Hogan v. Long

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION
LAQUINCE HOGAN 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Case No. 6:24-cv-06108
SHARONDA LONG;
DEPUTY DIRECTOR WILLIAM
STRAUGHN; SGT DALE REED; and
PREA COORDINATOR AMANDA PASLEY 	DEFENDANTS
ORDER
Before the Court is a Report and Recommendation filed on October 8, 2024, by the
Honorable Mark E. Ford, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Arkansas.
(ECF No. 10). Plaintiff has filed objections. (ECF No. 15). The Court finds the matter ripe for
consideration.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On November 29, 2021, Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint in the Eastern District of
Texas.1 On August 7, 2024, his claims against Defendants Long, Straughn, Reed and Pasley were
severed from that case and transferred to this District. (ECF Nos. 1, 2). On August 12, 2024, the
Court entered an Order directing Plaintiff to submit an Amended Complaint concerning only these
four Defendants. (ECF No. 8). Plaintiff submitted his Amended Complaint on August 30, 2024.
(ECF No. 9).
Plaintiff asserts two claims in his Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 9). Both claims center
around his time incarcerated in the Arkansas Division of Correction (“ADC”) Ouachita River Unit.
First, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Long, an advanced physician’s assistant, denied him medical
care by taking away his wheelchair on January 8, 2020, and his walker on January 15, 2020, which
1 Hogan v. Goodwin, Case No. 5:21-cv-00144-RWS-JBB (E.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2021).
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caused him to fall outside of the medical clinic. Plaintiff alleges that his fall resulted in “severe
pain to [his] spine (neck and back) and more damage to the disc in [his] back.” (ECF No. 9, at 4).
Plaintiff claims that he was left for weeks without any mobility aid. (ECF No. 9, at 5). Plaintiff
also alleges that Defendant Long refused to see him on May 18, 2020, because he wrote a grievance
about inadequate medical attention. (ECF No. 9, at 4-5). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Long
refused to provide him with medical treatment for months. 	(ECF No. 9, at 5). 	Plaintiff sues
Defendant Long in both her official and individual capacities. 	For his official capacity claim,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Long violated the Wellpath and ADC policies to provide adequate
medical treatment and care to all individuals within their custody. (ECF No. 9, at 5).
Second, Plaintiff claims that Defendants Straughn, Reed, and Pasley violated his
constitutional rights by failing to adequately investigate his report that he was sexually assaulted.
(ECF No. 9, at 6). Plaintiff alleges that he was sexually assaulted by a nurse at the Wadley Regional
Memorial Hospital in Texarkana, Texas, on November 26, 2019. 	Plaintiff states that he was an
Arkansas Department of Corrections (“ADC”) inmate being housed at the Bowie County
Correction Facility in Texarkana, Texas, at the time of the assault. Plaintiff states that he reported
the assault to the authorities in Texas. On December 30, 2019, Plaintiff was transferred back to
the ADC Ouachita River Unit. Plaintiff states that he then reported the assault to ADC officials,
presumably Defendants Straughn, Reed, and Pasley. 	Plaintiff asserts that the ADC officials
dismissed his claim as “unable to substantiate.” 	(ECF No. 9, at 6). 	Plaintiff claims that he
“suffered pain to his anus” and “psychological pain, anxiety, depression, and PTSD” due to the
assault. 	(ECF No. 9, at 6). 	Plaintiff sues Defendants Straughn, Reed, and Pasley in both their
official and individual capacities. For his official capacity claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
Straughn, Reed, and Pasley violated the Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”). 	Plaintiff also
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alleges that Defendants Straughn, Reed, and Pasley failed to protect him from being subjected to
sexual assault by employees, contractors, or volunteers. (ECF No. 9, at 6).
Plaintiff requests monetary damages from each Defendant. Plaintiff also requests the Court
to require Defendant Long to attend classes for abuse and anger and to require Defendants
Straughn, Reed, and Pasley to attend PREA seminars and earn certificates. 	Finally, Plaintiff
requests that the Court issue an injunction to protect him from retribution. (ECF No. 9, at 9-10).
On October 8, 2024, Judge Ford conducted a preservice screening of Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint and made two recommendations. First, Judge Ford recommends that the Court dismiss
Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants Straughn, Reed, and Pasley without prejudice for failure to
state a claim. (ECF No. 10, at 5). Second, Judge Ford recommends that Plaintiff’s claim for denial
of medical care against Defendant Long proceed. 	On October 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed timely
objections to Judge Ford’s recommendations. (ECF No. 15).
II. 	DISCUSSION
The Court may designate a magistrate judge to hear pre- and post-trial matters and to
submit to the Court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1). Within fourteen days of receipt of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, “a
party 	may 	serve 	and 	file 	specific 	written 	objections 	to 	the 	proposed 	findings 	and
recommendations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); accord Local Rule 72.1(VII)(C). After conducting
an appropriate review of the report and recommendation, the Court may then “accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge . . . or
recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
“[T]he specific standard of review depends, in the first instance, upon whether or not a
party has objected to portions of the report and recommendation.” 	Anderson v. Evangelical
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Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, 308 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1015 (N.D. Iowa 2018). 	Generally,
“objections must be timely and specific” to trigger de novo review. 	Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d
356, 358-59 (8th Cir. 1990). The Court applies a liberal construction when determining whether
pro se objections are specific. 	Hudson v. Gammon, 46 F.3d 785, 786 (8th Cir. 1995). 	“When
conducting a de novo review, the district court makes its own determinations of disputed issues
and does not decide whether the magistrate’s proposed findings are clearly erroneous.” Branch v.
Martin, 886 F.2d 1043, 1045 (8th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).
In the instant case, Plaintiff only objects to Judge Ford’s recommendation that his second
claim be dismissed.2 (ECF No. 15, at 2). Plaintiff explains that he was under the authority, control,
and care of the ADC while he was being housed at the Bowie County Correction Center in
Texarkana, Texas, because ADC had an interstate contract with Bowie County, Texas. (ECF No.
15, at 2). Plaintiff also argues that he has a right to be free from sexual assault under the PREA
and an Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. (ECF No. 15, at
2). Plaintiff restates that he can identify the person directly responsible for his assault and that he
took every possible action to report it.
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s objections were timely and specific. Thus, the Court will
conduct a de novo review of Plaintiff’s second claim. See Thompson, 897 F.2d at 358-59. In his
objections, Plaintiff argues that he has a right to be free from sexual assault under the Prisoner
Rape Elimination Act and under the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment clause.
(ECF No. 15, at 2). Thus, the Court will consider Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Straughn,
Reed, and Pasley under both the PREA and the Eighth Amendment.
2 In his objections, Plaintiff clarifies and adds certain facts to his first claim, however, he states that he agrees with
Judge Ford’s finding that his first claim should proceed. (ECF No. 15, at 1).
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A. 	Failure to Investigate Sexual Assault under the PREA
Judge Ford recommends that Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants Straughn, Reed, and Pasley
failed to adequately investigate his sexual assault report be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Plaintiff alleges in his Amended Complaint that Defendants Straughn, Reed, and Pasley
“quickly dismissed” his report of the sexual assault as “unable to substantiate.” (ECF No. 9, at 6).
Plaintiff elaborates in his objection that he was able to identify the person responsible for the sexual
assault and reported the assault to “every agency that he could,” but that no one interviewed the
perpetrator. (ECF No. 15, at 2).
The Prison Rape Elimination Act authorizes the federal government to give grants to States
to implement procedures designed to detect, prevent, reduce, and punish prison rape. 	See 34
U.S.C. §§ 30301-30309. 	The Prison Rape Elimination Act does not provide an inmate with a
private right of action pursuant to § 1983. Doe v. Frakes, No. 8:20CV128, 2022 WL 2373825, at
5 (D. Neb. June 30, 2022), aff’d by No. 22-2954, 2022 WL 19037650, at *1 (8th Cir. Dec. 20,
2022); Johnson v. Garrison, 859 F. App’x 863, 864 (10th Cir. 2021); Bowens v. Wetzel, 674 F.
App’x 133, 137 (3d Cir. 2017); Krieg v. Steele, 599 F. App’x 231, 232 (5th Cir. 2015); Wilmoth v.
Sharp, No. 6:15-cv-06057, 2018 WL 1092031, at *3 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 27, 2018). Thus, Plaintiff
cannot state a claim solely under the PREA.
Further, to the extent that Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Straughn, Reed, and Pasley
failed to properly respond to his grievances or to enforce compliance with internal prison rules,
the Court agrees with Judge Ford that those claims are not actionable under § 1983. (ECF No. 10,
at 5). 	The Eighth Circuit has held that prisoners do not have a constitutional right to a prison
grievance procedure or to enforce compliance with internal prison rules or policies. See Lomholt
v. Holder, 287 F.3d 683, 684 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that a defendants’ denial of a prisoner’s
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grievances did not state a substantive constitutional claim); see Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844,
847 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[T]here is no federal constitutional liberty interest in having . . . prison
officials follow prison regulations.”); see also Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir.
1997) (“[T]here is no § 1983 liability for violating prison policy.”). Accordingly, the Court finds
that Plaintiff failed to state an actionable § 1983 claim that Defendants Straughn, Reed, and Pasley
failed to properly respond to his report of sexual assault or follow the prison’s PREA policy.
B. Failure to Protect under the Eighth Amendment
In his objection, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Straughn, Reed, and Pasley violated his
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. (ECF No. 15, at 2). Judge
Ford notes in his Report and Recommendation that Plaintiff did not sufficiently allege an Eighth
Amendment failure to protect claim because Plaintiff was in the custody of the Bowie County
Correctional Center, not the ADC, when he visited the hospital where he alleges the sexual assault
happened. (ECF No. 10, at 3 n.2). Plaintiff objects that he was under the control and care of the
ADC while he was housed at the Bowie County Correctional Center because the ADC had an
interstate contract with Bowie County, Texas, and because Plaintiff was sentenced by an Arkansas
Circuit Court. (ECF No. 15, at 2).
The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim that Defendants Straughn, Reed,
and Pasley failed to protect him from being sexually assaulted in the hospital while he was in the
custody of the Bowie County Correctional Center. To state a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must allege
that the defendant was personally involved in or had direct responsibility for incidents that resulted
in injury. See Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985). Even considering Plaintiff’s
assertion that he was still under the control and care of the ADC when he was allegedly assaulted
at the hospital in Texas as true, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts that Defendants Straughn, Reed,
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and Pasley were personally involved in or had direct responsibility for the sexual assault. Rather,
Plaintiff’s allegations involving Defendants Straughn, Reed, and Pasley are confined to their
failure to investigate his sexual assault.
Further, an inmate asserting a failure to protect claim under the Eighth Amendment must
allege both an objective component that there was a substantial risk of harm to him and a subjective
component that the prison official was deliberately indifferent to that risk. See Arnett v. Norris,
160 F.4th 921, 926 (8th Cir. 2025). 	Plaintiff’s claim fails at both components. 	The objective
component “ensures that the deprivation is sufficiently serious to amount to a deprivation of
constitutional dimension.” 	Id. 	The Eighth Circuit has held that a “risk of sexual assault is
‘substantial’ if it occurs with sufficient frequency that prisoners are put in reasonable fear for their
safety.” Id. (quoting Dean v. Bearden, 79 F.4th 986, 989 (8th Cir. 2023)) (emphasis in original).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was sexually assaulted once.
The subjective component of an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim “requires that
the prison officials have a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 935-40 (1994)). The state of mind required is that of “deliberate indifference.” Farmer,
511 U.S. at 828 (“A prison official’s “deliberate indifference” to a substantial risk of serious harm
to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.”). To be deliberately indifferent, “the official must
both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). Even
if Plaintiff alleged a substantial risk of harm, Plaintiff does not allege that any of the named
Defendants were aware of any facts from which an inference could be drawn that there was a risk
that he would be sexually assaulted at the hospital. 	Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff
failed to allege a failure to protect claim.
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Finally, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to allege an official capacity claim against
Defendants Straughn, Reed, and Pasley. Courts have “consistently recognized a general rule that,
in order for [official capacity] liability to attach, individual liability first must be found on an
underlying substantive claim.” Brockinton v. City of Sherwood, Ark., 503 F.3d 667, 674 (8th Cir.
2007). 	Where, like in this case, no defendant is found individually liable on an underlying
substantive claim, the governmental entity cannot be held liable under § 1983. Id.
III. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 10) should
be and hereby is ADOPTED. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Straughn, Reed, and Pasley
are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 	Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Long
MAY PROCEED.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 12th day of February, 2026.
/s/ Susan O. Hickey
Susan O. Hickey
United States District Judge
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