Altamirano v. Arizona Board of Regents

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Ulysses Altamirano,
Plaintiff,
v.
Arizona Board of Regents,
Defendant.
No. CV-25-02257-PHX-JJT
ORDER
At issue is pro se Plaintiff Ulysses Altamirano’s Renewed Motion for Exemption
From PACER Fees (Doc. 50, Mot.). For the reasons below, the Court grants in part and
denies in part the Motion.
As the Court explained in its earlier Order (Doc. 39), the Public Access to Court
Electronic Records (PACER) system allows users to “view and print case filings, judicial
opinions, and other docket information from the federal trial, bankruptcy, and appellate
courts.” In re Gollan, 728 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2013). There are several automatic fee
exemptions for users, including one free electronic copy of all documents filed
electronically and free viewing of judicial opinions. See Electronic Public Access Fee
Schedule, U.S. Cts. (Jan. 1, 2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/court-
programs/fees/electronic-public-access-fee-schedule. If Plaintiff chooses to access other
court records through PACER, that access is free at any courthouse public access terminal
or is charged at $0.10 per page up to $3.00 per document. Id. The first $30.00 of PACER
access over a quarterly billing cycle is free. Id.
Case 2:25-cv-02257-JJT Document 52 Filed 02/24/26 Page 1 of 4

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A party seeking an exemption from PACER fees must demonstrate “that an
exemption is necessary in order to avoid unreasonable burdens and to promote public
access to information.” See U.S. Cts., supra. “[E]xemptions should be granted as the
exception, not the rule.” Id. The fact that a party was granted in forma pauperis status is
insufficient on its own to establish that an exemption is necessary. Chima v. Perkins, No.
25-cv-06385-TSH, 2025 LX 380495, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2025); Bell v. OC 405
Partners, No. 8:22-cv-01095-AH-(DFM), 2025 LX 448694, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2025).
Here, Plaintiff maintains that he has incurred a $156.30 unpaid PACER balance for
the fourth quarter of 2025. (Mot. at 1–2.) He argues that he requires immediate docket
access to prepare his responsive memorandum to Defendants’ recent Motion to Dismiss
and anticipates that nonpayment of the outstanding balance will result in restrictions to
Plaintiff’s PACER access. (Id.)
Plaintiff suggests that the one-free-copy exemption is insufficient because access to
the copy is time-limited and he must repeatedly review case documents while drafting
responses and monitoring deadlines. (Mot. at 5.) Even if true, less than 300 pages of the
documents Plaintiff accessed from October 2025 through December 2025 were from the
instant action. (Doc. 50-2 at 9–15.) The $30.00 fee waiver would have been more than
sufficient to cover Plaintiff’s access to documents for his own matter.
Rather, Plaintiff’s PACER use was primarily devoted to accessing other cases. In
fact, he accessed approximately 1,200 pages of cases that were not his own. (See Doc. 50-
2 at 9–15.) To the extent he does this for legal research, that “is not the primary purpose of
PACER. It is atypical for litigants to be given free access to documents filed in cases in
which the litigant is not a party.” Woodall v. United States, No. 1:24-CV-1410, 2024 WL
4839396, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 20, 2024) (quoting Delgado v. Donald J. Trump for
President, Inc., No. 19-CV-11764 (AT) (KHP), 2024 WL 3534451, at *2 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
July 25, 2024)). Rather than conducting legal research through PACER, pro se litigants use
free repositories like FindLaw.com and Google Scholar, or accessing PACER court
documents for free from a courthouse terminal.
Case 2:25-cv-02257-JJT Document 52 Filed 02/24/26 Page 2 of 4

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Plaintiff concedes “that some federal opinions may be available through free
repositories” but argues that Defendants cite to “orders, docket entries, and related
materials that are not reliably available outside PACER.” (Mt. at 7.) Upon review of
Defendants’ recent Motion to Dismiss, however, the only documents referenced from the
docket are Plaintiff’s own First Amended Complaint that he surely has, and one of the
Court’s orders. (See generally Doc. 41.) Such scant references to docket items does not
justify Plaintiff’s excessive use of PACER. As for the substantive law, Defendants cited
public statutes and published Ninth Circuit case law that are available on Google Scholar.
Plaintiff identifies no case or law referenced by Defendants that are not publicly available
to him outside of PACER.
Plaintiff also acknowledges that he can access court documents for free at a
courthouse terminal but contends that he “cannot practically rely on courthouse terminals
as a primary access method because doing so would require repeated in-person visits,
transportation costs, and scheduling constraints inconsistent with effective, timely
litigation.” (Mot. at 5.) Those scheduling constraints, according to Plaintiff, are his “work
schedule and other obligations.” (Doc. 50-3 ¶ 11.) But Plaintiff has averred to the Court
that he works part-time, incurs no living costs, and has access to a vehicle for
transportation. (Doc. 3.) Based on his reported income of $360 per month and current state
minimum wage laws, see A.R.S. § 23-363(B), Plaintiff works no more than twenty-five
hours in a month, or less than seven hours per week. The Court is not convinced that, as a
part-time worker with reliable transportation and no living expenses, Plaintiff is without
the time or resources to use local and free resources for his legal research needs.
In sum, based on the billing records presented by Plaintiff, the automatic fee
exemptions are sufficient to permit Plaintiff repeated access to court documents related to
the instant action. The alternative resources for legal research are feasible given Plaintiff’s
previous averments of his work status and ability to transport himself locally. Accordingly,
Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the PACER fees are unreasonable or that a “research
exemption” is necessary.
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While the Court is disinclined to exempt Plaintiff from future PACER fees or grant
him greater research access, there is still the problem of the fees that Plaintiff already
incurred. As of December 2025, Plaintiff has an unpaid balance of $156.30. This amounts
to nearly one-half of Plaintiff’s monthly income. The Court will exempt Plaintiff from this
past-owed balance to ensure he will have access to PACER and impresses upon Plaintiff
that his future PACER use need be reasonable and prudent in light of the other free
resources available to him.
IT IS ORDERED granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion
for Exemption From PACER Fees (Doc. 50).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall be exempt from the payment of
fees for his use of the PACER system incurred before December 2025 only. Plaintiff shall
furnish a copy of this Order to the PACER Service Center.
Dated this 24th day of February, 2026.
Honorable John J. Tuchi
United States District Judge
Case 2:25-cv-02257-JJT Document 52 Filed 02/24/26 Page 4 of 4