Myles v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Jennifer Elaine Myles,
Plaintiff,
v.
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
No. CV-25-00810-PHX-SMB
ORDER
The Court now considers Plaintiff Jennifer Elaine Myles’s appeal from the Social
Security Administration’s denial of Plaintiff’s application for supplemental security
income (“SSI”). The Court reviewed the briefing, the Administrative Record (“AR”), and
the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision (AR 18–30). The Court affirms the
ALJ’s decision for the following reasons.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 27, 2022, Plaintiff applied for SSI under Title XVI of the Social
Security Act alleging a disability onset date of August 1, 2022. (AR. 18.) Plaintiff’s claims
were denied initially and on reconsideration. (AR 18.) After an administrative hearing, an
ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on March 15, 2024, finding Plaintiff not disabled.
(AR. 30.) The Appeals Council denied review of that decision, making the ALJ’s
determination the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration. (AR. 1–3.) Plaintiff seeks review of the Commissioner’s decision
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ
follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of
proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Tackett
v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines whether
the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If
so, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines
whether the claimant has a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends.
Id. At step three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of
impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P
of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is
automatically found to be disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four,
the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and determines
whether the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. If not,
the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, where he determines whether the claimant can
perform any other work based on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant
is disabled. Id.
The Court only reviews the issues raised by the party challenging the ALJ’s
decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court will
uphold an ALJ’s decision “unless it contains legal error or is not supported by substantial
evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). “Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance” and is such that “a reasonable
mind might accept [it] as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (first quoting Bayliss v.
Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005); and then quoting Burch v. Barnhart,
400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)). As a general rule, if the “evidence is susceptible to
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more than one rational interpretation,” the Court will affirm the ALJ’s decision. Burch,
400 F.3d at 679. That said, the Court should “consider the entire record as a whole and
may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Orne, 495
F.3d at 630 (citation modified).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony.
(Doc. 10 at 12.)
An ALJ employs a two-step process in evaluating a claimant’s symptom testimony.
Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). First, “the ALJ must determine
whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying
impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms
alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation modified).
Second, if there is such objective evidence, and “no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can
reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of [his] symptoms only by offering
specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. (citation modified). “The standard
isn’t whether [the] court is convinced, but instead whether the ALJ’s rationale is clear
enough that it has the power to convince.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir.
2022).
Here, The ALJ found that Plaintiff “has the following severe impairments: a
depressive disorder, an anxiety disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), and a
trauma related disorder.” (AR 21.) The ALJ found “that the claimant’s medically
determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged
symptoms.” (AR 24.) However, the ALJ found that “the claimant’s statements concerning
the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent
with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (AR 24.)
The ALJ summarized Platiniff’s testimony as follows:
She is 31 years old. She has a high school education. She is not attending
school presently. She has never worked full time. She lives in a house with
her parents. Her mother works (in between jobs) and her father is disabled
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(both physical and mental disability). She does not help care for him. The
claimant testified that she does not do dishes, rarely goes to the grocery store,
does not cook, and does not do laundry. She testified drawing as a hobby.
She does not do volunteer work or odd jobs for money. She has no current
source of income. She has a driver’s license but does not drive (last drove
maybe 10 years ago). She is 5 feet 4 inches tall and weighs 250 pounds. She
is prevented from working due to severe anxiety and depression interfering
with her ability to function. She receives mental health treatment with a
therapist and psychiatrist. Things go wrong when she tries to work that she
described as anxiety attacks, memory problems (does not remember what
people are telling her to do), and brain fog. She last worked 7 years ago for
a few weeks; she keep having panic attacks and ended up quitting. Her panic
attacks last anywhere from 20 minutes to a couple of hours. She can have
panic attacks everyday if she does not keep herself distracted. She takes
depression and anxiety medication. She has OCD and does things in
increments of three (e.g., touching a doorknob, counting steps). She has
suicidal ideations every day. She does okay interacting one on one with
people, but later added that it depends on the person.
(AR 23–24.)
Plaintiff first argues that “the ALJ failed to connect anything specific in the medical
record to a specific inconsistency with any particular portion of Myles’s work-preclusive
symptom testimony.” (Doc. 10 at 13.) Plaintiff then argues that “the ALJ ignored that the
record contained findings showing Myles’s depression, anxiety, OCD, and PTSD caused
severe symptoms and were consistent with Myles’s written statements and hearing
symptom testimony.” (Id. at 14.) Plaintiff also argues that Plaintiff’s symptoms improving
with medication “is an insufficient reason to reject Myles’s symptom testimony as this
record does not show that Myles’s mental health symptoms overall were improved with
treatments on a long-term basis such that her symptom testimony was invalid or that she
could return to work.” (Id. at 17.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s reliance on
Plaintiff’s daily activities was insufficient to reject her symptom testimony because
“[t]hese activities, however, were not inconsistent with Myles’s symptom testimony when
none of these activities were performed outside of the house she shared with her parents,
and all were performed on an occasional basis and/or with varying amounts of required
attention.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s arguments are unconvincing.
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To start, the record supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff improved with
treatment. This is a recognized basis for discounting subjective symptom testimony.
Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[E]vidence of medical
treatment successfully relieving symptoms can undermine a claim of disability.”) The ALJ
points to multiple instances in the record reflecting that Plaintiff reported that medication
helped mitigate her symptoms. (AR 24, 400, 402, 722.)
The record also supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s reported symptoms
are not as severe as alleged. This is a recognized basis for discounting subjective symptom
testimony. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958–60 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that
inconsistencies between subjective complaints and objective medical evidence is a clear
and convincing reason for discounting claimant’s testimony). The ALJ points to multiple
mental status exams containing generally normal findings and various instances of
Plaintiff’s self-reported improvements. (AR 24, 680–81, 724, 792, 879, 884, 1073.)
The record also supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s daily activities
contradict her symptom testimony. Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219,
1227 (9th Cir. 2009) (“In reaching a credibility determination, an ALJ may weigh
inconsistencies between the claimant’s testimony and his or her conduct, daily activities,
and work record, among other factors.”); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir.
2012) (“Even where those activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be
grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict claims
of a totally debilitating impairment.”). Despite Plaintiff’s testimony, the record reflects
that Plaintiff cooks, takes care of pets, engages in a variety of hobbies, maintains a social
life, and performs some household duties such as babysitting. (AR 25–26, 395–405, 641,
643, 670–71, 683, 794, 796, 806, 1065.)
Viewed as a whole, the ALJ adequately identified which aspects of Plaintiff’s
testimony that were inconsistent with the record and provided clear and convincing
reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for discounting his subjective symptom
allegations. Though the evidence in this record may be fairly “susceptible to more than
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one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.” Burch v.
Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). It is not the role of this Court to reweigh the
evidence; it is only to consider whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.
Mata v. Kijakazi, No. 22-35482, 2023 WL 3836421, at *1 (9th Cir. June 6, 2023). The
ALJ’s evaluations were proper, and her findings are supported by substantial evidence in
this record.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED affirming the ALJ’s March 15, 2024 decision.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter final judgment
consistent with this Order and close this case.
Dated this 20th day of February, 2026.
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