Doe et al v. Mayes et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Jane Doe, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Col. Jeffrey Glover, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-24-02259-PHX-MTL
ORDER
Pending before the Court is the parties’ Joint Discovery Dispute Motion in which
the parties dispute whether the Court should prohibit Plaintiffs’ taking of Defendant Col.
Jeffrey Glover’s deposition. (Docs. 267.)
I.
Col. Glover is the Director of the Arizona Department of Public Safety (“DPS”),
and he is sued in his official capacity. (Doc. 241 ¶ 64.) Plaintiffs served a notice of
deposition on May 28, 2026, stating that Col. Glover would be deposed on June 10, 2026,
which is one day before the last date on which the Court permits the parties to schedule
depositions. (Doc. 267-1; 181 at 2; 206.) In deposing Col. Glover, Plaintiffs seek
information about sex offender statistics, the sex offender website publication process, and
the sex offender website generally. (Doc. 267-2.) But Col. Glover maintains that Plaintiffs
have not exhausted less intrusive discovery methods to obtain that information and that
Col. Glover otherwise lacks personal knowledge as to the information sought. (Doc. 267
at 2-3.) Prior to the notice of deposition, the only discovery sought by Plaintiffs from DPS
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is a set of requests for interrogatories that was not timely served. (Id. at 3.)
Defendant Col. Jeffrey Glover filed a Motion for Protective Order, requesting a
protective order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1) preventing Plaintiff
from taking Col. Glover’s deposition (Doc. 264). The Court denied the Motion for its
failure to follow the Scheduling Order’s joint briefing procedure for discovery disputes.
(Doc. 265.) The parties re-raised the issue to the Court in a joint discovery motion that
outlines the parties’ respective positions in accordance with the Scheduling Order.
(Doc. 267.)
II.
“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to
any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1). Rule 26(c)(1), however, allows courts to limit discovery “to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.”
“The deposition of a high-level official or executive, often referred to as an ‘apex’
deposition, may be precluded by the Court under Rule 26(c) where the discovery sought
can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less
expensive.” Estate of Levingston v. Cty. Of Kern, 320 F.R.D. 520, 525 (E.D. Cal. 2017)
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Seeking such depositions creates “a
tremendous potential for abuse or harassment.” Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,
Ltd., 282 F.R.D. 259, 263 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (internal citation omitted). “[T]he closer that a
proposed witness is to the apex of some particular peak in the corporate mountain range,
and the less directly relevant that person is to the evidence proffered in support of his
deposition, the more appropriate the protections of the apex doctrine become.” Id. at 263.
Col. Glover, as Director of DPS, oversees almost 2,100 full-time employees. See
https://www.azdps.gov/organization. The Court finds that he is sufficiently high ranking to
invoke the privilege.
III.
“In determining whether to allow an apex deposition, courts consider (1) whether
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the deponent has unique first-hand, non-repetitive knowledge of the facts at issue in the
case and (2) whether the party seeking the deposition has exhausted other less intrusive
discovery methods.” Topete v. City of Mesa, No. CV-18-03127-PHX-ROS (ESW), 2020
WL 8872800, at*1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2020) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
Plaintiffs generally argue that “[w]hile subordinate employees may be able to
describe individual procedures or technical functions, they cannot speak with the same
authority regarding” agency objectives, administration, and decision-making. (Doc. 267 at
5.) Plaintiffs have offered no specific evidence that Col. Glover specifically possesses
unique first-hand, non-repetitive knowledge concerning the information Plaintiffs seeks.
Rather, Defendants persuasively argue that, as head of an agency, Col. Glover is unlikely
to possess the information sought by Plaintiffs, such as the process for publishing the
agency’s website. (Id. at 3.) Moreover, Col. Glover’s deposition is the first timely attempt
to pursue discovery from DPS. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiffs have not exhausted less intrusive
discovery methods because they have not pursued any alternative discover methods. The
Court therefore finds that both factors counsel against authorizing Plaintiffs to depose Col.
Glover. The Court will grant the Motion (Doc. 267) as to Defendants and prohibit Plaintiffs
from deposing Col. Glover.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Joint Discovery Dispute Motion
(Doc. 267) is GRANTED as to Defendants. Plaintiffs are barred from taking the deposition
of Defendant Col. Jeffrey Glover.
Dated this 5th day of June, 2026.
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