McElroy v. Miners et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
JEREL R. McELROY 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 4:24-CV-04102-SOH-CDC
WARDEN MINERS,
Southwest Arkansas Community Correction Center (“SWACCC”);
MAJOR VICKI WALKER, SWACCC;
LIEUTENANT SHARITA DEDMON, SWACC;
JOHN AND JANE DOE EMPLOYEES of the
SWACCC Medical Department;
DISCIPLINARY HEARING COMMITTEE (DHC); and
TINA HODGE (SOD), Staff over Discipline, 	DEFENDANTS.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Jerel R. McElroy, a convicted prisoner incarcerated at the Southwest Arkansas
Community Correction Center (“SWACCC”), has initiated the above-captioned civil rights action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”). 	(ECF No. 7).
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Susan O.
Hickey, Chief United States District Judge, has referred this case to the undersigned for the
purposes of entering a report and recommendation on preservice review of Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).1 	Section 1915A requires the Court to
review any complaint in which a prisoner, such as Plaintiff, seeks redress from a governmental
1 Upon initial review of Plaintiff’s original complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), United
States Magistrate Judge Barry Bryant ordered Plaintiff to submit an amended complaint. 	(ECF
No. 3). 	After submitting an amended complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting permission to
further amend his complaint. 	See (ECF No. 9). 	This Court granted that request. 	(ECF No. 10).
On November 19, 2024, Plaintiff submitted his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), which
remains the operative pleading in this matter.
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entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 	Upon that review
and for the reasons outlined below, this Court recommends that Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint, (ECF No. 11), be dismissed, in part.
BACKGROUND2
Plaintiff explicitly asserts six claims for relief.3 	First, identifying Warden Miners and
DHC Court (“Disciplinary Hearing Committee”) as defendants in their official and personal
capacities,4 Plaintiff claims that he has been exposed to various unconstitutional conditions of
confinement while incarcerated at the SWACCC. 	Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that:
• 	On February 15, 2024, he was subjected to freezing cold showers and “some floors”
during his intake.
• 	From March 10, 2024, until the following month, “no toilet paper was allotted to each
inmate.” 	Plaintiff also says that he did not have any toilet paper from August 30, 2024,
to September 3, 2024.
• 	Plaintiff was exposed to asbestos and black mold, which caused him to become sick.
• 	Dishes were not washed with soap or bleach “for months” because the kitchen
dishwasher was broken.
• 	Plaintiff’s request for medical attention for a UTI was refused.
• 	Plaintiff was placed in segregation without cause.
2 The facts in this section derive from Plaintiff’s verified Second Amended Complaint. 	(ECF No.
11). 	For the purposes of preservice review, the Court assumes the factual allegations to be true.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.”) (internal citation omitted).
3 There is significant overlap in the factual assertions giving rise to each claim. 	The Court,
however, endeavors to describe and address those factual allegations only once in this report and
recommendation.
4 Plaintiff is inconsistent in the spelling of Warden Miners. 	In the case caption and “defendant
information” section of the SAC, he spells it “Miners,” (ECF No. 11, p. 2), elsewhere, however,
he spells it “Miner,” see id., p. 4. 	For consistency, this Court spells the name as it appears in the
case caption: “Miners.”
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• 	On October 25, 2024, Plaintiff sent a request to the Warden about “his safety and
treatment from [the] staff,” but the Warden ignored his letter, telling him to direct his
complaints to the DHC.
• 	Plaintiff’s segregation cell was infested with ants and covered with feces, but “officers”
would not adequately address these conditions.
• 	Plaintiff was denied access to the administrative grievance process.
• 	Plaintiff was “locked down” for 24 hours a day without the ability to shower, make
phone calls, or exercise.
• 	Officials read Plaintiff’s legal mail from this Court.
• 	The facility was “infested” with roaches. 	Plaintiff says that he has found roaches in
the food.
• 	Officials retaliated against Plaintiff by placing him in segregation on June 7, 2024, for
exercising his First Amendment right to free speech.
• 	Plaintiff was placed in segregation on July 9, 2024, and August 28, 2024, without just
cause.
• 	Plaintiff was housed in cells 103, 109, and 113. 	In cell 103, there was rust around the
sink and faucet, black mold growing on the walls, which caused him to become sick,
and human feces rubbed onto the left side of the cell.
• 	Plaintiff says that while he was in segregation, he asked Defendant Warden Miners for
a grievance/complaint form, but Defendant Miners told him that he needed to write the
“A.R.O.” to request the form. 	Plaintiff says that he requested the forms through the
A.R.O., but did not receive them, and that Defendant Miners directed Cpl. Johny
Peavey to provide him with the grievance forms, knowing that officers could not supply
such forms.
(ECF No. 11, pp. 4-9).
Second, identifying Major Vicki Walker, “DHC (Disciplinary Hearing Committee),” and
Warden Miners (SWACC) as defendants in their official and individual capacities, Plaintiff says
that on June 7, 2024, Defendant Walker called him down for work at 7:30 am, thirty minutes before
his shift started, and directed him to start working. 	Plaintiff says that he and Defendant Walker
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exchanged words, and he eventually told her that he “hires people and put[s] them to work,” which
prompted her to order him to be placed in segregation. 	(ECF No. 11, pp. 10-11). 	Plaintiff says
that Defendant Walker retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment right to free
speech by ordering him to segregation and that he was placed in segregation without adequate
process. 	(ECF No. 11, p. 11).
Third, Plaintiff says that on August 24, 2024, Plaintiff, along with other inmates, waited in
the hallway after lunch for other inmates to pass. 	(ECF No. 11, pp. 14-15). 	According to
Plaintiff, Defendant Dedmon, who had been “targeting him,” was “disrespectful towards him,”
and ultimately ordered him to be placed in segregation without justification. 	Id., p. 15. 	Plaintiff
says that Defendant Dedmon provided incorrect information in her report on the incident. 	Id., pp.
15-16. 	Plaintiff also claims that the DHC failed to properly investigate the incident, finding him
“not guilty” of failing to comply with staff orders but “guilty” of something that did not happen.
Id., p. 18.
Fourth, Plaintiff says that on March 25, 2024, he submitted a medical request, and, in
response, he was asked to provide additional information regarding the basis for that request.
(ECF No. 11, p. 19). 	According to Plaintiff, he replied, saying, “UTI,” but officials responded
requesting more information about his symptoms. 	Plaintiff says that on April 6, 2024, he
submitted a second medical request, but it was denied as “incomplete request,” because he failed
to include the basis for his medical request including the symptoms he was experiencing. 	The
same thing happened again on April 7, 2024, when he submitted a third medical request. 	Plaintiff
asserts that he was denied medical care and that he continues to experience “problems.” 	Id., p.
20. 	As to this claim, Plaintiff identifies “John and Jane Doe Medical Staff” and Warden Miners
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(SWACCC) as defendants in their individual and official capacities.
Fifth, Plaintiff says that on or about June 11, 2024, July 9, 2024, August 28, 2024,
September 5, 2024, and October 31, 2024, he was placed in administrative segregation without
cause in violation of his due process rights. 	(ECF No. 11, p. 22). 	According to Plaintiff, while
he was in segregation, he was exposed to unconstitutional conditions of confinement, specifically:
• 	He was placed on “lockdown” 24 hours a day without access to a shower, exercise, or
a phone call.
• 	Plaintiff’s segregation cell contained feces and ants.
• 	He was not provided toilet paper from August 30, 2024, to September 3, 2024.
Id.
Plaintiff asserts that he was placed in segregation on June 7, 2024, (following a hearing)
for purportedly telling officials that he only cleaned his own floors. 	Id., p. 23. 	He further claims
that he was placed in segregation on July 9, 2024, (following a hearing), for “not standing in
protocol;” and that he was placed in segregation on August 28, 2024, for “asking an officer why
[the officer] is always targeting him and stating that [he] knows his rights.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff
contends that none of these reasons constitutes a sufficient basis to place him in segregation. 	As
to this claim, Plaintiff identifies “DHC” (Disciplinary Hearing Committee), John and Jane Doe,
and Warden Miners (SWACCC) as defendants in their individual and official capacities.
Finally, Plaintiff says that Defendant Hodge placed him in solitary for “not standing in
protocol,” in violation of his constitutional rights. 	(ECF No. 11, p. 27). 	Plaintiff claims that on
October 24, 2024, Defendant Hodge filed a false disciplinary charge against him in retaliation for
filing lawsuits. 	Id., p. 28. 	Further, while he was in segregation, Plaintiff claims that he was not
allowed access to any complaints or grievances to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding
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the conditions of his cell. 	As to claim five, Plaintiff identifies Tina Hodge, (“SOD”)
staff/supervisor over discipline, and Warden Miners as defendants in their official and individual
capacities.
Plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the Court is required to review this
case prior to service of process being issued. 	Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the Court must
dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are frivolous, malicious, or
fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seek monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” 	Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 	A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	A pro se complaint, moreover, is to be
given liberal construction, meaning “that if the essence of an allegation is discernable, even though
it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe the complaint in a way
that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal framework.” 	Stone v.
Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2004). 	However, “they still must allege sufficient facts to
support the claims advanced.” 	Id. at 914 (citing Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir.
1989)).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff brings his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	To state a claim under 42 U.S.C.
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§ 1983, “a plaintiff must allege a violation of a constitutional right committed by a person acting
under color of state law.” 	Andrews v. City of West Branch, Iowa, 454 F.3d 914, 918 (8th Cir.
2006). 	Further, “[p]ublic servants may be sued under section 1983 in either their official capacity,
their individual capacity, or both.” Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th
Cir. 1999) (citing Murphy v. Arkansas, 127 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir. 1997)).
A. Official Capacity Claims
“Claims against government actors in their individual capacities differ from those in their
official capacities as to the type of conduct that is actionable and as to the type of defense that is
available.” 	Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 914 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.
21 (1991)). 	“A suit against a government official in his or her official capacity is another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Baker v. Chisom, 501 F.3d
920, 925 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)).
Here, Plaintiff identifies Disciplinary Hearing Committee (“DHC”), an entity, as a
defendant to this action. 	It is well-established, however, that the Eleventh Amendment bars
claims against states and their entities. 	Murphy v. State of Ark., 127 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir. 1997)
(citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979)). 	Defendant “DHC Court” is therefore immune
from suit and should be dismissed from this action on that basis.
Further, of the remaining defendants, each is alleged to be an agent of the State of Arkansas.
(ECF No. 11). 	“Neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’
under § 1983” when sued for money damages. 	Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
71 (1989). 	Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against individual state officials for money damages
should therefore be dismissed.
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Thus, in sum, this Court recommends that Plaintiff’s claims against DHC Court, and his
claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities for money damages be
dismissed without prejudice. 	This Court now turns to Plaintiff’s six claims against the remaining
defendants.
A. Claim 1
The only remaining defendant with respect to claim one is Warden Miners (SWACCC).
(ECF No. 11, p. 4). 	Warden Miners is identified as a defendant in his individual and official
capacities. 	Id., p. 5.
i. 	Constitutional Violations
As a threshold matter, claim one includes a wide-ranging list of grievances, including
allegations that prison officials read his mail from this Court, and violated SWACCC policies and
grievances. 	Such allegations, however, do not constitute plausible constitutional violations.
First, “privileged prisoner mail, that is mail to or from an inmate’s attorney and identified
as such, may not be opened for inspections for contraband except in the presence of the prisoner.”
Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017, 1037 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d
427, 430 (8th Cir. 1997)). 	Here, Plaintiff does not allege that his legal mail was read outside of
his presence. 	(ECF No. 11, p. 6). 	Even if he did, mail from this Court does not constitute
privileged legal mail. 	Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to assert a plausible constitutional
violation against prison officials for reading his mail from this Court.
Second, to the extent that Plaintiff claims that the defendants violated his constitutional
rights by failing to provide him access to the prison’s grievance forms, such a claim also fails as a
matter of law. 	See Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (no constitutional right
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to process grievances). 	Similarly, a violation of prison policy, by itself, does not constitute a
constitutional violation. 	See Gardner, 109 F.3d at 430. 	Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims alleging
that prison officials opened his mail from this Court, and that prison official violated prison policies
and grievances procedures should be dismissed.5 	This Court now turns to Plaintiff’s remaining
claims against Defendant Miners with respect to claim one.
ii. 	Individual Capacity Claims
To establish liability against officials in their individual capacity, “the plaintiff must show
that the official, acting under color of state law caused the deprivation of a federal right.” 	Handt
v. Lynch, 681 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Graham, 473 U.S. at 166) (emphasis added);
see also Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Liability under § 1983
requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.”). 	Put differently,
“government officials are personally liable only for their own misconduct.” S.M. v. Krigbaum, 808
F.3d 335, 340 (8th Cir. 2015). 	Respondeat superior—the theory that a supervisor is responsible
for the torts of his subordinates—is not a basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	Keeper v.
King, 130 F.3d 1309, 1314 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Kulow v. Nix, 28 F.3d 855, 858 (8th Cir.
1994)). 	Instead, for a supervisor to be liable under § 1983 on a theory of “failure to supervise or
failure to train,” the plaintiff must show that the supervisor “(1) received notice of a pattern of
unconstitutional acts committed by a subordinate, and (2) was deliberately indifferent to or
authorized those acts.” 	S.M., 808 F.3d at 340.
Here, 	Plaintiff 	asserts 	no 	facts 	suggesting 	that 	Defendant 	Miners 	was 	personally
responsible for exposing him to any of the conditions alleged in claim one, including freezing cold
5 Notably, Plaintiff repeats this allegation in claim five. 	See (ECF No. 11, p. 23).
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showers, freezing cold floors, asbestos, and mold. 	Similarly, Plaintiff does not claim that
Defendant Miners was personally involved in any of the decisions to place him in segregation, and
he does not assert that Defendant Miners was responsible for providing him with constitutionally
adequate medical care for his UTI. 	While Plaintiff claims that the “conduct of Warden is so
closely related to the resulting injuries that it can be said to have caused it, or have been its
proximate cause,” (ECF No. 11, p. 8), such allegations are wholly conclusory. 	As such, they are
not presumed true for the purposes of determining whether Plaintiff has established a plausible
claim for relief. 	See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680-81 (the court considers nonconclusory allegations in
determining whether plaintiff has established a plausible claim for relief).
Similarly, Plaintiff has failed to assert a plausible cause of action against Defendant Miners
for failure to supervise or train his subordinates. 	While Plaintiff claims that he told Defendant
Miners about his safety concerns and described to him how he was being treated by staff, (ECF
No. 11, p. 5), he asserts no facts suggesting that Defendant Miners was on notice of a pattern of
similar conduct by his subordinates. 	See Livers v. Schenck, 700 F.3d 340, 356 (8th Cir. 2012)
(“To impose supervisory liability, other misconduct must be very similar to the conduct giving rise
to liability.”).
Further, Plaintiff asserts no facts establishing that Defendant Miners acted with deliberate
indifference to his rights. 	“Deliberate indifference is a subjective standard that entails a level of
culpability equal to the criminal law definition of recklessness.” 	S.M., 808 F.3d at 341 (internal
quotations and citations omitted). 	“Plaintiff[] must prove [defendant] personally knew of the
constitutional risk posed by [his] inadequate training or supervision 	of [the defendant’s
subordinate.” 	Id. 	Here, Plaintiff asserts no such facts. 	Accordingly, Plaintiff’s individual
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capacity claims against Defendant Miners should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
iii. 	Official Capacity Claims
This leaves Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Defendant Miners. 	State officials
may be sued in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief. 	Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123, 157-60 (1908); Fond du Lac Band of Chippewa Indians v. Carlson, 68 F.3d 253, 255 (8th
Cir. 1995) (“Ex parte Young recognized that suits may be brought in federal court against state
officials in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief to prevent future violations of
federal law.”). 	In determining whether the plaintiff is requesting prospective, injunctive relief, a
court conducts a straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation
of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” 	281 Care Committee v.
Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 632 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In this case, Plaintiff claims that he has been exposed to black mold, asbestos, dirty dishes,
cockroaches, cold showers and cold floors, was refused toilet paper, and one time he was denied
medical care. 	He also claims that he was placed in segregation several times without sufficient
cause and that the conditions of isolation violated his constitutional rights. 	Most of these
conditions, however, cannot reasonably be construed as “ongoing” violations—Plaintiff is not in
isolation and thus not currently subject to the conditions of isolation, he does not claim that he
continues to be denied medical care for a UTI, and he does not assert that he continues to be denied
toilet paper (only that he was denied toilet paper twice in the past). 	Accordingly, recognizing that
pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, for the limited purpose of preservice review pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), this Court recommends that Plaintiff’s official capacity claim against
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Defendant Miners for Plaintiff’s purportedly ongoing exposure to mold, asbestos, and a “bug
infestation” proceed and that all other claims with respect to claim one be dismissed without
prejudice.
B. Claim Two
Regarding claim two, having recommended dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against DHC,
only Plaintiff’s claims against Major Vicki Walker, and Warden Miners in their individual and
official capacities for prospective injunctive relief remain pending.
i. 	Individual Capacity Claims
With respect to Defendant Miners, here, again, there are no allegations that Defendant
Miners was directly involved in the events that gave rise to his disciplinary proceedings or the
disciplinary proceedings themselves. 	(ECF No. 11, pp. 10-13). 	Rather, as the Court understands
it, Plaintiff seeks to establish liability against Defendant Miners for failing to properly supervise
or train Defendant Walker. 	Plaintiff claims, for example, that “Major Walker has been on
discipline leave, violations, and reports in the past (as a counselor) of her employment at
SWACCC.” 	(ECF No. 11, p. 11). 	But recall that to impose supervisory liability, the “other
misconduct must be very similar to the conduct giving rise to liability.” Livers, 700 F.3d at 356.
Plaintiff asserts no facts establishing that Defendant Walker’s prior discipline involved similar
conduct as alleged here—namely, retaliating against inmates for exercising their First Amendment
rights by issuing a disciplinary violation. 	Further, while Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Miners
was “callously indifferent” to him, such an allegation is wholly conclusory. 	Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s claim two against Defendant Miners in his individual capacity should be dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
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With respect to Plaintiff’s individual capacity claim against Defendant Walker, as the Court
understands it, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Walker retaliated against him for exercising his First
Amendment right to free speech by ordering that he be placed in segregation without just cause
and that he was housed in segregation without due process. 	Plaintiff also claims that he was
subject to 24-hour lockdown without one hour to exercise, access the phones, or shower. 	(ECF
No. 11, p. 14).
The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause “protects persons against deprivations of
life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that
one of these interests is at stake.” 	Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). 	The
Constitution itself “does not give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse
conditions of confinement.” 	Id. (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976)). 	But “a
liberty interest in avoiding particular conditions of confinement may arise from state policies or
regulations, subject to the important limitations set forth in Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472
(1995).” 	Id. at 222. 	Indeed, after Sandin, the inquiry into “the existence of a protected, state-
created liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of confinement [is] the nature of those
conditions themselves ‘in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’” Id. at 223 (quoting
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484). 	In this case, Plaintiff says that when he was in segregation, he was
subjected to “lockdown” conditions all day and not provided any time to exercise, shower, or make
phone calls. (ECF No. 11, p. 11). 	See Sanders v. Norris, 153 F. App’x 403, 405 (8th Cir. 2005)
(explaining that “in certain circumstances, an inmate transferred to and held indefinitely in a
maximum security environment may enjoy certain due process protections”) (citing Wilkinson,
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545 U.S. 209)).6
Further, the Eighth Circuit has recognized that while “the filing of a false disciplinary
charge is not itself actionable under § 1983, the filing of a disciplinary charge becomes actionable
if done in retaliation for the inmate’s filing of a grievance.” 	Dixon v. Brown, 38 F.3d 379, 379
(8th Cir. 1994). 	Here, even though Plaintiff does not assert that Defendant Walker retaliated
against him for filing a grievance, he claims that Defendant Walker retaliated against him for
telling her that he does not clean other people’s floors. 	Accordingly, for the limited purpose of
preservice review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), this Court recommends that Plaintiff’s
individual capacity claims against Defendant Walker (claim two) proceed.
To the extent, however, that Plaintiff also contends that the conditions of his confinement
while in lockdown violated his constitutional rights, he fails to assert any facts establishing that
Defendant Walker was personally responsible for those conditions. 	Accordingly, this claim
should also be dismissed without prejudice.
ii. 	Official Capacity Claims
With respect to claim two, Plaintiff identifies Defendants Walker and Miners as defendants
in their official capacities and he requests injunctive relief. See (ECF No. 11, p. 18). 	But only
prospective, injunctive relief is available to plaintiffs who assert claims against state officials in
their official capacities. 	See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157-60. 	Plaintiff, therefore, cannot
obtain retroactive relief for an incident that occurred in June 2024. 	Plaintiff, moreover, cannot
obtain prospective, injunctive relief for the conditions of his confinement in isolation following
6 Plaintiff claims that while he was in segregation, he requested, but did not receive, grievances
and complaint forms. 	(ECF No. 11, p. 11). 	Here, again, for the reasons described above, such a
claim does not establish a plausible constitutional violation.
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the June 2024, because he is no longer subject to those conditions. 	Plaintiff’s official capacity
claims against Defendants Walker and Miners should therefore be dismissed.
C. Claim Three
As to claim three, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Lieutenant Sharita Dedmon and
Warden Miners in their individual capacities for money damages and in their official capacities
for prospective, injunctive relief remain pending.
Here, again, while Plaintiff alleges that on August 24, 2024, Defendant Dedmon ordered
him to be placed in segregation without cause and without due process of law, he asserts no facts
alleging that Defendant Miners was personally involved in the decision to place in him segregation
or the conditions of segregation. 	Further, to the extent that Plaintiff claims that Defendant Miners
failed to adequately supervise or train Defendant Dedmon, he asserts no facts establishing that
Defendant Miners was on notice of Defendant Dedmon’s purportedly unconstitutional conduct, or
that there was a pattern of Defendant Dedmon engaging in such conduct. 	Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
individual capacity claim against Defendant Miners should be dismissed. 	Similarly, to the extent
that Plaintiff asserts that the conditions of lockdown violated his constitutional rights, he asserts
no facts establishing that either Defendant Miners or Defendant Dedmon was personally
responsible for those conditions. 	Such claims should therefore also be dismissed.
Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Dedmon violated his rights by placing him in
segregation without due process of law. 	For the limited purposes of preservice review pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), this Court recommends that this claim proceed.
D. Claim Four
Turning now to claim four, Plaintiff says that John and Jane Doe medical staff and Warden
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Miners (SWACC) denied him constitutionally adequate medical care. 	(ECF No. 11, p. 19).
Deliberate 	indifference 	to 	an 	inmate’s 	serious 	medical 	needs 	violates 	the 	Eighth
Amendment. 	See Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000). 	Deliberate indifference
includes an objective and subjective component: “The plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he
suffered from objectively serious medical needs and (2) that prison officials actually knew of but
deliberately disregarded those needs.” 	Id. (quoting Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239
(8th Cir. 1997)) (cleaned up).
Here, Plaintiff’s medical claim does not pass the objective component. 	Under this prong,
“[a] medical need is objectively serious if it either has been ‘diagnosed by a physician as requiring
treatment’ or is ‘so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a
doctor’s attention.” 	Scott v. Benson, 742 F.3d 335, 340 (8th Cir. 2014). 	Courts “determine
whether an objectively serious medical need exists based on the attendant circumstances,
irrespective of what the officer believes the cause to be.” 	Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 965 (8th
Cir. 2016) (listing cases).
In this case, Plaintiff fails to describe any facts about his condition, whether, for example,
he had been receiving treatment for a UTI prior to his incarceration, or what (if any) symptoms he
was experiencing that would make it obvious to a layperson, such as a prison official, that he
required medical attention. 	Plaintiff’s claim four—alleging a failure to provide constitutionally
adequate medical care for his UTI—should therefore be dismissed.
E. Claim Five
Plaintiff asserts that on June 11, 2024, July 9, 2024, August 28, 2024, September 5, 2024,
and October 31, 2024, he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement when he
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was housed in segregation. 	Upon review, claim five appears to repeat many of the same factual
assertions Plaintiff alleges in claims one (1) through three (3) and six (6). 	Specifically, he again
claims that he was placed on lockdown for 24 hours each day without access to a shower, exercise,
or the phones. 	(ECF No. 11, p. 22). 	Plaintiff identifies Defendants DHC (Disciplinary Hearing
Committee), John and Jane Doe, and Warden Miners (SWACCC) as defendants in their individual
and official capacities.
As noted above, the claims against DHC should be dismissed without prejudice on
sovereign immunity grounds. 	With respect to the remaining defendants, Plaintiff fails to assert
how Defendant Miners or the John and Jane Doe defendants were personally involved in or
responsible for the conditions of segregation. 	While Plaintiff identifies “John and Jane Does” as
defendants to this claim, the factual basis for his claim includes no allegations about what each
John or Jane Doe defendant did (or failed to do) in violation of his constitutional rights. 	(ECF
No. 11, pp. 22-26). 	Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against Defendant Miners and the John
and Jane Does should therefore be dismissed.
Here, again, while Plaintiff also identifies the defendants in their official capacities, he
asserts no “ongoing violation of federal law.” 	See 281 Care Committee, 638 F.3d at 632.
Instead, Plaintiff requests relief for past violations. 	Accordingly, Plaintiff’s official capacity
claims for prospective, injunctive relief should similarly be dismissed.
F. 	Claim Six
Turning, finally, to claim six, Plaintiff identifies “Tina Hodge (SOD) staff/supervisor over
discipline and Warden Miners” as defendants in their individual and official capacities. 	(ECF No.
11, p. 27). 	With respect to this claim, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Hodge retaliated against
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him for filing lawsuits by placing him in lockdown on October 24, 2024. 	Id. 	Plaintiff says that
while he was in segregation, there were “ants and feces” in his cell. 	Id., p. 28.
Here, again, Plaintiff fails to assert any facts establishing that Defendant Miners was
personally involved in the decision to place him in segregation, or the conditions of segregation.
To the extent that Plaintiff claims that Defendant Miners failed to properly supervise or train
Defendant Hodge, Plaintiff has asserted no facts establishing that Defendant Miners was on notice
of Defendant Hodge’s purportedly unconstitutional conduct or that Defendant Hodge had engaged
in a pattern of similar unconstitutional conduct. 	Accordingly, Plaintiff’s individual capacity claim
against Defendant Miners should fail as a matter of law.
For the limited purposes of preservice review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), however,
this Court recommends that Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against Defendant Hodge for
purportedly retaliating against Plaintiff by placing him in lockdown on October 24, 2024, without
due process of law proceed.
This leaves Plaintiff’s official capacity claims. 	Recall that, with respect to these claims,
Plaintiff is only entitled to prospective, injunctive relief. 	Here, again, however, Plaintiff is
requesting relief for a past violation of his constitutional rights, he does not claim an ongoing
violation of his constitutional rights. 	Indeed, he does not assert that he remains subject to the
conditions of segregation. 	Plaintiff’s official capacity claims with respect to claim six, therefore,
should also be dismissed without prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, having reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this Court
recommends that:
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(1) Plaintiff’s claims against DHC be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
(2) Plaintiff’s official capacity claims for money damages be DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
(3) Plaintiff’s 	official 	capacity 	claim 	against 	Defendant 	Miners 	for 	the 	purportedly
unconstitutional conditions of SWACCC, specifically Plaintiff’s exposure to black mold,
asbestos, and a bug infestation (claim one) PROCEED.
(4) All other claims with respect to claim one be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
(5) Plaintiff’s individual capacity claim against Defendant Walker for placing him in
lockdown on June 7, 2024, without due process of law (claim two) PROCEED.
(6) Plaintiff’s individual capacity claim against Defendant Walker for retaliating against him
by placing him on lockdown on June 7, 2024, (claim two) PROCEED.
(7) All other claims with respect to claim two be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
(8) Plaintiff’s individual capacity claim against Defendant Dedmon for retaliating against
him by placing him on lockdown on August 24, 2024, (claim three), should PROCEED.
(9) Plaintiff’s individual capacity claim against Defendant Dedmon for placing him in
lockdown without due process of law on August 24, 2024, (claim three), should
PROCEED.
(10) 	Plaintiff’s claim four—alleging a failure to provide constitutional adequate medical
care—should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
(11) 	Plaintiff’s claim five—alleging that the conditions of his confinement while housed
in lockdown violated his constitutional rights—should be DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
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(12) 	Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Hodge in her individual capacity for retaliating
against him by placing him in segregation on October 24, 2024, without due process of law
(claim six) should PROCEED.
(13) 	All other claims with respect to claim six should be DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE, including Plaintiff’s official capacity claims and the claims against
Defendant Miners.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
DATED this 6th day of January 2025.
STATUS 	OF 	REFERRAL: 	Remains 	referred 	consistent 	with 	this 	Report 	and
Recommendation.
/s/ Christy Comstock
CHRISTY COMSTOCK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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