Hunter v. TForce Freight Incorporated

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Charles Hunter,
Plaintiff,
v.
TForce Freight Incorporated,
Defendant.
No. CV-26-00122-PHX-KML
ORDER
Plaintiff Charles Hunter is attempting to sue his former employer, defendant TForce
Freight Inc., for a variety of federal and state claims. Hunter’s latest complaint, like an
earlier one, does not state any claim for relief. Hunter is given a final opportunity to amend.
BACKGROUND
This case began with Hunter filing an unsigned complaint. (Doc. 1.) The court
ordered him to file a signed version of the complaint, which he failed to do, and the case
was closed. (Docs. 6, 8.) Hunter then sought to reopen the case, claiming there had been
confusion regarding his mailing address. (Doc. 9.) The court granted that request and again
ordered Hunter to file a signed complaint. (Doc. 10.)
On February 13, 2026, Hunter filed a signed complaint. (Doc. 12.) That complaint
alleged claims for sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, wrongful termination,
breach of a collective bargaining agreement, and a “pattern or practice of unlawful
employment practices.” (Doc. 12 at 1-2.) The court dismissed that complaint because it did
“not contain any factual allegations explaining what happened, who was involved, or why
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Hunter believes he was treated differently because of sex discrimination or retaliation,” nor
any facts regarding “the relevant provisions of the CBA he believes were violated.” (Doc.
17 at 2-3.) The court granted Hunter leave to amend but warned he needed to “provide
significantly more details regarding what happened to him, the other employees who were
involved, and why he believes the actions relevant to his claims were taken because of his
sex, in retaliation for his prior actions, or contrary to the CBA.” (Doc. 17 at 3.)
As permitted by the court’s order, on March 2, 2026, Hunter filed an amended
complaint. (Doc. 19.) A few days later, Hunter filed another amended complaint. (Doc.
20.) The court treats that latest complaint filed on March 4, 2026, as Hunter’s amendment
as of right. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A). On March 6, 2026, Hunter filed yet another
amended complaint. (Doc. 21.) Because Hunter’s March 4 complaint is deemed his
amendment as of right, all amendments after that filing may occur only “with the opposing
party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Hunter did not obtain
TForce’s written consent or leave of court, so his March 6, 2026, complaint is stricken as
unauthorized. The following analysis focuses exclusively on the March 4 complaint. Ferdik
v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992) (amended complaint supersedes earlier).
According to the operative complaint, Hunter “is a member of protected classes
based on race (Black) and sex/sexual orientation (gay male).” (Doc. 20 at 1.) While
working for TForce in Arizona, Hunter “was denied promotional opportunities despite
seniority and qualifications.” (Doc. 20 at 1.) Hunter does not identify what opportunities
he is referencing. After Hunter complained to “management and Human Resources,” he
“was accused of theft or criminal conduct.” (Doc. 20 at 1.) Hunter does not identify who
he spoke with or when this occurred. Hunter also alleges he was “subjected to harassment
and a hostile work environment, including taunting by co-workers.” (Doc. 20 at 1.) But
again, Hunter does not provide specifics regarding this harassment or why his work
environment would qualify as hostile. At some point, “[a] manager physically attacked
[Hunter] and [Hunter] was denied proper medical assistance.” (Doc. 20 at 1.) Hunter does
not explain if this physical attack is linked to his discrimination claims. All of these events
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appear to predate December 2022 because Hunter alleges that month he “was laid off or
terminated allegedly for lack of work, while less senior forklift operators were retained.”
(Doc. 20 at 1.)
In February 2025, TForce rehired Hunter. Hoping “to escape the prior
discriminatory treatment experienced in Arizona,” Hunter transferred to work at a location
in Colorado, but the “same pattern of harassment, targeting, and retaliatory treatment”
continued. (Doc. 20 at 1.) Hunter apparently complained again, on unidentified dates, but
“HR investigations . . . found no wrongdoing.” (Doc. 20 at 1.) At some point Hunter was
terminated.
Hunter asserts claims for race discrimination, sex discrimination, retaliation, and
hostile work environment under Title VII.1 Hunter also asserts claims for wrongful
termination and defamation under Arizona law. (Doc. 20 at 2). Although his latest
complaint provides slightly more information than the previous one the court analyzed,
Hunter still has not stated any claim for relief.
ANALYSIS
Because Hunter is proceeding in forma pauperis, the court must consider whether
his complaint states any claims on which he might be able to obtain relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(1). This requires the complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (simplified). This is not a “probability requirement,” but a requirement that the
factual allegations show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
1 Hunter also cites 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as a basis for his race discrimination claim. Section
1981 claims are analyzed under “the same legal principles as those applicable in a Title VII
disparate treatment case.” Surrell v. California Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th
Cir. 2008) (simplified). The court therefore analyzes the Title VII and § 1981 claims
together.
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experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
Beginning with Hunter’s claims for race and sex discrimination under Title VII, a
prima facie case of such discrimination requires the plaintiff show: (1) he belongs to a class
of persons protected by Title VII; (2) he performed his job satisfactorily; (3) he suffered an
adverse employment action; and (4) his employer treated him differently than a similarly-
situated employee who does not belong to the same protected class.2 See McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Hunter alleges he belongs to a protected
class, but he does not provide sufficiently clear allegations to establish any of the remaining
requirements. Hunter does not allege he was performing adequately, and he does not clearly
identify the adverse employment action he suffered. That is, Hunter may believe the
adverse action was the “pattern of harassment” or he may believe it was his termination.
He might also be attempting to identify both as actionable. The complaint simply does not
make this clear.
In addition to failing to identify the adverse action at issue, Hunter also fails to
identify any other similarly-situated employee he believes was treated differently. Nor has
Hunter alleged any other facts indicating he was treated differently because of his race or
sex. Overall, Hunter has not provided sufficient background facts for the court to conclude
he may have been the victim of discrimination. His race and sex discrimination claims are
dismissed.
Hunter’s next claim is for retaliation under Title VII. To state such a claim, Hunter
must allege (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment
action; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action. Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 2008).
Hunter alleges he “complained to management and Human Resources regarding
2 The requirement of establishing a prima facie case is an “evidentiary standard” and not a
“pleading requirement[].” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002). Thus,
a complaint cannot be dismissed merely because it does not contain facts establishing all
the requirements of a prima facie case. See Austin v. Univ. of Or., 925 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th
Cir. 2019). That said, a plaintiff’s complaint must still include “sufficient, nonconclusory
allegations plausibly linking the [adverse] action to discrimination” or retaliation. Id. at
1138 (applying this standard in the Title IX context).
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discrimination and unequal treatment,” but he does not provide any specifics about when
those complaints occurred. (Doc. 20 at 1.) At some unidentified time after those
complaints, Hunter was subject to “harassment, targeting, and retaliatory treatment” but he
does not provide any facts explaining what that treatment involved. Of particular
importance, Hunter does not provide any explanation why he believes his subsequent
treatment was because of his earlier protected activity. Without allegations linking the
protected activity to later events, Hunter has not stated a plausible retaliation claim. This
claim is dismissed.
Hunter then alleges a claim for wrongful termination. Arizona law “strictly limits
the claims available to an employee alleging wrongful termination.” Peterson v. City of
Surprise, 418 P.3d 1020, 1025 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018). Such a claim may be brought only
when “(1) a discharge is in violation of an employment contract; (2) a discharge violates
an Arizona statute; or (3) a discharge is in retaliation for the employee’s assertion of certain
rights protected by state law.” Guernsey v. Elko Wire Rope Inc., No. CV-21-00848-PHX-
DJH, 2023 WL 5348567, at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 21, 2023). Hunter does not provide factual
allegations establishing any of these possibilities. He does not identify any employment
contract, he does not identify an Arizona statute violated by his termination, and he does
not allege he was terminated in retaliation for complaints regarding violations of state law.
The wrongful termination claim is dismissed.
Hunter’s final claim is for defamation. Such a claim requires allegations the speaker
“publishes a false and defamatory communication” when the speaker “(a) knows that the
statement is false and it defames the other, (b) acts in reckless disregard of these matters,
or (c) acts negligently in failing to ascertain them.” Dube v. Likins, 167 P.3d 93, 104 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2007) (simplified). Hunter identifies the relevant statement as one that accused
him of “theft or criminal conduct.” (Doc. 20 at 1.) But he does not provide any meaningful
additional details, such as the identity of the speaker, how the statement was published, or
why that speaker knew the statement was false. Perhaps most importantly, Hunter appears
to place the statement as occurring prior to 2022. If that is when the statement was made,
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any defamation claim would be barred by the one-year statute of limitations. A.R.S.
§ 12-541(1). Without adequate factual allegations and likely barred by the statute of
limitations, the current defamation claim is dismissed.
Hunter has not provided sufficient factual allegations to state any claim, but he may
be able to add sufficient additional allegations. Hunter therefore is granted leave to file
one—and only one—amended complaint. If he chooses to file an amended complaint,
Hunter must explain what happened, who was involved, and why he believes certain
actions were based on his race, sex, or previous protected activity. Hunter must also
identify how his termination qualifies as actionable under the limited circumstances
Arizona law recognizes for a viable wrongful termination claim. And he must identify
when the defamatory statement was made, who made it, and how it was conveyed to a third
party.
Finally, some of Hunter’s filings suggest he may be using generative artificial
intelligence (“generative AI”).3 The court has a general policy that requires any party that
uses generative AI in connection with filings to attach to the subject filing a separate
declaration disclosing the use of generative AI and certifying that the filer, in the exercise
of the filer’s independent judgment, has personally reviewed and verified the content of
the filing as accurate and in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The
declaration must identify which, if any, portion of the filing incorporates Generative AI
outputs. Any party who presents to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper
incorporating inaccurate or undeclared generative AI outputs, including but not limited to
inaccurate or non-existent case citations, may be subject to sanctions including dismissal
without further warning. In preparing his amended complaint, Hunter must comply with
the court’s procedures regarding generative AI.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED the amended complaint (Doc. 20) is DISMISSED WITH
3 “Generative AI” as used in this order refers to large language models that accept user
input and generate new content. Generative AI includes, but is not limited to, the tools
available through ChatGPT, Claude, Copilot, DeepSeek, Google Gemini, and Grok.
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LEAVE TO AMEND. No later than March 25, 2026, plaintiff shall file an amended
complaint. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter a judgment of dismissal with prejudice
in the event no amended complaint is filed by that date.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Clerk of Court shall STRIKE the unauthorized
complaint (Doc. 21).
Dated this 10th day of March, 2026.
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