Lucky v. Wartburg Watch et al

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Lawrence Lucky,
Plaintiff,
v.
Wartburg Watch, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-03030-PHX-DWL
ORDER
This is a defamation action. Plaintiff Lawrence Lucky (“Lucky”) alleges that
Defendant Todd Wilhelm (“Wilhelm”) authored an article on a blog, the Wartburg Watch,
that contained a “false and defamatory statement of fact” suggesting that “Lucky engaged
in the criminal acts of forgery and/or impersonating a lawyer.” (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 22-23.) Also
named as Defendants are the Wartburg Watch and its “co-founder and/or operator,”
Darlene Parsons (“Parsons”). (Id. ¶¶ 2-3.)1
Now pending before the Court are motions to dismiss filed by Wilhelm and Parsons.
(Docs. 11, 15.) The motions are fully briefed (Docs. 18, 19) and no party requested oral
argument. For the reasons that follow, Parsons’s motion is granted and Wilhelm’s motion
is denied.
…
1 The complaint also named Wanda Martin (“Martin”), co-founder of the Wartburg
Watch, as a defendant. (Doc. 1 ¶ 4.) On November 10, 2025, Lucky voluntarily dismissed
Martin as a defendant. (Doc. 20.) The Court will refer to Wilhelm, Parsons, and the
Wartburg Watch as “Defendants” in this order.
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 1 of 36

- 2 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
BACKGROUND
I. Relevant Factual Background
The following facts, presumed true, are taken from the complaint unless otherwise
noted. (Doc. 1.)
A. The Parties
“Lucky is an individual and a citizen of the State of Missouri.” (Id. ¶ 1.)
“The Wartburg Watch . . . is an unincorporated association that conducts an online
presence and, more specifically a ‘blog’, from the State of North Carolina, has a principal
place of business in the State of North Carolina, and is a citizen of the State of North
Carolina.” (Id. ¶ 2.)
Parsons “is an individual, a citizen of the State of North Carolina, and co-founder
and/or operator of Wartburg Watch.” (Id. ¶ 3.)
Wilhelm “is an individual, a citizen of the State of Arizona, and a reporter,
contributor, and/or author for Wartburg Watch.” (Id. ¶ 5.) “Wilhelm publicly portrays
himself as a ‘truth teller’ who engages in ‘research’ and ‘expos[es] evil’ and ‘darkness
among evangelical elites’.” (Id. ¶ 24.) “His work is described as covering ‘many ground
breaking stories that others in the mainstream evangelical press were afraid to cover’.”
(Id.)
B. Lucky’s Tenure At IHOPKC
“Between 2008 and 2010, Lucky held a paid staff position with the International
House of Prayer, Kansas City (‘IHOPKC’), related to information technology and music,
and also volunteered with youth ministries.” (Id. ¶ 14.) “In February 2010, Lucky
voluntarily left IHOPKC to accept new employment as a recording engineer and
production manager for a record label.” (Id. ¶ 15.)
C. The Wartburg Watch And Wilhelm’s Involvement With The Blog
“Wartburg Watch’s blog purports to offer commentary and news on various
religious and social topics.” (Id. ¶ 16.) “Defendants, through Wartberg [sic] Watch, hold
themselves out as a source of ‘armchair investigative journalists’ who ‘hawkishly cover
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 2 of 36

- 3 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
any credible allegation’ of abuse. Wartberg [sic] Watch’s blog bolsters its posts with
materials such as ‘court records, police reports, video clips of pastors’ sermons, and
emails.’” (Id. ¶ 17.) “Parsons has also stated that she ‘never lie[s] when [she’s] writing
these blogs’ and is ‘dead serious about what [she] write[s].’” (Id.)
“Recently, Parsons, identified as the ‘well-known author of The Wartburg Watch’,
offered Wilhelm a writing opportunity on Wartburg Watch’s blog, which he accepted,
stating that his future articles would be found at Wartburg Watch’s blog.” (Id. ¶ 18.)
“Wilhelm publicly thanked ‘Dee and Deb of the Wartburg Watch’ for telling his story and
encouraging him to write.” (Id.) The complaint alleges that “at all relevant times,
[Wilhelm] was acting as an agent of and/or within the scope of his employment or
association with the Wartburg Watch, [and] Parsons . . . when publishing and
disseminating the defamatory statements alleged in th[e] [c]omplaint.” (Id.)
D. The Article
“On or about August 23, 2024, Defendants, through Wartburg Watch, published a
false and defamatory article titled, ‘Former IHOPKC Musician Larry Lucky Has Larger
Issues to Worry About than a Tik Tok Video Alleging Nefarious Deeds’ . . . .” (Id. ¶ 19.)
This article will be referred to in this order as “The Article.” Wilhelm “was the reporter
and/or author of the Article.” (Id. ¶ 20.) “The Article was widely disseminated on the
internet and was accessible to and viewed by individuals in Arizona, including Lucky’s
colleagues, clients, friends, and family members.” (Id. ¶ 21.)
The Article discusses allegations that Lucky had engaged in inappropriate contact
with minors while working at IHOPKC. (Doc. 11-1.)2 The Article includes the statement:
2 Parsons and Wilhelm attach the Article as exhibits to their motions and ask the Court
to consider the Article incorporated by reference into the complaint. (Doc. 11 at 4; Doc.
11-1; Doc. 15 at 10; Doc. 15-1.) Lucky does not appear to object to this request. The Court
may consider the Article without converting Parsons’s and Wilhelm’s motions into
motions for summary judgment because the complaint refers to and relies on the Article,
and the Article is central to Lucky’s claims. See, e.g., Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448
(9th Cir. 2006) (“A court may consider evidence on which the complaint ‘necessarily
relies’ if: (1) the complaint refers to the document; (2) the document is central to the
plaintiff’s claim; and (3) no party questions the authenticity of the copy attached to the
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 3 of 36

- 4 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
“On January 12, 2024 I [Wilhelm] was made aware of a TikTok video published by a
woman who attended IHOPKC with her family while in her teen years. She alleged that
Larry Lucky was attempting to groom boys, two of whom were her brothers.” (Id. at 3.)
The Article explains that Wilhelm had “made a copy of the video and published it on [his]
‘X’ account.” (Id.)
The end of the Article includes the following passage:
Below you will see two letters I received allegedly from Citron Law Group
PLLC on behalf of Larry Lucky. I have reason to believe these letters were
not written by Beau Citron of the Citron Law Group. When researching this
matter I found that “pretending to be a lawyer to scare someone into
compliance can be subject to both criminal and civil penalties.”
(Id. at 7. See also Doc. 1 ¶ 22.) These three sentences will be referred to in this order as
“the Statement.”
Enclosed with the Article are two cease-and-desist letters (“the Letters”), both of
which demanded that Wilhelm “immediately and permanently remove” the above-
mentioned post on “X” within seven days or otherwise face potential legal action. (Doc.
11-1 at 8-9.)3
The complaint alleges that the Statement “accus[es] Lucky of concrete, unlawful
conduct.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 23.) The complaint further alleges that the “[S]tatement accusing
Lucky of forging an attorney’s letter, impersonating an attorney, or any criminal conduct
related to such activities, is entirely false” and that “Beau Citron is in fact a licensed and
practicing attorney in Arizona, who personally authored and sent the cease-and-desist
[L]etters on behalf of Lucky to Wilhelm at Wilhelm’s Arizona address.” (Id. ¶¶ 25-26.)
The complaint also notes that “when directly asked in the comments section of the Article
12(b)(6) motion.”); United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A court
may . . . consider certain materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents
incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without
converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.”).
3 “Wilhelm received [these] cease and desist letters from an Arizona attorney on
behalf of Lucky, at Wilhelm’s Arizona address.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 6.)
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 4 of 36

- 5 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
to substantiate his claims regarding the authenticity of the cease-and-desist letters, Wilhelm
refused, stating, ‘I believe it would be in my best interest to not state my reasons at this
time.’” (Id. ¶ 27. See also Doc. 11-1 at 10.)
II. Relevant Procedural Background
On August 21, 2025, Lucky initiated this action. (Doc. 1.)
On September 18, 2025, Wilhelm filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 11.)
On September 24, 2025, Parsons filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 15.) That same
day, the Wartburg Watch filed an answer to the complaint. (Doc. 16.)
On October 2, 2025, Lucky filed a combined response to Wilhelm’s and Parsons’s
motions to dismiss. (Doc. 18.)
On October 8, 2025, Wilhelm and Parsons filed a joint reply in support of their
motions to dismiss. (Doc. 19.)
On January 16, 2026, the parties requested a referral to a magistrate judge for a
settlement conference. (Doc. 22 at 3.) The Court postponed resolving the pending motions
until the completion of the settlement conference, which was unsuccessful. (Doc. 35.)
DISCUSSION
I. Parsons’s Motion To Dismiss
Parsons moves to dismiss the claims against her pursuant to Rules 12(b)(2) and
12(b)(6). (Doc. 15.) Because, as discussed below, the Court concludes that it lacks
personal jurisdiction over Parsons, it is unnecessary to address Parsons’s Rule 12(b)(6)
arguments.
A. Rule 12(b)(2)
A defendant may move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(2). “In opposing a defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,
the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction is proper.” Ranza v. Nike,
Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). “Where, as here, the
defendant’s motion is based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, the
plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 5 of 36

- 6 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
motion to dismiss.” Id. (cleaned up).
When ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,
“uncontroverted allegations must be taken as true, and conflicts between parties over
statements contained in affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor,” but a “plaintiff
may not simply rest on the bare allegations of the complaint.” Id. (cleaned up). The Court
may also consider “deposition testimony and other evidence” outside of the pleadings to
determine whether it has personal jurisdiction. Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S,
52 F.3d 267, 268 (9th Cir. 1995). See also Lee v. Plex, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 3d 755, 769
(N.D. Cal. 2025) (“The court may also consider declarations and other evidence outside
the pleadings to determine whether it has personal jurisdiction.”) (cleaned up); 1 Gensler,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules and Commentary, Rule 12 § 12:31 (2025) (“The
plaintiff must supply specific facts in support of personal jurisdiction.”).
“Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their
jurisdiction over persons.” Morrill v. Scott Fin. Corp., 873 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2017)
(quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014)). “Arizona law permits the
exercise of personal jurisdiction to the extent permitted under the United States
Constitution.” Id. (citing Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a).) Accordingly, whether the Court has
personal jurisdiction over Parsons “is subject to the terms of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.
“Constitutional due process requires that defendants have certain minimum contacts
with a forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. (cleaned up). Minimum contacts exist “if the
defendant has continuous and systematic general business contacts with a forum state
(general jurisdiction), or if the defendant has sufficient contacts arising from or related to
specific transactions or activities in the forum state (specific jurisdiction).” Id. at 1142
(cleaned up).
Lucky does not contend that Parsons is subject to general personal jurisdiction in
Arizona. (Doc. 18 at 8 [arguing only that specific personal jurisdiction exists over
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 6 of 36

- 7 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Parsons].) Thus, the Court must apply the Ninth Circuit’s three-prong test to determine
whether Parsons has sufficient contacts with Arizona to be subject to specific personal
jurisdiction: “(1) The non-resident must purposefully direct his activities or consummate
some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he
purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises
out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of
jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e., it must be reasonable.”
Morrill, 873 F.3d at 1142 (citation omitted). “The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying
the first two prongs of the test.” Id. (citation omitted). “If the plaintiff fails to satisfy either
of these prongs, personal jurisdiction is not established in the forum state.” Id. (citation
omitted).
B. The Parties’ Arguments
Parsons argues that she is not subject to specific personal jurisdiction because the
“purposeful availment” prong is not satisfied. (Doc. 15 at 6.) First, Parsons argues that
she has not committed an “intentional act.” (Id.) Parsons argues that the complaint “merely
alleges that Mrs. Parsons allowed Mr. Wilhelm an opportunity to post on the blog” and that
the “[c]omplaint fails to allege any intentional act by Mrs. Parsons in relation to the
publication of the Article.” (Id.) Parsons also notes that the complaint “does not allege
that Mrs. Parsons was responsible for, or had a duty to, screen Mr. Wilhelm’s Article,
received compensation from Mr. Wilhelm’s Article, or otherwise directed or oversaw Mr.
Wilhelm’s authorship and publication of the Article.” (Id. at 6-7.) Parsons further argues
that even “if [Lucky] had alleged as much,” Parsons’s declaration attached to her motion4
“establishes that Mrs. Parsons did not screen, oversee, or otherwise take part in Mr.
Wilhelm’s authorship or publication of the Article, and that Mrs. Parsons did not
compensate Mr. Wilhelm for posting to the blog,” and “[t]herefore, to satisfy his burden to
establish Mrs. Parsons committed an intentional act, [Lucky] must produce evidence that
4 Parsons’s declaration is attached to her motion as Exhibit B. (Doc. 15-2.)
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 7 of 36

- 8 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
sufficiently rebuts Mrs. Parsons’s evidence.” (Id. at 7.) Second, Parsons argues that she
did not direct any act toward Arizona. (Id.) Parsons argues that Lucky “acknowledges that
Mrs. Parsons is a citizen of North Carolina, that [Lucky] is a citizen of Missouri, that the
subject of the Article concerned events that occurred while [Lucky] worked in Missouri
and for a Missouri-based church, and that as a result of the Article, [Lucky] has suffered
harm to his reputation in his community—which is in Missouri.” (Id.) Parsons argues that
Lucky’s “sole allegation concerning Arizona is that the blog ‘is accessible to and viewed
by individuals in Arizona,’” but “the fact that individuals in Arizona could have accessed
or viewed the Article is insufficient to establish jurisdiction” because Lucky “must show
that Mrs. Parsons received a benefit, privilege, or protection from Arizona through
marketing, advertising, or conducting business in Arizona” and the complaint does not
allege such facts. (Id. at 7-8.) Parsons also emphasizes that she did not “author, publish,
or oversee Mr. Wilhelm’s publication of the Article.” (Id. at 7.) Third, Parsons argues that
even “[a]ssuming [Lucky] could establish the first two elements of the purposeful
availment prong, [Lucky] cannot prove that Mrs. Parsons likely knew harm would be
caused in Arizona” because “[c]ourts generally consider whether the defendant knew
whether the plaintiff lived in the forum when determining this element” and Lucky lives in
Missouri—thus, Lucky “suffered injury in Missouri, not Arizona.” (Id. at 8.) Parsons also
argues that even assuming she “is vicariously liable for Mr. Wilhelm’s Article, [she] had
no knowledge of [Lucky’s] residence and [Lucky] does not allege that she did.” (Id.)
Parsons argues that Lucky “merely alleged that his reputation may have been foreseeably
harmed in Arizona, but failed to allege why, how, or in what way his reputation could
potentially be harmed in Arizona” and that Lucky “does not describe in any capacity what
connection he has to Arizona, if any.” (Id.) Put differently, Parsons argues that “even if
[she] authored the Article (which she did not), published the Article (which she did not),
and purposefully directed the Article and her conduct towards Arizona (which she did not),
[Lucky] still cannot satisfy the purposeful availment prong of the due process test because
she had no basis to believe that [Lucky], a Missouri resident, would suffer harm in Arizona,
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 8 of 36

- 9 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
a forum to which [Lucky] has no connection.” (Id. at 8-9.)
In response, Lucky argues that “Parsons is the editor of Defendant The Wartburg
Watch . . . and operates it as a blog, reaching all corners of the internet.” (Doc. 18 at 2.)
Lucky argues that “Parsons, who publicly presents herself as a serious ‘investigative
journalist’ who is ‘dead serious’ about the truth of what she publishes, purposefully
directed tortious activity at this forum when publishing Wilhelm’s defamatory statement
on the blog.” (Id.) Lucky argues that the “[c]omplaint pleads sufficient facts to establish
a plausible claim that Parsons is vicariously liable for the defamatory publication—a claim
substantiated by her own public admission of being the ‘editor’ of The Wartburg Watch
and her statements detailing her editorial control and sophisticated understanding of
defamation law.” (Id.) As for the “first prong of the three-prong minimum contacts test
(commonly referred to as purposeful direction),” Lucky argues that “Parsons committed
an intentional act that was aimed at this forum and caused harm, which she knew was likely
to be suffered in this forum.” (Id. at 8.) Lucky argues that where, as here, an intentional
tort is alleged, the “effects test” set forth in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), applies.
(Id.) Lucky acknowledges that “[i]n the context of an interactive website, operation of the
website alone does not constitute express aiming—the plaintiff needs to allege ‘something
more.’” (Id. at 9, citation omitted.) Put differently, Lucky argues that “[w]hen the website
itself is the only jurisdictional contact, [the] analysis turns on whether the site had a forum-
specific focus or the defendant exhibited an intent to cultivate an audience in the forum.”
(Id., citation omitted.) Nevertheless, Lucky argues that “[i]n this case, [t]here is a direct
connection between this forum and the underlying controversy” because “Wilhelm is a
resident of Arizona and authored the Article at issue, including the defamatory
[S]tatement” and because “Lucky alleged that Wilhelm is integrally intertwined with The
Wartburg Watch, including Parsons.” (Id.) Lucky emphasizes that “Wilhelm publicly
thanked ‘Dee and Deb of the Wartburg Watch’ for telling his story and encouraging him
to write.” (Id., citing Doc. 1 ¶ 18.) And Lucky argues that “Parsons cannot deny with a
straight face her entanglement with Wilhelm, or that he resides in and writes from Arizona”
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 9 of 36

- 10 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
and “also cannot deny with a straight face that she operates and is the editor of The
Wartburg Watch, which adopted and published the Article that contains the defamatory
statement and filed an Answer in this matter, admitting and consenting to jurisdiction.”
(Id. at 9-10.) Lucky also notes that “Parsons accepted service of the [c]omplaint on behalf
of The Wartburg Watch at her residence.” (Id. at 10.) Lucky argues that the “Wartburg
Watch is not a distinct legal entity that provides Parsons with a shield, she cannot assert
that the Court has no personal jurisdiction over her when she admits the Court has it over
her blog, an alter ego of her and an entity for which she accepted service. Moreover, The
Wartburg Watch is an interactive blog, which encourages commentary from people all over
the world, including Arizona. Parsons’s relationship with Wilhelm, as well as posting his
articles on her blog, establish the direct connection necessary for this Court to exercise
specific personal jurisdiction over her.” (Id.) Next, “[r]egarding the second prong of the
three-prong minimum contacts test,” Lucky argues that the allegations in the complaint
“establish that his defamation claim undoubtedly arises out of the intertwined relationships
between Wilhelm, Parsons, and The Wartburg Watch. Wilhelm, the Arizona resident,
authored the defamatory [S]tatement. The Article, which contains the defamatory
statement, was posted on The Wartburg Watch. And The Wartburg Watch is operated by
Parsons, edited by Parsons, disseminates information across the nation, and invites
interactive commentary with people all over the nation, including residents of this forum–
the home state of the originator of the defamatory [S]tatement.” (Id.) Lucky also argues
that the “Article was not about a random topic; it was authored by Wilhelm, an Arizona
resident, and centered on his receipt of legal correspondence at his Arizona address from
an Arizona law firm. The defamatory statement calls into question Lucky’s alleged
unauthorized practice of law in Arizona and alleged forgery in Arizona.” (Id.) Last,
“regarding the third prong,” Lucky argues that “the Court’s exercise of specific personal
jurisdiction would not be unreasonable for all of the reasons stated above.” (Id.)
Specifically, Lucky argues that “Wilhelm obviously cannot contest personal jurisdiction,”
and the “Wartburg Watch filed an Answer and did not raise lack of personal jurisdiction as
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 10 of 36

- 11 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
an affirmative defense, which is a waiver of such a defense.” (Id.) Thus, Lucky argues
that “Parsons, not being under a corporate shield of some kind extended by The Wartburg
Watch, cannot benefit from a ‘defense’ that her alter ego does not raise.” (Id. at 10-11.)
In reply, Parsons argues that Lucky “fails to address how Mrs. Parsons is connected
to Arizona.” (Doc. 19 at 5.) Instead, Parsons argues that Lucky “analyzes how Mr.
Wilhelm—not Mrs. Parsons—is intertwined with [the Wartburg Watch] and contends that
because [the Wartburg Watch] is an online blog accessible in Arizona that Mrs. Parsons is
also subject to Arizona jurisdiction.” (Id.) Parsons argues that “[i]n fact, [Lucky] admits
that the only basis for Mrs. Parsons being subject to this Court’s jurisdiction is her
‘relationship with Wilhelm, as well as posting articles on’ [the Wartburg Watch].” (Id.)
Parsons argues that “[i]n the same breath, [Lucky] argues that jurisdiction exists because
the Article was ‘authored by Wilhelm, an Arizona resident, and centered on his receipt of
legal correspondence at his Arizona address from an Arizona law firm,” “[b]ut none of this
relates to Parsons, the defendant that is contesting jurisdiction.” (Id. at 5-6.) In sum,
Parsons argues that “[b]ecause [Lucky] has not produced any evidence in support of his
jurisdictional facts, and the unsupported allegations [Lucky] relies on concern Wilhelm,
not Parsons, the Court should dismiss the [c]omplaint as to Parsons.” (Id. at 6.)
C. Analysis
Defamation is an “intentional tort.” Freestream Aircraft (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Aero L.
Grp., 905 F.3d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 2018). “A purposeful direction analysis applies in suits
sounding in tort where the tort was committed outside the forum state.” Id. at 605.5 The
Calder “effects test” “is normally employed in purposeful direction cases.” Yahoo! Inc. v.
Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2006). The
Ninth Circuit “construe[s] Calder to impose three requirements: the defendant allegedly
must have (1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3)
5 Even assuming that Wilhelm’s alleged conduct occurred inside Arizona, Parsons’s
alleged conduct occurred in North Carolina where she operates the Wartburg Watch and
publishes articles.
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 11 of 36

- 12 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Id.
(cleaned up).
Even assuming that Parsons’s operation of the Wartburg Watch and publication of
the Article (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 3,7) qualifies as an “intentional act,” Lucky has not met his burden
of showing that Parsons expressly aimed this conduct at Arizona.
“More than two decades ago, [the Ninth Circuit] recognized a distinction between
‘passive’ websites that merely make information available to visitors and ‘interactive’
websites, where ‘users can exchange information with the host computer when the site is
interactive.’” Herbal Brands, Inc. v. Photoplaza, Inc., 72 F.4th 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2023).
(citation omitted). “It is well settled that mere passive operation of a website is insufficient
to demonstrate express aiming.” Id. (cleaned up). “Similarly, operation of an interactive
website does not, by itself, establish express aiming. Otherwise, every time a seller offered
a product for sale through an interactive website, the seller would be subjecting itself to
specific jurisdiction in every forum in which the website was visible, whether or not the
seller actually consummated a sale. That result would be too broad to comport with due
process.” Id. “But operating a website in conjunction with ‘something more’—conduct
directly targeting the forum—is sufficient to satisfy the express aiming prong.” Id. at 1092
(cleaned up). “The interactivity of the website is one of several factors that can be relevant
to the question whether a defendant has done ‘something more.’” Id. (cleaned up). The
Ninth Circuit has “acknowledged that there is a ‘sliding scale’ of how interactive a website
is, and a higher degree of interactivity provides greater support for the exercise of specific
jurisdiction.” Id. at 1092 n.3.6 “In some cases, the operators of a website can be said to
6 The “sliding scale” test ultimately derives from Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.,
130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997). The Court observes that some courts have approached the
Cybersell sliding-scale test as an independent test distinct from the Calder effects test,
whereas other courts have applied the Cybersell sliding-scale test as part of the second
prong of the Calder effects test. Because the result here is the same regardless of whether
the Cybersell sliding-scale test is used as a separate test or as a component of the second
prong of the Calder effects test, the Court will follow the latter approach as in Mavrix
Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2011), and Herbal Brands, 72
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 12 of 36

- 13 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
have ‘expressly aimed’ at a forum state where a website with national viewership and scope
appeals to, and profits from, an audience in a particular state.” Id. (cleaned up). But
“[w]hen the website itself is the only jurisdictional contact, our analysis turns on whether
the site had a forum-specific focus or the defendant exhibited an intent to cultivate an
audience in the forum.” Id. Put differently, “[i]n determining whether a nonresident
defendant has done ‘something more,’ we have considered several factors, including the
interactivity of the defendant’s website, the geographic scope of the defendant’s
commercial ambitions, and whether the defendant ‘individually targeted’ a plaintiff known
to be a forum resident.” Mavrix Photo, 647 F.3d at 1229 (citations omitted).
The only allegation in the complaint addressing personal jurisdiction over Parsons
in Arizona is the following:
This Court has personal jurisdiction over Wartburg Watch, [and] Parsons,
. . . because they conduct an online presence and, more specifically a “blog”,
that is accessible to and viewed by individuals in Arizona and, further,
published the defamatory article on the blog that specifically targeted Lucky,
whose reputation could foreseeably be harmed in Arizona, and intentionally
directed their activities towards this forum. Wartburg Watch, [and] Parsons,
. . . therefore have sufficient minimum contacts with this forum for purposes
of this Court exercising personal jurisdiction over them.
(Doc. 1 ¶ 7.) In other words, the complaint simply alleges that Parsons operates the
Wartburg Watch, that the Wartburg Watch is accessible in Arizona, that Parsons published
the Article on the Wartburg Watch, and that it was foreseeable that Lucky’s reputation
would be harmed everywhere (including in Arizona) as a result of the Article. (See also
Doc. 18 at 10 [“The Wartburg Watch is operated by Parsons, edited by Parsons,
disseminates information across the nation, and invites interactive commentary with people
all over the nation, including residents of this forum . . . .”].) But the mere fact that Parsons
published the Article on a blog that is accessible in Arizona is insufficient to confer specific
personal jurisdiction over Parsons. Instead, the complaint must allege “something more”—
i.e., “conduct directly targeting the forum.” Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1229, 1231 (personal
F.4th 1085.
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 13 of 36

- 14 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
jurisdiction would unlikely exist over a “a local newspaper, an individual, or an unpaid
blogger who posted an allegedly actionable comment or photo to a website accessible in
all fifty states, but who could not be as certain . . . that his actions would be so widely
observed and who did not seek commercial gain from users outside his locality” because
“[n]ot all material placed on the Internet is, solely by virtue of its universal accessibility,
expressly aimed at every state in which it is accessed”) (emphasis added).
In Cybersell, the Ninth Circuit cited Benusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997), with approval, explaining that in
Benusan, the defendant, the owner of a Missouri jazz club, “created a general access web
page that contained information about the club in Missouri as well as a calendar of events
and ticketing information” but that “[t]ickets were not available through the web site.”
Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 417 (footnote omitted). The Ninth Circuit referred to this type of
website as “passive.” Id. at 418. Quoting Benusan, the Ninth Circuit explained: “Creating
a site, like placing a product into the stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide—or even
worldwide—but, without more, it is not an act purposefully directed toward the forum
state.” Id. (quoting Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301). After discussing several other
persuasive authorities, the Ninth Circuit held that “the common thread . . . is that the
likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly
proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over
the Internet.” Id. at 419. Applying that rule to the facts of the case before it, the Ninth
Circuit held:
Here, Cybersell FL has conducted no commercial activity over the Internet
in Arizona. All that it did was post an essentially passive home page on the
web, using the name “CyberSell,” which Cybersell AZ was in the process of
registering as a federal service mark. While there is no question that anyone,
anywhere could access that home page and thereby learn about the services
offered, we cannot see how from that fact alone it can be inferred that
Cybersell FL deliberately directed its merchandising efforts toward Arizona
residents.
Cybersell FL did nothing to encourage people in Arizona to access its site,
and there is no evidence that any part of its business (let alone a continuous
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 14 of 36

- 15 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
part of its business) was sought or achieved in Arizona. . . . No money
changed hands on the Internet from (or through) Arizona. In short, Cybersell
FL has done no act and has consummated no transaction, nor has it performed
any act by which it purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting
activities, in Arizona, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of
Arizona law.
We therefore hold that Cybersell FL’s contacts are insufficient to establish
“purposeful availment.” Cybersell AZ has thus failed to satisfy the first
prong of our three-part test for specific jurisdiction. We decline to go further
solely on the footing that Cybersell AZ has alleged trademark infringement
over the Internet by Cybersell FL's use of the registered name “Cybersell” on
an essentially passive web page advertisement. Otherwise, every complaint
arising out of alleged trademark infringement on the Internet would
automatically result in personal jurisdiction wherever the plaintiff's principal
place of business is located. That would not comport with traditional notions
of what qualifies as purposeful activity invoking the benefits and protections
of the forum state.
Id. at 419-20 (emphasis added).
District courts within the Ninth Circuit have applied Cybersell when evaluating
whether personal jurisdiction exists over defendants accused of engaging in defamation via
website postings. For example, in Hayes v. Bevil, 2005 WL 8160696 (D. Ariz. 2005), the
plaintiff, an Arizona resident, sued the defendants, residents of Louisiana. Id. at *1. The
defendants operated Cattyshaq.com, “an online forum, dedicated to ‘open discussion of
online scams,’ set up for the public to post information regarding suspected online scams.
Anyone who visits the website can obtain that information and post one’s own information.
The website does not sell or promote a service and there is no commercial conduct initiated
on its behalf.” Id. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id.
at *2. The court agreed: “In the Ninth Circuit the mere posting of information on an
otherwise passive website is insufficient to subject a party to personal jurisdiction. Rather,
in the Ninth Circuit, ‘the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally
exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an
entity conducts over the Internet.’” Id. at *3 (cleaned up). First, the court explained that
“Cattyshaq.com” was a “passive” website because “[i]t is set up for the public to post
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 15 of 36

- 16 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
information regarding certain companies and anyone who visits the website can obtain that
information or post one’s own message. There is no service being sold or promoted and
no affirmative commercial conduct initiated on behalf of the website.” Id. (quoting
Medinah Mining, Inc. v. Amunategui, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1135 (D. Nev. 2002)). “Thus,
Defendants merely operate a website that is accessible, and is in fact accessed, from
anywhere in the world.” Id. The same is true here. The complaint simply alleges that
personal jurisdiction exists over Parsons because she “conduct[s] an online presence and,
more specifically, a ‘blog’, that is accessible to and viewed by individuals in Arizona.”
(Doc. ¶ 7.) The complaint does not allege that the Wartburg Watch caters specifically to
an Arizona audience. Nor does the complaint allege that there is any service being sold
through the website to residents of Arizona. Moreover, Parsons’s declaration avers that
(1) the Wartburg Watch “does not advertise or market its posts, does not engage in
commercial activity, and does [not] receive any form of revenue or compensation from any
source”;7 (2) the Wartburg Watch “does not advertise in Arizona and does not solicit
customers, viewers, or otherwise direct activity towards Arizona”; and (3) the Wartburg
Watch “was intended, and is, simply a forum for [Parsons] and others to post commentary
opinion articles regarding current events.” (Doc. 15-2 ¶¶ 8-9.) Neither the complaint (Doc.
1) nor Lucky’s declaration in response to Parsons’s motion (Doc. 18-1) disputes these facts.
Thus, the Wartburg Watch is a passive website, and Parsons’s operation of that website is
alone insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over her.
Nevertheless, the Hayes court held that “while Defendants’ website itself is passive,
this Court must still determine whether Defendants’ allegedly tortious activity thereon can
also be considered passive.” 2005 WL 8160696 at *3. In Hayes, the plaintiff “accuse[d]
Defendants of posting, and allowing others to post, allegedly defamatory information
regarding Plaintiff on the Cattyshaq.com website.” Id. But the court held that, once again,
7 The Court presumes, based on the syntax of this sentence, that this paragraph of
Parsons’s declaration was intended to say that the Wartburg Watch “does [not] receive any
form of revenue or compensation from any source.” (Doc. 15-2 ¶ 8.)
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 16 of 36

- 17 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
that “the Ninth Circuit held in Cybersell that ‘something more’ is required . . . [beyond]
merely posting information on a website.” Id. The court found that “[t]hat ‘something
more’ [was] absent” because, inter alia: “[t]here [was] no evidence that Defendants
deliberately directed their activities toward Arizona residents”; “Defendants did nothing to
encourage people in Arizona to access Cattyshaq.com”; “[t]here [was] no evidence that
any Arizonan other than Plaintiff, or his attorney . . . accessed Defendants’ website”;
“Defendants did not enter into any contracts in Arizona, made no sales in Arizona, . . . and
earned no income from Arizona”; “[t]here [was] no evidence that Defendants had any
contact with Arizona other than the postings on their website, which could be accessed by
anyone”; and “[t]here [was] no evidence to suggest that Defendants reached out to Arizona
any more than to persons residing elsewhere.” Id. The same is true here. The complaint
does not allege, and Parsons’s declaration disavows, that the Wartburg Watch specifically
encourages Arizona readers to visit the blog or that the Wartburg Watch is involved in any
commercial activity in Arizona. At most, the complaint vaguely alleges that the Article
was “accessible to and viewed by individuals in Arizona.”8 As in Hayes, there is “no
evidence to suggest that [Parsons] reached out to Arizona any more than to persons residing
elsewhere.” Id. at *3.
Similarly, in Medinah Mining, “the parties’ main dispute [was] whether Ingram’s
8 Specifically, the complaint vaguely alleges that “[t]he Article was widely
disseminated on the internet and was accessible to and viewed by individuals in Arizona,
including Lucky’s colleagues, clients, friends, and family members.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 21.) And
in his declaration attached to his response brief, Lucky avers that the “damage to [his]
professional integrity and [his] businesses . . . is not confined to [his] local community in
Missouri but extends across the country, including to Arizona, where [he] ha[s] business
and personal connections.” (Doc. 18-1 ¶ 7.) These unspecific allegations are insufficient.
Gensler, § 12:31, supra (“The plaintiff must supply specific facts in support of personal
jurisdiction.”). And as discussed, these vague and conclusory allegations do not show that
Parsons specifically directed her activities at Arizona as opposed to the nation at large.
Indeed, Lucky’s declaration avers that it is “[t]he national reach and reputation of The
Wartburg Watch” that is “central to the harm [he] ha[s] suffered” and that “the defamatory
accusation against [him] was disseminated to a national audience.” (Doc. 18-1 ¶ 7,
emphases added.)
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 17 of 36

- 18 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
alleged posting of defamatory statements on a website [was] sufficient to” support the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over Ingram. 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1135. The “[p]laintiffs
accuse[d] Ingram of allegedly posting defamatory information about Medinah and Price
on the Raging Bull website.” Id. The court held that the website at issue was passive for
the same reasons identified in Hayes. Id. The court continued:
[H]ere, there is no evidence that Ingram did any business with anyone in
Nevada or that he directed his allegedly defamatory comments at Nevada.
He posted messages on a website that could be accessed by anyone around
the world who had access to the Internet. There is no evidence that any
Nevada resident actually did access the alleged defamation. Moreover, Price
is a citizen of Canada and Medinah is headquartered in California, with its
operations in Chile, which makes the inference that Ingram’s alleged
defamation was directed at Nevada even more tenuous.
Id.9 As discussed, there is no evidence that Parsons, through the Wartburg Watch, does
business in Arizona—at most, the complaint alleges that Parsons operates the Wartburg
Watch from North Carolina and that the blog is accessible everywhere in America,
including Arizona. Moreover, similar to Medinah, Lucky is a resident of Missouri, not
Arizona, “which makes the inference that [the] alleged defamation was directed at
[Arizona] even more tenuous.” Id.
Lucky’s arguments in his response brief do not compel a different result. Lucky
emphasizes that the “Wartburg Watch is operated by Parsons, edited by Parsons,
disseminates information across the nation, and invites interactive commentary with people
all over the nation, including residents of [Arizona].” (Doc. 18 at 10.) But this argument
only proves the point—at most, any “allegedly defamatory statements were directed at the
9 In its analysis under the Calder “effects test,” the Medinah Mining court rejected
the plaintiff’s argument “that alleged defamatory postings on the Internet alone are enough
to subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction in a forum where the alleged defamation can
be accessed under the effects test.” Id. at 1137. The court emphasized that in the case
before it, one plaintiff, Medinah, was “merely incorporated in Nevada,” the forum state,
but “[i]ts principal place of business, headquarters and operations are not in Nevada.” Id.
Moreover, the other plaintiff “Price [was] a citizen of Canada.” Id. at 1138. Thus, the
court held that the plaintiffs had “present[ed] no evidence that Ingram targeted Nevada or
its residents in making his alleged defamatory statements.” Id.
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 18 of 36

- 19 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Internet community generally without regard for whether any result, intended or otherwise,
would result in [Arizona].” Cummins v. Lollar, 2013 WL 12124089, *6 (C.D. Cal. 2013).
Lucky also emphasizes that “Wilhelm is a resident of Arizona and authored the
Article at issue” and “Wilhelm is integrally intertwined with The Wartburg Watch,
including Parsons and Martin.” (Doc. 18 at 9.) To the extent Lucky’s “integrally
intertwined” argument is an attempt to assert personal jurisdiction over Parsons (a non-
Arizona resident) through Wilhelm (an Arizona resident) under an agency theory, that
argument fails. As an initial matter, it’s unclear whether the Ninth Circuit recognizes an
agency test in the context of specific personal jurisdiction. “Historically, the Ninth Circuit
used an agency test to determine personal jurisdiction. Under that test, a subsidiary’s
contacts with a forum jurisdiction could be attributed to a parent corporation if the
subsidiary performed functions ‘sufficiently important to the foreign corporation that if it
did not have a representative to perform them, the corporation’s own officials would
undertake to perform substantially similar services.” Luna v. Taurus Int’l Mfg. Inc., 2025
WL 2676084, *6 (D. Ariz. 2025) (quoting Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 928 (9th
Cir. 2001)). The Supreme Court later “rejected this agency test as applied to general
jurisdiction” but “left open the possibility that agency relationships may be relevant to the
existence of specific jurisdiction.” Id. (cleaned up). Then, in 2017, the Ninth Circuit in
Williams v. Yamaha Motor Co., 851 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2017), held that the Supreme
Court’s decision was “irreconcilable” with the agency test previously used by the Ninth
Circuit. Luna, 2025 WL 2676084 at *6. The Ninth Circuit “then assumed, without
deciding, that some standard of agency continues to be relevant to the existence of specific
jurisdiction but nonetheless found that specific jurisdiction was lacking because under any
standard for finding an agency relationship, the parent company must have the right to
substantially control its subsidiary’s activities,’ and appellants neither alleged nor
otherwise showed that the parent company had such control.” Id.(cleaned up).
As this Court has previously observed, “[i]n the wake of Williams, district courts in
the Ninth Circuit have largely followed two different approaches to the agency test as it
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 19 of 36

- 20 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
applies to specific jurisdiction. First, some courts have held that a subsidiary’s contacts
cannot be attributed to a parent corporation under any theory of agency. Second, other
courts have concluded that a subsidiary’s jurisdictional contacts can be attributed to a
parent corporation when the parent exercises ‘substantial control’ over its subsidiary.” Id.
(citations omitted). “If the former interpretation is correct, [Lucky’s] agency theory is a
non-starter.” Id. at *7. “And even assuming the latter interpretation is correct,” and further
assuming that the latter interpretation is also potentially applicable in the context of
individual co-defendants (as opposed to corporate entities with a parent-subsidiary
relationship), Lucky has still “failed to make the necessary showing here because” neither
the complaint nor Lucky’s declaration supports that Parsons “substantially controlled”
Wilhelm’s activities. Id.
In his response brief, Lucky appears to assume that Parsons “post[ed] [Wilhelm’s]
articles on her blog” (Doc. 18 at 10) and that Parsons has some level of “editorial control”
over the articles on The Wartburg Watch (id. at 2). But these vague and conclusory
assumptions do not actually appear as allegations in the complaint. At most, the complaint
makes two conclusory statements that (1) “[a]t all relevant times, Defendants acted within
the scope of their operation of Wartburg Watch, individually, and/or jointly in the
publication and dissemination of defamatory statements alleged in this [c]omplaint”; and
(2) there exists an “ongoing collaborative relationship between Defendants” such that
“Wilhelm, at all relevant times, was acting as an agent of and/or within the scope of his
employment or association with Wartburg Watch, Parsons, and Martin, when publishing
and disseminating the defamatory statements alleged in this [c]omplaint.” (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 11,
18.) But such conclusory allegations of an agency relationship are insufficient. See, e.g.,
Williams, 851 F.3d at 1025 n.5 (holding that the “conclusory legal statement unsupported
by any factual assertion” that “‘Defendants . . . were the agents or employees of each other
and were acting at all times within the course and scope of such agency and employment
. . . and are legally responsible because of their relationship with their co-Defendants’” was
insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction under an agency theory because there were no
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 20 of 36

- 21 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
factual allegations of “control” as required to establish an agency relationship) (alterations
in original); Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 766 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[M]ere ‘bare bones’
assertions of minimum contacts with the forum or legal conclusions unsupported by
specific factual allegations will not satisfy a plaintiff's pleading burden.”).
In his declaration attached to his response brief, Lucky avers that Parsons self-
identifies as the “Editor” of the Wartburg Watch, that Parsons “published” the Article, and
that Lucky has “read Ms. Parsons’ public statements in which she describes her meticulous
editorial process, including holding stories until she is ‘convinced of the story’s veracity’
and independently verifying facts.” (Doc. 18-1 ¶¶ 5-6, 8.) But none of these new factual
allegations speaks to Parsons having “substantial control” over any Wartburg Watch
contributor, much less Wilhelm.10 By contrast, Parsons’s declaration states explicitly that
the Wartburg Watch “does not have any employees”; that Parsons “do[es] not compensate
Mr. Wilhelm for posting opinion articles to the [Wartburg Watch]”; and that “[n]either
[Parsons] nor anyone else on behalf of the [Wartburg Watch] supervise Mr. Wilhelm, direct
or control the subject matter for which he decides to write about, and do not screen or
otherwise approve any material Mr. Wilhelm authors or publishes to the [Wartburg Watch],
including the [A]rticle Mr. Wilhelm published to the [Wartburg Watch] on August 23,
2024, that is the subject of the above-captioned lawsuit.” (Doc. 15-2 ¶¶ 8, 11-12.)
Finally, Lucky’s argument that the Wartburg Watch filed an answer, thereby
“admitting and consenting to jurisdiction,” and that Parsons is somehow bound by that
admission under an “alter ego” theory (Doc. 18 at 10-11), is undeveloped and unpersuasive.
Lucky does not cite a single case that holds that personal jurisdiction can be exercised over
one defendant based on another defendant’s failure to challenge personal jurisdiction in an
10 For example, Lucky’s declaration does not aver that Parsons screens articles
authored by others before they are published on the Wartburg Watch. Although paragraph
eight of Lucky’s declaration states that Parsons’s editorial process “includ[es] holding
stories” until Parsons verifies the facts contained therein (Doc. 18-1 ¶ 8), it’s unclear
whether that is Parsons’s editorial process for her own articles or whether Parsons
somehow controls the content of other contributors’ articles. At any rate, nothing in this
paragraph suggests that Parsons exercised “substantial control” over Wilhelm specifically.
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 21 of 36

- 22 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
answer. And the complaint contains no allegations regarding an “alter ego” theory.11
In sum, Lucky has not met his burden of showing that Parsons expressly aimed any
allegedly defamatory statement at Arizona, and thus Lucky has not shown purposeful
direction as required by Calder.12 Accordingly, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over
Parsons.
II. Wilhelm’s Motion to Dismiss
Wilhelm moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. 11.)
A. Rule 12(b)(6)
Under Rule 12(b)(6), “to survive a motion to dismiss, a party must allege sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” In re
Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “[A]ll well-pleaded allegations of
11 Lucky also argues that the Article “was authored by Wilhelm, an Arizona resident,
and centered on his receipt of legal correspondence at his Arizona residence from an
Arizona law firm” and that the alleged “defamatory [S]tatement calls into question Lucky’s
alleged unauthorized practice of law in Arizona and alleged forgery in Arizona.” (Doc. 18
at 10.) This argument, too, is unavailing. As an initial matter, Lucky lives in Missouri and
there is nothing to suggest that Lucky drafted or sent the Letters in Arizona. Moreover,
Lucky’s argument that the Article was “centered on [Wilhelm’s] receipt of” the Letters
(id.) is a mischaracterization of the Article. The Article focuses on Lucky (a Missouri
resident) and his alleged inappropriate encounters at a Missouri church. (Doc. 11-1.)
Although the Article does cite the Letters, that discussion is made in reference to the
lengthy discussion that precedes it regarding Lucky’s alleged misconduct in Missouri—
any relationship to Arizona is tenuous at best and does not support that the Article is
somehow focused on Arizona. Cf. Young v. New Haven Advoc., 315 F.3d 256, 263-64 (4th
Cir. 2002) (acknowledging the allegedly defamatory articles “included discussions about
the allegedly harsh conditions at the Wallens Ridge prison [in Virginia], where Young was
warden” but noting that “[t]he focus of the articles, however, was the Connecticut prisoner
transfer policy and its impact on the transferred prisoners and their families back home in
Connecticut” and thus “Connecticut, not Virginia, was the focal point of the articles”).
12 These conclusions render it unnecessary to address the remaining Calder factors, as
well as the remaining specific personal jurisdiction factors as set forth in Morrill.
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 22 of 36

- 23 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
material fact in the complaint are accepted as true and are construed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party.” Id. at 1144-45 (citation omitted). However, the Court
need not accept legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-
80. Moreover, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. The court also may dismiss due
to “a lack of a cognizable legal theory.” Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., 795 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th
Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
B. The Parties’ Arguments
Wilhelm argues that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss a defamation claim,” Lucky
must show that the allegedly defamatory Statement is “not mere comment within the ambit
of the First Amendment.” (Doc. 11 at 5, citation omitted.) Wilhelm argues that
“[g]enerally defamation is governed by state law, however the First Amendment
safeguards for freedom of speech limit state law and provide constitutional protection to
statements of opinion on matters that do not contain or imply a provable factual assertion.”
(Id.) Thus, Wilhelm argues that “when it is clear that the speaker is expressing a subjective
view, an interpretation, a theory, conjecture, or surmise on a matter, the statement is not
actionable” and “[w]hether a statement is actionable for defamation is therefore
conditioned upon ‘whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the statement
implies an assertion of objective fact’”—“[i]f there is no assertion of objective fact, the
claim is foreclosed by the First Amendment.” (Id.) Next, Wilhelm argues that the
Statement constitutes protected opinion under the Ninth Circuit’s “three-part test to
determine whether a statement asserts an objective fact or is protected under the First
Amendment.” (Id.) Defendant analogizes this case to Hosszu v. Barrett, 202 F. Supp. 3d
1101 (D. Ariz. 2016), aff’d, 716 F. App’x 622 (9th Cir. 2017). (Id. at 5-6.) Wilhelm then
proceeds to apply the Ninth Circuit’s three-factor test to the facts of this case. As for the
first factor, the general tenor of the work, Wilhelm argues this factor weighs in his favor
because blogs are “a form of media known for containing opinionated writings and
personal perspectives.” (Id. at 6.) Wilhelm also argues that “[e]ven considering the
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 23 of 36

- 24 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Statement itself, the plain text of the Statement makes it clear that Mr. Wilhelm is
expressing his personal opinion” and that he included “his reasoning and the sources from
which he gained his opinions.” (Id. at 6-7.) As for the second factor, the use of hyperbolic
or figurative speech, Wilhelm “does not contest that the Article, nor the Statement, did not
include hyperbolic or figurative speech,” but he argues that, “as illustrated by the Hosszu
court, this is immaterial to the determination of whether the Statement is actionable
defamation.” (Id. at 7.) As for the third factor, whether the statement can be proved true
or false, Wilhelm argues that “it cannot be because it is Mr. Wilhelm’s personal opinion.”
(Id.) Wilhelm argues that the “Statement merely recited Mr. Wilhelm’s personal
perspective and belief that the Letters were not sent by Beau Citron because of the manner
in which the Letters were authored” and that “Mr. Wilhelm inserted pictures of the Lettres
[sic] into the Article which indicate why Mr. Wilhelm held that belief: because the Letters
did not include an email address for Citron Law Group or Beau Citron, a physical address,
phone numbers, fax numbers, or an attorney State Bar number for Mr. Citron, and were
written in a manner Mr. Wilhelm expected an attorney to write.” (Id.) Wilhelm also argues
that his “opinions and belief for why the Letters were questionable are also held by
others”—for example, one person commented on his Article that “the fact there is no
contact info [on the Letter] is my first red flag that this is not an official letter.” (Id.) Next,
Wilhelm argues that even “if the Court were to entertain the legal contention in the
[c]omplaint that whether the Letters were sent by Beau Citron could have been proven true
by inquiring with Beau Citron, the Court must still dismiss the case” because the Letters
contained no contact information for Beau Citron and thus “even if Mr. Wilhelm wanted
to contact Mr. Citron, the Letters provided no way for him to do so.” (Id. at 8.) Wilhelm
also argues that he “research[ed] the return address for the Letters” and “not a single search
result related to Citron Law Group or Beau Citron.” (Id.) Last, Wilhelm argues that
“[e]ven if the Statement is actionable under the First Amendment, [Lucky’s] claim fails
because the Statement does not constitute defamation.” (Id.) Wilhelm argues that he “does
not dispute that the Statement was published to third persons”; however, “even the bare
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 24 of 36

- 25 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
allegations of the [c]omplaint prove that the Statement is not false”13 and that the Statement
does not identify Lucky. (Id. at 9.) Specifically, Wilhelm argues that (1) “[t]he Statement
does not accuse [Lucky] of pretending to be a lawyer,” (2) “[n]or does the Statement accuse
Mr. Wilhelm [sic] of trying to scare Mr. Wilhelm into complying with the demands in the
Letters,” and (3) “nor [do] the remaining portions of the Article, identify, accuse, or state
that [Lucky] is the person that Wilhelm believes sent the Letters.” (Id.) To the contrary,
Wilhelm argues that “the Statement merely states that Mr. Wilhelm believes the Letters
were not sent by the Citron Law Group.” (Id.)
In response, Lucky argues “that the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual
allegations as true for purposes of ruling on the Motion[] to Dismiss,” and thus Wilhelm’s
“arguments directed towards disputes regarding material facts should fall on deaf ears as
they are affirmative defenses to be pled, established in discovery, and proved at trial.”
(Doc. 18 at 11.) Lucky further argues that Wilhelm “misapprehend[s] the standard of
review in arguing for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), which requires that all factual
allegations be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party,” that the “admissibility of the evidence supporting the allegations or factual disputes
about the evidence are simply not at issue,” and that Wilhelm’s “First Amendment and
other factually-based arguments are therefore without merit at this stage and are simply
affirmative defenses, proper to plead in an Answer and establish through discovery and
proven at trial.” (Id. at 12.)14 Next, Lucky argues that “the threshold question in
13 To the extent Wilhelm is arguing that the Court should dismiss Lucky’s defamation
claim because his statement that the Letters were not written by Beau Citron is true, that
argument lacks merit. At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must accept all well-
pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. The complaint unequivocally alleges that
Wilhelm’s statement “is entirely false” and that “Beau Citron is in fact a licensed and
practicing attorney in Arizona, who personally authored and sent the cease-and-desist
letters on behalf of Lucky to Wilhelm at Wilhelm’s Arizona address.” (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 25-26.)
14 To the extent Lucky is arguing that the question of whether an allegedly defamatory
statement is protected opinion under the First Amendment cannot be resolved at the motion
to dismiss stage, that argument is without merit. See, e.g., Hosszu, 716 F. App’x at 623
(affirming the district court’s resolution of this issue at the motion to dismiss stage).
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 25 of 36

- 26 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
defamation suits is not whether a statement might be labeled opinion, but rather whether a
reasonable factfinder could conclude that the statement implies an assertion of objective
fact.” (Id., cleaned up.) Lucky argues that he “has alleged that his Arizona attorney’s
identity was objectively verifiable and, as a result, any ‘belief’ by Wilhelm about Lucky’s
actions or conduct was not a protected opinion” and “a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that Wilhelm’s statement was an assertion of an objectively verifiable fact.” (Id.)
Lucky also argues that Wilhelm’s reliance upon Hosszu is “misplaced” and that “[h]iding
behind the characterization of a ‘blog’ as a ‘form of media known for containing personal
opinion and commentary’ does not give [Wilhelm] free reign to falsely accuse Lucky (or
anyone else for that matter) of committing a crime or impersonating a lawyer.” (Id. at 13,
citation omitted.) Lucky argues that “[t]he ease of verification distinguishes this case from
those like Hosszu, where the court found speculation about an athlete’s potential use of
undetectable performance-enhancing drugs to be protected opinion.” (Id.) Lucky argues
that “[t]he bottom line is that Lucky has alleged facts supporting the essential elements of
a defamation claim: (1) Wilhelm implied Lucky was impersonating an attorney and
committing a crime; (2) Defendants, without any privilege to do so, published the statement
on the internet for all to see; (3) Defendants acted with the requisite degree of fault; and
[4] Lucky suffered damages or, in the alternative, damages are presumed because the
defamatory statement accused Lucky of a crime.” (Id. at 13-14.)
In reply, Wilhelm contends that the Court “need only look to the Statement and must
ignore the following allegations [Lucky] includes in [the] [c]omplaint”: (1) “The Statement
is not pure opinion”; (2) “The reference to criminal and civil penalties further conveys to
the average reader that Wilhelm is accusing Lucky of concrete, unlawful conduct, not
merely expressing a subjective viewpoint”; (3) “The Statement ‘implies underlying false
facts and defamatory facts’”; (4) “The information in the Statement is ‘objectively
verifiable.’” (Doc. 19 at 3.) Wilhelm also argues that the “Court must ignore the additional
allegations below on the basis that they are patently false and can be proven false by the
very text of the Statement”: (1) “The Statement ‘falsely asserts that Lucky engaged in the
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 26 of 36

- 27 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
criminal acts of forgery and/or impersonating a lawyer in Arizona’”; and (2) “The
Statement accuses Lucky of ‘engag[ing] in the unauthorized practice of law or forgery.’”
(Id.) And Wilhelm argues that “[w]hen analyzing the Statement, and not [Lucky’s]
impermissible conclusions of law and fact, the Court is compelled to make the following
determinations”: (1) “The Statement does not include Lucky’s name in any manner”; (2)
“The Statement does not state or insinuate that Lucky impersonated a lawyer. It only states
that pretending to be a lawyer can subject the impersonator to consequences”; (3) “The
Statement does not accuse Lucky of engaging in ‘criminal acts of forgery’”; (4) “The
Statement does not accuse Lucky of ‘engaging in the unauthorized practice of law’”; and
(5) “The Statement does not accuse Lucky of ‘committing a crime or impersonating a
lawyer.’” (Id. at 3-4.) Wilhelm reiterates that “the Statement is [not] false” and “provides
only that Mr. Wilhelm believed the [L]etters were not written by the Citron Law Group
and that pretending to be a lawyer can subject an individual to penalties.” (Id. at 4.)
Wilhelm argues that the “Statement does not state that the Letters were not written by an
attorney,” “does not state that Lucky authored the letters and impersonated an attorney,”
and “does not state that Lucky wrote the letters to scare anybody.” (Id.) And Wilhelm
reiterates that the Statement “merely provides Mr. Wilhelm’s opinion.” (Id.) Next,
Wilhelm argues that Lucky’s “attempt to distinguish Hosszu is unpersuasive” and that
Lucky’s position that “First Amendment defenses are not proper at this juncture . . . is
wrong.” (Id.) Wilhelm contends that Hosszu is analogous because “[a]lthough the
Statement does implicate Lucky, if the Court construes the Statement and the entire Article
to the ends of the earth, the Statement can be interpreted to merely raise a suspicion that
Lucky impersonated a lawyer by writing the Letters.” (Id. at 5.)
C. Analysis
Because the parties assume that Lucky’s defamation claim is governed by Arizona
law (Doc. 1 ¶ 36; Doc. 11 at 8), the Court will do the same. “Arizona follows the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) . . . on claims relating to defamation of a private
person.” Desert Palm Surgical Grp., P.L.C. v. Petta, 343 P.3d 438, 449 (Ariz. Ct. App.
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 27 of 36

- 28 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2015). See also Koepnick v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 762 P.2d 609, 617 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988)
(“Arizona courts follow the Restatement (Second) of Torts absent authority to the
contrary.”). Under the Second Restatement, “[t]o create liability for defamation there must
be: (a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged
publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the
publisher; and (d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm [i.e.,
defamation per se] or the existence of special harm caused by the publication [i.e.,
defamation per quod].” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (1977).
1. Opinion
Wilhelm argues that the allegedly defamatory Statement—that Wilhelm “ha[d]
reason to believe the[] [L]etters were not written by Beau Citron of the Citron Law Group”
(Doc. 11-1 at 7)—is a statement of opinion protected by the First Amendment.
“Although defamation is primarily governed by state law, the First Amendment
safeguards for freedom of speech and press limit state law.” Underwager v. Channel 9
Australia, 69 F.3d 361, 366 (9th Cir. 1995). “The scope of constitutional protection
extends to statements of opinion on matters of public concern that do not contain or imply
a provable factual assertion.” Id. “To determine whether a statement implies a factual
assertion, we examine the totality of the circumstances in which it was made.” Id. “First,
we look at the statement in its broad context, which includes the general tenor of the entire
work, the subject of the statements, the setting, and the format of the work. Next we turn
to the specific context and content of the statements, analyzing the extent of figurative or
hyperbolic language used and the reasonable expectations of the audience in that particular
situation. Finally, we inquire whether the statement itself is sufficiently factual to be
susceptible of being proved true or false.” Id. See also Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d
1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 1990).
a. General Tenor Of The Work
Although a close call, the first factor—the general tenor of the work—weighs in
Wilhelm’s favor. On the one hand, the complaint alleges that Defendants “hold themselves
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 28 of 36

- 29 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
out as a source of ‘armchair investigative journalists’ who ‘hawkishly cover any credible
allegation’ of abuse”; that “Wartberg [sic] Watch’s blog bolsters its posts with materials
such as ‘court records, police reports, video clips of pastors’ sermons, and emails’, a
methodology that is inconsistent with a platform of subjective commentary”;15 and that
“Parsons has also stated that she ‘never lie[s] when [she’s] writing these blogs’ and is ‘dead
serious about what [she] write[s],’ reinforcing the intent to present factual information to
the public.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 17.) At first blush, these allegations suggest that the general tenor
of the Wartburg Watch is to report objective facts. On the other hand, the complaint itself
states that the Wartburg Watch is a blog that reports news and provides commentary on
that news. (Doc. 1 ¶ 16, emphasis added [alleging that the “Wartburg Watch’s blog
purports to offer commentary and news on various religious and social topics”].) Courts
within the Ninth Circuit have frequently held that blogs are “a form of media known for
containing personal opinion and commentary.” Hosszu, 202 F. Supp. 3d at 1107. See also
Amaretto Ranch Breedables, LLC v. Ozimals, Inc., 2013 WL 3460707, *4 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
(statements made on personal blogs “are less likely to [be] view[ed] [by readers] as
assertions of fact”); Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1223 (D. Or.
2011), aff’d, 740 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir.2014) (“[B]logs are a subspecies of online speech
which inherently suggest that statements made there are not likely provable assertions of
fact.”). Thus, the general tenor of the Wartburg Watch, a blog that provides commentary,
negates the impression that Wilhelm was asserting an objective fact.
b. Figurative Or Hyperbolic Language
“Wilhelm does not contest that the Article, nor the Statement, did not include
hyperbolic or figurative speech.” (Doc. 11 at 7.) Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor
15 The Court also disagrees that bolstering blog posts with sources is “a methodology
that is inconsistent with a platform of subjective commentary,” as the complaint contends.
(Doc. 1 ¶ 17.) The Ninth Circuit has held that “when an author outlines the facts available
to him, thus making it clear that the challenged statements represent his own interpretation
of those facts and leaving the reader free to draw his own conclusions, those statements are
generally protected by the First Amendment.” Partington v. Bugliosi, 56 F.3d 1147, 1156-
57 (9th Cir. 1995).
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 29 of 36

- 30 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
of Lucky.16
c. Susceptible Of Being Proved True Or False
Wilhelm argues that the Statement cannot be proved true or false “because it is [his]
personal opinion” and “merely recited [his] personal perspective and belief that the Letters
were not sent by Beau Citron.” (Doc. 11 at 7.) To the extent Wilhelm is arguing that, by
couching the Statement with the language “I have reason to believe,” the Statement is
therefore a non-actionable opinion, that argument is without merit. Courts have repeatedly
held that the use of such prefatory language does not transform an otherwise false statement
of fact into a non-actionable opinion. See, e.g., Berris v. Choi, 2025 WL 2548743, *13
(S.D.N.Y. 2025) (“Similarly, ‘we have reasons to believe that [Berris] may be defrauding
the company’ has a precise meaning, can be proven untrue by showing that Choi had no
reason to believe Berris was defrauding the company, and the surrounding circumstances—
an employer stating to outside counsel that they have reason to believe that a former
employee was engaged in fraud—would signal fact, not opinion.”); McKnight v. McKnight,
2021 WL 4133970, *5 (D. Ariz. 2021) (prefacing challenged statement with “I caught
wind” did not “prevent the [s]tatement from being ‘provably false’” because “‘I caught
wind’ would communicate to a reasonable viewer that the rest of Defendant’s statement
was the repetition of an actual or manufactured rumor,” and thus “adding the phrase ‘I
16 Wilhelm argues that, in Hosszu, “the court gave no weight to this factor in
determining that the article was protected speech,” and thus, the fact that Wilhelm concedes
that the Article lacks hyperbolic/figurative language “is immaterial to the determination of
whether the Statement is actionable defamation.” (Doc. 11 at 6-7.) The Court disagrees
with Wilhelm’s interpretation of Hosszu. Nowhere did the district court in Hosszu state,
much less suggest, that it gave the second factor “no weight.” The district court weighed
all three factors in Hosszu before concluding that the statements at issue were protected
opinion. 202 F. Supp. 3d at 1108 (“For all of the above reasons, Barrett’s statements in
the May 20th article are protected by the First Amendment.”) (emphasis added). See also
id. at 1105 (in considering “whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the
statement implies an assertion of objective fact . . . [c]ourts should consider the ‘totality of
the circumstances’”) (cleaned up). At any rate, in affirming, the Ninth Circuit devoted an
entire paragraph to the use of figurative or hyperbolic language in the article at issue. 716
F. App’x at 624.
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 30 of 36

- 31 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
caught wind’ did nothing to shield Defendant from potential liability”); Intercon Sols., Inc.
v. Basel Action Network, 969 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1058 (N.D. Ill. 2013), aff’d, 791 F.3d 729
(7th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he fact that the alleged communications at issue are prefaced with the
word ‘may’ or the phrase ‘has every reason to believe’ does not render them non-actionable
opinions. Prefatory language does not control whether a statement is defamatory.”)
(cleaned up).
Moreover, even if the assertion “I have reason to believe these [L]etters were not
written by Beau Citron of the Citron Law Group” were considered opinion, that assertion
is still potentially defamatory to the extent it implies a false assertion of objective fact.
“Even in contexts in which the general tenor of the work suggests that the author is
expressing personal opinions, it is possible that a particular statement of opinion may imply
a false assertion of objective fact and therefore fall outside the scope of the First
Amendment’s protection . . . .” Partington, 56 F.3d at 1155. “The courts of appeals that
have considered defamation claims . . . have consistently held that when a speaker outlines
the factual basis for his conclusion, his statement is protected by the First Amendment.”
Id. at 1156. Thus, the Ninth Circuit has held that “when an author outlines the facts
available to him, thus making it clear that the challenged statements represent his own
interpretation of those facts and leaving the reader free to draw his own conclusions, those
statements are generally protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 1156-57.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 is instructive on this point. Section 566
explains that “a statement in the form of an opinion . . . is actionable . . . if it implies the
allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.” Id. This doctrine
derives from the statement’s effect on the reader. If an expression of opinion
follows from nondefamatory facts that are either stated or assumed, the
reader is likely to take the opinion for what it is. Indeed, the reader is free to
form another, perhaps contradictory opinion from the same facts. But when
the opinion derives from unstated or unassumed facts, the reader can only
presume that the publisher of the statement is asserting the facts to support
the opinion as well. Thus, the effect is the same as if the unstated facts were
specified, and the publisher risks liability if they are defamatory.
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 31 of 36

- 32 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Lewis v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 555 (9th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Here, a reasonable factfinder could construe the Statement as expressing an opinion
derived from an unstated fact, i.e., that the Letters were not, in fact, written by Beau Citron,
and presume that Wilhelm was asserting that fact to support his opinion.17 Thus, the
analysis turns on whether Wilhelm provided the basis for his conclusion that the Letters
were not written by Beau Citron. Although Wilhelm attached the Letters to the Article
(Doc. 11-1 at 8-9), he provided no factual basis for why he had reason to believe they were
not written by Beau Citron.18 Indeed, in the comment section to the Article, one reader
commented “Are you at liberty to discuss why you have reason to believe these letters were
not written by Beau Citron of the Citron Law Group?,” to which Wilhelm responded “I
believe it would be in my best interest to not state my reasons at this time.” (Doc. 11-1 at
10.) The Court’s analysis of a similar issue in McKnight is instructive here:
The Second Restatement’s illustrations in § 566, in which an author writes
to a third party about his neighbor, help explain why Defendant’s Statement
may be premised on undisclosed facts. In one scenario, the author simply
writes, “I think he must be an alcoholic.” The Second Restatement explains
that “[a] jury might find that this was not just an expression of opinion but
that it implied that [author] knew undisclosed facts that might justify his
opinion.” In a contrasting scenario, the author writes, “He moved in six
months ago. He works downtown, and I have seen him during that time only
twice, in his backyard around 5:30 seated in a deck chair with a portable radio
listening to a news broadcast, and with a drink in his hand. I think he must
be an alcoholic.” The Second Restatement explains that, because “[t]he
statement indicates the facts on which the expression of opinion was based
17 To the extent Wilhelm is arguing that whether Beau Citron wrote the Letters cannot
be proved true or false because Beau Citron’s contact information was not provided on the
Letters, that argument is without merit. Beau Citron’s authorship of the Letters can be
proved true or false through a variety of means, such as by comparing them to other letters
written by Beau Citron, analyzing the metadata associated with the Letters, or perhaps
simply finding Beau Citron and asking him if he wrote the Letters. This is in contrast to
Hosszu, in which the Ninth Circuit emphasized that “there is no available, reliable means
to definitively confirm PED use.” 716 F. App’x at 622, 624.
18 In contrast, Wilhelm did include a screenshot of the research he performed to reach
the conclusion that “pretending to be a lawyer to scare someone into compliance can be
subject to both criminal and civil penalties.” (Doc. 11-1 at 7, 10.)
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 32 of 36

- 33 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
and does not imply others,” the author cannot be “liable for defamation.”
McKnight, 2021 WL 4133970 at *6 (cleaned up). This case resembles the former scenario.
In the Article, Wilhelm provides no facts to support why he believes the Letters were not
written by Beau Citron. Cf. Manufactured Home Communities Inc. v. Cnty. of San Diego,
544 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e leave it to the jury to determine whether Jacob’s
statements were opinions based upon express facts. A reasonable juror could conclude that
Jacob did not outline the facts available to her sufficient to make it clear that the challenged
statements represent her own interpretation of express facts. Here, Jacob’s statements were
not clearly attached to such an outline of fact, nor did she explicitly link her statements to
an express factual basis. Accordingly, . . . a reasonable listener could conclude that Jacob
implied there are other, unstated facts supporting her comments.”) (cleaned up).
Wilhelm’s belated attempt to use his motion to dismiss as a vehicle for providing
this explanation is unavailing. In his motion, Wilhelm indicates that the reason he believes
the Letters were not written by Beau Citron is “because the Letters did not include an email
address for Citron Law Group or Beau Citron, a physical address, phone numbers, fax
numbers, or an attorney State Bar number for Mr. Citron, and were written in a manner
Mr. Wilhelm expected an attorney to write.” (Doc. 11 at 7.) Wilhelm also argues that he
“research[ed] the return address for the Letters” and “not a single search result related to
Citron Law Group or Beau Citron.” (Id. at 8.) But these facts don’t appear in the Article
alongside the Statement.19
d. Summary As To Opinion Factors
For these reasons, the Court concludes that the Statement could be reasonably
construed as implying a false assertion of objective fact. Thus, Wilhelm is not entitled to
dismissal on First Amendment grounds at the motion-to-dismiss stage.20
19 In his motion, Wilhelm also points to comments made by others which state, among
other things “the fact there is no contract info [on the Letter] is my first red flag that this is
not an official letter.” (Doc. 11 at 7, citing Doc. 11-1 at 11.) But that is a reason given by
someone else and was not supplied until after the Statement was made.
20 Hosszu, relied upon at length by Wilhelm, is distinguishable. There, Hosszu alleged
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 33 of 36

- 34 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2. Identification
“To be actionable as a matter of law, defamatory statements must be published in
such a manner that they reasonably relate to specific individuals. While the individual need
not be named, the burden rests on the plaintiff to show that the publication was of and
concerning him.” Hansell v. Stoll, 636 P.2d 1236, 1240 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (cleaned
up). A plaintiff need not prove that “every reader could make the connection, as
publication to any individuals will suffice. But the [reader’s identification of the plaintiff]
must be reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. (citation omitted). “Extrinsic facts may
make it clear that a statement refers to a particular individual although the language appears
to defame nobody. . . . [T]he defamer is subject to liability if he knew that the
communication would be understood by the recipient to refer to the plaintiff or was
negligent in failing to recognize that this may happen.” Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 564, cmts. b, f. Once a plaintiff meets this burden, “[t]he question of identification is for
the jury to decide.” Hansell, 636 P.2d at 1241.
Here, the Statement was published in a manner that reasonably related to Lucky.
The Statement reads:
Below you will see two [L]etters I received allegedly from Citron Law Group
that Barrett published an article that contained “false ‘assertions of fact’ which accuse[d]
[Hosszu] of using performance-enhancing drugs to achieve her success.” 202 F. Supp. 3d
at 1104. The court emphasized that “[w]hen an author outlines the facts available to him,
thus making it clear that the challenged statements represent his own interpretation of those
facts and leaving the reader free to draw his own conclusions, those statements are
generally protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 1105 (citation omitted). In holding
that Barrett’s article did not imply an assertion of objective fact, the court noted that (1)
“Barrett stated in the first sentence of the May 20th article that ‘there is no proof’ that
Hosszu is aiding her performances with drugs”; (2) “Barrett based his conclusion on facts
about Hosszu’s recent achievements, her unusual ability to recover in between races, and
her body type changes,” thus “outlin[ing] the facts available to him, and Hosszu does not
dispute the truth of those facts”; and (3) “Barrett conceded that his suspicions about Hosszu
could be wrong, and stated that he hopes they are,” “[b]ut then he provided a few more
facts to support his suspicions.” Id. at 1105-06. In contrast, and as detailed above, Wilhelm
did not provide any facts or explanation to support his conclusion that the Letters were not
written by Beau Citron (other than attaching the Letters themselves).
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 34 of 36

- 35 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
PLLC on behalf of Larry Lucky. I have reason to believe these letters were
not written by Beau Citron of the Citron Law Group. When researching this
matter I found that “pretending to be a lawyer to scare someone into
compliance can be subject to both criminal and civil penalties.”
(Doc. 11-1 at 7.) This Statement was made in an Article entirely about Lucky and Lucky’s
alleged inappropriate encounters with minors. Although the Statement does not state
outright that Wilhelm believes Lucky wrote the Letters, that is the only logical implication.
The Statement clearly implies that the Letters allegedly sent on behalf of Lucky by Citron
Law Group were actually sent by Lucky “pretending to be a lawyer to scare” Wilhelm into
taking down social media posts regarding Lucky’s allegedly inappropriate behavior.
Indeed, Wilhelm appears to tacitly admit as much in his reply brief. (Doc. 19 at 5
[“Although the Statement does implicate Lucky, if the Court construes the Statement and
the entire Article to the ends of the earth, the Statement can be interpreted to merely raise
a suspicion that Lucky impersonated a lawyer by writing the Letters.”].) Thus, Lucky has
met his burden at this stage of showing that the Statement reasonably relates to him.
III. Leave To Amend
Although “[i]t is unclear whether the Court must assess the possibility of leave to
amend in connection with a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2),” Driscoll v. JEF Invs.
LLC, 2025 WL 3513888, *4 n.3 (D. Ariz. 2025), “[c]ourts have more often than not granted
leave to amend after granting a motion to dismiss on 12(b)(2) grounds,” Prime Healthcare
Servs., Inc. v. Emblemhealth, Inc., 2016 WL 11771246, *4 (C.D. Cal. 2016). Thus,
consistent with Rule 15(a)(2)’s textual mandate to “freely give leave” to amend and the
Ninth Circuit’s exhortation to apply this mandate with “extreme liberality,” Owens v.
Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted), the
Court will authorize Lucky to amend his complaint in an attempt to add new factual
allegations sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over Parsons. See also Beauchamp
v. Flaherty, 2024 WL 4475089, *2 (D. Ariz. 2024) (granting leave to amend following
grant of Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss); State Narrow Fabrics, Inc. v. Fisher, 2016 WL
11002147, *6 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (“Case law is not definitive how whether motions under
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 35 of 36

- 36 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Rule 12(b)(2) should be granted with leave to amend. However, some supporting case law
does exist.”).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Parsons’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 15) is granted.
2. Wilhelm’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 11) is denied.
3. Lucky may file a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) within 14 days of the
issuance of this order. Any changes shall be limited to attempting to rectify the deficiencies
identified in this order. Lucky shall, consistent with LRCiv 15.1, attach a redlined version
of the pleading as an exhibit.
Dated this 5th day of June, 2026.
Case 2:25-cv-03030-DWL Document 36 Filed 06/05/26 Page 36 of 36