Jordan v. Maricopa County Sheriff's Office et al

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Several pending Motions1 will be addressed in this Order: (1) Defendants Kendall
Mudrow and Joshua Mudrow’s Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default (Doc. 19); (2)
Plaintiff Daylon Jordan’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 20); Plaintiff’s Motion for
Entry of Default as to Defendant Allstate Insurance Company (Doc. 26); (4) Plaintiff’s
Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint to Correct Defendant’s Name (Doc. 38). For the
following reasons, the Court now rules as follows.2
I. BACKGROUND
This action arises from a car accident that occurred on April 23, 2025, involving
1 Also pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants
Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office and Officer Daris (Doc. 31) and the Motion for Judicial
Notice accompanying that Motion (Doc. 32). Those Motions will not be resolved at this
time.
2 Because it would not assist in resolution of the instant issues, the Court finds the
pending motions are suitable for decision without oral argument. See LRCiv. 7.2(f); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 78(b); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998).
Daylon Jordan,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, et
al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. CV-25-02959-PHX-SPL
ORDER
Case 2:25-cv-02959-SPL Document 51 Filed 04/15/26 Page 1 of 11

2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Plaintiff and Defendant Kendall Mudrow. (Doc. 1 at 3–4). Plaintiff alleges that he was
driving within the speed limit and had right-of-way when Defendant Mudrow’s vehicle
made a turn, and the two vehicles collided. (Id.). Plaintiff’s hand was injured “with glass”
during the collision. (Id. at 4). A Maricopa County Sheriff’s Deputy responded to the
collision and issued Plaintiff a citation for failure to wear his seatbelt. (Id.).
On April 24, 2025, Defendant Kendall Mudrow filed a claim with Allstate and
reported that Plaintiff was at fault in the accident because he was speeding. (Id. at 5).
Plaintiff alleges that the claim was rejected by GEICO, Plaintiff’s insurer. (Id.). Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Allstate contacted him and “stat[ed] he had been cited for speeding,”
which Plaintiff alleges is untrue. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that since the accident, he has
experienced medical issues as well as mental and psychological distress from the accident.
(Id. at 6–7).
Plaintiff initiated this case on August 18, 2025 against Defendants Maricopa County
Sherrif’s Office (“MCSO”), MCSO Deputy A. Daris, Allstate Insurance Company
(“Allstate”),3 Kendall Mudrow, and Unknown Mudrow (“Joshua Mudrow”). (See Doc. 1).
Plaintiff brings claims for: (1) Violation of First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and the
Fourteenth Amendment against Defendant MCSO and Defendant Daris; (2) Negligent
Investigation and Malicious Prosecution against Defendant MCSO and Defendant Daris;
(3) Bad Faith and Insurance Misconduct against Defendant Allstate; (4) Defamation and
False Reporting against Defendants Mudrow; (5) Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress against all Defendants; and (6) Discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment and federal and state anti-discrimination laws against all Defendants. (Id. at
8–23). He requests compensatory damages, punitive damages, and declaratory relief. (Id.
at 23–25).
3 Plaintiff initiated this case against Defendant Allstate Insurance Company. (Doc. 1).
However, Defendant Allstate points out that Plaintiff erroneously sued Allstate Insurance
Company, when the entity involved in this dispute is Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance
Company. (Doc. 35 at 1). The Court will address that issue in resolving Plaintiff’s Motion
to Amend.
Case 2:25-cv-02959-SPL Document 51 Filed 04/15/26 Page 2 of 11

3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Now, there are several pending Motions before the Court and Defendants are in
different procedural postures. First, default was entered against Defendants Kendall and
Joshua Mudrow (Doc. 15), who moved to set aside default. (Doc. 19). Defendant Allstate
answered the Complaint (Doc. 23), and Plaintiff then moved for entry of default. (Doc. 26).
Defendants MCSO and Officer Daris moved to dismiss the Complaint (Doc. 31). Finally,
Plaintiff moved to amend the Complaint to correct Defendant Allstate’s name. (Doc. 38).
II. MUDROW DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO SET ASIDE
The Court will first address Defendants Kendall and Joshua Mudrow’s Motion to
Set Aside. Because that Motion will be granted, Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment is
moot. See Troy-CSL Lighting, Inc. v. Bath Kitchen Decor, LLC, No. CV 13-8834 GAF
(VBKx), 2014 WL 12911165, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2014) (“In light of the Court’s
decision to set aside the entry of default against Defendants, Plaintiff’s application for
default judgment must be denied. . . . Plaintiff can no longer meet Rule 55(b)’s procedural
requirements for default judgment.”).
Plaintiff filed proof of service for all Defendants on September 15, 2025. (Docs. 8–
12). Defendant Mudrow was served on September 4, 2025. (Doc. 11). Plaintiff filed an
Application for Entry of Default on September 29, 2025 and default was entered the same
day. (Docs. 14, 15). On September 29, 2025, Defendants Mudrow also filed a Motion to
Dismiss, which was denied by the Court because default had been entered. (Docs. 16, 17).
Defendants Mudrow then filed the Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default (Doc. 19) and
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 20).
A. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 55(c) directs that “[t]he court may set aside
an entry of default for good cause.” In determining whether good cause exists, a court must
consider: “(1) whether the party seeking to set aside the default engaged in culpable
conduct that led to the default; (2) whether it had no meritorious defense; or (3) whether
reopening the default judgment would prejudice the other party.” United States v. Signed
Personal Check No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle, 615 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal
Case 2:25-cv-02959-SPL Document 51 Filed 04/15/26 Page 3 of 11

4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
quotation marks and alterations omitted). If any one of the factors is true, the court has
sufficient reason to refuse to set aside the default. Id. However, the court’s discretion under
Rule 55(c) is “especially broad,” and the court should “resolve[ ] all doubt in favor of
setting aside the entry of default and deciding the case on its merits.” O’Connor v. Nevada,
27 F.3d 357, 364 (9th Cir. 1994). This is because “judgment by default is a drastic step
appropriate only in extreme circumstances; a case should, whenever possible, be decided
on the merits.” Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1091 (quoting Falk v. Allen, 739 F.2d 461, 463 (9th Cir.
1984)).
B. Discussion
For the following reasons, the Court finds that Defendants Kendall and Joshua
Mudrow have demonstrated good cause such that the entry of default should be set aside.
1. Culpable Conduct
“A defendant’s conduct is culpable if he has received actual or constructive notice
of the filing of the action and intentionally failed to answer.” Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1092
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Under the Mesle standard, a defendant
“intentionally” fails to answer when he acts with bad faith, “such as an intention to take
advantage of the opposing party, interfere with judicial decisionmaking, or otherwise
manipulates the legal process.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The mere
“conscious choice not to answer” does not make a defendant’s conduct culpable. Id. Rather,
the Ninth Circuit has “typically held that a defendant’s conduct was culpable for the
purposes of the good cause factors where there is no explanation of the default inconsistent
with a devious, deliberate, willful, or bad faith failure to respond.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and alteration omitted).
Here, the Mudrow Defendants argue that their conduct was not culpable because
they acted in good faith. (Doc. 19 at 3–4). Defendants assert that they contacted Plaintiff
to request an extension of time to respond to the Complaint, and Plaintiff agreed to an
extension until October 9, 2025. (Id. at 3). But on September 27, 2025, Plaintiff informed
the Mudrow Defendants that he would seek entry of default after all. (Id. at 3). On
Case 2:25-cv-02959-SPL Document 51 Filed 04/15/26 Page 4 of 11

5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
September 29, 2025, Plaintiff applied for entry of default and Defendants simultaneously
moved to dismiss the complaint. (Id. at 3–4). Defendants assert they did not intentionally
disregard the rules and acted promptly to attempt to remedy the situation. (Id. at 4).
Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that Defendants were aware of their deadline but relied
“on email correspondence instead of following the Court’s rules,” and they should have
requested an extension by filing a Motion on the docket. (Doc. 21 at 4).
The Mudrow Defendants’ failure to file a request for extension of time on the docket
does not amount to culpable conduct. Although the Mudrow Defendants were represented
by counsel at the time of default and therefore “an understanding of the consequences of
[their] actions may be assumed,” the facts do not reflect an intentional failure to answer.
Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1093. Nothing here indicates that Defendants intended to take advantage
of Plaintiff or manipulate the legal process. See id. at 1092. Instead, Defendants’ counsel
contacted Plaintiff regarding an extension of time and communicated their intent to respond
to the pleading. (Doc. 19 at 3–4; Doc. 21 at 4). Requests or stipulations to extend court
deadlines should be filed on the docket. However, Defendants’ communication with
Plaintiff about an extension provides a plausible explanation for their failure to respond
that lacks any evidence of deviousness, willfulness, or bad faith. The Court finds that
Defendants did not engage in culpable conduct that led to the default.
2. Meritorious Defenses
For the meritorious defense factor, a defendant seeking to set aside a default
judgment must merely “allege sufficient facts that, if true, would constitute a defense.”
Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1094. This burden is “not extraordinarily heavy,” and the Court need
not determine whether the alleged facts are true when deciding the motion to set aside the
default. Id. at 1093–94 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Defendants assert four
defenses: (1) the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction; (2) there is no federal question
jurisdiction because the Complaint does not assert a federal cause of action against the
Mudrow Defendants; (3) the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state
law claims; and (4) Plaintiff’s defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
Case 2:25-cv-02959-SPL Document 51 Filed 04/15/26 Page 5 of 11

6
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
discrimination claims fail to state a claim under Arizona law. (Doc. 19 at 4–5). Defendants
assert that they have fully detailed these arguments in their Motion to Dismiss. Id.
Defendants also assert that Plaintiff’s claims against them fail under 12(b)(6), for the
reasons stated in their Motion to Dismiss.4 (Doc. 16).
In the Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argued that their statements to the law
enforcement officer are privileged and do not constitute defamation, their conduct does not
rise to the extreme and outrageous level necessary for a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and that Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to support a discrimination
claim against them. (Doc. 16 at 9–10). Although Defendants do not discuss the arguments
at length in their Motion to Set Aside, the Court finds that the assertions referenced are
sufficient to meet the minimal burden for this factor. See Gold Star Res., LLC v. Balser,
No. CV-14-02733-PHX-NVW, 2015 WL 5817644, at *3 (D. Ariz. Oct. 6, 2015) (holding
a defendant who alleged the contracts at issue had no warranties giving rise to the plaintiff’s
claims against him met the meritorious defense factor); Whitmore v. Universal Am. Mortg.
Co. LLC, No. CV-14-01299-PHX-DGC, 2014 WL 5431203, at *3 (D. Ariz. Oct. 27, 2014)
(finding an allegation of an applicable arbitration agreement sufficient to meet the
meritorious defense factor). Therefore, the Court finds that Defendants have presented
meritorious defenses. See O’Connor, 27 F.3d at 364 (The court should “resolve[ ] all doubt
in favor of setting aside the entry of default and deciding the case on its merits.”).
3. Prejudice to Plaintiff
For a plaintiff to be prejudiced under this factor, “the setting aside of a judgment
must result in greater harm than simply delaying resolution of the case.” TCI Grp. Life Ins.
Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 701 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex. rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141 (2001). Instead, “the standard is whether
plaintiff’s ability to pursue his claim will be hindered.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted). For delay to constitute prejudice, it must “result in tangible harm such
4 As stated above, the Motion to Dismiss was denied because default was entered
against Defendants. (Doc. 17).
Case 2:25-cv-02959-SPL Document 51 Filed 04/15/26 Page 6 of 11

7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
as loss of evidence, increased difficulties of discovery, or greater opportunity for fraud or
collusion.” Id. (quoting Thompson v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 95 F.3d 429, 433–34 (6th
Cir. 1996)).
Defendants argue that setting aside default will not result in prejudice to Plaintiff
because the case is in an early stage, no discovery has been exchanged, and Plaintiff
initially agreed to Defendants’ request to extend their response deadline. (Doc. 19 at 5).
Plaintiff argues that he would be prejudiced because he “has acted in reliance on the Clerk’s
entry of default and has prepared a motion for default judgment.” (Doc. 21 at 5). But
Plaintiff does not argue that his ability to litigate the case on the merits has been hindered
in any way. See FOC Fin. Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l City Com. Cap. Corp., 612 F. Supp. 2d 1080,
1084 (D. Ariz. 2009) (holding that “forcing the parties to file additional briefs” does not
amount to prejudice). No prejudice is apparent to the Court. Thus, the Court finds that
Plaintiff will not be prejudiced by setting aside the entry of default.
C. Conclusion
In sum, the Court finds that none of the factors that would negate good cause to set
aside the entry of default are met. This case does not present any “extreme circumstances”
that would justify the “drastic step” of default judgment. See Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1091.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Set Aside Default (Doc. 19) will be granted. As a
result, Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 20) is moot.
III. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION AGAINST DEFENDANT ALLSTATE
Next, the Court will address Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default as to Defendant
Allstate. (Doc. 26). As stated above, Plaintiff filed proof of service as to Defendant Allstate,
stating that the summons and Complaint were served on the Arizona Department of
Insurance on September 12, 2025. (Doc. 10). On October 7, 2025, Defendant Allstate filed
an Answer to the Complaint. (Doc. 23). On October 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Response in
opposition to the Answer (Doc. 25)5 and the instant Motion for Entry of Default (Doc. 26).
5 Plaintiff filed a Response to the Answer. (Doc. 25). No such pleading is permitted
under the Rules. Plaintiff is required to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Case 2:25-cv-02959-SPL Document 51 Filed 04/15/26 Page 7 of 11

8
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
In his Motion for Entry of Default, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Allstate’s
responsive pleading was due October 3, 2025, 21 days from the date the documents were
served on the Arizona Department of Insurance and Financial Institutions (“DIFI”). (Doc.
26 at 2). In Response, Defendant Allstate states that its registered agent, CT Corporation,
did not receive the documents from DIFI until September 22, 2025. (Doc. 35 at 3). Further,
Defendant Allstate argues that CT Corporation advised that the response was not due until
21 days from the date of receipt, making the responsive pleading deadline October 13,
2025. (Id.). On October 7, 2025, counsel reviewed the case and realized the responsive
pleading deadline may be earlier, if calculated from the date it was served on DIFI. (Id. at
3–4). Defendant Allstate filed the Answer on October 7, 2025, “out of an abundance of
caution,” but argues that under A.R.S. § 20-222, it should have forty dates after the date of
service on DIFI to answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint. (Id. at 4). Further,
Defendant Allstate argues that “Plaintiff sued the incorrect Allstate entity,” which further
contributed to the delay in answering the Complaint. (Doc. 41 at 2–3).
The Court will accept Defendant Allstate’s Answer. First, default was not entered
against Defendant Allstate, as Plaintiff’s Motion still remains pending. (Doc. 26). Indeed,
Defendant Allstate filed its Answer before Plaintiff filed the instant Motion. (See Docs. 23,
25). Therefore, the Court need not decide whether to set aside default. Instead, the Court
will accept the Answer, even if it was belated, to decide the case on the merits. Even in
Local Rules. Any future filings that do not conform will be stricken.
In the Response, Plaintiff asks the Court to strike Defendant Allstate’s Answer as
procedurally defective, deny the defenses asserted, and recognize Defendant Allstate’s
conduct as evidence of bad faith and neglect. (Doc. 25 at 10). Plaintiff also asks the Court
to order Defendant Allstate “to produce the recorded phone call from April 25, 2025.” (Id.).
The Court will treat these requests as a Motion to Strike the Answer and a Motion for
Discovery. For the same reasons that the Motion for Entry of Default Judgment as to
Defendant Allstate (Doc. 26) will be denied, the Court will deny the Motion to Strike. In
addition, the Court will deny the Motion for Discovery. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(d) provides that “[a] party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties
have conferred as required by Rule 26(f), except in a proceeding exempted from initial
disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(B), or when authorized by these rules, by stipulation, or by
court order.” Plaintiff may only obtain early discovery if authorized by the Court based on
“good cause.” See Contentguard Holdings, Inc. v. ZTE Corp., No. 12cv1226-CAB (MDD),
2013 WL 12072533, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2013). No good cause appearing, the Court
finds the request is premature and the Motion will be denied.
Case 2:25-cv-02959-SPL Document 51 Filed 04/15/26 Page 8 of 11

9
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
cases where default has been entered, the law cautions that “a case should, whenever
possible, be decided on the merits.” Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1091. Therefore, the Court will
deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default (Doc. 26).
IV. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND/CORRECT COMPLAINT
Finally, on October 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Amend the
Complaint to Correct Defendant’s Name, requesting permission to change Defendant
Allstate’s name from Allstate Insurance Company to Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance
Company (Doc. 38). Specifically, Plaintiff “seeks to correct a misnomer—substituting the
proper corporate name of the existing defendant—and not to add new parties or claims.”
(Id. at 5).6 On February 24, 2026, Plaintiff lodged a proposed Amended Complaint and
filed a document titled Notice of Supplement to Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint. (Doc. 46). In the Notice, Plaintiff requests leave to amend the Complaint to add
a negligence claim against Defendants Kendall and Joshua Mudrow. (Id. at 3).
The Court will deny the Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint without
prejudice because Plaintiff has not adhered to the Rules in filing the Motion and
Subsequent Notice. If Plaintiff seeks to file another Motion for Leave to Amend, he must
comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 and the Local Rules. Specifically, Plaintiff
is directed to Rule 15.1 of the Local Rule Rules of Civil Procedure (“LRCiv”), Rules of
Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona.7 Local Rule 15.1 provides in
part: “A party who moves for leave to amend a pleading must attach a copy of the proposed
amended pleading as an exhibit to the motion, which must indicate in what respect it differs
from the pleading which it amends, by bracketing or striking through the text to be deleted
and underlining the text to be added. The proposed amended pleading must not incorporate
by reference any part of the preceding pleading, including exhibits.” LRCiv. 15.1. Any
future requests filed by Plaintiff should be filed in the form of a Motion, rather than as a
6 Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company has appeared in this case and
informed the Court that Plaintiff erroneously sued Allstate Insurance Company. (Doc. 35
at 1).
7 The local rules may be found at: http://www.azd.uscourts.gov/local-rules
Case 2:25-cv-02959-SPL Document 51 Filed 04/15/26 Page 9 of 11

10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Notice or other filing. In addition, a Motion filed on the docket should not contain more
than one Motion therein.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will grant Defendants Kendall and Johsua
Mudrow’s Motion to Set Aside Default (Doc. 19) and deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Default
Judgment as to the Mudrow Defendants. (Doc. 20). The Court will also deny Plaintiff’s
Motion for Entry of Default against Defendant Allstate. (Doc. 26). Therefore, none of
Defendants are in default. The Court will deny without prejudice Plaintiff’s Motion for
Leave to Amend the Complaint (Doc. 38) and the additional request to amend the
Complaint, contained in Plaintiff’s Notice (Doc. 46). However, Plaintiff will have
additional time to file a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint, if he chooses, as
ordered below.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants Kendall and Johsua Mudrow’s Motion to Set
Aside Entry of Default (Doc. 19) is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall vacate the Entry of
Default (Doc. 15).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc.
20) is denied as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant Allstate’s
Answer which the Court treats as a Motion to Strike and Motion for Discovery (Doc. 25)
will be denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default as to
Defendant Allstate (Doc. 26) is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend the
Complaint to Correct Defendant’s Name (Doc. 38) is denied without prejudice. The
request to amend the complaint contained in Plaintiff’s Notice of Supplement to Plaintiff’s
Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint (Doc. 46) is also denied without prejudice.
Case 2:25-cv-02959-SPL Document 51 Filed 04/15/26 Page 10 of 11

11
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff must file a Motion for Leave to Amend
to the Complaint, if he so chooses, by April 28, 2026.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that if Plaintiff does not file Motion for Leave to
Amend the Complaint by April 28, 2026, Defendants Mudrow shall have until May 12,
2026 to file a responsive pleading to the Complaint (Doc. 1).
Dated this 14th day of April, 2026.
Honorable Steven P. Logan
United States District Judge
Case 2:25-cv-02959-SPL Document 51 Filed 04/15/26 Page 11 of 11