Jacobs v. Jones et al

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Steven B Jacobs,
Plaintiff,
v.
Oscar B Jones, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-03428-PHX-SMB
ORDER
The Court now considers: Defendant Oscar Jones’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 20);
Defendant Jones’ Motion to Dismiss Under A.R.S. § 12-751 (“Anti-SLAPP Motion”)
(Doc. 22); Defendant Trianna Begum’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 28); and Defendant
Begum’s Motion to Set Aside Clerk’s Entry of Default (Doc. 30).
I. BACKGROUND
The Complaint alleges as follows. Underlying this case is a dispute between
Plaintiff and Defendant Jones over a purported unpaid gambling debt. (Doc. 1 at 1.)
Defendant Jones filed three separate lawsuits against Plaintiff in New York to recover said
debt. (Id. at 4–5.) Two of the lawsuits were voluntarily dismissed. (Id. at 5.) This case
arises out of allegedly “false and malicious statements” Defendant Jones made about
Plaintiff in relation to the New York lawsuits. (Id.) Plaintiff categorizes the statements as
follows: “(i) statements that Plaintiff committed theft or fraud, or otherwise stole money
from Jones and admitted to such theft in a recorded oral argument; and (ii) statements that
Plaintiff has engaged in frivolous litigation activities.” (Id.)
Case 2:25-cv-03428-SMB Document 43 Filed 06/18/26 Page 1 of 11

- 2 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Many of the statements arise out of, or relate to, an oral argument from the New
York lawsuits. (Id. at 6.) The Complaint refers to a video posted on YouTube of the oral
argument; the video was “deceptively edited” by Defendant Jones to misconstrue
Plaintiff’s representations at the oral argument. (Id.) Defendant Jones then posted the
following messages online:
- “@FBI @JusticeOIG @SDNYnews #ArrestStevenJacobsNow; please
take 5 minutes out of your day to watch what 5 NY appeals court judges
had to say about this @NYSBA-licensed attorney openly admitting to a
half-million fraud.” (Id. at 7.)
- “Hey @Socrates1848652 do you have any personal knowledge about this
#LegalFraud @NYSBA-licensed attorney-criminal Steven Jacobs that
you can share with our fine friends in blue @FBI @JusticeOIG
@SDNYnews @NYPDnews @NYPDDetectives
#GrandLarcenyDivision??” (Id.)
- Defendant Jones posted the following with a link to the video: “In which
Steven . . . Jacobs admits to defrauding his co-fiduciary for hundreds of
thousands of dollars.” (Id. (alteration in original))
- “Same reason Steven B. Jacobs . . . is still licensed to practice law in New
York (cc: @NYSBA) despite admitting in court to stealing ~$400k from
me in a fraud scheme.” (Id.(alteration in original).)
- “[T]ruth is an Absolute Defense to Defamation” when asked by a
follower whether he checked on the “laws surrounding defamation per
se.” (Id.)
- “[S]o grateful that I live in America, where we have strong legal
protections re: publishing facts . . . such as the Fact that @StevenBJacobs
(Steven Jacobs, middle name Benjamin . . . ) is a CRIMINAL FRAUD
who COMMITED [sic] FELONY THEFT.” (Id. at 7–8 (second and third
alterations in original).)
- “[T]he criminal fraud named Steven Benjamin Jacobs who not only
committed fraud, but also admitted it [in] front of the New York State
Appellate Division 1st Department during oral argument.” (Id. at 8
(second alteration in original).)
- “Scammin’ Steven Jacobs . . . ADMITTED in OPEN COURT to being a
scam-artist A.K.A. lying to a fiduciary, yet is inexplicably still licensed
by the @NYSBA to practice law.” (Id.)
- “Steven Jacobs . . . would rather succeed by fraud than do anything with
honor. He would steal a nickel from his grandma if he thought she
wouldn’t find out. Fortunately for society and justice writ large, he is
finally failing badly [because] of his many frauds.” (Id. (alterations in
original).)
- ‘“Steven B Jacobs . . . is definitely in ‘Catch me if you can’ mode. His
Case 2:25-cv-03428-SMB Document 43 Filed 06/18/26 Page 2 of 11

- 3 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
days as a practicing attorney at [Jacobs’ employer] are certainly
numbered; probably in the low single digits.” (Id. (alterations in
original).) This post also included an AI-generated video of FBI agents
tackling Plaintiff and arresting him. (Id.)
Defendant Jones then called Plaintiff’s supervisor, accusing Plaintiff of having
committed “felony theft.” (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff is an attorney and Defendant Jones later
messaged the supervisor:
“[H]ow do you interpret your duties under Arizona Rules of Professional
Conduct 8.3(a) re: what I told you about Steven the other day? I am assuming
that both the facts I told you, *and* Stevens own oral argument transcript,
raise a substantial question as to Stevens honesty here, but perhaps one of the
exceptions applies? [Let me know].”
(Id. (second alteration in original).) Defendant Jones continued posting similar content on
social media and other AI-generated videos portraying Plaintiff as a criminal. (Id.)
Defendant Jones also sent an email to Plaintiff’s mother which “included a bizarre,
unwelcome, half-naked picture of himself and” his wife, Defendant Begum, that “stated
that Plaintiff ‘scammed us [ie Jones and Begum as a marital community] for ~$500k.’”
(Id. at 11 (alterations in original).) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Jones “made
certain false and malicious statements about Jacobs engaging in frivolous litigation
conduct.” (Id.) Plaintiff thus asserts two claims of defamation per se, false light invasions
of privacy, and tortious interference with contract. (Doc. 1 at 12–15.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) motion for failure
to state a claim, a complaint must meet the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2)
requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief,” so that the defendant has “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). This notice exists if the pleader sets
forth “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
Case 2:25-cv-03428-SMB Document 43 Filed 06/18/26 Page 3 of 11

- 4 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) “can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory
or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v.
Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). A complaint that sets forth a
cognizable legal theory will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual
matter, which, if accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility does not equal
“probability,” but requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a
defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility . . . .’”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the well-pleaded factual allegations
are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cousins
v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). However, legal conclusions couched as
factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness, and “conclusory allegations
of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto
v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). A court ordinarily may not consider evidence
outside the pleadings when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See United States
v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003). “A court may, however, consider
materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in
the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into
a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 908.
III. DISCUSSION
The Court begins by considering Defendant Jones’ Motion to Dismiss, beginning
with Plaintiff’s defamation claims.
A. Defamation Per Se Claims
“To establish defamation under Arizona common law, a publication must be false
and must bring the defamed person into disrepute, contempt, or ridicule, or must impeach
Case 2:25-cv-03428-SMB Document 43 Filed 06/18/26 Page 4 of 11

- 5 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
plaintiff's honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation.” Rogers v. Mroz, 502 P.3d 986, 988
(Ariz. 2022) (citation modified). “Substantial truth is an absolute defense against
defamation claims.” Ruggeroli v. Residential Real Est. Council, No.
CV-23-00259-TUC-JAS, 2024 WL 4203156, at *6 (D. Ariz. Sept. 16, 2024). “Defamation
per se includes statements that are facially defamatory without the need for ‘extrinsic
matter’ or facts to understand the statements are defamatory . . . .” Id. “In defamation per
se claims, the plaintiff does not need to plead to special damages because the damages are
assumed.” Id. at *7. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must show that the alleged
statements are reasonably capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning and are not mere
comment within the ambit of the First Amendment.” Hernandez v. Scottsdale Hotel Grp.
LLC, No. CV-20-00349-PHX-DWL, 2020 WL 6827745, at *2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 20, 2020)
(citation modified). “Only statements which may be reasonably interpreted as factual
assertions, not simply statements of opinion, are actionable as defamation.” Id. (citation
modified).
Taking the Complaint as true, and construing it in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim of defamation per se—at
least in part. Again, Defendant Jones posted the following on social media: that Plaintiff
“openly admit[ed] to a half-million fraud”; that Plaintiff “admits to defrauding his co-
fiduciary for hundreds of thousands of dollars”; that Plaintiff “admitt[ed] in court to
stealing ~$400k from me in a fraud scheme”; accused Plaintiff of being “a CRIMINAL
FRAUD who COMMITED [sic] FELONY THEFT”; and otherwise accused Plaintiff of
bring a criminal who committed criminal fraud. (Doc. 1 at 7–8.) Plaintiff also alleges that
Defendant Jones contacted Plaintiff’s supervisor and accused Plaintiff of having committed
felony theft.1 (Id. at 9.) These statements “are reasonably capable of sustaining a
defamatory meaning.” Hernandez, 2020 WL 6827745, at *2. Simply put, Defendant Jones
1 Defendant Jones’ contends that the Court cannot consider this assertion because it is
unsupported, conclusory, and “made without any factual basis or evidence.” (Doc. 20 at 6.)
Defendant Jones misunderstands both the pleading and Rule 12(b)(6) standard. This
statement is not an impermissible legal conclusion, it is a specific factual assertion.
Additionally, Plaintiff is not required to supplement his Complaint with extrinsic evidence
at this juncture.
Case 2:25-cv-03428-SMB Document 43 Filed 06/18/26 Page 5 of 11

- 6 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
openly accused Plaintiff of committing a crime. Arizona courts recognize that “defamation
per se includes the communication or publication of statements that another has committed
a crime or a criminal act.”2 Sebring v. Pamintuan, No. 1 CA-CV 07-0478, 2008 WL
2497446, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. June 17, 2008).
Defendant Jones disagrees, and contends that these statements “appeared on social
media platforms, forums where sharp language, emotional commentary, and exaggerated
phrasing are commonplace and understood as such by reasonable readers.” (Doc. 20 at 11.)
Defendant Jones goes on to note that on social media, “no reasonable reader would interpret
the challenged statements as literal factual assertions rather than commentary about a legal
dispute already playing out.” (Id.) The Court cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that
Defendant Jones’ statements are mere hyperbole. For example, Defendant Jones’ posted
that he is “grateful” to live in America, where he has “strong legal protection re: publishing
facts . . . such as the Fact that [Plaintiff] is a CRIMINAL FRAUD who COMMITED [sic]
FELONY THEFT.” (Doc. 1 at 7–8 (emphasis added); Doc. 1–1 at 13.) This post is not
mere “emotional commentary”; Defendant Jones plainly made a factual assertion that
Plaintiff committed crime.
The Court will not evaluate each of the alleged defamatory statements. Plaintiff’s
Complaint sufficiently alleges a defamation per se claim in reference to Defendant Jones’
statements on fraud and theft. The Court recognizes that Plaintiff also brings a second
defamation claim predicated on statements made by Defendant Jones relating to Plaintiff’s
purported history of frivolous litigation. Defendant Jones, however, does not specifically
challenge this claim so the Court does not address it.
B. False Light Invasion of Privacy Claim
The Court now addresses Plaintiff’s claim of false light invasion of privacy. “To
establish a claim for false light invasion of privacy, a plaintiff must show (1) the defendant,
with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, gave publicity to information
placing the plaintiff in a false light, and (2) the false light in which the plaintiff was placed
2 The quoted language comes from a trial court’s jury instruction which was affirmed on
appeal. See Sebring, 2008 WL 2497446, at*6.
Case 2:25-cv-03428-SMB Document 43 Filed 06/18/26 Page 6 of 11

- 7 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position.” Desert Palm
Surgical Grp., P.L.C. v. Petta, 343 P.3d 438, 450 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015). This is “a tort
separate from defamation” although the distinction between the two is “subtle.” Id.
at 449–50. “Although a cause of action for false light invasion of privacy may arise when
someone publishes something untrue about a person, in some instances, even a true
statement may form the basis for false light liability if it creates a false implication about
the person.” Id. at 450.
For many of the reasons previously stated, Plaintiff plausibly alleges a false light
claim. Again, Defendant Jones is alleged to have repeatedly accused Plaintiff of being a
criminal who committed fraud and theft. Defendant Jones disagrees, contending that
“[n]othing in the Complaint suggests that Mr. Jones posted anything he believed to be
untrue or that he entertained serious doubt about the accuracy of the material he
referenced.” (Doc. 20 at 12.) Defendant Jones goes on to note that “the statements forming
the backbone of Plaintiff’s false-light theory all trace back to sources that are either public,
drawn directly from the New York Case, or rooted in Mr. Jones’ protected opinion based
on firsthand dealings with Plaintiff.” (Id.) While this argument may be true regarding
some of the statements Plaintiff mentions in the Complaint, it certainly does not apply to
Defendant Jones’ repeated assertions that Plaintiff is a criminal guilty of fraud and theft.
Even if Defendant Jones’ believed that Plaintiff was guilty of these crimes, Plaintiff has
not been convicted; Defendant Jones recklessly disregards this truth by espousing
otherwise.
Defendant Jones goes on to note that the second element of false light is not
established here because “the Complaint does not address how an average person, knowing
there is an ongoing fraud dispute, would consider these comments to be outside acceptable
expression.” (Id. at 13.) This argument lacks merit. Although there might be an ongoing
fraud dispute in civil court, this does not give Defendant Jones license to repeatedly assert
that Plaintiff is a criminal. Additionally, Defendant Jones calling Plaintiff’s supervisor and
accusing Plaintiff of felony theft clearly meets the elements of false light and is not, as a
Case 2:25-cv-03428-SMB Document 43 Filed 06/18/26 Page 7 of 11

- 8 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
matter of law, “acceptable expression.”
C. Tortious Interference with Contract Claim
Finally, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s claim of tortious interference with contract.
“Tort liability may be imposed upon a defendant who intentionally and improperly
interferes with the plaintiff’s rights under a contract with another if the interference causes
the plaintiff to lose a right under the contract.” ABCDW LLC v. Banning, 388 P.3d 821,
830–831 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016) (citation modified). “A prima facie case of intentional
interference with contract requires alleging the following: (1) the existence of a valid
contractual relationship; (2) knowledge of the relationship on the part of the interferor;
(3) intentional interference inducing or causing a breach; (4) resultant damage to the party
whose relationship has been disrupted; and (5) that the defendant acted improperly.” Id.
at 831 (citation modified).
Plaintiff’s tortious interference claim is predicated on Defendant Jones’ contact with
Plaintiff’s supervisor. (Doc. 1 at 15–16.) However, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts
establishing the third or fourth elements of his claim. In short, Plaintiff does not allege that
his employment relationship was affected by Defendant Jones’ conduct. Plaintiff merely
alleges that his reputation and prospects of employment were damaged. (Doc. 1 at 16.)
However, neither of these damages, by themselves, affect his contractual relationship with
his employer. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff tortious interference with contract
claim without prejudice.
D. Anti-SLAPP Motion (A.R.S. 12-751)
The Court now consider Defendant Jones’ Anti-SLAPP Motion. Defendant Jones
filed the Motion pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-751—Arizona’s anti-SLAPP statute. A lengthy
discussion of this Motion is unnecessary because it functionally duplicates Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss.
“The Ninth Circuit employs a two-step process to evaluate anti-SLAPP motions.”
Avid Telecom LLC v. Frankel, No. CV-22-00558-TUC-JCH, 2023 WL 5056949, at *2 (D.
Ariz. May 26, 2023). “First, the court determines whether the actions at issue involve an
Case 2:25-cv-03428-SMB Document 43 Filed 06/18/26 Page 8 of 11

- 9 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
exercise of protected rights.” Id. “Second, the court analyzes whether the anti-SLAPP
motion raises a legal or a factual challenge.” Id. Defendant Jones’ Motion raises a legal
challenge. (Doc. 22 at 9.) “When the anti-SLAPP motion challenges the legal sufficiency
of a claim, a district court should apply the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
standard and consider whether a claim is properly stated.” Frankel, 2023 WL 5056949,
at *2 (citation modified).
The Court has evaluated the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). That same analysis
applies to Defendant’s Anti-SLAPP Motion.
E. Defendant Begum
The Court now considers Defendant Begum’s motions.
1. Motion to Set Aside Clerk’s Entry of Default
The Court begins with Defendant Begum’s Motion to Set Aside Clerk’s Entry of
Default. Plaintiff previously moved for entry of default against Defendant Begum based
on her failure to file a responsive pleading. (Doc. 26 at 2.) The Clerk entered default
against Defendant Begum. (Doc. 29). Defendant Begum now moves to set aside default.
“The court may set aside an entry of default for good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c).
“To determine ‘good cause,’ a court must ‘consider three factors: (1) whether the party
seeking to set aside the default engaged in culpable conduct that led to the default;
(2) whether it had no meritorious defense; or (3) whether reopening the default judgment
would prejudice’ the other party.” Meridian PO Fin. LLC v. OTR Tire Grp. Inc., 507 F.
Supp. 3d 1148, 1160 (D. Ariz. 2020) (citation modified) (quoting United states v. Signed
Pers. Check No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle, 615 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010)). “[T]he
court’s discretion under Rule 55(c) is ‘especially broad,’ and any doubt should be resolved
‘in favor of setting aside the entry of default and deciding the case on its merits.’” Payne
v. Shalash Sales LLC, No. CV-25-01261-PHX-SPL, 2026 WL 1251640, at *1 (D. Ariz.
May 7, 2026) (quoting O’Connor v. Nevada, 27 F.3d 357, 364 (9th Cir. 1994)). “Judgment
by default is a drastic step appropriate only in extreme circumstances; a case should,
whenever possible, be decided on the merits.” Id. (citation modified) (quoting Falk v.
Case 2:25-cv-03428-SMB Document 43 Filed 06/18/26 Page 9 of 11

- 10 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Allen, 739 F.2d 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1984)).
Here, the Court will set aside default judgment because doing so would not
prejudice Plaintiff. “To be prejudicial, the setting aside of a judgment must result in greater
harm than simply delaying resolution of the case.” Id. (quoting TCI Grp. Life Ins. Plan v.
Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 701 (9th Cir. 2001)). “A plaintiff is prejudiced if his ability to
pursue his claim has been hindered due to delay resulting in such tangible harms as the loss
of evidence, increased difficulties of discovery, or greater opportunity for fraud or
collusion.” Id. (citation modified). Here, Plaintiff claims he would be prejudiced because
“Every day that this litigation is stalled by Begum’s procedural gamesmanship is another
day where the Defendants can dissipate the community assets that are the subject of the
suit.” (Doc. 32 at 13.) This argument fails for multiple reasons. First, Plaintiff’s concern
is speculative. Second, as discussed below, Plaintiff only sues Defendant Begum to collect
any judgment from the marital community. Thus, recovery ultimately depends on
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Jones. Moreover, as discussed below, the Court denies
Defendant Begum’s Motion to Dismiss,so Plaintiff can still collect any judgment from
community assets. Because Plaintiff will suffer no prejudice, the Court sets aside the entry
of default.
2. Motion to Dismiss
The Court now considers Defendant Begum’s Motion to Dismiss. Defendant
Begum seeks dismissal because there are “no factual allegations that [she] made any
statement, published any content, contacted any third party, interfered with any contract,
or participated in any conduct giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims.” (Doc. 28 at 2.) Plaintiff
contends that Defendant Begum is a proper party pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-215(D). (Doc.
32 at 14.) Under that statute, “a party seeking damages from community assets for an
unpaid debt or breach of an obligation must join both spouses when asserting a cause of
action.” Lattin v. Shamrock Materials, LLC, 503 P.3d 116, 119 (Ariz. 2022) (citing A.R.S.
§ 25-215(D)). In reply, Defendant Begum does not offer any reason why her joinder on
this basis is improper. The Court agrees that the Complaint is bereft of any allegation that
Case 2:25-cv-03428-SMB Document 43 Filed 06/18/26 Page 10 of 11

- 11 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Defendant Begum is personally liable for any of the complained of conduct. However, it
is permissible for Plaintiff to name Defendant Begum solely for purposes of collecting any
potential judgment from the marital community. See Greenburg v. Wray, No.
CV-22-00122-PHX-DLR, 2022 WL 2176499, at *3 (D. Ariz. June 16, 2022).
Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant Begum’s Motion to Dismiss.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED granting in part and denying in part Defendant Jones’ Motion
to Dismiss (Doc. 20) and Anti-SLAPP Motion (Doc. 22).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Defendant Begum’s Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 28).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Defendant Begum’s Motion to Set Aside
Clerk’s Entry of Default (Doc. 30). The Clerk’s Entry of Default (Doc. 29) is vacated.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Plaintiff leave to amend his tortious
interference with contract claim only. If Plaintiff so chooses, she must file an Amended
Complaint no later than thirty (30) days after the date this Order is issued.
Dated this 18th day of June, 2026.
Case 2:25-cv-03428-SMB Document 43 Filed 06/18/26 Page 11 of 11