Creech v. Barrett Financial Group LLC et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Bonnie Creech,
Plaintiff,
v.
John Claude Hegglin,
Defendant.
No. CV-22-00871-PHX-SMB
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Bonnie Creech’s Motion to Join Defendant
John Hegglin’s Spouse (Doc. 121). After reviewing the briefing, the Court denies
Plaintiff’s Motion for the following reasons.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed her original Complaint against: Barret Financial Group, LLC; Broker
Solutions, Inc., d/b/a Kind Lending; Kind Lending, LLC; John Hegglin; and John and Jane
Doe employees. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff has since amended her complaint four times. (Docs.
32, 52, 68, 115, 120.) However, the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) controls because
the Court ordered Plaintiff to file her Fourth Amended Complaint following a ruling on
this motion.
The TAC only names Kind Lending LLC and John Hegglin as Defendants. (Doc.
68.) However, upon motion, the Court dismissed without prejudice Kind Lending, LLC.
(Doc. 96.) Accordingly, Hegglin is the only remaining Defendant until Plaintiff files her
Fourth Amended Complaint. This Order now determines whether Hegglin’s spouse,
Case 2:22-cv-00871-SMB Document 137 Filed 04/02/26 Page 1 of 7

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Jennifer Piña, may be joined in Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 19 governs compulsory joinder of parties
in federal courts. “A Rule 19 motion poses three successive inquiries.” EEOC v. Peabody
W. Coal Co., 610 F.3d 1070, 1078 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation modified). First, the court must
determine whether the nonparty should be joined under Rule 19(a) because “the court
cannot accord complete relief among existing parties.” Id. at 1077–78 (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A)). Second, if joinder of the nonparty is necessary for relief, the court
must determine whether their joinder is feasible. Id. at 1078. Third, if joinder is not
feasible, the court must determine whether the case can proceed in the nonparty’s absence.
Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff seeks to join Piña, Defendant’s wife. (Doc. 121). Plaintiff asserts that
Defendant’s wife must be joined in order to “tap the community asset pool” should the
Court enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant. (Doc. 121 at 6.) Plaintiff
is correct; Piña must be joined for Plaintiff to reach Hegglin’s community property. An
amendment adding Piña, however, is futile.
A. Joinder is Required
Under Rule 19(a)(1)(A), Joinder is required where “the court cannot accord
complete relief among existing parties” in the non-party’s absence. The Court finds joinder
of Piña is required here.
In Arizona, “a party seeking damages from community assets for an unpaid debt or
breach of an obligation must join both spouses when asserting a cause of action.” Lattin v.
Shamrock Materials, LLC, 503 P.3d 116, 118 (Ariz. 2022) (citing A.R.S. § 25-215(D)). If
not, “a judgment entered against a wife who had neither been served nor named, and had
not appeared, [is] void insofar as it attempt[s] to bind her or the community.” Vikse v.
Johnson, 672 P.2d 193, 195 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). A future judgment of liability for tort,
fraud, or breach of contract committed by one spouse for the benefit of the marriage is a
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community obligation. See Hays v. Richardson, 386 P.2d 791, 792 (Ariz. 1963) (“It is
undisputed that if one spouse is negligent while furthering a community purpose, the
community is liable for damages resulting therefrom.”); Cadwell v. Cadwell, 616 P.2d 920,
923 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (“Our case law has recognized community liability for the fraud
of one member.”); Eng v. Stein, 599 P.2d 796, 798 (Ariz. 1979) (“The contract which forms
the basis of this action is presumably a community obligation.”). Therefore, joinder is
necessary in such actions to reach marital assets.
Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Hegglin violated the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act
(“ACFA”) by misrepresenting and concealing facts regarding her loan. (Doc. 121 at 2.)
Thus, if Defendant is found liable, and intended to benefit the marriage by these acts, then
the community is also liable See Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, 423 P.2d 364, 367 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1967) (“If the husband acts with the object of benefiting the community . . . the obligations
so incurred by him are community in nature, whether or not the wife approved thereof.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff must join Piña in this suit to seek damages from community assets.
The Court now considers whether it can afford Plaintiff complete relief without joining
Piña.
Complete relief, under Rule 19, “is concerned with consummate rather than partial
or hollow relief as to those already parties.” Alto v. Black, 738 F.3d 1111, 1126 (9th Cir.
2013) (citation modified). “To be ‘complete,’ relief must be meaningful relief as between
the parties.” Id. (citation modified) (emphasis omitted). Should Plaintiff prevail, the
available relief would be minimal without access to the marital assets. In Arizona, “[a]ll
property acquired by either husband or wife during the marriage is the community property
of the husband and wife.” Alvarez v. Saldana, No. 1 CA-CV 16-0721 FC, 2017 WL
4784486, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2017) (quoting A.R.S. § 25-211(A)). This typically
includes income, real and personal property, future earnings, stock options, and the gains
attributable to any of these assets. See Shaw v. Greer, 194 P.2d 430, 431 (Ariz. 1948)
(income); In re Jones & Norton, No. 2 CA-CV 2022-0093-FC, 2023 WL 3909244, at *3
(Ariz. Ct. App. June 8, 2023) (real property); Cameron v. Cameron, 715 P.2d 1246, 1247
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(Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (personal property), State ex rel. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz. v. Wright,
43 P.3d 203, 207 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (future earnings); Brebaugh v. Deane, 118 P.3d 43,
46 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (stock options); Schickner v. Schickner, 348 P.3d 890, 895 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2015) (gains).
Here, Defendant has been married to Piña for sixteen years. (Doc. 121-1 at 2.)
Therefore, it is dubious whether there is sufficient separate property to satisfy any potential
judgment against him. Indeed, Defendant anticipated this reality. He admits that “he
engaged in limited discovery in this case, foregoing deposing Plaintiff or any other witness
identified by any other party” because he believed “only his sole and separate property was
at stake in the litigation.” (Doc. 124 at 4.) In other words, the risks of an adverse judgment
seemed low given the limited property at stake.
Accordingly, the Court finds that it cannot accord complete or meaningful relief
unless Piña is joined. Several courts agree that joining a party’s spouse is necessary to
accord complete relief to an opposing party under Arizona law. See, e.g., Weimer v.
Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 184 F.R.D. 309, 310–11 (D. Ariz. 1998); Warden v.
Coolidge Unified Sch. Dist., No. CIV-07-2273-PHX-MHB, 2008 WL 3582804, at *1–2
(D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2008); Vicente v. City of Prescott, No. CV-11-8204-PCT-DGC, 2012
WL 5878844, at *2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 21, 2012).
B. Joinder is Feasible But Amendment is Futile
Because joinder is required, the Court must determine if it is feasible. “There are
three instances when joinder is not feasible: when venue is improper, when the absentee is
not subject to personal jurisdiction, and when joinder would destroy subject matter
jurisdiction.” Gracia v. County of Kern, No. 1:23-CV-1104-JLT-BAM, 2025 WL 303859,
at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-01104
JLT BAM, 2025 WL 510357 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2025) (citation modified).
Understandably, the parties do not address feasibility because these concerns are not
implicated here. Thus, joinder is feasible, and the Court need not continue to step three of
the Rule 19 analysis.
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However, amendment is futile. To join Piña at this stage of the proceedings,
Plaintiff must amend her Complaint to include a new defendant. However, as Plaintiff
recognizes, such an amendment “must satisfy the requirements of relation back under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)” because the statute of limitations has run. (Doc.
121 at 7.) Under Rule 15(c)(1)(C), an amendment adding a party relates back when: (1) the
claims asserted against the newly added defendant arise out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set out in the original pleading; (2) the new defendant had notice of the original
action within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint;
and (3) the new defendant knew, or should have known, within the Rule 4(m) period that
it would have been named in the original complaint but for a mistake of the party’s identity.
See In re Honest Co., Inc., No. 2:21-CV-07405-MCS-PLA, 2024 WL 466822, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 31, 2024). Under Rule 4(m), the service period is ninety days.
Here, the alleged events involving Defendant occurred from January to June in
2021. (Doc. 68 at 7–15.) The only claim against Defendant is an alleged violation of the
ACFA. (Doc. 121 at 2; Doc. 115-1 at 19–23.) This claim is subject to a one-year statute
of limitations. Steinberger v. McVey ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 318 P.3d 419, 436 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2014). Accordingly, to assert a consumer fraud claim against Piña, Plaintiff’s
amendment must relate back to the original complaint to be timely. The Court finds that
Plaintiff fails to make this showing.
Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that Piña knew, or should have known, within ninety
days of the original complaint, that she would have been named but for a mistake of her
identity. See ASARCO, LLC v. Union Pac. R. Co., 765 F.3d 999, 1006 (9th Cir. 2014)
(“[N]otice is an essential element in the relation back determination.”). Plaintiff’s
contention otherwise relies on falsity. She argues that Piña knew or should have known
that “any action stemming from her husband’s income-producing acts that sought recovery
from the community estate would necessarily require her joinder to perfect execution
rights” given § 25-215(D). (Doc. 121 at 9 (emphasis added).) But the original Complaint
did not seek recovery from the community estate. The Complaint did not mention
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community property, community assets, marital assets, § 25-215, or even marriage. (Doc.
1.) And Plaintiff does not suggest Defendant’s wife had any role or part in his allegedly
fraudulent behavior. Simply put, the original Complaint does nothing to put Piña on notice
that she would have been named in the lawsuit. Thus, Plaintiff is left to argue that the
existence of § 25-215(D) alone is sufficient to notify all spouses that they would have been
named in any action against their husband or wife because a plaintiff cannot reach
community property otherwise. The Court refuses to adopt such an expansive, per se
finding of notice. “Fairness to the defendant demands that the defendant be able to
anticipate claims that might follow from the facts alleged by the plaintiff.” Percy v. S.F.
Gen. Hosp., 841 F.2d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 1988). The dearth of any allegation or reference
to Hegglin’s marriage until now demonstrates the unfairness of permitting Plaintiff to bring
any claim against Piña.
Finally, the Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s excuses for not naming Hegglin’s
spouse earlier. Plaintiff contends she “could not have named Mrs. Hegglin earlier because
her existence and identity were unknown until Defendant’s June 2025 deposition.” (Doc.
125 at 8.) But Plaintiff moved to file her Fourth Amended Complaint four months after
this deposition and still did not include any reference to Jennifer Piña, Hegglin’s marriage
generally, or Hegglin’s community property. (Doc. 115-1.) Plaintiff acknowledges this
mistake as a “technical omission.” (Doc. 121 at 9.) But this is Plaintiff’s fifth
omission—the original Complaint and all four subsequent amendments fail to make any
reference to Hegglin’s wife or his community property.
Moreover, Plaintiff acknowledges that she contemplated adding a Jane Doe
placeholder in the original Complaint for Hegglin’s spouse but declined to do so “because
federal pleading rules generally prohibit the use of Jane/John Doe designations as
placeholders for unknown parties.” (Doc. 121 at 2–3.) This argument backfires for three
reasons. First, Plaintiff’s backpedaling is disingenuous because her original Complaint
named two Jane and John Doe employee defendants. Second, Plaintiff misstates the law.
Federal law allows doe defendant pleading where “there are specific unknown individuals
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whose conduct forms the basis of plaintiff’s claims and who may be identifiable through
some discovery.” Calderon v. City of San Jose, No. 24-CV-00289-VKD, 2024 WL
3560729, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2024) (citation modified). Third, if true, then Plaintiff
contemplated that Hegglin was potentially married before the original complaint. This
directly undermines Plaintiff’s claim that she had no inkling of Defendant’s marriage prior
to his deposition. It also undercuts her blame shifting that “Defendant provided no
disclosure or notice whatsoever that would have alerted Plaintiff to add or join his spouse
earlier.” (Doc. 125 at 3.) If Plaintiff considered that Hegglin might have been married,
then she should have made any allegation or referenced this marriage in the original
complaint—or the four subsequent amendments. If she had, Defendant would have
admitted or denied the allegations in his Answer. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot now blame
Defendant for information she repeatedly failed to seek.
Accordingly, the Court finds that amendment would be futile here.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Joinder is denied (Doc.
121.)
Dated this 2nd day of April, 2026.
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