Colman-Randas v. Cantu et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Silvia Elizabeth Colman-Randas,
Petitioner,
v.
John Cantu, et al.,
Respondents.
No. CV-25-03594-PHX-MTL (ASB)
ORDER
Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under § 2241 challenging her
immigration detention. (Doc. 1.) The Petition is fully briefed.* (Docs. 12, 15.) For the
reasons below, the Petition will be granted.
I. Background
Petitioner is a Guatemalan national who has resided in the United States since 2018.
Petitioner was placed in removal proceedings and released on her own recognizance in
April 2019. (Doc. 14-1 ¶ 10.) Petitioner’s application for asylum was denied, and she was
ordered removed from the United States in July 2019. (Id. ¶ 14.) Petitioner appealed and
the Ninth Circuit has issued a stay of Petitioner’s removal while her appeal remains
pending. (Id. ¶ 25.) Despite the Ninth Circuit’s stay, Petitioner was taken into ICE custody
on May 15, 2025, and has remained detained since that time, in alleged violation of the
Fifth Amendment, the Rehabilitation Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the
* Petitioner also filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction. Because the Court grants the Petition, the motion for injunctive relief will be
denied as moot.
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Accardi Doctrine. Petitioner requests release from custody.
II. Revocation of Petitioner’s Order of Supervision
In their response, Respondents do not dispute Petitioner was released on an order of
release on recognizance and received no process before her subsequent redetention.
The Court notes the growing number of cases holding that individuals like Petitioner
who were released from immigration detention on an order of recognizance are entitled to
a pre-deprivation hearing before any rearrest or detention as a matter of due process. See,
e.g., J.C.E.P. v. Minga Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01559-EFB (HC), 2025 WL 3268273, *6
(E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025) (collecting cases); Ramirez Clavijo v. Kaiser, 25-CV-06248-
BLF, 2025 WL 2419263, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025) (“Petitioner thus has shown a
likelihood of success on the merits of her claim that she is entitled to a pre-deprivation
hearing before a neutral decisionmaker prior to any re-arrest or detention under the Due
Process Clause.”); Singh v. Andrews, 1:25-CV-00801-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 1918679,
at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025) (“On balance, the Mathews factors show that petitioner is
entitled to process, and that process should have been provided before petitioner was
detained.”).
Respondents also do not address the three-pronged test described in Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). Mathews explains “[t]he fundamental requirement of
[procedural] due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.’” Id. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
To determine whether procedural protections satisfy the Due Process Clause, courts
consider three factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”;
(2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. at 335.
As to the first factor, “[f]reedom from imprisonment — from government custody,
detention, or other forms of physical restraint — lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due
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Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citing Foucha v.
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.)); Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d
976, 994 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he government’s discretion to incarcerate non-citizens is
always constrained by the requirements of due process.”).
As to the second factor, Respondents argue now that Petitioner’s release on an order
of recognizance was an error, and she is properly subject to mandatory detention. But “the
government cannot switch tracks and subject Petitioner[] to mandatory detention under
section 1225(b)(2) when the government has instead placed Petitioner[ ] in removal
proceedings under section 1229a and released [her] on [her] own recognizance under
section 1226(a).” Valencia Zapata v. Kaiser, 801 F. Supp. 3d, 919, 936 (N.D. Cal. 2025),
appeal filed, No. 25-7472 (9th Cir. Nov. 26, 2025). Petitioner remains in traditional
removal proceedings under § 1229 and, as a result, she is subject to detention under § 1226
and is not subject to mandatory detention.
Finally, as to the third Mathews factor, “[i]f the government wishes to re-arrest
Ortega at any point, it has the power to take steps toward doing so; but its interest in doing
so without a hearing is low.” Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
Further, detention hearings in immigration courts are commonplace and impose a “minimal
cost.” Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal. 2025). In addition, here,
Respondents’ interest is even lower because Petitioner was previously released on her own
recognizance after immigration officials determined she was not a flight risk or danger to
the community, and there is no indication Petitioner violated any condition of her release.
See Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-05632-RMI, 2025 WL 1853763, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 4,
2025).
The Court finds that the Mathews factors support finding that Petitioner was entitled
to a hearing before she was re-detained. See J.E.H.G. v. Chesnut, 1:25-CV-01673-JLT
SKO, 2025 WL 3523108, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025) (“[T]he immigrant’s initial
release reflected a determination by the government that the noncitizen is not a danger to
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the community or a flight risk. Since it is the government that initiated re-detention, it
follows that the government should be required to bear the burden of providing a
justification for the re-detention.”). “The only potential injury the government faces is a
short delay in detaining [Petitioner] if it ultimately demonstrates to a neutral decisionmaker
by clear and convincing evidence that [the] detention is necessary to prevent danger to the
community or flight.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1037-38 (N.D. Cal. 2025).
For all these reasons, the Petition will be granted, and Petitioner will be ordered
released from custody. The Court clarifies that nothing in this Order prevents Respondents
from pursuing Petitioner’s rearrest or detention along with a pre-deprivation hearing as a
matter of due process.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDRED Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
(Doc. 1) is granted as to the due process claim in Count One. The rest of the Petition is
denied as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Respondents must immediately release Petitioner
from custody under the same conditions that existed before her redetention.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Respondents must provide a notice of compliance
within two business days of Petitioner’s release.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED any pending motions are denied as moot and the
Clerk of Court must enter judgment in Petitioner’s favor and close this case.
Dated this 5th day of March, 2026.
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