Hansen v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Heather Gladys Marie H.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
No. CV-24-02933-PHX-SHD
ORDER
Claimant Heather Gladys Marie H. (“Claimant”)1 seeks review of the Social
Security Administration Commissioner’s (“SSA” or “Commissioner”) final decision
denying her disability insurance benefits. For the reasons set forth below, the
Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision is vacated and remanded for further
administrative proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Overview
Claimant was 50 years old on her alleged disability onset date of May 25, 2021.
(Administrative Record (“AR”) 15.) She has at least a high school education and her past
relevant work is skilled. (AR 27, 28.) Claimant filed an application for disability insurance
benefits on August 13, 2021, under Title II. (AR 15.) The claim was initially denied on
March 3, 2022, and again upon reconsideration on December 19, 2022. (Id.) After a
hearing held on October 19, 2023, the ALJ denied Claimant’s claim on December 8, 2023.
1 As a matter of practice, Claimant is referred to as such and, at most, by her first
name and last initial to protect her privacy.
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(AR 29.) The Appeals Council denied Claimant’s request for review on September 4,
2024. (AR 1.) Claimant then appealed to this Court. (Doc. 1.)
B. The SSA’s Five-Step Evaluation Process
To qualify for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits, a claimant must show
that she “is under a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). To be “under a disability,” the
claimant must be unable to engage in “substantial gainful activity” due to “any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment.” Id. § 423(d)(1). The impairment must be
of such severity that the claimant cannot do her previous work or any other substantial
gainful work within the national economy. Id. § 423(d)(2)(A). The SSA has created a
five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether an individual is disabled.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1). The steps are followed in order, and each step is
potentially dispositive. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4).
At Step One, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaging in “substantial
gainful activity.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). “Substantial gainful activity” is work activity
that is (1) “substantial,” i.e., doing “significant physical or mental activities”; and (2)
“gainful,” i.e., usually done “for pay or profit.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.972(a)–(b). If the claimant
is engaging in substantial gainful work activity, the ALJ will find the claimant is not
disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i).
At Step Two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has “a severe medically
determinable physical or mental impairment” or severe “combination of impairments.” Id.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). To be “severe,” the claimant’s impairment must “significantly limit”
the claimant’s “physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Id. § 404.1520(c).
If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the ALJ
will find the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii).
At Step Three, the ALJ determines whether the claimant’s impairment(s) “meets or
equals” an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. Id.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the ALJ will find the claimant is disabled, but if not, the ALJ
must assess the claimant’s “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”) before proceeding to
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Step Four. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (e). The claimant’s RFC is her ability perform
physical and mental work activities “despite [her] limitations,” based on all relevant
evidence in the case record. Id. § 404.1545(a)(1). To determine RFC, the ALJ must
consider all the claimant’s impairments, including those that are not “severe,” and any
related symptoms that “affect what [the claimant] can do in a work setting.” Id.
§§ 404.1545(a)(1)–(2).
At Step Four, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has the RFC to perform the
physical and mental demands of “[her] past relevant work.” Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (e).
“Past relevant work” is work the claimant has “done within the past five years that was
substantial gainful activity.” Id. § 404.1560(b)(1). If the claimant has the RFC to perform
her past relevant work, the ALJ will find the claimant is not disabled. Id.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant cannot perform her past relevant work, the ALJ will
proceed to Step Five in the sequential evaluation process.
At Step Five, the last in the sequence, the ALJ considers whether the claimant “can
make an adjustment to other work,” considering her RFC, age, education, and work
experience. Id. § 404.1520(a)(v). If so, the ALJ will find the claimant not disabled. Id. If
the claimant cannot make this adjustment, the ALJ will find the opposite. Id.
C. The ALJ’s Application of the Factors
Here, at Step One, the ALJ concluded that Claimant had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since the alleged disability onset date of May 25, 2021. (AR 17.)
At Step Two, the ALJ determined that Claimant had severe impairments, including
remote history of cirrhosis of the liver with ascites (without known symptoms), idiopathic
epilepsy, Guillain Barré Syndrome, migraines and small vessel ischemic disease, mild
neurocognitive disorder, depression, and obesity. (Id.)
At Step Three, the ALJ found that Claimant did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed
impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. § 404. (AR 18.) With respect to the
mental impairment, the ALJ analyzed the four “paragraph B” criteria and found that
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Claimant had mild limitations in: (1) understanding, remembering or applying information;
and (2) interacting with others; and moderate limitations in: (3) concentrating, persisting
or maintaining pace; and (4) adapting or managing oneself. The ALJ also found that the
medical evidence of record did not establish both ongoing medical treatment, mental health
therapy, psychosocial supports, or highly structured settings that diminished the
impairment symptoms and signs, thus the record failed to establish the presence of
“paragraph c” criteria. (AR 19–21.)
The ALJ then found that Claimant had the following RFC:
[Claimant can] perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except
she should never climb ropes, ladders or scaffolds; could frequently climb
ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; could frequently
reach overhead, feel, finger, and handle bilaterally; should avoid
concentrated exposure to loud noise and all exposure to unprotected heights
and moving and dangerous machinery; and was able to understand,
remember and carry out simple instructions and tasks.
(AR 21.)
At Step Four, the ALJ found that Claimant was not capable of performing any past
relevant work. (AR 27.) At Step Five, based on the RFC formulation and the testimony
of the vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ found that there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that claimant can perform considering her age, education,
work experience, and RFC, such as “Marker,” “Housekeeper/Cleaner,” and “Sales
Attendant.” (AR 28.) Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Claimant was not disabled as
defined in the Social Security Act from the alleged onset date through December 8, 2023.
(AR 29.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
This Court may not set aside a final denial of disability benefits unless the ALJ’s
decision is “based on legal error or not supported by substantial evidence in the record.”
Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Benton ex rel. Benton v.
Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003)). Substantial evidence refers to “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
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Id. (quoting Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir.
1988)). The Court, in its review, must consider the record in its entirety, “weighing both
the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the [ALJ’s] conclusion.” Id.
(quoting Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2007)).
The ALJ—not this Court—is responsible for resolving ambiguities, resolving
conflicts in medical testimony, determining credibility, and drawing logical inferences
from the medical record. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)
(citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989)); Gallant v. Heckler, 753
F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984). Therefore, when the evidence of record could result in
more than one rational interpretation, “the ALJ’s decision should be upheld.” Orn v.
Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007); Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d
1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (“When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than
one rational interpretation, [the Court] must defer to the ALJ’s conclusion.”). Further, this
Court may only review the reasons the ALJ provides in the disability determination; it
“may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at
1010. Finally, only those issues raised by the party challenging the decision are reviewed.
See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001).
III. DISCUSSION
Claimant frames her arguments on appeal as follows: (1) the RFC does not
adequately reflect Claimant’s limitations based upon the medical opinion evidence of
record; (2) the RFC does not account for Claimant’s testimony regarding her disabling
symptoms; and (3) the ALJ failed to present a complete hypothetical question to the VE.
(Doc. 13 at 2.) In reality, Claimant challenges the ALJ’s decisions to discount the opinions
of two medical professionals and discount her symptoms testimony. These challenges will
be addressed in turn.2
2 Claimant’s assertion that the ALJ failed to give a complete hypothetical question to
the VE is based entirely on her other arguments, and thus need not be separately analyzed.
See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2008) (declining to
substantively address the claimant’s argument that “the ALJ’s hypothetical was
incomplete” because the claimant “simply restate[d] her argument that the ALJ’s RFC
finding did not account for all her limitations because the ALJ improperly discounted her
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A. Medical Testimony
An ALJ must evaluate every medical source based on several factors, the “most
important” of which are “supportability” and “consistency.” Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th
785, 791 (9th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted). “Supportability means the extent to which a
medical source supports the medical opinion by explaining the relevant . . . objective
medical evidence,” and consistency “means the extent to which a medical opinion is
consistent . . . with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the
claim.” Id. at 791–92 (alterations in original) (quotation marks omitted). An ALJ “must
articulate . . . how persuasive [he or she] finds all of the medical opinions from each doctor
or other source and explain how [he or she] considered the supportability and consistency
factors in reaching these findings.” Id. at 792 (citation modified). Under the current
regulations, “the decision to discredit any medical opinion[] must simply be supported by
substantial evidence.” Id. at 787.
In this case, the ALJ evaluated evidence from six different doctors and, as relevant
here, found Dr. Keith Cunningham, M.D.’s opinion “only partially persuasive” and Dr.
Maryanne Belton, Psy.D.’s opinion “unpersuasive.” (AR 27.) Claimant challenges the
ALJ’s findings concerning Dr. Cunningham and Dr. Belton.
1. Dr. Cunningham’s Opinion
Dr. Cunningham met with Claimant on February 10, 2022, for purposes of
performing a “physical consultative examination.” (AR 27; see also AR 1428–35.) As
relevant here, Dr. Cunningham assessed Claimant as having “Guillain-Barre syndrome
with residual sensory and gait deficits.” (AR 1430.) He also opined Claimant could never
engage in “Kneeling” or “crawling,” and could only occasionally engage in “Reaching,”
“Handling,” “Fingering,” and “Feeling,” but left blank the portion of the form that asked,
“On which of your findings have you based these conclusions?” (AR 1433.)
The ALJ found that Dr. Cunningham’s opinion was “partially persuasive.” (AR
27.) Regarding the supportability factor, the ALJ found that the opinion was “generally
testimony and the testimony of medical experts”).
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supported by a physical examination during the consultative examination.” (Id.) With
respect to the consistency factor, however, the ALJ found that Dr. Cunningham’s opinions
regarding “gait issues were not supported by the medical evidence of record as a whole”
and “there was no basis in the record to prohibit crawling or kneeling, and the manipulative
limitations were too restrictive.” (AR 27). The ALJ further noted that another doctor—
whose opinion the ALJ found “persuasive,” (AR 26)—“also found that the limitations of
Dr. Cunningham were overly restrictive.” (AR 27 (citing AR 59 (stating that “MSS is
overly restrictive for PE findings, specifically the Postural & manipulative limitations.”)).)
Claimant argues that the ALJ erred in discounting Dr. Cunningham’s opinion by
“substitut[ing] his opinion for that of a medical provider” and by disregarding Dr.
Cunningham’s “examination findings.” (Doc. 13 at 13.) She further argues that Dr.
Cunningham’s “examination contains supportive findings that justify the limitations that
the ALJ declined to accept,” and Dr. Cunninghman’s “clinical findings in the opinion
support his conclusions.” (Id. at 14.) Claimant’s arguments focus exclusively on the
supportability factor.
But the ALJ partially discounted Dr. Cunningham’s opinion based on its lack of
consistency with the medical record—not based on the lack of supportability. (AR 27.)
Because Claimant does not argue that the ALJ erred in finding that Dr. Cunningham’s
opinion was not consistent with the medical record as a whole, such an argument cannot
be manufactured for her on appeal. See Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d
925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Our circuit has repeatedly admonished that we cannot
‘manufacture arguments for an appellant’ and therefore we will not consider any claims
that were not actually argued in appellant’s opening brief.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Lewis, 236 F.3d at 517 n.13 (declining to address argument that “was
not raised by [the claimant] on appeal”); see also Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin,
533 F.3 1155, 1161 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008) (declining to address a finding by an ALJ because
the claimant “failed to argue this issue with any specificity in his briefing”); cf. Bray v.
Astrue, 554 F.3d 1219, 1226 n.7 (9th Cir. 2009) (“This argument, however, was not made
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in [appellant’s] opening brief; thus, we deem it waived.”). Because Claimant did not
challenge the ALJ’s consistency finding, her argument concerning Dr. Cunningham’s
opinion fails.
2. Dr. Belton’s Opinion
Dr. Belton evaluated Claimant on January 28, 2022, performing a “psychological
consultative examination.” (AR 27.) Dr. Belton “deferred an opinion that any limitations
existed but wrote that memory and recall skills were impaired, sustaining attention to novel
tasks would be difficult, she would require step-by-step instructions, and she would be
challenged by unpredictable work environments, and needed assistance in managing
money.” (Id. (citing AR 1419–27).) In her report, Dr. Belton noted that “[t]here was
evidence for discrepancy across indices,” (AR 1422), and indicated that her opinions on
Claimant’s limitations would be “DEFERRED” because she “struggled to determine
whether [Claimant] might experience a return to cognitive capabilities after completion of
current interventions and treatment services,” (AR 1425), but then set forth limitations
anyway, (AR 1425–26).
The ALJ found Dr. Belton’s opinion “unpersuasive,” finding it to be both
unsupported and inconsistent with the record. (AR 27.) Specifically, the ALJ noted that
the opinion was “poorly supported as it was based upon test results that Dr. Belton found
unreliable,” stated that it was inconsistent because although it stated “no limitations could
be provided, it went on to opine that the claimant was unable to manage benefits,” and
determined it was “inconsistent with the claimant’s activities of daily living.” (Id.)
Claimant argues that the ALJ erred with respect to both the supportability and consistency
findings. (Doc. 13 at 14–16.)
a. Supportability
Claimant argues that the ALJ erred in its supportability finding because Dr. Belton
did not rely solely on test results she found unreliable, and instead “indicated that her
diagnostic impression was based on the clinical interview, review records [sic], and
observations, not simply on test data.” (Doc. 13 at 14–15.) In support of this assertion,
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Claimant cites AR 1425. (Id.).
Claimant’s argument fails because the record does not support her factual assertion
that Dr. Belton considered anything other than the unreliable test results in formulating the
limitations. Rather than support Claimant’s position, AR 1425 establishes that Dr. Belton
relied solely on the test results, referring only to Claimant’s “scores” as justification for the
limitations identified on that page. (AR 1425.) Likewise, the limitations on the following
page reflect that Dr. Belton relied on “test scores” and her “testing profile.” (AR 1426.)
b. Consistency
Claimant first argues that the ALJ erred in its consistency analysis because the ALJ
failed to evaluate the opinion of another doctor who—like Dr. Belton—found that Claimant
could understand and remember one to two step instructions. (Doc. 13 at 15.) Specifically,
Claimant argues that it was error for the ALJ to not consider the consistency of Dr. Belton’s
opinion with “the opinion of the State agency physician, Dr. Zeuss . . . [who] concluded
that [Claimant] could understand and remember one to two step instructions, a limitation
that the ALJ did not adopt.” (Id.) In support of her argument, Claimant cites a case in
which the Eastern District of Washington concluded that it was error for an ALJ to fail to
evaluate an opinion’s consistency with two other medical opinions that the ALJ also
rejected as inconsistent with the overall medical record. See Kevin H. v. Kijakazi, 2021
WL 4221612, at *5 (E.D. Wash. 2021) (“Under the new regulations, it was incumbent upon
the ALJ to consider consistency, or lack thereof, between the medical opinions when
considering the persuasiveness of Dr. Metoyer, Dr. Kester, and Dr. Gilbert's opinions.”).
Although neither party identifies binding precedent from the Ninth Circuit on this
issue, Kevin H. is persuasive. The Ninth Circuit has made clear that in evaluating the
consistency factor, an ALJ must evaluate whether the “medical opinion is
‘consistent . . . with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in
the claim.’” Woods, 32 F.4th at 792 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2)) (emphasis
added). Kevin H. is consistent with this requirement that an ALJ consider consistency with
respect to the record as a whole—including medical and non-medical evidence. Here the
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ALJ found Dr. Belton’s opinion inconsistent with the non-medical evidence concerning
Claimant’s activities of daily living, but did not address Dr. Zeuss’s opinion—or any
“evidence from other medical sources”—in the consistency analysis. (AR 27.) This failure
runs afoul of the principle set forth in Kevin H., and more importantly, the requirements
set forth in Woods and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2).
The Commissioner does not substantively engage with the holding in Kevin H. or
argue that I should not follow it, noting only that it was decided in a different district. (Doc.
17 at 8–9.) Rather, the Commissioner argues that Kevin H. is distinguishable because
“[t]here is no evidence the ALJ failed to consider the consistency of Dr. Belton’s opinion
with Dr. Zuess’s prior administrative finding” and that “courts should presume that public
officers have properly discharged their official duties.” (Id. at 9.) In other words, because
the ALJ generically noted that he “fully considered” all medical opinions in his decision,
(AR 26), the Commissioner argues I should assume the ALJ properly considered Dr.
Zeuss’s (and all other) medical opinions in evaluating the consistency of Dr. Belton’s
opinion. (Doc. 17 at 9.) But the Ninth Circuit has made clear that courts “cannot substitute
our conclusions for the ALJ’s, or speculate as to the grounds for the ALJ’s conclusions.”
Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 495 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Treichler v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014)). Because the ALJ provided no
explanation for why Dr. Belton’s opinion was or was not “consistent . . . with the evidence
from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim,” it is apparent that his
analysis runs afoul of applicable law.3
B. Evaluation of Claimant’s Disabling Symptoms
If the ALJ finds that a claimant “presented objective medical evidence of an
3 Claimant argues that the ALJ also erred in finding Dr. Belton’s opinion inconsistent
with her activities of daily living because there are “critical differences between activities
of daily living and activities in a fully time job.” (Doc. 13 at 15 (quoting Garrison v.
Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1016 (9th Cir. 2014).) Because the ALJ failed to engage in the
required consistency analysis—which requires analyzing both the medical and nonmedical
evidence—it is unnecessary to address Claimant’s second argument.
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underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other
symptoms alleged,” and that there is “no evidence of malingering,” the ALJ may “reject
[her] testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and
convincing reasons for doing so.” Revels, 874 F.3d at 655 (citation omitted). “This is not
an easy requirement to meet: The clear and convincing standard is the most demanding
required in Social Security cases.” Id. (citation omitted). “If the ALJ fails to provide
specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discounting the claimant’s subjective symptom
testimony, then the ALJ’s determination is not supported by substantial evidence.”
Ferguson v. O’Malley, 95 F.4th 1194, 1199 (9th Cir. 2024). An ALJ, however, is “not
required to believe every allegation of disabling pain.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489,
499 (9th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). “The standard isn’t whether [the] court is
convinced, but instead whether the ALJ’s rationale is clear enough that it has the power to
convince.” Id.
In this case, the ALJ rejected Claimant’s symptom testimony concerning her lack
of feeling in her feet and her lack of sensation in her hands, and in doing so identified
specific medical evidence suggesting that she had “[n]ormal or intact sensation.” (AR 21–
22 (citing AR 1125, 1129, 2036, 2051).) Claimant does not argue that the ALJ failed to
provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons when it cited the objective medical
evidence. Rather, she argues that the ALJ “appears to unduly rely on the objective
evidence,” and claims that this was improper because the ALJ was “not qualified to
interpret” that evidence. (Doc. 13 at 17–18.) The cases she cites in support of this
proposition are irrelevant, and there was nothing wrong with the ALJ relying on the
medical records to discount Claimant’s symptom testimony. See, e.g., Smartt v. Kijakazi,
53 F.4th 489, 498 (9th Cir. 2022) (“When objective medical evidence in the record is
inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ may indeed weigh it as
undercutting such testimony. We have upheld ALJ decisions that do just that in many
cases.”).
In rejecting certain symptom testimony, the ALJ also cited Claimant’s ability to
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climb in and out of a pool, handle and finger objects, care for herself, prepare meals, clean,
do laundry, shop, pay bills, manage finances, read, do word games, watch television, use a
computer, and watched movies, to discount her testimony concerning her sensation and her
concentration. (AR 20, 24, 26–27.) Again, Claimant does not argue that this doesn’t
constitute specific, clear, and convincing reasons, and instead argues that the ALJ was not
permitted to discount her symptom testimony based on evidence of daily living activities.
(Doc. 13 at 18–19.) The cases Claimant cites in support of this argument are irrelevant
and, indeed, her argument contradicts her statement—only one page earlier—that “[i]n
assessing a plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ may consider a number of factors, including . . .
daily activities.” (AR 17 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3)).) Her
argument thus fails.
C. Remand for Harmful Error
Having found that the ALJ erred in evaluating Dr. Belton’s opinion, the remedy
must be identified. Not every error requires vacating an ALJ’s decision. If an “error was
harmless, meaning it was inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination,” a
court may affirm. Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks
omitted); see also Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017) (“The Court may
not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of a harmless error.”).
The Commissioner does not argue that the insufficient analysis of Dr. Belton’s
opinion was harmless, (see generally Doc. 17), and it is apparent that this error is not
harmless. If the proper consistency analysis had resulted in the limitations set forth in Dr.
Belton’s opinion being incorporated into the RFC—including that Claimant could only
follow one to two step instructions—Claimant may have been found disabled. Because the
ALJ committed harmful error in discounting Dr. Belton’s opinion based on the consistency
factor, the ALJ’s decision denying Claimant benefits will be vacated.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the ALJ is vacated and remanded for
further administrative proceedings.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to enter final judgment
consistent with this Order and close this case.
Dated this 31st day of March, 2026.
Case 2:24-cv-02933-SHD Document 19 Filed 03/31/26 Page 13 of 13