Williams v. Mitchell et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
RANDY ELLIS WILLIAMS 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 4:25-CV-04013-SOH-BAB
PUBLIC DEFENDER JASON MITCHELL;
PUBLIC DEFENDER JOHN PICKETT; and
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY DAVID P. COTTEN 	DEFENDANTS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	He proceeds pro se and in
forma pauperis. 	Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in the Arkansas Division of Corrections –
Tucker Re-Entry Center in Tucker, Arkansas.
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Susan O.
Hickey, Chief United States District Judge, referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose
of making a Report and Recommendation.
The case is before the Court for preservice screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1)
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 	Pursuant to § 1915A, the Court has the obligation to screen any
complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of
a governmental entity. 	Upon consideration, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s Complaint be
dismissed.
I. 	BACKGROUND
In his Complaint, Plaintiff names three Defendants: Public Defender Jason Mitchell, Public
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Defender John Pickett, and Prosecuting Attorney David P. Cotten. 	Plaintiff alleges these
Defendants violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1985. 	(ECF No. 1).
In Claim One, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Jason Mitchell, his public defender, violated his
Due Process rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments by ignoring Plaintiff’s
verbal and written refusal for a continuance of trial and by forging a signature on a Motion to
Continue Trial. 	Plaintiff is unclear if it is his signature that was forged or if Defendant Mitchell
signed his own signature without Plaintiff’s permission. 	Further, Plaintiff claims Defendant
Mitchell conspired with David Cotten, the prosecutor, to deny Plaintiff his right to a speedy trial.
(ECF No. 1, pp. 4-5).
In Claim Two, Plaintiff alleges Defendants John Pickett, his public defender, and David
Cotten, the prosecuting attorney violated his Due Process rights pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment and also through the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. 	Specifically, Plaintiff
claims:
Pickett and Cotton conspired to claim no knowledge of A.R.C.P 28.1 Which would have
seen me released that day, and further, Pickett said this is your only way, the first offenders
act, which was not available to me, but Signed by Cotten, Leaving me to feel abandoned,
leaving me by then in total financial ruin.
(ECF No. 1, p. 6) (errors in original).
In Claim Three, Plaintiff alleges Defendant David Cotten violated his Due Process and
rights to a speedy trial by signing an illegal sentencing order. 	Plaintiff claims Defendant Cotten
signed this sentencing order to “get a conviction for a crime with no hope of success and to avoid
legal action.” 	(ECF No. 1, p. 8).
Plaintiff alleges all claims against all Defendants in their individual capacity only. 	(ECF
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No. 1).
For relief Plaintiff requests punitive damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)-(3). 	(ECF
No. 1, p. 9).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Under § 1915A, the Court is obligated to screen the case prior to service of process being
issued. 	The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are
frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 	Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 	An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be
false, or it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather
than to vindicate a cognizable right. 	In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988); Spencer
v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987). 	A claim fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we
hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” 	Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). 	This means “that if the essence of an allegation is
discernible, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe
the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal
framework.” 	Jackson, 747 F.3d at 544 (cleaned up). 	However, the complaint must still allege
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specific facts sufficient to support a claim. 	Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir.
1985).
III. 	DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, the Court notes Plaintiff filed his claims on the Court’s standard
Section 1983 Complaint Form. 	(ECF No. 1, p. 9). 	However, Plaintiff specifically states in his
request for relief that his claims here are asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)-(3). 	Plaintiff
also explains he filed previous suits on the same factual allegations pursuant to Section 1983 and
those claims were dismissed for failure to state a claim. 	(ECF No. 1, p. 10). 	According to
Plaintiff, this is why he now proceeds pursuant to Section 1985.
A. Section 1983
After a search of Plaintiff’s previous cases, the Court confirmed Plaintiff filed two previous
complaints pursuant to Section 1983 regarding the same claims and Defendants listed in the instant
Complaint. 	See Williams v. Mitchell, et al., Civil No. 4:23-cv-04061-SOH (W.D. Ark. Oct. 4,
2023) (dismissed by screening Order); Williams v. Mitchell, et al., Civil No. 4:24-cv-04064-SOH
(W.D. Ark. Aug. 28, 2024) (dismissed by screening Order) (affirmed Williams v. Mitchell, et al.,
Civil No. 24-2927 (8th Cir. Dec. 5, 2024)). 	Plaintiff received Section 1915(g) strikes in both of
these previous cases. 	Id.
As explained in the screening Orders dismissing Plaintiff’s previous cases, Plaintiff’s
allegations clearly do not state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Section 1983.
Id.
B. Immunities
First, Defendant Cotten, as the prosecutor in Plaintiff’s criminal case, enjoys absolute
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prosecutorial immunity from Plaintiff’s claims. 	A prosecutor who acts within the scope of his
duties in initiating criminal prosecution and presenting the state’s case has absolute immunity from
Section 1983 and Section 1985 claims. 	See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431-32 (1976);
White v. Bloom, 621 F.2d 276, 280 (8th Cir. 1980). 	Furthermore, immunity is not defeated by
“[a]llegations of unethical conduct and improper motive in the performance of prosecutorial
functions.” 	Sample v. City of Woodbury, 836 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 2016). 	“[A] prosecutor is
immune from suit even if he knowingly presented false, misleading, or perjured testimony . . . or
withheld or suppressed exculpatory evidence.” 	Woodworth v. Hulshof, 891 F.3d 1083, 1089 (8th
Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted).
C. Section 1985
The next issue is whether Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted
pursuant to Section 1985(2) and (3). 	Section 1985 subsection (2) protects individuals from
conspiracies which seek to interfere with the administration of justice with the intent to deny equal
protection of the law. 	42 U.S.C. § 1985(2); Kvalvog v. Park Christian School, Inc. 	66 4th 1147,
1154 (8th Cir. 2023). 	Plaintiff’s alleged conspirators must have been motivated by a “class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus.” 	Kvalvog, 66 4th at 1154 (internal citations omitted). 	“A
class must possess the characteristics of a discrete and insular minority, like race, national origin,
or gender.” 	Id. (citing McDonald v. City of Saint Paul, 679 F.3d 698, 706-07 (8th Cir. 2012)
(holding a class of whistleblowers were not protected by Section 1985(2)).
Likewise, Section 1985(3), which protects against conspiracies to deprive persons of equal
protection of the law, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), requires Plaintiff to assert he was the victim of a
conspiracy 	motivated 	by 	“some 	racial, 	or 	perhaps 	otherwise 	class-based, 	invidiously
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discriminatory animus.” 	Moore v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1346 (8th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations
omitted) (affirming the district court decision that pretrial detainees in a county jail failed to state
a claim under § 1985(3) because they did not claim to be victims of a conspiracy based on any
cognizable class-based animus); Rodgers v. University of Missouri Bd. Of Curators, 56 F.Supp.3d
1037 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 29, 2014) (“A claim under § 1985(3) requires proof of invidious
discriminatory intent and a violation of a serious constitutional right that is protected from official
and private encroachment.”) (citing Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263,
267-68 (1993)).
Plaintiff makes no assertion he is a member of any protected class or that the alleged
conspiracy of Defendants was motivated by any discriminatory animus. 	Accordingly, he has
failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to either subsection (2) or (3) of
Section 1985.
D. Heck
Furthermore, even if Plaintiff stated a Section 1985 claim, such claims would be barred.
Plaintiff may not recover damages for an unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment unless “the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a
federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” 	Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87
(1994). 	As evidenced by Plaintiff’s claims, he is still imprisoned on the sentence he complains
of, and he has produced no evidence or allegations in his Complaint to meet the Heck requirements.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is recommended:
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(1) the case be dismissed WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;
(2) Plaintiff be warned that, in the future, this dismissal may be counted as a strike for
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and thus, the Clerk be directed to place a § 1915(g)
strike flag on the case for future judicial consideration;
(3) the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this dismissal
would not be taken in good faith; and
(4) Plaintiff be further warned that any future attempt to file a complaint based on the same
facts alleged here may result in sanctions being imposed, including but not limited to
civil contempt.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 	The failure to file
timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties
are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by
the district court.
Status of Referral: 	The referral is terminated.
DATED this 24th day of April 2025.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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