Looney v. Maricopa County Office of Contract Counsel et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Shalanda Marie Looney,
Plaintiff,
v.
Maricopa County Office of Contract
Counsel, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-04102-PHX-KML
ORDER
Plaintiff Shalanda Marie Looney worked as an independent contractor attorney for
Maricopa County. Looney believes defendants—Maricopa County and four of its
employees—discriminated against her based on her race. Looney’s underlying
discrimination theory is unusual in that she seems to base her claims primarily on
defendants’ failure to dissuade her from terminating her independent contractor agreement
after she told them she intended to do so. Even if that type of failure could support claims
for relief, the claims against the individuals are barred by qualified immunity and Looney
has not alleged facts showing she was subjected to an unconstitutional policy or practice.
The operative complaint is dismissed with leave to amend.
I. Factual Background
Looney “is a Black/African American attorney who provided indigent defense
services as an independent contractor to Maricopa County” through the Office of Public
Defense Services (“OPDS”). (Doc. 14 at 1.) Looney executed her first ten-year independent
contractor agreement in 2009. (Doc. 14 at 3.) In 2019, Looney signed a second ten-year
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contract. (Doc. 14 at 4.)
In 2021, defendant Rosemarie Pena-Lynch became the director of OPDS. (Doc. 14
at 24.) In 2022, defendant Ellen Hoecker assumed the position of “Managing Attorney” at
OPDS. (Doc. 14 at 24.) Around that same time, defendant David Jahntz “assumed the new
title and duties as contract administrator,” presumably at OPDS. (Doc. 14 at 24.) Looney
seems to tie her claims to these leadership changes by alleging that prior to the changes, all
of her “discrimination concerns . . . were addressed promptly and without adverse
consequences.” (Doc. 14 at 24.)
On March 9, 2023, Looney met with Pena-Lynch, Hoecker, and Jahntz. (Doc. 14 at
13.) Looney does not allege any details regarding that meeting other than “[d]efendants
demanded compliance with discretionary practices enforced selectively against [Looney].”
(Doc. 14 at 13.) The following month, Pena-Lynch issued a “communication asserting that
[Looney] had ‘mischaracterized’ the meeting.” (Doc. 14 at 13.) It is not clear what this
communication said, but Looney “self-referred the matter to . . . the Arizona State Bar, out
of fear and emotional trauma.” (Doc. 14 at 13.) The “State Bar counsel” allegedly told
Looney she had not mischaracterized the March meeting, although Looney does not
explain the context in which the state bar representative made this statement. (Doc. 14 at
13.) Defendants then failed to “retract the April communication,” and opted to use it as “a
pretext to justify discriminatory and retaliatory conduct.” (Doc. 14 at 14.)
On May 2, 2023, “Pena-Lynch issued a written statement asserting that [Looney’s]
work ‘continues to fall below OPDS expectations.’” (Doc. 14 at 5.) According to the
statement, Looney needed “to adhere to a new requirement . . . to appear on video”
(apparently for court hearings) and was also expected to write more professionally, stop
using profanity, and change the contents of her “auto-response email.” (Doc. 14 at 5.) From
May 2023 to August 2023, Looney “repeatedly requested clarification, retraction, or
investigation of the accusation that her work fell below OPDS’ standards.” (Doc. 14 at 6.)
Looney alleges “[s]imilarly situated white contractors with documented performance
issues were not subjected to comparable written accusations.” (Doc. 14 at 6.)
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Looney provides many examples of situations where a “white contract attorney”
allegedly provided substandard representation. (Doc. 14 at 6-9.) Looney “repeatedly
reported to Defendants” either the examples she lists or others involving white contract
attorneys. (Doc. 14 at 9.) Looney does not provide any specifics regarding these reports,
such as which of the individual defendants she spoke with or when. But she alleges the
white contractors who were the subject of her complaints were never investigated or
disciplined “in the same derogatory way” that she had been. (Doc. 14 at 10.) There are no
allegations explaining how Looney knows the white contractors were not investigated or
disciplined.
As additional evidence of disparate treatment, Looney alleges she was prohibited
from appearing telephonically while white attorneys were allowed to do so. (Doc. 14 at
11.) Looney also alleges she was subjected to an “implied expectation that [she] must be
liked by the judges she appeared in front of” because a judge had “excused herself from all
of [Looney’s] cases after [Looney] vomited in her virtual courtroom.” (Doc. 14 at 11.) It
is not clear what this means. But the consistent overall theme is that Looney believes she
was “subjected to heightened scrutiny, negative characterizations, and adverse actions”
while white contract attorneys were not. (Doc. 14 at 11.)
On October 4, 2023, Looney “submitted a 30-day notice of intent to resign,
expressly stating that the resignation was due to racial discrimination.” (Doc. 14 at 14.)
During that 30-day notice period, unspecified individual defendants could have corrected
the “discriminatory statements and conduct” but did not do so. (Doc. 14 at 14.) Defendant
Kevin Tyne (the County’s Procurement Officer) “had the authority to reject [Looney’s]
resignation on the basis” she claimed. (Doc. 14 at 15.) This appears to mean Looney
believes Tyne should have rejected her resignation because it was based on racial
discrimination, but he did not do so. Equating the failure to reject her resignation with
discrimination, Looney alleges defendants “affirmatively chose silence . . . and allowed the
contract to terminate on November 4, 2023.” (Doc. 14 at 14.) Tyne sent Looney a letter on
behalf of Maricopa County “setting forth a termination date of November 4, 2023.” (Doc.
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14 at 15.)
The primary basis of Looney’s claims appears to be defendants’ failure to “reject”
her resignation. Looney alleges she had not suffered “a complete and definite injury” until
she received Tyne’s November 4, 2023, letter. Looney also alleges her “claims accrued no
earlier than November 4, 2023.” (Doc. 14 at 14-15.) It is not clear why Looney believes
she did not have any actionable claims prior to November 4, 2023, as almost all of the
discriminatory acts she complains of occurred long before that date. But Looney does
allege a few events after her termination that she believes constitute retaliation based on
her earlier complaints of race discrimination.
One such instance of retaliation occurred when Pena-Lynch “mailed a demand for
return of payment for services.” (Doc. 14 at 16.) Looney responded that “no money was
owed” but also “urged Defendants to demand money from white contractors in the same
way [they] did of [her].” (Doc. 14 at 16.) Defendants allegedly further retaliated against
Looney in September 2025, when they “intentionally refused to assist or provide
information to an alleged former Black client of [Looney].” (Doc. 14 at 21.) It is not clear
what exactly occurred or why Looney believes the actions involving that former client were
an attempt to retaliate against her. Finally, defendants retaliated against Looney when they
“refused to fairly consider” a job application she submitted to replace Pena-Lynch. (Doc.
14 at 21.)
On November 3, 2025, Looney filed her original complaint. (Doc. 1.) On December
23, 2025, Looney filed an amended complaint, naming as defendants Maricopa County,
Hoecker, Pena-Lynch, Jahntz, and Tyne. (Doc. 14.) The amended complaint alleges three
claims, although it is not clear which claims are brought against which defendants. The
first claim is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, based on defendants interfering with
Looney’s right to make and enforce contracts. (Doc. 14 at 17.) The second claim is also
brought under § 1981, but is based on retaliation after Looney complained of racial
discrimination. And her third claim is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for defendants
violating her right to Equal Protection by “subjecting her to different contracting
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requirements than White attorneys.” (Doc. 14 at 22.) She identifies only the third claim as
brought under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91
(1978). (Doc. 14 at 22.) Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss. (Doc. 18.)
II. Legal Standard and Basis for Claim
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (simplified). This is not a “probability requirement,” but a
requirement that the factual allegations show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Id. A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim
for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
Because Looney is a licensed attorney, the liberal pleading standard afforded to
most pro se litigants does not apply. Huffman v. Lindgren, 81 F.4th 1016, 1020 (9th Cir.
2023). In addition, Looney purportedly brings two claims under § 1981 but her complaint
admits “§ 1983 is the proper vehicle for asserting a § 1981 claim against governmental
actors.” (Doc. 14 at 22.) Because there is no dispute all defendants are state actors, § 1983
is the only permissible vehicle for Looney’s claims.1 Yoshikawa v. Seguirant, 74 F.4th
1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2023) (“A plaintiff seeking to enforce rights secured by § 1981 against
a state actor must bring a cause of action under § 1983.”).
III. Failure to State a Claim
Defendants’ motion to dismiss first addresses the alleged flaws with Looney’s
Monell claim or claims. The motion also argues there are not sufficient factual allegations
1 This creates a complicated issue regarding the appropriate statute of limitations. In
Arizona, § 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Cholla Ready Mix,
Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2004). Some § 1981 claims would be subject to
that same limitations period. Id. Certain § 1981 claims, however, were “made possible” by
the statutory changes to § 1981 in 1991, and would be subject to a four-year statute of
limitations. Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 383 (2004). Defendants do
not meaningfully develop an argument regarding the statute of limitations so the court need
not resolve which statute applies and whether it bars Looney’s claims.
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identifying what each individual defendant did, and even if there were adequate factual
allegations against each individual, qualified immunity would bar Looney’s claims.
A. Monell Claims
“A municipality may not be sued under § 1983 solely because an injury was inflicted
by its employees or agents.” Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir.
2006). However, a municipality may be held liable for its employees’ constitutional
violations under § 1983 in certain circumstances. Id. These Monell claims may be proved
in multiple ways, including (1) where the “execution of a government’s policy or custom,
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflict[ed] the injury”; (2) where a local government failed to train
employees in a manner that was so inadequate the “policymakers of the city can reasonably
be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need”; and (3) where “an official with
final policy-making authority” was the tort-feasor or ratified a subordinate’s
unconstitutional action. Rodriguez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 802-03 (9th Cir.
2018) (simplified). Looney appears to be alleging the first and third theories.
Beginning with the first theory of a longstanding policy or custom, Looney
vacillates on what policy or custom she is complaining about. Based on statements
throughout her complaint, it appears she is alleging a policy or custom of refusing “to
correct or retract discriminatory statements during the contractual notice period[,]” i.e., in
October 2025. (Doc. 14 at 25; see also Doc. 14 at 14-15 (acknowledging she did not suffer
“a complete and definite injury until contract termination.”).) Looney also alleges the
“discriminatory acts” that occurred before her contractual notice period are pleaded only
“as background evidence establishing motive, intent, and context for accrual, not as
independently time-barred claims.” (Doc. 14 at 27.)
To plausibly allege Maricopa County had a policy or custom of not correcting or
retracting discriminatory statements, Looney would need to allege facts showing the
custom was “persistent and widespread” such “that it constitutes a permanent and well
settled [county] policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (simplified).
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An actionable custom cannot be “predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be
founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct
has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Id. Looney makes no such
allegations. She does not cite any other instance where Maricopa County refused to
“correct or retract discriminatory statements during the contractual notice period.” (Doc.
14 at 25.) Without such allegations, Looney has not alleged a policy or custom under the
first Monell pathway.
Looney’s alternative path is to allege the individuals who failed to correct or retract
discriminatory statements qualified as policymakers or the actions by those individuals
were ratified by a policymaker. “For a person to be a final policymaker, he or she must be
in a position of authority such that a final decision by that person may appropriately be
attributed to the [county].” Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2004). Whether
someone is a policymaker is a question of state law, and ordinarily a court is “not justified
in assuming that municipal policymaking authority lies somewhere else than where the
applicable law purports to put it.” Id. 982-83. Looney does not allege sufficient facts
establishing Pena-Lynch, Hoecker, or Jahntz qualify as policymakers and she does not
allege any facts suggesting Tyne had any knowledge of the underlying events.
Pena-Lynch was the director of OPDS, Hoecker was the “Managing Attorney,” and
Jahntz was the “contract administrator.” (Doc. 14 at 24.) Looney argues all three of these
individuals qualify as “policymakers” because they “exercised delegated authority . . . over
contract administration, discipline, assignment decisions, and responses to discrimination
complaints.” (Doc. 19 at 8.) In other words, Looney appears to believe that these
individuals qualify as policymakers because they had discretionary authority over
particular decisions. But “[t]he fact that a particular official . . . has discretion in the
exercise of particular functions does not, without more, give rise to municipal liability
based on an exercise of that discretion.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481–
82 (1986). Thus, even where a city official “possessed the discretionary authority to hire
and fire employees,” that did not mean “he was responsible for establishing the City’s
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employment policy.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1350 (9th Cir. 1992). Similarly
here, Looney has not provided any basis to conclude these three individuals exercised
policymaking authority on behalf of Maricopa County. Looney does not cite any laws or
policies conferring policymaking authority on these three individuals or people in their
positions, and it is implausible that all three had such authority.
The analysis for defendant Tyne is slightly different. Tyne concedes he “is arguably
in a final policymaking role.” (Doc. 18 at 5.) But Tyne argues there are no allegations he
“had any knowledge of Plaintiff, the manner in which her work under her contract was
supervised, or her decision to end her contractual relationship.” (Doc. 18 at 5.) Looney’s
only allegation involving Tyne is that he failed to act after receiving her resignation and
instead sent a letter acknowledging the termination date of the relationship. It is difficult to
see how allowing an independent contractor to terminate her relationship or sending a letter
acknowledging that termination—without knowing more about allegedly discriminatory
events—could constitute a constitutional tort. And if Looney is trying to allege Tyne
ratified the actions of others, she would need to allege Tyne approved of the underlying
discretionary decision “and the basis for it.” Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1348. Looney does not
point to any allegations showing Tyne was aware of any events leading up to Looney’s
resignation. Looney has not alleged a viable Monell claim.
B. Individual Liability
Looney claims to be suing the four individuals in their individual capacities, but
given her other allegations about when she was injured, it is not clear which actions by
which defendants are at issue. That is, Looney alleges she did not suffer an injury until
November 3, 2023, and all events prior to that date are “pleaded as background evidence
establishing motive, intent, and context for accrual, not as independently time-barred
claims.” (Doc. 14 at 27.) The vast majority of the actions by Hoecker, Pena-Lynch, and
Jahntz occurred prior to November 3, 2023. Accepting Looney’s concession regarding
when her claims accrued, the court looks only to events after November 3, 2023. During
that time period, Looney alleges only two events involving Hoecker, Pena-Lynch, and
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Jahntz and one event regarding Tyne.
At some point after November 3, 2023, Pena-Lynch sent a letter requesting Looney
repay certain amounts of money. And in 2025, defendants (again, it is unclear which)
“intentionally refused to assist or provide information to an alleged former Black client of
[Looney].” (Doc. 14 at 21.) As for Tyne, the only action he took was issuing the November
4, 2023, letter accepting Looney’s resignation. Defendants argue these claims are barred
by qualified immunity.
“Qualified immunity shields . . . state officials from money damages unless a
plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right,
and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.”
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (simplified). The motion to dismiss focuses
on the second step regarding clearly-established law. (Doc. 18 at 9-10.) For that step, it is
the plaintiff’s “burden to show that the contours of the right were clearly established.”
Clairmont v. Sound Mental Health, 632 F.3d 1091, 1109 (9th Cir. 2011). And “the clearly
established right must be defined with specificity.” City of Escondido, Cal. v. Emmons, 586
U.S. 38, 42 (2019).
Looney has not clearly alleged which actions, taken by which defendant, are the
basis for her claims, making it almost impossible to conduct a meaningful analysis. To the
extent the court can understand her claims against the individuals, Looney believes it was
retaliatory for Pena-Lynch to seek repayment and it was retaliatory for Pena-Lynch,
Hoecker, and Jahntz to interfere with Looney’s former client gaining access to files. It was
also improper for Tyne to let her terminate her contract. Looney offers no authority finding
a constitutional violation in remotely similar situations. Instead, Looney argues “[t]he right
to be free from intentional racial discrimination and retaliation in contracting has been
clearly established for decades.” (Doc. 19 at 14.) That approach to the “clearly established
law” requirement is the exact type of “high level of generality” approach the Supreme
Court has repeatedly rejected. Id. (citing cases). Even assuming defendants violated a
statutory or constitutional right, Looney has not established that right was clearly
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established. The claims are therefore barred by qualified immunity.
C. Leave to Amend
Looney is granted leave to amend because she may be able to state claims for relief.
But if she chooses to amend, Looney must more coherently and clearly identify the exact
basis for her claims, and she should not include extensive background facts that are not
relevant. For example, the first amended complaint includes pages of examples of
differential treatment (Doc. 14 at 6-9), but Looney explicitly states she is not basing her
claims on how she was treated prior to November 3, 2023. Thus, instead of excessive
background allegations, Looney must succinctly identify the factual basis for the claims
she is attempting to pursue and tie them to specific defendants. See Gibson v. City of
Portland, 165 F.4th 1265, 1289 (9th Cir. 2026) (“[i]t is not the job of the district courts to
make sense of the pleading, [or] to supply facts to support the claim,” and plaintiffs must
“tie factual averments against specific parties to individual causes of action” to comply
with Rule 8). Looney must also familiarize herself with the requirements for pleading a
claim for municipal liability and include allegations making clear why she believes
municipal liability exists.
IT IS ORDERED the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 18) is GRANTED WITH LEAVE
TO AMEND.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED no later than May 27, 2026, plaintiff shall file an
amended complaint. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter a judgment of dismissal with
prejudice if no amended complaint is filed by that date.
Dated this 13th day of May, 2026.
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