Davis v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Debra Davis,
Plaintiff,
v.
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
No. CV-24-02916-PHX-DJH
ORDER
Plaintiff Debra Davis (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a decision by the Social
Security Administration (“SSA”) Commissioner (the “Commissioner”) denying her
application for disability benefits. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff filed her Opening Brief (Doc. 12),
the Commissioner filed a Response (14). Upon review of the briefs and the Administrative
Record (“AR”), the Court will affirm the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) January 18,
2024, decision.
I. Background
Plaintiff filed an application for benefits on June 14, 2022, alleging a disability on
the onset date of March 20, 2020. (AR at 43). She was 471 years old at the time of her
alleged onset date and had a high school education. (Id.) Her past relevant work includes
1 Plaintiff says she was 47 years old at the date of onset of disability, while the ALJ says
she was 50 years old. Compare (AR at 51, ALJ Decision) with (Doc. 12, Plaintiff’s
Opening Brief). Based on the oral transcript of the hearing, the Court finds that Plaintiff
was 47 years old at the time of onset. (AR at 60, Hearing). Ultimately, however, this does
not change the outcome for this Court, nor would it have changed the outcome for the
ALJ’s decision because Plaintiff would still be defined as a younger individual aged
between 18–49 on the date last insured. 20 CFR 404.1563
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employment as an apartment house manager and apartment maintenance worker. (Id.)
Plaintiff claims she is unable to work because she cannot remain standing for extended
periods of time after suffering a traumatic injury that affected her lower extremities.
Plaintiff’s claims were initially denied on February 10, 2023, and again for a second
time on January 18, 2024 (“January Hearing”), when the ALJ found that although she
suffered from several severe impairments, she retained the Residual Functional Capacity
(“RFC”) to perform light work. (AR at 43). Now, Plaintiff is seeking this Court’s review
of the ALJ decision.
II. The ALJ’s Five Step Process
To be eligible for Social Security benefits, a claimant must show an “inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical
or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999).
The ALJ follows a five-step process2 to determine whether a claimant is disabled under the
Act:
The five-step process for disability determinations begins, at the first and second
steps, by asking whether a claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity” and
considering the severity of the claimant’s impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i)–
(ii). If the inquiry continues beyond the second step, the third step asks whether the
claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals a listing under
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 and meets the duration requirement.
See id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is considered disabled and benefits are
awarded, ending the inquiry. See id. If the process continues beyond the third step, the
fourth and fifth steps consider the claimant’s “residual functional capacity”3 in determining
2 The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the
Commissioner at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999).
3 A claimant’s residual functional capacity is defined as their maximum ability to do
physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite limitations from their
impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
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whether the claimant can still do past relevant work or make an adjustment to other work.
See id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv)–(v). Kennedy v. Colvin, 738 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 2013);
see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)–(g). If the ALJ determines no such work is available, the
claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).
The ALJ’s findings in the January Hearing are summarized follows:
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the
Act on December 31, 2022, and that she has not engaged in substantial gainful activity
from the alleged onset date of March 20, 2020, through her last insured date of December
31, 2022. (AR at 45). At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe
impairments: idiopathic peripheral neuropathy, a bilateral leg crush injury, degenerative
disc disease of the lumbar spine, and peripheral vascular disease. (Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(c)). At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is not covered under the
definition of an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals
an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. (Id.)
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) through her date last insured to perform light work and that the claimant can
“occasionally operate bilateral foot controls; never climb ladder, ropes, or scaffolds;
occasionally climb ramps or stairs, stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl; avoid concentrated
exposure to extreme cold avoid concentrated exposure to atmospheric conditions such as
fumes, odors, dusts, gasses, and poorly ventilated areas; and should avoid all exposure to
dangerous moving machinery and unprotected heights.” (Id. at 48). In determining
Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ stated that he “considered all symptoms and the extent to which
these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical
evidence and other evidence . . . .” (Id.) The ALJ also considered the medical opinions and
prior administrative medical findings in accordance with the requirements of 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520c. Given her RFC assessment, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform work
as an inspector and hand packager, sale attendant, and routing clerk. (Id. at 52). At step
five, although the ALJ found that Plaintiff could not do any past relevant work, he found
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that she was able to do work that existed in significant numbers in the national economy.
(Id. at 51). Ultimately, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled.
The SSA Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the January
decision, thus adopting the Decision as the agency’s final decision. (Doc. 11-2 at 2,
Correspondence from Appeals Council). This appeal followed. On January 8, 2025,
Plaintiff filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3) requesting judicial
review and reversal of the Commissioner’s decision. (Doc. 1).
III. Standard of Review
In determining whether to reverse a decision by an ALJ, the district court reviews
only those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d
503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). “An ALJ’s disability determination should be upheld unless
it contains legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759
F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050,
1052 (9th Cir. 2006)); 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3)). “‘Substantial evidence’ means
more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Garrison, 759 F.3d
at 1009 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted). To determine whether substantial
evidence supports a decision, the Court must consider the record as a whole and may not
affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Orn v. Astrue,
495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007).
The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts, ambiguity, and determining
credibility. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995); Magallanes v. Bowen,
881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). The ALJ must “set forth the reasoning behind its
decisions in a way that allows for meaningful review.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d
487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015). This is because district courts may only review those reasons the
ALJ places on the record and cannot speculate what the ALJ’s reasoning might have been
based on other evidence available. Bray v. Commissioner of Social Security Admin., 554
F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Long-standing principles of administrative law require
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[the court] to review the ALJ’s decision based on the reasoning and factual findings offered
by the ALJ—not post hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit what the adjudicator may
have been thinking.”). Generally, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one
rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion
must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).
“Harmless error principles apply in the Social Security Act context.” Molina v.
Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012). An error is harmless if there remains
substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision, and the error does not affect the
ultimate nondisability determination. Id. Typically, the claimant bears the burden of
showing that an error is harmful. Id. at 1111 (citing Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396,
409 (2009)).
IV. Discussion
Plaintiff appeals the ALJ’s decision rendering her not disabled. (Doc. 12). Plaintiff
sets forth one issue for the Court to review: Did the ALJ properly assess Plaintiff’s
subjective testimony, along with the record as a whole, to accurately determine her RFC.
(Id.) According to Plaintiff, the ALJ improperly discounted her subjective symptom
testimony. (Id. at 4). She claims that had the ALJ fully accounted for her testimony stating
that she cannot stand for long period of time, he would have found her RFC to be sedentary.
(Id.) If he had fully considered her testimony, and the relevant medical records, he would
have come to a finding that Plaintiff is indeed disabled, alleges Plaintiff. (Id.) The
Commissioner disagrees, arguing that the ALJ cited other sources of evidence from the
record, such as Plaintiff’s medical history and objective medical evidence to discount her
subjective testimony. (Doc. 14 at 5). The Commissioner further argues that the ALJ is not
required to take Plaintiff’s testimony as face value and may look at whether Plaintiff’s
subjective testimony is inconsistent with objective medical evidence. (Id.) The Court
agrees and finds that the ALJ properly cited to portions of the objective medical evidence
to provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons why he found her not disabled.
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A. Legal Standards
An ALJ must perform a two-step analysis when determining whether a claimant’s
testimony regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credible. Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at
1035–1036 (9th Cir. 2007). First, the ALJ must determine whether Plaintiff presented
objective medical evidence of an impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce
the symptoms alleged. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014. “In this analysis, the claimant is not
required to show ‘that her impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity
of the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably have caused
some degree of the symptom.’ ” Id. (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th
Cir. 1996)). Second, if there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject the
Plaintiff’s symptom testimony only by giving specific, clear, and convincing reasons. Id.
at 1015; Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 488–89. “This is not an easy requirement to meet:
‘The clear and convincing standard is the most demanding required in Social Security
cases.’” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1015 (quoting Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278
F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002)). “The standard isn’t whether [the reviewing] court is
convinced, but instead whether the ALJ’s rationale is clear enough that it has the power to
convince.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 494 (9th Cir. 2022).
To determine whether a claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of her
symptoms is credible, an ALJ may consider the following:
(1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant’s
reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and
other testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid;
(2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow
a prescribed course of treatment; and
(3) the claimant’s daily activities.
Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. An ALJ may also consider the claimant’s work record, and the
observations of treating and examining physicians and other third parties regarding “the
nature, onset, duration and frequency of claimant’s symptoms, and precipitating and
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aggravating factors, functional restrictions caused by the symptoms, and the claimant’s
daily activities.” Id. “General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what
testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.”
Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014).
B. Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony
At issue is Plaintiff’s symptom testimony that she cannot stand for an extended
duration. (Doc. 12 at 5). Because she cannot stand for an extended duration, Plaintiff says
that her RFC determination was improperly found to be that at the level of light work, when
it should have been at the level of sedentary. (Id.) She also says that her inability to stand
for extended durations results in her having to alternate her position throughout the day
and that she needs to spend most of her day laying down. (Id.) The ALJ summarized
Plaintiff’s symptom testimony like this:
In her initial filings, the claimant alleged that she is disabled
due to peripheral neuropathy in her legs following an
automobile accident, fatty liver disease, pancreatitis, diabetes,
and asthma (Exhibit 2E). The claimant reported that, as a result
of these conditions, she has difficulty performing activities
such as lifting, squatting, bending, standing, reaching, walking,
sitting, kneeling, climbing stairs, and competing tasks (Exhibit
4E). Specifically, the claimant reported that she is unable to lift
more than 10 pounds, that she can only walk for one half of a
block, that neuropathy in her lower extremities makes
balancing difficult, and that she has difficulty dressing and
bathing herself (Exhibit 4E). She stated that she relies on her
daughter to assist in performing chores around the home, that
she must sit when preparing simple meals, and that she avoids
driving (Exhibit 4E). At the hearing, the claimant testified
that she spends her day on the couch or in bed due to
concerns of falling and that she spends her day watching
television or playing games (Testimony). She testified that
she occasionally goes shopping with her daughter, but that
she will use a motorized scooter when she does so
(Testimony). The claimant further reported that she was
limited to standing for 10 minutes and could only sit for 5
minutes before changing positions (Testimony).
(AR at 49) (emphasis added). At the first step of the symptom testimony analysis, the ALJ
determined that “[Plaintiff’s] medically determinable impairments could reasonably be
expected to cause the alleged symptoms.” (Id. at 49). However, at the second step, the
ALJ concluded that “[Plaintiff’s] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and
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limiting effects of her alleged symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical
evidence and other evidence in the record[.]” (Id.) In particular, the ALJ stated that he
found the Disability Determination Services consultants’ evaluations persuasive. (Id. at
50). The consultants found that “claimant can perform less than the full range of light
work, can occasionally climb ramps or stairs; should never climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds; can frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl; must be allowed to
alternate between sitting and standing, though this could be accommodated through normal
breaks . . . .” (Id. at 50).
Plaintiff argues that her testimony described greater limitations due to her inability
to stand for long periods of time. (Doc. 12 at 5). In fact, Plaintiff argues that she cannot
stand for more than 5–10 minutes at a time. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, if the ALJ had
factored in her subjective testimony along with objective medical evidence, he would have
readjusted her RFC to sedentary. (Id.) The Court disagrees.
B. Objective Medical Records
The Court first addresses the ALJ’s discussion of objective medical records. The
ALJ relied on not only the Disability Determination Consultants, but also other medical
evidence from the record. The ALJ cited imaging from hospital records shortly after
Plaintiff’s accident that affected her lower extremities. (AR at 49; see also Ex. 1F, Hospital
Records). The records showed no laceration, paresthesia, and Plaintiff’s plantar and dorsal
flection was intact. (Ex. 1F, Hospital Records). No evidence of a fracture or dislocation
was detected on the imaging scans themselves. (Id.) Months later, physical therapy records
conflicted with Plaintiff’s testimony according to the ALJ, because she was able to
ambulate with only a mildly antalgic gait. (Ex. 3F/2, Physical Therapy Records). Further
records of testing did not reveal significant “degeneration, bulges, or foraminal narrowing
at L4-5.” (AR at 49). An MRI that was performed in 2022, also revealed only minor
spondylitic changes. (Id.) As for Plaintiff’s latest examinations, the ALJ also noted that
the treatment strategy was conservative. (Id.) The Commissioner argues that the ALJ
adequately identified areas in the medical record that were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s
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testimony. (Doc. 14 at 6). According to the Commissioner, this conservative course of
treatment contradicts Plaintiff’s subjective testimony of the intensity and severity of her
pain. The Court agrees. In sum, the Court finds that the ALJ set forth clear and convincing
reasons for his conclusion that Plaintiff’s testimony was inconsistent with the medical
record.
C. Inconsistent Physical Therapy
The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff’s compliance with physical therapy was
inconsistent. (AR at 49). The Social Security Regulations provide that “if the frequency
or extent of the treatment sought by an individual is not comparable with the degree of the
individual’s subjective complaints . . . we may find the alleged intensity and persistence of
an individual’s symptoms are inconsistent with the overall evidence of record.” S.S.R. 16-
3p. Indeed, an ALJ may consider a claimant’s “failure to seek treatment or to follow a
prescribed course of treatment” in discrediting her symptom testimony. Molina, 674 F.3d
at 1112 (quoting Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 1224 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010)).
“[A]n unexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to seek treatment or follow a
prescribed course of treatment” may serve as a sufficient reason for an adverse credibility
determination. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing 20 C.F.R. §
404.1530(c) (1988)); see also Burch, 400 F.3d at 681 (holding that a claimant’s failure to
seek treatment for back pain, depression, and fatigue was “powerful evidence” regarding
the extent of her conditions). However, an ALJ “will not find an individual’s symptoms
inconsistent with the evidence in the record on this basis without considering possible
reasons he or she may not comply with treatment or seek treatment consistent with the
degree of his or her complaints.” Wilmot v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 2022 WL
18810954, *5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 17, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL
2140483 (D. Ariz. Feb. 21, 2023) (quoting S.S.R. 16-3p).
The ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s compliance with physical therapy was inconsistent.
(AR at 49). He also noted that she was discharged from physical therapy in January of
2021. (Id.; see also Ex. 3F, Physical Therapy Records). Plaintiff provided no reasons for
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why she discontinued physical therapy. And although, as commented on by the
Commissioner, she tried physical therapy again in April of 2022, she reported improved
symptoms. (Doc. 14 at 6). Therefore, ALJ’s decision to discount Plaintiff’s symptom
testimony is substantial evidence.
V. Conclusion
Because the ALJ set forth clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s
subjective testimony based on objective medical records and Plaintiff’s course of
treatment, the Court finds that the RFC adequately reflects the total limiting effects of
Plaintiff’s impairments.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Administrative Law Judge’s January 18, 2024, decision
is affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is kindly directed to enter
judgment accordingly and terminate this action.
Dated this 30th day of March, 2026.
Honorable Diane J. Humetewa
United States District Judge
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