Johnson v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

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Case 2:23-cv-01123-DJH
Document 19
Filed 04/06/26
Page 1 of 4
WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Michelle L Johnson,
Plaintiff,
V.
Commissioner of Social Security Administration,
Defendant.
No. CV-23-01123-PHX-DJH ORDER
Plaintiff Michelle L. Johnson ("Plaintiff") filed a Motion for Attorney Fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 15), seeking an award of $7,500.00. Plaintiff's Motion was backed by her Memorandum in Support. (See Doc. 16). The Social Security Administration ("SSA") Commissioner (the "Commissioner") filed a Response (Doc. 18) neither supporting nor opposing the award sought.
I. Background
Plaintiff filed Applications for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits, claiming a disability onset date of May 26, 2019. (Doc. 1 at 2). These claims were originally denied and denied again on reconsideration. (Id.) Ultimately, The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled under the SSA, which became the final agency decision after it was adopted by the Appeals Council. (Id.) Plaintiff then sought judicial review of the ALJ's decision. (See id.). On September 7, 2023, the parties filed a Stipulated Motion to Remand, requesting that the Court reverse and remand the ALJ's decision for further proceedings. (See Doc. 10). The Court granted the parties' Stipulated
AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GPO
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Motion on September 8, 2023. In accordance with the parties’ stipulation, the Court also
issued Plaintiff an award of $1,359.57 in attorney fees and costs under the Equal Access to
Justice Act (“EAJA”). (Doc. 14).
On remand, Plaintiff received a favorable decision, and, of the awarded amount,
$18,635.50 was set aside to pay Plaintiff’s representative. (Doc. 16-1 at 7). The SSA
stated, on their decision, that $18,635.50 represented 25% of Plaintiff’s past due benefits.
(Id.) Therefore, it can be inferred that Plaintiff’s total award was approximately
$74,542.00. Pursuant to the fee agreement, Plaintiff’s counsel now seeks $7,500.00 in
attorney fees.
II. Legal Standard
Section 4061 establishes “the exclusive regime for obtaining fees for successful
representation of Social Security benefits claimants.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789,
795–96 (2002). Section 406(b) provides that “[w]henever a court renders a judgment
favorable to a claimant . . . who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court
may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation,
not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is
entitled by reason of such judgment . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). Fees are payable out
of, and not in addition to, the amount of the past-due benefits. Id. Before awarding fees,
the Court must consider whether the 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) fee requested is (1) within the
statutory guidelines; (2) consistent with the fee agreement; and (3) reasonable in light of
the contingent-fee agreement. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807–08.
III. Discussion
Plaintiff’s counsel is seeking $7,500.00 in § 496(b) fees. (Doc. 16 at 1). Upon
review of Plaintiff’s Memorandum, the time expended and the amounts charged by
Plaintiff’s counsel are reasonable in this case. First, the fees sought adhere to § 406(b)’s
guidelines. Plaintiff was awarded around $74,542.00 in past-due benefits, and the
requested $7,500.00 in attorney fees equals less than 25% of the award. Second, this
1 Unless where otherwise noted, all Section references are to the Social Security Act.
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amount does not contravene the fee agreement which clearly states that Plaintiff’s attorney
would be entitled to 25% of past-due benefits. (Doc. 16-2 at 2). Lastly, the requested fee
is reasonable given the contingent-fee agreement because it reflects the nature of the
recovery. (Doc. 16 at 4–5). Plaintiff’s case had a substantial risk of loss because Plaintiff
had been repeatedly denied on agency review before the initiating this civil action. (Id.)
In sum, the Court finds that the amount requested is reasonable under Gisbrecht and will
award Plaintiff $7,500.00 in § 406(b) fees.
Under the present circumstances, however, an offset is necessary. The Court
granted the parties’ Stipulation for Attorney Fees under the EAJA and awarded fees in the
amount of $1,359.57. (Doc. 14). When an attorney receives an award under § 406(b) and
the EAJA, the attorney must refund to the client the smaller of the awards. See Parrish v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 698 F.3d 1215, 1221 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding “[w]here the
same attorney represented a claimant at each stage of judicial review, the court need merely
offset all EAJA awards against the § 406(b) award”). Given the $7,500.00 award of
§ 406(b) fees to Plaintiff’s counsel, the fees awarded under the EAJA here shall be
refunded to Plaintiff.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees (Doc. 27) is
granted under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Plaintiff’s counsel Robin Larkin is awarded $7,500.00
in attorney fees to be paid out of the sum from Plaintiff’s past-due benefits.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s counsel shall refund to Plaintiff the
lesser of the fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and the Equal Access to Justice Act.
Dated this 6th day of April, 2026.
Honorable Diane J. Humetewa
United States District Judge
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Case 2:23-cv-01123-DJH Document 19
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