Harris v. Experian Information Solutions Incorporated

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Diana Harris,
Plaintiff,
v.
Experian Information Solutions
Incorporated,
Defendant.
No. CV-25-04761-PHX-SHD
ORDER
At issue is Defendant Experian Information Solutions Incorporated’s (“Experian”)
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (Doc. 15), and Experian’s Motion to Stay
Discovery, (Doc. 22). For the following reasons, Experian’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings will be granted, and the Motion to Stay Discovery will be denied as moot.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On January 1, 2022, Plaintiff Diana Harris purchased an exercise bike from Target’s
website for $529.29, using her Discover credit card. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 43, 59.) In February
2022, Harris paid off the full balance of her Discover account (the “Account”), including
the amount paid for the exercise bike. (Id. at ¶¶ 45–46.) In March 2022, Harris contacted
Target to initiate a return of the bike. (Id. at ¶ 47.) In early April, Target informed Harris
that it could schedule UPS to retrieve the item. (Id. at ¶¶ 49–50.) UPS picked the bike up
from Harris’s residence on April 5, 2022, and delivered it to a Target facility in Indiana on
April 8, 2022. (Id. at ¶¶ 51–52.)
By June 2022, Harris had not received a refund for the exercise bike. (Id. at ¶ 54.)
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Harris contacted Discover, explaining that she had not received a credit for the returned
bike and enclosed proof of the UPS pickup and delivery to Target. (Id. at ¶¶ 54–57.) On
September 1, 2022, Discover issued Harris a credit for the bike. (Id. at ¶ 58.) However, in
October 2022, Harris learned that Discover had reversed the credit and recharged the
$529.29 to her Account after an “additional review” in which Discover determined the
charge was valid. (Id. at ¶¶ 59–60.) Harris alleges that Discover reversed the credit
because Target told Discover that the bike was never returned. (Id. at ¶ 61.)
Between October 2022 and February 2023, Harris engaged in numerous
communications with Target, which maintained that the bike had not been returned. (Id.
at ¶¶ 62–63.) In January 2023, Target advised Harris that it would resolve the matter
directly with Discover, and Harris relayed this information to Discover. (Id. at ¶¶ 64–66.)
On February 16, 2023, Target sent Harris an email “approving” a refund of $539.17 plus
tax, to be credited to her original form of payment. (Id. at ¶¶ 68–70.) Harris, however,
never received a credit to her Account. (Id. at ¶ 71.) Instead, she received a Target gift
card. (Id.)
Harris did not pay the balance on her Account, so on February 28, 2023, Discover
suspended both the Account and Harris’s second Discover account, citing “the continued
delinquency.” (See id. at ¶¶ 77–78.) Two months later, on April 28, 2023, Discover closed
both accounts. (Id. at ¶ 80.)
Harris alleges that beginning in June 2023, Discover reported to Experian, a Credit
Reporting Agency (“CRA”), that the Account had been charged off with a balance of $811,
and that Experian thereafter included that information in Harris’s credit file and consumer
reports. (Id. at ¶¶ 15–16, 82–84.) Harris disputed the charged-off status and the $811
balance with Experian twice—first in the summer of 2024 and again on September 22,
2025—each time describing the Target and Discover controversy in detail and attaching
supporting documentation. (Id. at ¶¶ 85–88, 110–14.) In response to each dispute,
Experian sent an Automated Consumer Dispute Verification (“ACDV”) to Discover;
Discover verified the reported information as accurate; Experian communicated that result
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to Harris; and Experian did not correct or delete the reporting. (Id. at ¶¶ 89–90, 106, 115–
16.)
Harris alleges that Experian’s reporting of the charged-off status and $811 balance
caused her to suffer a number of adverse credit actions between March 2025 and September
2025, including the suspension of her Home Equity Line of Credit with PNC Bank, an
increase in her Annual Percentage Rate by American Express, closure of an account by
BMO Bank, N.A., denial of a credit application by CitiBank, denial of an insurance
application by Allstate, and denial of an account application by Skyla Credit Union. (Id.
at ¶¶ 133–57.) Harris further alleges that she has expended significant time and effort
disputing the reporting and has suffered emotional distress, including stress, anxiety,
embarrassment, and sleeplessness. (Id. at ¶¶ 160–64.)
Harris filed her Complaint on December 17, 2025, alleging that Experian violated
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., by failing to follow
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of Harris’s credit information
as required by § 1681e(b) and by failing to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation of her
disputes as required by § 1681i. (See generally id.) Harris brings this action individually
and asserts two counts. Count I alleges that Experian violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) by
failing to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy in the
preparation of Harris’s consumer reports. (Id. at ¶¶ 165–72.) Count II alleges that
Experian violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681i by failing to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation of
Harris’s disputes regarding the charged-off status and balance reported on her Discover
account. (Id. at ¶¶ 173–81.) Harris seeks actual, statutory, and punitive damages, together
with attorneys’ fees and costs, alleging that Experian’s conduct was willful or, in the
alternative, negligent. (Id. at ¶¶ 171–72, 180–81.)
On February 4, 2026, Experian answered the Complaint. (Doc. 13.) On February
26, 2026, Experian filed the instant Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). (Doc. 15.) Harris responded, (Doc. 18), and
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Experian replied, (Doc. 19).1
On March 25, 2026, Experian filed a Motion to Stay Discovery pending resolution
of the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Doc. 22.) Harris responded, (Doc. 24), and
Experian replied, (Doc. 25).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may
move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Judgment on the pleadings is
appropriate when, taking all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, “the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925
(9th Cir. 2009). A court’s analysis “under Rule 12(c) is substantially identical to analysis
under Rule 12(b)(6) because, under both rules, a court must determine whether the facts
alleged in the complaint, taken as true, entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy.” Chavez v.
United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, to survive a Rule 12(c) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true” and construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, “to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quotation marks omitted). A claim is plausible if the plaintiff pleads “factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In making this determination, courts do not accept legal
conclusions as true, nor do they consider “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id.; see also id. (“Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.”
(alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted)). For the purposes of ruling on a Rule
12(c) motion, courts must “accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe
the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).
1 The parties did not request oral argument, and it is not necessary, so this motion is
decided without holding a hearing. See LRCiv 7.2(f).
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III. DISCUSSION
Experian moves for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that Harris has failed
to plausibly allege an inaccuracy in her consumer report, as required to state a claim under
both § 1681e(b) and § 1681i of the FCRA. (See Doc. 15 at 4.)
A. Inaccuracy Under Ninth Circuit Law
The FCRA requires CRAs to “follow reasonable procedures to assure the maximum
possible accuracy” of consumer reports, 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b), and to “conduct a
reasonable reinvestigation” upon receiving notice of a consumer dispute, id.
§ 1681i(a)(1)(A). To state a claim under either provision, a plaintiff must first make “a
prima facie showing of inaccurate reporting by the CRA.” Shaw v. Experian Info. Sols.,
Inc., 891 F.3d 749, 756 (9th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted). Information on a
consumer report is “inaccurate” if it is “patently incorrect” or “misleading in such a way
and to such an extent that it can be expected to adversely affect credit decisions.” Id.
(citation omitted). Without a cognizable inaccuracy, courts “need not consider whether
[the CRA] had reasonable procedures or conducted reasonable reinvestigations.” Id. at
759.
Harris’s own allegations establish that Experian did not engage in inaccurate
reporting. Harris used her Discover credit card to purchase an exercise bike for $529.29.
(Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 43, 59.) Discover initially credited her Account for the charge but later
reversed that credit after concluding that the charge was valid. (Id. at ¶¶ 58–60.) Target
ultimately refunded Harris by issuing her a Target gift card rather than a credit to her
Account. (Id. at ¶¶ 70–71.) Harris did not pay the resulting balance on her Discover card,
and Discover suspended and closed the Account for “continued delinquency.” (See id. at
¶¶ 77–81.) On these facts, Experian’s reporting that the Account was charged off with an
outstanding balance is neither “patently incorrect” nor materially misleading. See Shaw,
891 F.3d at 756. The Complaint’s allegations confirm that the charge was placed on the
Account, that the balance went unpaid, and that Discover closed the Account as a result.
Harris’s grievance is properly directed at Target and Discover, not Experian. At
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bottom, Harris believes she should not be required to pay the $811 balance because she
returned the exercise bike and Target “approved” a refund to her Discover card. (Doc. 1
at ¶¶ 51–53, 70; Doc. 18 at 7–8.) But it is not Experian’s responsibility to resolve a dispute
between Harris, Target, and Discover over who is ultimately responsible for the $811
balance under the applicable credit and purchase agreements. The Ninth Circuit has
squarely held that such disputes are not cognizable against a CRA under the FCRA. In
Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, the Ninth Circuit explained that “credit reporting
agencies are not tribunals. They simply collect and report information furnished by others.
Because CRAs are ill equipped to adjudicate contract disputes, courts have been loath to
allow consumers to mount collateral attacks on the legal validity of their debts in the guise
of FCRA reinvestigation claims.” 629 F.3d 876, 891 (9th Cir. 2010). “A CRA is not
required as part of its reinvestigation duties to provide a legal opinion” on the validity of a
consumer’s debt; rather, “determining whether the consumer has a valid defense is a
question for a court to resolve in a suit against the creditor, not a job imposed upon
consumer reporting agencies by the FCRA.” Id. at 892 (cleaned up).
The facts here are materially indistinguishable from those in Carvalho. There, the
plaintiff received medical treatment, her insurer declined to pay, and the resulting debt was
reported on her credit file. Id. at 881–82. The plaintiff disputed the debt, and did not pay
it, on the ground that her insurer had wrongfully refused to pay. Id. at 882. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed dismissal of her FCRA claims because “a consumer who avails herself of
a good or service but defaults on payment would be considered less creditworthy than one
who does not, regardless of how legally sound her reasons for default are.” Id. at 891. The
same is true here. Harris availed herself of the exercise bike through a purchase financed
by her Discover card, Discover treated the charge as valid, and Harris did not pay the
resulting balance. Whether Target’s issuance of a gift card satisfied any obligation owed
to Harris, and whether that excuses her obligation to pay Discover, are questions governed
by her agreements with Target and/or Discover. They are not questions Experian is
required or equipped to resolve. See id. at 892.
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Nor does the documentation Harris allegedly provided Experian alter that
conclusion. Whatever supporting documentation Harris submitted establishes, at most, a
potential defense to the debt—a matter to be pressed against Discover or Target, neither of
whom is named as a defendant here. See id. Harris’s reliance on Chaitoff v. Experian
Information Solutions, Inc., 79 F.4th 800 (9th Cir. 2023), does not change that conclusion.
Harris cites Chaitoff for the proposition that “a CRA might be liable if it ignores or
overlooks documents of unquestioned authenticity, even if they relate to a legal dispute.”
Id. at 815; (Doc. 18 at 7). But even assuming Harris submitted documents of “unquestioned
authenticity”—proof of shipment and Target’s refund “approval”—those documents do
not themselves resolve the inaccuracy she alleges. They establish, at most, that Harris
returned the bike and that Target purported to approve a refund; they do not establish that
Target’s issuance of a gift card failed to satisfy its refund obligation, or that any such failure
relieved Harris of her obligation to pay Discover. Resolving those questions still requires
the kind of contractual interpretation that Carvalho places beyond a CRA’s reinvestigation
duties. See Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 891–92. Chaitoff does not stand for the broader
proposition that a CRA must credit a consumer’s documents whenever they bear on a legal
dispute. Where, as here, the documents do not resolve the underlying dispute, Chaitoff
affords Harris no relief. A consumer’s argument that a CRA is ignoring a “documented
discrepancy does not change the fact that [she] has failed to plead sufficient facts that there
is an inaccuracy in the [CRA’s] reporting to begin with.” Silva v. Santander Consumer
USA Inc., 2025 WL 3215772, at *3 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (cleaned up). Harris has therefore
failed to plausibly allege a cognizable inaccuracy under binding Ninth Circuit law.
B. The Alternative “Objectively and Readily Verifiable” Standard
Harris urges me to apply a different standard, adopted by several other circuits, that
an inaccuracy is actionable under the FCRA if it is “objectively and readily verifiable.”
(Doc. 18 at 5–6.) The Ninth Circuit has not adopted the “objectively and readily verifiable”
standard. See Silva, 2025 WL 3215772, at *3 (noting “there is no definitive Ninth Circuit
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case law adopting the ‘objectively and readily verifiable test’ for § 1681e(b) claims”).2
Carvalho and Shaw therefore remain binding. But even if I were to apply the standard
Harris urges, her claims would still fail.
The “objectively and readily verifiable” standard is not satisfied when resolving the
alleged inaccuracy requires “bespoke attention and legal reasoning.” Mader v. Experian
Info. Sols., Inc., 56 F.4th 264, 270 (2d Cir. 2023). “[I]naccuracies that turn on legal
disputes are not cognizable under the FCRA.” Id. Instead, “if a legal question is
sufficiently settled so that the import on a particular debt is readily and objectively
verifiable, the FCRA sometimes requires that the implications of that decision be reflected
in credit reports.” Id. at 271. Other circuits applying this framework have reached the
same conclusion in the context of contractual disputes. See Holden v. Holiday Inn Club
Vacations Inc., 98 F.4th 1359, 1368 (11th Cir. 2024) (“The problem for [plaintiffs] is that
the alleged inaccurate information is not objectively and readily verifiable because it stems
from a contractual dispute without a straightforward answer.”); Roberts v. Carter-Young,
Inc., 131 F.4th 241, 251 (4th Cir. 2025) (“[A] dispute that involves complex fact-gathering
and in-depth legal analysis of the sort that courts would typically perform is not objectively
and readily verifiable.”).
The same reasoning applies here. To determine whether the $811 balance was
accurately reported, Experian would have to obtain and interpret at least two separate
agreements: Target’s purchase and return policies, to assess whether Harris was entitled to
a cash refund rather than a gift card; and Harris’s credit agreement with Discover, to assess
2 None of the remaining cases Harris cites changes the analysis. Harris’s reliance on
Gross v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 33 F.4th 1246 (9th Cir. 2022), for the proposition that the
Ninth Circuit has called the “legal vs. factual” framework into question is misplaced. (See
Doc. 18 at 6.) Gross addresses the investigative obligations of furnishers like Discover
under § 1681s-2(b), not the obligations of CRAs like Experian under §§ 1681e(b) and
1681i. See id. at 1253. Indeed, Gross expressly distinguishes the two, citing Carvalho and
explaining that because CRAs “lack any direct relationship with the consumer . . . they
must rely on the representations of the furnishers who usually own the debt,” whereas
furnishers “stand in a far better position to make a thorough investigation of a disputed
debt.” Id. (cleaned up). Harris also cites Hebrank v. Early Warning Services, LLC, 2025
WL 1148801 (D. Ariz. 2025), which applied the “objectively and readily verifiable”
standard at the motion-to-dismiss stage. See id. at * 4. Hebrank is not binding, and the
question whether that standard displaces Carvalho and Shaw was not squarely presented
there. In any event, Harris’s claims fail under either standard.
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whether Target’s alleged failure to provide a cash refund relieves Harris of her obligation
to pay the charge. Those are not inquiries that can be resolved by a “straightforward
answer,” Holden, 98 F.4th at 1368, and they plainly involve the kind of “in-depth legal
analysis” that courts—not CRAs—are equipped to perform, Roberts, 131 F.4th at 251. See
also Mader, 56 F.4th at 271 (FCRA does not require CRAs to “resolve unsettled legal
questions”).
The out-of-circuit district court decisions Harris cites do not compel a different
result. Harris relies on Kanani v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 2024 WL 3729484
(M.D. Fla. 2024), and Brutus v. Yes Companies Fred, LLC, 754 F. Supp. 3d 1161 (N.D.
Fla. 2024), for the proposition that whether a debt is owed is “objectively and readily
verifiable.” (Doc. 18 at 9–10.) Both cases are distinguishable. The Kanani plaintiffs
alleged that an oral “walkaway agreement” with their landlord extinguished their debt
entirely, and the court held that whether such an agreement existed was a “straightforward
application of law to facts.” 2024 WL 3729484, at *3. The Brutus plaintiff alleged his
landlord had duplicated charges in a manner apparent on the face of a single document.
754 F. Supp. 3d at 1164–65. Harris alleges neither. She does not contend that the charge
never occurred, that the balance was misstated, or that the debt was wiped out by
agreement. Although Harris frames her dispute as a purely factual one—“did Plaintiff
return the bike?”, (Doc. 18 at 9)—resolving whether the $811 balance is accurate requires
more than verifying the return. As discussed above, it requires determining whether
Target’s gift card satisfied any refund obligation owed to Harris and whether any
deficiency relieves Harris of her obligation to pay Discover under the cardholder
agreement. Those questions require interpreting written agreements, and Kanani itself
acknowledged that such inquiries fall outside the “objectively and readily verifiable”
category. See 2024 WL 3729484, at *3 (contrasting the plaintiffs’ allegations with cases
requiring interpretation of written agreements about which courts had reached “conflicting
conclusions” (quotation marks omitted)).
Harris’s claims thus fail under either standard. Accordingly, because Harris has not
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made the prima facie showing of inaccuracy required under either § 1681e(b) or § 1681i,
both counts fail as a matter of law. Experian’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,
(Doc. 15), will therefore be granted.
C. Leave to Amend
Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted without leave to
amend, as any amendment would be futile. Harris contends that she could plead additional
facts regarding her return of the bike, Target’s approval of a refund, and Experian’s failure
to consider that evidence. (Doc. 18 at 10.) But I assumed the truth of those allegations
throughout this Order, and they do not cure the legal deficiency in Harris’s claims, which
turns on the nature of the underlying dispute rather than the strength of the evidence
supporting her position. See Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 893 (“Because we hold that Carvalho
cannot make a prima facie case of inaccurate reporting, we conclude that amendment to
include other claims requiring inaccuracy would be futile.”).
D. Motion to Stay Discovery
Experian’s Motion to Stay Discovery, (Doc. 22), seeks a stay of discovery pending
resolution of the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Because I granted the Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, the Motion to Stay Discovery will be denied as moot.
IT IS ORDERED that Experian’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 15)
is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Stay Discovery, (Doc.
22), is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to enter judgment
accordingly and close this case.
Dated this 1st day of May, 2026.
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