Due Process Clause. His position finds support in a number of
district court decisions recognizing that prolonged detention may, at some point, raise
constitutional concerns. See, e.g., Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1117 (W.D.
Wash. 2019) (“[T]he Court joins the vast majority of other district courts to conclude that
unreasonably prolonged detention under § 1225(b) without a bond hearing violates due
process.”); Gomez v. Doe, No. CV 25-03255 PHX JJT (CDB), 2025 WL 3269886, at *11
(D. Ariz. Nov. 3, 2025) (holding that “[t]he Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
extends to all persons, regardless of status” and applying a balancing test to determine what
procedural safeguards apply to a noncitizen challenging his detention under §
1225(b)(2)(A)), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Gomez v. Unknown Party,
2025 WL 3269055 (D. Ariz. Nov. 24, 2025); Avakian v. Cantu, No. CV-26-00104-PHX-
SHD, 2026 WL 746351, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 17, 2026) (applying due process
considerations to petitioner’s prolonged detention under § 1225(b)).
Courts have applied a variety of balancing tests to evaluate on a case-by-case basis
whether mandatory detention under § 1225(b) without a bond hearing violates due process.
See, e.g., Imani v. Cantu, No. CV 26-01933 PHX DJH (CDB), 2026 WL 1406307, at *10
(D. Ariz. May 4, 2026) (“The [Ninth Circuit] has not provided the lower courts with
guidance regarding the point at which an immigration detainee’s prolonged mandatory
detention under § 1225(b) without a bond hearing becomes unconstitutional. The District
Courts within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction have generally found the test stated in Banda
v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1117 (W.D. Wash. 2019) applicable with regard to
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those detained pursuant to § 1225(b) . . . , although some courts have instead applied the
test stated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) . . . which has often been
applied in situations involving detention under § 1226(c).”), report and recommendation
adopted, 2026 WL 1398596 (D. Ariz. May 19, 2026).
Petitioner’s circumstances evoke similar concerns. He has remained in custody
since January 24, 2024, when he presented himself for inspection, and was immediately
detained. (Doc. 1 at 4.) He subsequently requested review of his detention and he was
denied bond by an Immigration Judge on April 25, 2025. (Id.) Petitioner was then ordered
removed and his appeal of that decision is currently pending before the BIA. (Id. at 4-5.)
The length of his detention is undoubtedly burdensome and has occurred while his removal
proceedings remain unresolved.
Nevertheless, existing Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent have
distinguished between noncitizens who have established substantial ties to the United
States and those like Petitioner who are treated, for legal purposes, as applicants for
admission at the threshold of entry. In Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam,
591 U.S. 103 (2020), the Supreme Court reiterated that Congress possesses broad authority
to determine the conditions under which an alien may enter the United States and that an
alien seeking initial admission generally cannot claim procedural due process rights beyond
those provided by statute. The Court relied upon a long line of cases, see, e.g., Nishimura
Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892), United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,
338 U.S. 537 (1950), and Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953),
reaffirming that Congress may prescribe the procedures governing admission and
exclusion decisions. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 138-39 (“The power to admit or exclude
aliens is a sovereign prerogative,” “the Constitution gives ‘the political department of the
government’ plenary authority to decide which aliens to admit,” and “a concomitant of that
power is the power to set the procedures to be followed in determining whether an alien
should be admitted.” (internal citations omitted)).
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This court confronted a closely related issue in Ibarra-Perez v. Howard, 468 F.
Supp. 3d 1156 (D. Ariz. 2020). There, an alien detained pursuant to § 1225(b) argued that
his prolonged detention without a bond hearing violated due process. After reviewing
applicable Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit authority, the court concluded that detention
of an arriving alien during the pendency of removal proceedings remained constitutionally
permissible. Id. at 1177. The court observed that neither Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S.
281 (2018), nor subsequent Ninth Circuit decisions had undermined prior precedent
suggesting that mandatory detention under § 1225(b) may continue for the duration of
pending removal proceedings. Id.
Importantly, Ibarra-Perez acknowledged the existence of contrary district court
authority, including Banda, and recognized the liberty interests at stake. However, it
ultimately declined to adopt those decisions because they did not fully account for the
entry-fiction doctrine and related Ninth Circuit precedent governing arriving aliens
detained under § 1225(b).1 Id. Specifically, the court stated,
[T]he Court must do its best to discern and apply the law of the Ninth Circuit
as it currently stands. As discussed, [Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d
1441 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc)] suggests it is constitutionally permissible to
require Petitioner to remain in custody for the duration of his removal
proceeding. If anything, the Ninth Circuit seemed to ratify that understanding
of Barrera-Echavarria in Rodriguez II [Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127
(9th Cir. 2013)] and Rodriguez III [Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th
Cir. 2015)]. And neither the Supreme Court’s decision in [Jennings] nor the
Ninth Circuit’s remand order in Rodriguez V [Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d
252 (9th Cir. 2018)] casts any doubt upon the continued validity of those
portions of Barrera-Echavarria, Rodriguez II, and Rodriguez III.
1 The entry fiction doctrine is based upon the “distinction between those aliens who have
come to our shores seeking admission, such as petitioner, and those who are within the
United States after an entry, irrespective of its legality.” Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S.
185, 187 (1958). The Supreme Court has noted that the latter category of noncitizens has
“additional rights and privileges not extended to those in the former category who are
merely ‘on the threshold of initial entry.’” Id. (quoting Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212);
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 139 (“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is
due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned”) (quoting Shaughnessy, 338 U.S.
at 544). Those noncitizens who are on the “threshold of initial entry” are not considered
“to have ‘effected an entry[.]’” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 140 (quoting Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 693).
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Ibarra-Perez, 468 F. Supp. 3d at 1177.2 Notably, the court recognized that 1225(b) does
not authorize the Attorney General to incarcerate detainees for an indefinite period and
emphasized that the petitioner would be detained only “‘until specified events take place,’
i.e., until the resolution of the current removal proceeding . . . [a]nd if Petitioner’s removal
ceases to become reasonably foreseeable, Petitioner [would] have other potential avenues
for seeking release.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
Thuraissigiam, decided shortly after Ibarra-Perez, further reinforced that
conclusion. Although Thuraissigiam arose in the context of admission procedures rather
than prolonged detention, it relied on the holding of Mezei – which was decided in the
detention context. Since Thuraissigiam, other courts have concluded that mandatory
detention under § 1225(b) does not create a constitutional entitlement to an individualized
bond hearing while removal proceedings remain pending. See, e.g., Petgrave v. Aleman,
529 F. Supp. 3d 665 (S.D. Tex. 2021); Gonzales Garcia v. Rosen, 513 F. Supp. 3d 329
(W.D.N.Y. 2021); Leon Alcazar v. Cantu, No. CV-24-03342-PHX-JAT (DMF), 2025 WL
2548698 (D. Ariz. June 5, 2025), report and recommendation adopted 2025 WL 2304357
(D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025); Chavez v. Noem, 2026 WL 381618 (D. Ariz. Feb. 9, 2026);
Ibarra-Perez, 468 F. Supp. 3d 1156; Mamedova v. Noem, 2026 WL 1162282 (D. Ariz.
Apr. 29, 2026); Savin v. Rivas, 2026 WL 1162384 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2026).
At the same time, and as illustrated above, the law remains unsettled. The Ninth
Circuit has acknowledged that it remains unresolved whether the Due Process Clause
requires additional bond procedures under any immigration detention statute. Rodriguez
Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1201 (9th Cir. 2022). Thus, while authority exists
supporting Petitioner’s concerns regarding prolonged detention, neither the Supreme Court
nor Ninth Circuit precedent presently establish a constitutional right to an individualized
2 With regards to Banda, the court specifically stated, “[i]n Banda, which is the district
court decision on which Petitioner primarily relies, the court did not cite or discuss
Barrera-Echavarria, the ‘entry fiction,’ or the portions of Rodriguez II and Rodriguez III
that seem to adopt Barrera-Echavarria’s logic as it pertains to arriving aliens who are
detained under § 1225(b) and are subject to the entry fiction.” Ibarra-Perez, 468 F. Supp.
3d at 1177.
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bond hearing for an arriving alien detained under § 1225(b) while removal proceedings
remain pending.
Furthermore, although in this case Petitioner’s detention has been lengthy, the
record demonstrates that he has received the procedural protections Congress has provided.
He presented himself for inspection, was immediately detained, requested review of his
detention, and he was denied bond by an Immigration Judge. Petitioner was then ordered
removed and his appeal of that decision is currently pending before the BIA. His detention
therefore remains tied to, and time-bound by, the ongoing adjudication of his claims.
The Court notes that this is not a case of indefinite detention. Under Jennings,
detention authorized by § 1225(b) continues only until specified events occur – namely,
the conclusion of immigration proceedings or removal. If Petitioner prevails on appeal, he
may obtain release through that process. If he becomes subject to a final order of removal
and detention later extends beyond the period authorized by statute, additional remedies
are available. See Ibarra-Perez, 468 F. Supp. 3d at 1177.
Accordingly, while the Court is sympathetic to the hardship imposed by Petitioner’s
prolonged confinement and recognizes the liberty interests implicated by continued
detention, existing Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent do not presently establish a
constitutional right to an individualized bond hearing for an arriving alien detained under
§ 1225(b) while removal proceedings remain pending. Petitioner has been afforded the
process authorized by Congress and he is not facing indefinite detention.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that Petitioner is subject to mandatory
detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and Petitioner is not constitutionally entitled to
a bond hearing. The Court will recommend that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be
denied and dismissed with prejudice.
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Accordingly,
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The
parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and
Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days
within which to file a response to the objections.
Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the
district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,
1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the
Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the
findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report
and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.
Dated this 8th day of June, 2026.
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