Mack v. Studdard et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION

MALCOLM CORNELIUS MACK PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 4:24-cv-04002-SOH-SGS

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER STUDDARD;

SHERIFF WAYNE EASLEY;

WARDEN JEFFIE WALKER;

LEAD NURSE KING; NURSE LISA;

NURSE LESLIE; JOHN DOE MEMBERS

OF THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE;

CAPTAIN ADAMS; and LT. GUTHRIE! DEFENDANTS

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 60). Defendants
Nurse King, Nurse Lisa, and Nurse Leslie (hereinafter “Medical Defendants”) Responded. (ECF
Nos. 67-69). Defendants Easley, Walker, Adams, and Guthrie (hereinafter “Miller County
Defendants”) responded. (ECF Nos.70-72). Plaintiff replied. (ECF Nos. 73, 74, 87, 91, 99).

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3) (2011), the Honorable Susan
O. Hickey, United States District Judge, referred the instant motion to the undersigned for the
purpose of making a Report and Recommendation. For the reasons stated herein, the Court
recommends Plaintiff’s Motion be denied but that multiple claims be dismissed for failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted or for other appropriate reasons.

' The Clerk of the Court is directed to change the spelling of Defendant Lt. Gunthrie on the docket
to Lt. Guthrie per his Answer. (ECF No. 15).

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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I. 	PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
Plaintiff filed his original Complaint along with a Motion to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”) on January 10, 2024. (ECF Nos. 1-2). Plaintiff was granted IFP status on the same day.
(ECF No. 3). 	Plaintiff then filed a Supplement to his original Complaint on January 23, 2024.
(ECF No. 6). On January 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 7).
The Court ordered the Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 7), served on all Defendants on
March 1, 2024. (ECF No. 8). The summons issued to Defendants Lead Nurse King, Nurse Leslie,
Nurse Lisa, and Officer Studdard were returned unexecuted on March 22, 2024. (ECF No. 10).
The Summons on Defendants Adams, Easley, Guthrie, and Walker (hereinafter collectively
“Miller County Defendants”) were returned executed on the same day. (ECF No. 11).
2 All parties in this action have filed Motions for Summary Judgment. Miller County Defendants
filed theirs first on April 11, 2025. (ECF Nos. 56-58). Plaintiff filed his, the instant Motion, on
April 14, 2025, (ECF No. 60-62), and Medical Defendants filed theirs on the same day, (ECF No.
63-65). The Court determined, after a review of all the parties’ pending Motions, that addressing
Plaintiff’s Motion first was the most efficient plan of action as analyzing the instant Motion moots
the need to separately analyze Medical Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. The instant
Motion for Summary Judgment record includes 639 pages not including the Defendants’ separate
Motions for Summary Judgment and supporting documents which they incorporated into their
Responses to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment by reference pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 10(c). 	Plaintiff states five claims in his Amended Complaint and Supplement
(ECF Nos. 7, 26), and there was an extensive pleadings practice surrounding all parties’ Motions
for Summary Judgment including responses, replies, sur-replies, supplements and more. For this
reason, the Court has endeavored to organize this Report and Recommendation in a way that
provides a procedural background including all separate motions for summary judgment and
responding documents even though the only Motion analyzed for recommendation herein is
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court found this full procedural history necessary
given the interrelated issues, incorporations, and references used by all parties in the separate
motions and responding documents. Finally, the Court has judiciously reviewed this voluminous
summary judgment record, and while the length of this Report and Recommendation may appear
otherwise, all the facts produced on this record are not included herein. 	If the Court found
summary judgment evidence proffered irrelevant to the claims at issue or properly before it, such
facts or testimony were omitted from the factual renditions below.
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Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend his Amended Complaint on April 3, 2024. (ECF No.
13). 	The Court granted this Motion and directed the Clerk to file the Motion to Amend as a
Supplement to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at ECF No. 7. (ECF No. 25). The Clerk did so,
and that Supplement was filed on May 16, 2025. (ECF No. 26). Miller County Defendants filed
their Answer on April 4, 2024. (ECF No. 15).
On April 11, 2024, the Court issued a second Service Order on Defendants Lead Nurse
King, Nurse Lisa, Nurse Leslie, and Officer Studdard ordering personal service on these
Defendants at addresses provided by Miller County Defendants. (ECF No. 16). On May 2, 2024,
the second summons issued to Defendant Studdard was also returned unexecuted. (ECF No. 18).
The Court entered an order on May 3, 2024, directing Plaintiff to provide additional service
information for Defendant Studdard. Plaintiff was advised in this Order that his failure to provide
additional service information would result in Defendant Studdard’s dismissal from this case.
(ECF No. 19). On May 7, 2024, the Court received an Amended Summons Returned Unexecuted
for Defendant Studdard. (ECF No. 21). In this Amended Return, the United States Marshal noted
he received a returned phone call from Defendant Studdard in which he provided his correct
address. Id. Accordingly, the Court issued a third Service Order directing personal service at the
correct address provided by Defendant Studdard himself. (ECF No. 22). On November 14, 2024,
the third Summons issued to Defendant Studdard was returned unexecuted. 	(ECF No. 38).
Plaintiff never provided additional service information for Defendant Studdard in response to the
Court’s May 3, 2024 Order. (ECF No. 19). Accordingly, Defendant Studdard was never properly
served in this matter.
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On May 7, 2024, the summons issued on Defendants King, Leslie, and Lisa (hereinafter
collectively “Medical Defendants”) were returned executed. (ECF No. 20). Medical Defendants
filed their Answer on May 15, 2024. (ECF No. 24).
After an extended and contested discovery period, Miller County Defendants filed their
Motion for Summary Judgment, Brief in Support, and Statement of Indisputable Facts. (ECF Nos.
56, 57, 58). 	On April 14, 2025, the Court ordered Plaintiff to respond to the Miller County
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 59). In this Order, Plaintiff was advised
of his obligations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 to respond. Id.
Also on April 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed his Motion for Summary Judgment, Brief in Support,
and Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. (ECF Nos. 60,61, 62). This Motion and Brief did
not include any attached summary judgment evidence or cite to any such evidence in the record.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s statement of facts was not verified or supported by any summary judgment
evidence. Therefore, the Court did not rely upon these facts unless such facts were asserted in one
of Plaintiff’s other pleadings which is properly supported pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(c).3
Also on April 14, 2024, Medical Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment,
Brief in Support, and Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. (ECF Nos. 63, 64, 65). Plaintiff
was also ordered to respond to this Motion as well. (ECF No. 66).
3 See Shanklin v. Fitzgerald, 397 F.3d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 2005) (“To be considered on summary
judgment, documents must be authenticated by and attached to an affidavit made on personal
knowledge setting forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence or a deposition that meets
the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 	Documents which do not meet those requirements
cannot be considered.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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On April 28, 2025, Medical Defendants filed a “Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’
Motion for Summary Judgment” along with a Brief in Support and “Response to Plaintiff’s
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts.” (ECF Nos. 67,68, 69).
On May 2, 2025, Miller County Defendants filed a “Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment” along with a Brief in Support and a “Response in Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts.” (ECF Nos. 70, 71, 72).
On May 5, 2025, Plaintiff called the Clerk’s Office to state he hand delivered his “Response
to Motion for Summary Judgment” to the “mail clerk” in the Texarkana Division. 	The docket
indicates the Texarkana Clerk’s Office was closed on May 5, 2025. The Court takes note that the
Texarkana Clerk’s Office is in the same building as the United States Postal Service, and no
documents were filed with the Court on May 5, 2025. 	Accordingly, the Court must presume
Plaintiff meant he hand delivered his Response to the United States Postal Service’s mail clerk in
his phone call.
On May 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Plaintiff’s Statement regarding
Defendants’ Failure to Provide Discovery (or Declaration in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment).” (ECF No. 73). As with his original Motion, his Declaration was unverified,
thus, the facts asserted in this first Declaration were also not considered by the Court herein unless
they were reasserted in another document on the record which is properly supported pursuant to
Rule 56(c).
Also on May 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts.” (ECF No. 74). There is no indication with this document whether it is in response
to one of Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment or whether it is a supplement to his own
Motion for Summary Judgment. Again, this document is unverified, and the facts alleged were
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not considered by the Court herein unless they were reasserted in another document on the record
which is properly supported pursuant to Rule 56(c).
On May 13, 2025, Medical Defendants filed a document titled “Reply in Support of its
Motion for Summary Judgment.” (ECF No. 75). Medical Defendants interpreted Plaintiff’s May
8, 2025 filing as a response to their Motion for Summary Judgment and filed this document in
reply.
On June 18, 2025, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause directing Plaintiff to show
cause why he failed to respond to either of the Court’s Orders directing he file responses to both
Defendants’ pending Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 82). Plaintiff responded to the
Court’s Order to Show Cause on June 23, 2025. (ECF No. 83). 	Plaintiff explained that he did
respond to the Court’s Orders by placing his Response in the mail on May 5, 2025, when he first
attempted hand delivery and the Clerk’s Office was closed. Id. 	The Court notes the document
filed closest in time to May 5, 2025, was not a response to either Defendants’ Motions for
Summary Judgment but a Declaration in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
(ECF No. 73).
On June 25, 2025, the Court entered an Order explaining to Plaintiff it did not receive any
responses to the two separate Motions for Summary Judgment filed by the Medical Defendants
and Miller County Defendants. 	Plaintiff was again ordered to send responses, and his deadline
was extended to July 9, 2025. (ECF No. 84).
On July 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed a document titled: “Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment.” (ECF No. 85). Additionally, in the document Plaintiff states it
is his “Response in opposition to the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 59
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and 66).” Id. Documents 59 and 66 are the Court’s Orders to respond to Miller County Defendants
and Medical Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment respectively.
On July 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File Plaintiff’s Reply out of Time.
(ECF No. 86). In this Motion, Plaintiff requested leave to file his Reply to “Defendants’ Response
to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff also filed a document titled:
“Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendants’ Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment” on the same day. (ECF No. 87). The Court granted Plaintiff leave and will consider
his Reply as timely filed. (ECF No. 98).
On July 14, 2025, Medical Defendants filed a document titled “Second Reply in Support
of its Motion for Summary Judgment.” 	(ECF No. 88). 	In this document, Medical Defendants
interpret Plaintiff’s Response on July 8, 2025 (ECF No. 85) as a “renewed Response to [Medical
Defendants’] Motion for Summary Judgment.” Id.
On July 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Leave to File Declaration out of Time.”
(ECF No. 89). This document does not indicate whether it is intended to support Plaintiff’s Motion
for Summary Judgment or his Response to Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment.
However, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to file this “Declaration,” and he did so on September
22, 2025. 	(ECF No. 99). 	In the Declaration it is clear it is in support of his own Motion for
Summary Judgment. Id. (hereinafter “Second Declaration”). This Declaration is properly verified
pursuant to Rule 56(c) and attaches 157 pages of exhibits in support of Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. The Court, therefore, relies upon this Second Declaration and its attached
summary judgment evidence herein.
On July 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply.” (ECF No. 90).
In this document, Plaintiff indicates this Sur-Reply is to Medical Defendants’ Second Reply in
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Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment at ECF No. 63. Id. Also on July 24, 2025, Plaintiff
filed his “Sur-Reply in Opposition to Medical Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment” but it
was docketed as a Response to Medical Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No.
91). The Court granted Plaintiff leave and considers his Sur-Reply as timely filed. (ECF No. 98).
Also on July 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a document titled: “Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition
to Defendants Summary Judgment.” 	(ECF No. 92). 	Plaintiff does not provide any document
numbers indicating which Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment this document responds.
On July 31, 2025, Medical Defendants filed a “Third Reply in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment.” (ECF No. 94). In this document, Medical Defendants interpret Plaintiff’s
filings at Documents 91 and 92 as his third and fourth responses to their Motion for Summary
Judgment.
Also on July 31, 2025, Medical Defendants filed a “Fourth Reply in Support of its Motion
for Summary Judgment.” (ECF No. 95).
On September 2, 2025, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Plaintiff’s third Response to
Medical Defendants Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.” (ECF No. 97).
Also on September 2, 2025, the Court entered an Order directing the Clerk to accept no
further filings from any party on the issue of summary judgment other than Plaintiff’s
supplemental declaration in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment. 	(ECF No. 98).
Plaintiff filed this Second Declaration on September 22, 2025. (ECF No. 99).
II. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
At all times relevant, Plaintiff was an inmate at the Miller County Detention Center
(“MCDC”) in Texarkana, Arkansas. (ECF No. 7). Plaintiff indicates in his Amended Complaint
he was a pretrial detainee during the time at issue. 	Id. at 2. 	Plaintiff’s Arrest-Booking Sheet
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indicates Plaintiff was booked into the MCDC on November 9, 2023, for a felony failure to appear.
Additionally, a warrant was served on Plaintiff, on December 29, 2023, at the MCDC for Second
Degree Battery. (ECF Nos. 68-1, p. 1; 58-2). Finally, in his Deposition taken by Miller County
Defendants,4 Plaintiff indicates he was a pretrial detainee at all times in issue here. (ECF No. 58-
6, p. 35). No Defendants dispute Plaintiff’s status as a pretrial detainee in their Responses. (ECF
Nos. 67, 70).
In his Amended Complaint and Supplement (ECF Nos. 7, 26),5 Plaintiff names as
Defendants: Correctional Officer Studdard; Sheriff Wayne Easley; Warden Jeffie Walker; Lead
Nurse King; Nurse Lisa; Nurse Leslie; Captain Adams; and Lieutenant Guthrie. (ECF No. 7). The
Court originally interpreted Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and Supplement to also name
unknown members of the Miller County Disciplinary Committee as a Defendant, however, after
reading Plaintiff’s Deposition it is clear he intended only to name the specific members of the
Disciplinary Committee, Captain Adams and Lieutenant Guthrie. 	Plaintiff explains in his
Deposition, there are no other unnamed Defendants in this matter. (ECF No. 58-6, pp. 4-5, 71,
100). Accordingly, the Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate John Does Members of the Disciplinary
Committee from the docket heading in this matter.
Plaintiff claims a total of five6 claims, specifically:
4 Both Miller County Defendants’ counsel and Medical Defendants counsel deposed Plaintiff on
separate days. Miller County Defendants attached their full deposition in support of their Motion
for Summary Judgment at ECF No. 58-6. Medical Defendants attached selected pages from their
deposition of Plaintiff to their Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at ECF No.
68-2.
5 The Court will not consider Plaintiff’s original Complaint (ECF No. 1) or his Supplement to the
original Complaint (ECF No. 6) as his Amended Complaint (ECF No. 7) superseded his original
complaint and supplements rending those documents without legal effect. In re Atlas Lines Inc.,
209 F.3d 1064, 1067 (8th Cir. 2000).
6 Plaintiff lists Claims One, Two, Three, Five, and Six in his Amended Complaint and Supplement
omitting a claim four. (ECF No. 7, 26).
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• 	In Claim One, Plaintiff alleges Officer Studdard, in both his individual and official
capacities, violated Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights through excessive force, on
December 4, 2023. 	Plaintiff also claims Officer Studdard violated the “Equal Rights
Protection Clause” with his actions on December 4, 2023. (ECF No. 7, p. 4).
• 	In Claim Two, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Easley and Walker violated his constitutional
rights through retaliation, his conditions of confinement, and miscellaneous allegations.
(ECF No. 7, p. 6). Plaintiff alleges this Claim Two against Defendants Easley and Walker
in both their individual and official capacities. Id.
• 	In his Claim Three, Plaintiff claims Defendants Nurse King, Nurse Lisa, and Nurse Leslie
violated his constitutional rights on December 4, 6, 8, and 12 of 2023 when they denied
him medical care for his broken finger. 	(ECF No. 7, p. 7). 	Plaintiff asserts this claim
against Medical Defendants in both their individual and official capacities. Id. at 8.
• 	In Claim Five, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Adams and Guthrie violated his Fifth
Amendment Due Process rights on December 4, 2023, by prolonging his disciplinary for
25 days without a hearing. (ECF No. 7, p. 12). Plaintiff alleges this Claim Five against
Defendants Adams, and Guthrie in both their individual and official capacities. Id. at 13.
• 	In Claim Six, Plaintiff alleges Miller County Defendants Easley and Walker violated his
Eighth Amendment rights through the conditions of his confinement in administrative
segregation. (ECF No. 26, p. 1). Plaintiff does not indicate whether he is alleging Claim
Six against Miller County Defendants Easley and Walker in their official or individual
capacities. Id.
The Court will reserve the specific facts from the summary judgment record related to
Plaintiff’s claims to each section below addressing such claim.
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III. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the record “shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “Once
a party moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with the
non-moving party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine
issue of material fact exists.” Nat’l Bank of Comm. v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir.
1999).
The non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. “They must show there is sufficient
evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor.” Nat’l Bank, 165 F.3d at 607. “A case founded
on speculation or suspicion is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 610.
“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the
record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts
for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380
(2007).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argues there are no material issues of fact
on his following claims: (1) excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (2) cruel and
unusual punishment based on conditions of confinement; (3) deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs; (4) violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (5) retaliation
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in violation of the First Amendment.7 (ECF No. 60). Plaintiff states his Brief and attached exhibits
prove the lack of any genuine dispute of fact. Id. However, as explained above in the procedural
background section, Plaintiff did not attach any exhibits to his Motion for Summary Judgment or
verify any of his statements of fact. Accordingly, the Court will not enumerate those statements
of fact here. 	However, Plaintiff submitted his Second Declaration in support of his Motion for
Summary Judgment containing 162 pages of attached exhibits and this Declaration is sworn under
penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746. (ECF No. 99). The Court will rely on this Second
Declaration along with Plaintiff’s verified Amended Complaint and Supplement for all factual
assertions and Plaintiff’s proffered summary judgment evidence.
Also in his Motion, Plaintiff specifically argues Defendants do not deny that Defendant
Studdard choked him and pushed him down the stairs resulting in serious injury to Plaintiff. (ECF
No. 61 p. 2). Further, Plaintiff argues this excessive force caused Plaintiff a “mucous tear” in his
knee and a blackened finger, but Defendants failed to provide him with any medical evaluation or
treatment. Id. at 2-3. Additionally, Plaintiff argues his lockdown for 141 days in administrative
segregation without proper hearing and unsanitary conditions violates his Eighth Amendment
rights. Id. at 3. Plaintiff also argues being held for 141 days in administrative segregation without
a proper hearing violates his Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 	Id. at 3-4.
Finally, Plaintiff argues he tried multiple times to file grievances on these issues and in response
Defendant Walker violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him with threats. Id.
at 4.
7 The Court notes Plaintiff has rearranged the order of his Claims in his Motion, but the Court will
retain the original labeling from Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and Supplement and will address
each claim in the order asserted and as labeled in the Amended Complaint and Supplement.
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Miller County Defendants responded arguing: (1) Plaintiff failed to present evidence that
Miller County Defendants violated Plaintiff’s Eighth, Fourteenth, and First Amendment rights; (2)
no named Defendant had personal involvement in the events complained of by Plaintiff; (3) Miller
County Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; (4) Miller County Defendants
are entitled to qualified immunity; and (5) Plaintiff has not sufficiently stated any official capacity
claims. (ECF No. 70).
Medical Defendants also responded arguing Plaintiff cannot present any evidence of
deliberate indifference by Medical Defendants. Instead, Plaintiff simply did not trust the judgment
of Medical Defendants and believed the medical care provided was not the correct care. (ECF No.
68).
Plaintiff replied with his Second Declaration arguing: (1) the excessive force inflicted on
Plaintiff by Defendant Studdard violated his Eighth Amendment rights; (2) the conditions of the
141 days of administrative segregation violated his constitutional rights; (3) the repeated denial of
medical care for his knee violated his constitutional rights; (4) Plaintiff’s Due Process rights were
violated by the administrative segregation because he did not receive a timely disciplinary hearing;
and (5) Defendant Walker’s threats were used to intimidate Plaintiff and deter him from exercising
his constitutional rights. (ECF No. 99).
The Court will address each of Plaintiff’s arguments in his Motion and Second Declaration
in turn, as well as, all Defendants arguments as they pertain to each of Plaintiff’s asserted claims
from his Amended Complaint and Supplement. The Court will not, however, address Plaintiff’s
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arguments in his Motion and Second Declaration regarding claims he did not assert in his Amended
Complaint and Supplement.8
A. 	Claim One – Excessive Force
In Plaintiff’s Claim One he asserts Defendant Studdard violated his Eighth Amendment
rights, on December 4, 2023, through “excessive force, severe pain, psychological, physical
suffering, emotional suffering, solitary confinement” and violated his Fourteenth Amendment
rights through the “Equal Rights Protection Clause.” (ECF No. 7, p. 4). Plaintiff alleges his claims
against Defendant Studdard in his individual and official capacities. Id. at 5. Plaintiff only alleges
his Claim One for excessive force against Officer Studdard. 	For his individual capacity claim,
Plaintiff specifically alleges:
On Dec. 4, 2023 in Max C Pod around 1030-11 am Officer Studdard removed me
from #9 cell. I asked him can he get my court documents notarized. He insisted
the don’t do them on Mondays. 	I simply asked him simply could he check. 	He
responded “OK Bubba.” 	I then asked him to never call me that, it is racist. 	I
proceeded to inform him in case he didn’t know. By simply telling him to ask other
Black Inmates in the Pod. Out of no where, he grabbed me by the back of my head
and pushed me down the 16 flights stairs with excessive force. 	As I kept my
balance to the end. Asking again not to put his hands on me. He grabbed me by
my collar, then punched me in my mouth busting my bottom lip. I had no choice
but to defend myself. After the altercation I helped him up. Once he got up, he
8 Parties may not assert new claims for the first time on summary judgment. See Hildreth v. City
of Des Moines, 773 Fed. App’x. 334, 335 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald and
Co., 382 F.3d 1312. 1315 (11th Cir. 2004)). Liberal pleading does not require that, at summary
judgment stage, defendants must infer all possible claims that could arise out of facts set forth in
the complaint.” Gilmour, 382 F.3d at 1315. Here, Plaintiff filed his original Complaint (ECF No.
1), a Supplement to his original Complaint, (ECF No. 6), his Amended Complaint (ECF No. 7),
and finally his Supplement to his Amended Complaint (ECF No. 26). Plaintiff did not allege any
facts of a knee injury in any of these documents. 	Accordingly, the Court will not consider
Plaintiff’s attempted denial of medical care claim regarding his knee made for the first time in his
Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting documents. (ECF Nos. 60-62, 73, 74, 87, 91, 99).
The Court also will not address Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Easley for failure to train
employees first made in his Deposition taken by Miller County Defendants’ counsel. (ECF No.
58-6). 	Finally, the Court will not address Plaintiff’s retaliation claim as asserted against all
Defendants in his Motion for Summary Judgment when he only asserted it against Defendant
Easley and Walker in his Amended Complaint. (ECF Nos. 7, 60).
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choked me. He never requested to restrain me one time until we exited C-Pod. My
hands was in the air showing no sign of restrain. As we exit C-Pod he asked me to
get on the floor he wrapped me like a Rattlesnake in a Taekwondo Position choking
me to were I couldn’t breath.
(ECF No. 7, p. 4-5) (errors in original).
For his official capacity claim Plaintiff specifically alleges:
8th Amendment violation-excessive force, violation of inmate rights, negligent tort,
intentional tort, Equal Rights Protection Clause, By him using racial slurs against
me. 	Acting outside the scope of his authority. 	He could of killed me when he
pushed me down the stairs. He chipped the inside of my teeth. He choked to where
I couldn’t breath. Motivated by evil motives or intention.
(ECF No. 7, p. 5) (errors in original).
Where, as here, the Court authorizes a plaintiff to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915, Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the Court to order service on the
defendants by the United States Marshal Service (“USMS”). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). Pursuant
to Rule 4(m), however, “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed,
the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without
prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time . . . .” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 4(m). The Court must extend the period for service, moreover, “if the plaintiff shows
good cause for the failure” to serve. Id.
While Rule 4 requires the Court to order the USMS to effect service on the defendants
when a plaintiff is proceeding IFP, the plaintiff is ultimately responsible for providing the Court
with a proper address for service. See Mack v. Dillon, 594 F.3d 620, 622 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing
Rance v. Rocksolid Granit USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 1284, 1286-88, n.3 (11th Cir. 2009)); Lee v.
Armontrout, 991 F.2d 487, 489 (8th Cir. 1993).
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Plaintiff named Correctional Officer Studdard in his Amended Complaint on January 29,
2024. (ECF No. 7). In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff provided Defendant Studdard’s address
for service as Miller County Detention Center at 2300 East Street, Texarkana, AR 71854. (ECF
No. 7, p. 2). As Plaintiff proceeds IFP herein, on March 1, 2024, the Court Ordered Defendant
Studdard served at this address. (ECF No. 8). The summons was returned unexecuted on March
22, 2024, as Officer Studdard was no longer employed at the MCDC, and the last known address
of Defendant Studdard was provided to the Court by the Miller County Defendants. 	(ECF No.
10).
The Court then issued a Second Service Order for Defendant Studdard at the last known
address provided in the returned summons from Miller County. (ECF No. 16). This Second Order
provided for personal service of Defendant Studdard. 	Id. 	This summons was also returned
unexecuted on May 2, 2024. (ECF No. 18). This return included notes from the USMS indicating
three unsuccessful attempts to find and serve Defendant Studdard. Id.
On May 3, 2025, the Court issued an Order directing Plaintiff to provide more information
to serve Defendant Studdard. (ECF No. 19). Plaintiff was advised that it was his responsibility to
provide the Court with an address for proper service and that two summons were previously
returned unexecuted. Plaintiff was given until May 24, 2024, to provide the Court with an accurate
address for service on Defendant Studdard. 	Plaintiff was also advised if he failed to do so,
Defendant Studdard would be dismissed from this case. 	Id. 	Plaintiff never responded to this
Order.
On May 7, 2024, the Court received an Amended Summons Returned Unexecuted from
the USMS for Defendant Studdard. (ECF No. 21). 	This summons indicated the USMS finally
received a return phone call from Defendant Studdard, and he provided his correct address. Id.
Accordingly, the Court, on May 9, 2024, issued a third Service Order directing personal service
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on Defendant Studdard at the address he provided to the USMS. (ECF No. 22). On November
14, 2024, the Court received this summons returned unexecuted. 	The Marshall noted on the
summons the address provided by Defendant Studdard does not exist and Defendant Studdard
would not return any of the Marshall’s phone calls. (ECF No. 38).
Despite three Service Orders and multiple attempts at service by the USMS on Defendant
Studdard, this Defendant has never been successfully served with summons in this matter. 	All
addresses provided by Plaintiff, Miller County Defendants, and even Defendant Studdard himself
have proven incorrect. Plaintiff was informed in the Court’s May 3, 2024 Order that Defendant
Studdard would be dismissed from this case if Plaintiff could not provide an accurate address for
service, and more than 90 days have elapsed since the Amended Complaint was filed.
Accordingly, the Court recommends Correctional Officer Studdard, be dismissed without
prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) and all claims against him be dismissed
without prejudice at this time. Therefore, the Court need not address Plaintiff’s Claim One herein
as it was only asserted against Officer Studdard.
B. 	Claim Two – Retaliation and Miscellaneous Assertions
In Claim Two, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Easley and Walker violated his constitutional
rights through “conditions of confinement, Targeting, Threatening, Ignoring my Request &
Grievances, Correctional Officers harassing, Equal Rights Protection Clause, Ignoring or failing
to react to a widespread health or safety problem.” 	(ECF No. 7, p. 6). 	Plaintiff alleges these
violations began on December 4, 2023, and are “still going.” Id. Plaintiff specifically alleges:
Every Since this Altercation I requested to speak to with Sheriff Easley, I even
written him. I still haven’t received a response. I’ve been placed on Administration
Segregation since Dec 4, 2023. Placed in the hole with Protective Custody inmates
and disciplinary inmates. 	I’ve been stopped from writing Requests & Grievance
forms twice once on the Dec. 16, 2023 and Jan 10, 2024. 	I’ve advised them
numerous of times “I fear for my life.” On December 7, 2023 around 2:35 to 2:37
pm WARDEN WALKER threaten me about pushing in front of her office. 	She
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even deleted potions out of the video and submitted it to the Prosecutor. Then when
I went to court she advised the Prosecutor not to release me because there pursuing
charges on December 12, 2023. Psychologically having me completely depressed
and stressed being on 23/1 lockdown since December 4 still going. I was supposed
to go home. Haven’t had clean clothes for 2 weeks. Max E cell 011 & 013 doesn’t
have panic button in rooms. Placing me on Ad Seg.
(ECF No. 7, p. 6) (errors in original). Plaintiff alleges this Claim Two against Defendants Easley
and Walker in both their individual and official capacities. For his official capacity claim, Plaintiff
states:
Violation of 13 Amendment – I feel Im being treated as a slave. 	Violation of 8
Amendment – failing to investigate the altercation. 	Ignoring my Grievances, by
not letting me exhaust my remedies. Keeping me on cuff restriction placing me on
a chart in R&D like Im a dangerous person. 	Threatening me with Free -World
charges. Equal Rights Protection Clause violation of 14th Amendment Cruel and
Unusual Punishment.
(ECF No. 7, p. 7) (errors in original).
1. 	Summary Judgment Evidence
In his Motion, Plaintiff frames his Claim Two as a retaliation claim against all Defendants.
(ECF No. 60). The Court finds Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts within his Amended Complaint at
Claim Two to be framed as a retaliation claim against Defendants Walker and Easley even if he
did not specifically identify it as such in his Amended Complaint.9 (ECF No. 7, p. 6).
Miller County Defendants generally argue: (1) they had no personal involvement in the
claims alleged by Plaintiff; (2) even assuming Plaintiff’s allegations are true they do not assert a
cognizable constitutional violation; (3) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; and (4)
Plaintiff has failed to state an official capacity claim upon which relief may be granted. (ECF No.
9 As Plaintiff has a separate claim for conditions of confinement at Claim Six the Court will analyze
any conditions of confinement allegations made in Claim Two under Claim Six below. However,
the Court will not expand Plaintiff’s Claim Two to be asserted against all Defendants as he argues
in his Motion. Footnote 6, supra at p. 14.
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71). For support of their Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Miller County
Defendants incorporate by reference all the exhibits they attached to their own Motion for
Summary Judgment at ECF No. 58, but do not cite to any specifically. 	Next, Miller County
Defendants deny Plaintiff’s allegation in his statements of fact that Defendant Walker threatened
him on December 7, 2023, by saying: “Im going to make sure you get charges pressed on you”
and warning him “to stop with your shenanigans” for filing grievances. 	(ECF Nos. 62, 72).
However, even considering all the exhibits attached to Miller County Defendants Motion for
Summary Judgment, Miller County Defendants failed to produce any summary judgment evidence
to support this denial. (ECF Nos. 56-58; 70-72). Defendant Walker does not speak to Plaintiff’s
threat allegation in her Affidavit and does not deny, in her Affidavit, that she threatened Plaintiff.
(ECF No. 58-1).
No other exhibits attached to Miller County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
were cited in response to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. However, Plaintiff’s Deposition, attached
to Miller County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and incorporated in Miller County
Defendants’ Response, does include pertinent testimony from Plaintiff regarding his retaliation
claim against Defendant Walker. Miller County Defendants’ counsel questioned Plaintiff multiple
times during the Deposition regarding the facts surrounding his retaliation claim. First, Plaintiff
testified that Warden Walker “threatened me three days after” and told Plaintiff if he did not “quit
that Bubba shenanigan” she would make sure he got charges pressed against him. (ECF No. 58-
6, p. 63). Defense counsel then asked Plaintiff what he understood Warden Walker to mean, and
Plaintiff testified: “I was going to get additional charges from what I was actually in there for, and
she did it.” Id. Defense counsel then asked: “And what you mean, they pressed charges against
you for assaulting Officer Studdard?” and Plaintiff responded: “Right, and he assaulted me.” Id.
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at 64. Defense counsel then asked Plaintiff what type of charges and he responded it was criminal
charges, specifically, second degree battery. Id. at 64-65. Plaintiff went on to testify the charges
were dropped on “March 1st .” Id. at 65. Finally, in this line of questioning, defense counsel asked
Plaintiff if the nature of his claim against Defendant Easley and Walker was that Defendant Walker
told him she was going to press charges on him and she ultimately did. 	Plaintiff responded:
“Right.” Defense counsel then asked: “it seems like they believed what you had was a violation
of the law, and there was a difference of opinion about that; is that right?” Plaintiff responded:
“Correct.” 	Defense counsel asked: “You had a defense of self-defense that you had planned to
assert?” Plaintiff responded: “Yes, ma’am.” Id. at 69.
Later in the Deposition, defense counsel again asked Plaintiff why he was suing Defendant
Walker and Plaintiff responded again with “[b]ecause she threatened me. 	She was threatening
that’s why.” Id. at 89. Defense counsel then asked: “your claim against Warden Walker is because
she threatened to press charges against you?” 	Plaintiff responded: “correct.” 	Id. 	After some
discussion, defense counsel then asked: “Well, if she’s just informing you, hey Mack, we’re going
to be pressing charges for this incident?” 	Plaintiff responded: “Right.” 	Defense counsel then
asked: “It sounds like that’s kind of what happened?” Plaintiff responded: “Correct.” Id. at 91.
After 	Miller 	County 	Defendants 	filed 	their 	Response, 	Plaintiff 	filed 	his 	Second
Declaration. 	(ECF No. 99). 	In this Declaration, Plaintiff states: “After I filed grievances and
complaints regarding the unlawful treatment and conditions, I was threatened by Warden Jeffie
Walker. These threats were made to intimidate me and deter me from exercising my constitutional
rights to seek redress.” 	(ECF No. 99, p. 3). 	In support of this sworn statements, Plaintiff also
submitted copies of grievances and requests containing his handwritten notes indicating those
grievances that he believes show evidence of retaliation. 	This group of grievances included 18
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separate submissions through the MCDC grievance procedure. 	The Court need not enumerate
each one here because most of these grievances complain of alleged retaliation by either non-
parties, or Miller County Defendants Plaintiff did not assert a Retaliation claim against in his
Amended Complaint. However, there are two relevant grievances attached to Plaintiff’s Second
Declaration.10
The first is from December 8, 2023:
10 All highlighting and handwritten notations are contained in the original exhibits and presumed
by the Court to be Plaintiff’s notes and emphasis.
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(ECF No. 99-1, p. 83). 	On December 12, 2023, Plaintiff filed the second grievance regarding
Defendant Walker:
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(ECF No. 99-1, p. 85).
2. 	Retaliation Analysis
“To prevail on a § 1983 claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, [a
Plaintiff] must demonstrate (1) that he engaged in a protected activity; (2) that the government
official took adverse action against him that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from
continuing in the activity; and (3) that the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the
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exercise of the protected activity.” Santiago v. Blair, 707 F.3d 984, 991 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing
Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th Cir. 2004)).
In general, “[c]onduct that retaliates against the exercise of a constitutionally protected
right is actionable, even if the conduct would have been proper if motivated by a different reason.”
Cody v. Weber, 256 F.3d 764, 771 (8th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); Madewell v. Roberts, 909
F.2d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). “Indeed, the retaliatory conduct does not itself
need to be a constitutional violation in order to be actionable.” Id. See also Dixon v. Brown, 38
F.3d 379, 380 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[W]hen retaliatory conduct is involved, there is no independent
injury requirement.”).
a. 	Defendant Walker
Plaintiff adequately alleged he engaged in protected activity—filing grievances related to
the use of force incident with Officer Studdard—and Defendants do not dispute this allegation.
See Haynes v. Stephenson, 588 F.3d 1152, 1155-56 (8th Cir. 2009) (“The filing of a prison
grievance, like the filing of an inmate lawsuit, is protected First Amendment activity.”).
Then Plaintiff claims in his Amended Complaint that Defendant Walker threatened him
with pursing new criminal charges regarding the altercation with Officer Studdard, (ECF No. 7, p.
6), and he attached the cited grievances to his Second Declaration, providing additional facts
clarifying his claim that Defendant Walker threatened him with “new free world charges” related
to the force incident with Officer Studdard. 	(ECF No. 99-1, pp.83, 85). 	Moreover, Plaintiff
provided testimony in his sworn Second Declaration that clarifies Defendant Walker’s threats of
new charges came after Plaintiff filed grievances and were intended to deter Plaintiff from “seeking
redress.” (ECF No. 99, p. 3).
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“An inmate may maintain a cause of action for retaliatory discipline under [section 1983]
where a prison official files disciplinary charges in retaliation for an inmate’s exercise of
constitutional rights.” 	Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 829 (8th Cir 2008). 	However, the
inmate’s claim fails when the alleged retaliatory charge was issued for an actual rule violation or
crime. Id. Miller County Defendants may successfully defend against Plaintiff’s retaliation claim
by showing “some evidence” that Plaintiff actually committed the rule violation or crime. Id. at
829. “[A] report from a correctional officer, even if disputed by the inmate and supported by no
other evidence, legally suffices as some evidence upon which to base a prison disciplinary
violation, if the violation is found by an impartial decisionmaker.” Id. at 831 (internal quotations
omitted).
While Miller County Defendants attempted to deny Defendant Walker made any threats
against Plaintiff in their Response, they did not support this denial with any summary judgment
evidence. (ECF No. 72). Furthermore, as explained below in the Due Process Section,11 Miller
County Defendants failed to produce any summary judgment evidence regarding the altercation
with Officer Studdard, incident reports, disciplinary reports, or information on the battery charge
Plaintiff seemingly received as a result of the altercation. 	(ECF Nos. 56-58; 70-72). 	The only
Hartsfield-type summary judgment evidence to dispute Plaintiff’s retaliation claim comes from
Plaintiff’s own testimony in his deposition when Plaintiff agrees that Defendant Walker’s threats
of criminal charges may have simply been an informative statement letting Plaintiff know they
were pursuing criminal charges against Plaintiff for his role in the incident with Officer Studdard.
(ECF No. 58-6, pp. 90-91). The Court, however, is unable to make credibility determinations at
this juncture so it will not attempt a determination of whether Plaintiff’s deposition testimony or
11 Section D. infra at p. 42.
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Second Declaration testimony is more credible. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530
U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (explaining the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party and may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence as those are
jury functions). 	Furthermore, because the current summary judgment record is devoid of any
documentary evidence regarding the incident with Officer Studdard, Plaintiff’s disciplinaries, or
criminal charges, the Court cannot find Plaintiff’s Second Declaration testimony is of the type that
is blatantly contradicted by the record. Cf. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (a video on
the record blatantly contradicted the plaintiff’s version of events).
Accordingly, considering the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to
Defendant Walker, as it must on Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court finds a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant Walker’s threat was motivated, at least in
part, by an actual rule violation or criminal act. 	Thus, the claim should survive for further
litigation.
b. 	Defendant Easley
While Plaintiff failed to assert any arguments in his Motion or Second Declaration
regarding a retaliation claim against Defendant Easley, he did name Defendant Easley under Claim
Two in his Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 7, p. 6). However, Plaintiff has not asserted any facts
alleging Defendant Easley retaliated against him in anyway. 	To state a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, Plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law, and that the actor
violated a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,
48 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir.1999). 	Furthermore, Rule 8(a)
contains the general pleading rules and requires a complaint to present “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While the Court
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will liberally construe a pro se plaintiff’s complaint, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to
support his claims. See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff has failed to
do so here regarding any claim for retaliation against Defendant Easley.
Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Defendant Easley fails as
a matter of law and should be dismissed. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)
(A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”). As Plaintiff has had four opportunities to
state his claims against Defendant Easley, the Court finds this dismissal should be with prejudice.12
3. 	Plaintiff’s Miscellaneous Assertions in Claim Two
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff complains that Defendant Easley has not responded
to Plaintiff’s requests to speak with him. (ECF No. 7, p. 6). Then Plaintiff lists all the complaints
he seemingly wants to speak about with Defendant Easley. Id. As the parties did not argue these
miscellaneous claims on summary judgment, the Court will address them pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e (hereinafter “PLRA”). Pursuant to the PLRA, “The
court shall on its own motion . . . dismiss any action brought with respect to prison conditions
under section 1983 of this title . . . if the court is satisfied that the action . . . is frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(c)(1). 	A claim is frivolous if “it lacks
arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1998). An action is
malicious when the allegations are known to be false, or it is undertaken for the purpose of
harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather than to vindicate a cognizable right. Spencer
12 Plaintiff has filed an Original Complaint, Supplement to Original Complaint, Amended
Complaint and Supplement to Amended Complaint in this matter. (ECF Nos. 1, 6, 7, 26).
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v. Rhodes, 656 F.Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987); In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-4 (8th Cir.
1988). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). 	Section 1997e(c) is applicable throughout the life of a case and provides the
District Court with the authority to sua sponte dismiss at any time during litigation if it becomes
apparent that this dismissal provision has been satisfied. Beenick v. LeFebvre, 684 F.App’x. 200,
204 (3d Cir. 2017) (unpublished); see also Williams v. Cox, 3:20-CV-00070-JTR, 2022 WL
883026, at n. 8, *4 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 24, 2022) (dismissing inmate’s case at the summary judgment
stage under § 1997e(c)(1) and collecting cases supporting a District Court’s ability to do so sua
sponte).
a. 	Grievance procedures
“Inmates do not have a constitutionally protected right to a grievance procedure. Because
a . . . grievance procedure does not confer any substantive right upon prison inmates, a prison
official’s failure to comply with the . . . grievance procedure is not actionable under § 1983.”
Ashann–Ra v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 112 F.Supp.2d 559, 569 (W.D. Va. 2000) (citations
omitted); see also Lombolt v. Holder, 287 F.3d 683, 684 (8th Cir. 2002) (denial of grievances does
not state a substantive constitutional claim); Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993)
(“no constitutional right was violated by the defendants’ failure, if any, to process all of the
grievances [Plaintiff] submitted for consideration”); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994)
(inmates have no constitutional right to grievance procedure); Blagman v. White, 112 F. Supp.2d
534 (E.D. Va. 2000) (inmate has no constitutional entitlement to grievance procedure), aff’d, 3
Fed.App’x. 23 (4th Cir. 2001).
“Rather, prison inmates have a constitutional right to petition the government for redress
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through a right of access to the courts.” Blagman, 112 F.Supp.2d at 542 (citing Flick v. Alba, 932
F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991)). A jail’s “refusal to entertain such grievances does not compromise
the inmate’s constitutional rights, as access to the courts would still be available.” 	Id. (citation
omitted). Moreover, Plaintiff’s statement under Claim Two that Defendants Walker and Easley
failed to investigate the altercation also fails as a matter of law because “any alleged due process
violation arising from the alleged failure to investigate . . . grievances is indisputably meritless.”
Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 2005).
Accordingly, any claim Plaintiff attempts regarding Defendant Easley’s failure to respond
to his requests to speak with him are frivolous and should be dismissed with prejudice. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1998).
b. 	Equal Protection
Finally, Plaintiff lists “Equal Rights Protection Clause violation of 14th Amendment Cruel
and Unusual Punishment” in his Claim Two. 	(ECF No. 7, p. 6). 	To the extent Plaintiff is
attempting to allege his rights were violated pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause, this claim
also fails as a matter of law.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall
“deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. Amend
XIV, § 1. The purpose of the Equal Protection Clause “is to secure every person within the State’s
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination.” Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553
U.S. 591, 610 (2008) (quoting Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per
curiam)). Proof that discriminatory intent was a motivating factor is required to show a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. Arlington Heights v. Metro Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-
66 (1977).
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An equal protection claim may be established in two ways. The first requires a plaintiff to
“show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based
upon membership in a protected class.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976). If the
claims do not involve a protected class, a plaintiff can establish an equal protection “class of one”
claim by alleging that he “has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated
and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Olech, 528 U.S. at 564; see also
Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 558 F.3d 794, 798 (8th Cir. 2009). To prevail under this theory,
a plaintiff must show that (1) he or she is a member of an identifiable class; (2) he or she was
intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated; and (3) there is no rational basis for
the difference in treatment. Olech, 528 U.S. at 564.
While Plaintiff makes allegations related to racially motivated comments by Officer
Studdard related to his Claim One for excessive force, he does not allege that Defendant Easley
discriminated against him because he is a black male or treated him differently from any other
similar situated inmate at the MCDC. 	For the same reasons as explained above regarding the
retaliation claims against Defendant Easley,13 any attempted equal protection claims also fail as a
matter of law and should be dismissed with prejudice.14
c. 	Respondeat Superior
Furthermore, neither Defendant Easley nor Defendant Walker can be held liable for
Plaintiff’s claims in Claim Two simply because he is the Sheriff of Miller County and she is the
Warden of the MCDC.
13 Section B.2.b supra at p. 26.
14 The Court also notes Plaintiff testified in his Deposition that he only sued Defendant Walker for
her threats. (ECF No. 58-6, p. 89). Accordingly, the Court does not interpret any of Plaintiff’s
miscellaneous allegations in Claim Two to be asserted against Defendant Walker.
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A claim of deprivation of a constitutional right cannot be based on a respondeat superior
theory of liability. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 654, 694 (1978). “[A]
supervisor is not vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an employee’s unconstitutional
activity.” White v. Holmes, 21 F.3d 277, 280 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Keeper v. King, 130 F.3d
1309, 1314 (8th Cir. 1997) (“general responsibility for supervising the operations of a prison is
insufficient to establish the personal involvement required to support liability”). “Liability under
section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights. To
establish personal liability of the supervisory defendants, [Plaintiff] must allege specific facts of
personal involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a deprivation of his constitutional rights.”
Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mayorga v. Missouri, 442
F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006)); see also Kulow v. Nix, 28 F.3d 855, 859 (8th Cir. 1994) (“if any
claim of medical indifference . . . is to succeed, it must be brought against the individual directly
responsible for [Plaintiff’s] medical care.”).
Plaintiff has failed to allege any personal involvement of Defendant Easley in his claimed
retaliation or any of the other listed complaints under Claim Two. As stated above, Plaintiff simply
complains that Defendant Easley did not respond to his request to speak to him about the listed
complaints. (ECF No. 7, p. 6). That claim, as explained above fails as a matter of law.
Regarding Defendant Walker, Plaintiff did sufficiently allege specific facts regarding the
alleged retaliatory conduct by Defendant Walker, but he failed to allege any specific involvement
of Defendant Walker in his miscellaneous claims asserted under Claim Two.
Accordingly, neither Defendants Easley nor Walker may be liable under Section 1983
under a theory of respondeat superior for Plaintiff’s Claim Two. 	Plaintiff’s Claim Two for
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retaliation against Defendant Walker, in her individual capacity, as explained above, will survive
summary judgment and proceed for further litigation.
4. 	Official Capacity
The Court agrees with Miller County Defendants that Plaintiff’s official capacity claim in
Claim Two fails as a matter of law.
Official capacity claims are “functionally equivalent to a suit against the employing
governmental entity.” Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010). In
this case, Plaintiff’s official capacity claim against Defendant Walker is treated as a claim against
Miller County, Arkansas. See Murray v. Lene, 595 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 2010).
“[I]t is well established that a municipality [or county] cannot be held liable on a
respondeat superior theory, that is, solely because it employs a tortfeasor.” 	Atkinson v. City of
Mountain View, Mo., 709 F.3d 1201, 1214 (8th Cir. 2013). To establish Miller County’s liability
under section 1983, “plaintiff must show that a constitutional violation was committed pursuant to
an official custom, policy, or practice of the governmental entity.” Moyle v. Anderson, 571 F.3d
814, 817 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). 	Thus, Plaintiff’s official capacity claim against
Defendant Walker is “functionally equivalent” to alleging [their] employer, [Miller County,] had
“a policy, custom, or [took an] official action” that deprived him of his constitutional rights.
Veatch, 627 F.3d at 1257; Johnson v. Hamilton, 452 F.3d 967, 973 (8th Cir. 2006).
To establish a claim for “custom” liability, Plaintiff must demonstrate:
1) The existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional
misconduct by the governmental entity’s employees;
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2) Deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by the governmental
entity’s policymaking officials after notice to the official of that misconduct; and
3) That Plaintiff was injured by acts pursuant to the government entity’s custom, i.e., that
the custom was a moving force behind the constitutional violation.
Johnson v. Douglas County Medical Dept., 725 F.3d 825, 828 (8th Cir. 2013). “A single deviation
from a written, official policy does not prove a conflicting custom.” Id. at 828 (internal citation
omitted).
First, Plaintiff only repeats his individual capacity allegations against Defendant Walker
regarding retaliation in his official capacity claim: “Threatening me with Free -World charges.”
(ECF No. 7, p. 7). Plaintiff wholly failed to allege any facts or assertions that Defendant Walker’s
alleged retaliation was committed pursuant to an official custom, policy, or practice of the
governmental entity. Furthermore, he has not argued Defendant Walker’s alleged retaliation was
pursuant to a custom or liability of Miller County. Plaintiff did not add any allegations regarding
an official capacity claim for retaliation in his Motion or Second Declaration. (ECF Nos. 60-62,
99). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s official capacity retaliation claim against Defendant Walker fails as
a matter of law.
Next, as the Court finds all of Plaintiff’s miscellaneous claims and all his claims against
Defendant Easley in Claim Two, fail to state a cognizable constitutional violation, he cannot
maintain an official capacity claim based on the same facts. See McCoy v. City of Monticello, 411
F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 2005) (The Eighth Circuit has consistently recognized without an
underlying substantive constitutional violation against a defendant in their individual capacity, a
plaintiff cannot be successful on an official capacity claim against that defendant’s employer).
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Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state any official capacity claim in Claim Two and all
official capacity claims should be dismissed against both Defendants Easley and Walker with
prejudice.
C. 	Claim Three – Denial of Medical Care
In his Claim Three, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Nurse King, Nurse Lisa, and Nurse Leslie
violated his constitutional rights on December 4, 6, 8, and 12, 2023 when they denied him medical
care for his broken finger. (ECF No. 7, p. 7). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges:
I have placed Grievance & Request on my left ring finger has no feeling. I can’t
close it properly. 	My finger has turned black. 	Nurse King has come to my cell
then placed me back in my cell. He also denied me from seeing the Doctors twice.
He has not wrapped my finger up at all. Nurse Leslie tells me to shut up Dec. 1.
She tried popping my finger back into place, it doesn’t work. Nurse lisa comes by
my cell delivering medication for fellow inmates. She always tells me “Im gone
check on your finger” but never does. None of them has come and checked upon
my finger at all. The pain is still there and hasn’t went away.
(ECF No. 7, p. 8) (errors in original). 	For his official capacity claim against the Medical
Defendants, Plaintiff alleges:
Widespread practice – my finger is not working Medical Negligence, I should of
gotten a cat scan on my head from being punched. I also should of got my lungs
checked out. Denied of seeing the Doctor twice.
(ECF No. 7, p. 8) (errors in original).
1. 	Summary Judgment Evidence
Plaintiff argues in his Motion, he suffered a “blackened finger,” presumably during the
excessive force incident, yet Medical Defendants failed to provide any medical evaluation or
treatment, and this failure satisfies both the subjective and objective prongs of deliberate
indifference. 	(ECF No. 61, p. 3). 	Plaintiff, however, did not present any factual evidence to
support this argument in his Motion.
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Medical Defendants argue in their Response to Plaintiff’s Motion, that they were not
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s finger injury. 	Specifically, Medical Defendants produce
summary judgment evidence indicating Plaintiff was evaluated in the infirmary directly following
the excessive force incident.15 	(ECF No. 65-1, p. 1). 	During this evaluation Plaintiff only
complained of a busted lip and denied any other injuries or pain at that time. Id. Plaintiff then
wrote a grievance regarding his finger on December 7, 2023. (ECF No. 65-1, p. 2). Defendant
King evaluated Plaintiff’s finger at Plaintiff’s cell, on December 7, 2023, and ordered an x-ray of
the finger. (ECF No. 65-1, p.3). Plaintiff received an x-ray of his finger on the same day, which
found “no acute fracture or dislocation.” (ECF No. 65-1, p. 4).
Next, on December 10, 2023, Plaintiff filed a request for medical assistance claiming his
finger was turning black. (ECF No. 65-1, p. 5). Plaintiff was seen on the same day in the infirmary
by Defendant Leslie who observed: “Patient continues to complain of finger pain since incident.
Patient states that finger is turning black. 	No discoloration noted. 	States he has no feeling to
finger, capillary refill <2 seconds.” (ECF No. 65-1, pp. 6-7). On December 11, 2023, Plaintiff
was placed on Ibuprofen 800MG twice a day for 30 days. (ECF No. 65-1, p. 9). On December
12, 2023, Plaintiff requested a different pain medication and Medical Defendants King and
Davidson responded switching Plaintiff to Tylenol 1000MG twice a day. (ECF No. 65-1, p. 10).
On December 12, 2023, Plaintiff submitted another complaint his finger was still hurting.
Medical Defendant King responded on December 18, 2023, that Plaintiff had declined his pain
medication the last five times it was offered to him. (ECF No. 65-1, p. 11). On December 13,
2023, Plaintiff sent another Medical Request complaining of finger pain. Medical Defendant King
15 Medical Defendants reference and incorporate in their Response all exhibits produced in
connection with their own Motion for Summary Judgment at ECF Nos. 63-65.
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responded noting Plaintiff had refused his pain medication the “last couple of days, including this
morning.” (ECF No. 65-1, p. 12).
In his deposition, Plaintiff did not deny he declined his pain medication, but explained he
did so because he did not trust the medical staff at the MCDC. (ECF No. 8-2, p. 11-14). Plaintiff
also sent a medical request asking the prescribed pain medication stopped on December 15, 2023.
(ECF No. 65-1, p. 14). 	Specifically, Plaintiff stated in this request: “please stop bringing me
medicine that’s not helping me. I need to go to the doctor my finger is broken.” Id.
Plaintiff did not file another medical request or grievance regarding his finger until
February 1, 2024, when he stated his finger was hurting worse. 	(ECF No. 65-1, p. 16).
Specifically, Plaintiff states:
i need to go to the doctor my finger is hurting even worst now. I wake up in middle
of the night in pain. and hell na’ll i don’t want pain pills. Something is tore in my
finger like a ligament i cant make a fist still 2 months later. i keep telling the nurses
when they serve meds but they never do anything about it. i need to go to the
hospital and get an exam done.
(ECF No. 65-1, p. 16) (errors in original). 	In response to this medical request the nursing staff
examined Plaintiff and obtained a doctor’s order to x-ray Plaintiff’s hand a second time. 	(ECF
No. 65-1, pp. 17). The second x-ray was conducted on February 16, 2024, and indicated: “1. No
acute radiographic abnormality of the left hand. 	No fracture, dislocation, boney erosion or
periostitis. 2. No significant join space narrowing.” (ECF No. 56-1, p. 19).
On February 25, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a greivance stating:
Nurse Leslie is so unprofessional at the extreme high. She does not know how to
assist inmates regarding to injuries. I’ve been telling her for 3 months my finger
doesnt work at all. It must be some torn legiments in or something because i cant
make a fist with my left hand. She wants to issue out medicine thats not gonna help
me at all. Which ill be paying for nothing.
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(ECF No. 65-1, p. 27) (errors in original). The medical department responded to this grievance on
February 27, 2024, stating Plaintiff was seen on February 26, 2024. Id. The progress notes from
Plaintiff’s February 25, 2024 visit to the infirmary stated: Plaintiff became hostile and stated he
needed to go to the hospital for testing. Plaintiff was returned to his pod after becoming hostile to
medical staff. (ECF No. 65-1, p. 26).
On March 1, 2024, the MCDC nurse practitioner, a nonparty, ordered Plaintiff to be seen
by orthopedic specialist for his left ring finger. (ECF No. 65-1, p. 22). Medical Defendant King
then attempted to schedule Plaintiff an MRI at Wadley Hospital and Collom and Carney Clinic
with no success. Neither would accept a referral for Plaintiff. (ECF No. 65-1, pp. 32-36).
Plaintiff testified in his deposition that the only treatment that would have satisfied him
was a transfer to another facility for treatment and evaluation. (ECF No. 68-2, pp. 21-22). Plaintiff
also admitted he refused to take the pain medication prescribed. 	(ECF No. 68-2, p. 24).
Additionally, Plaintiff admitted he was seen by the MCDC doctor and received an orthopedic
referral for his finger. (ECF No. 68-2, pp. 26-28). Finally, Plaintiff testified he has not had any
treatment of his finger since being discharged from the MCDC. (ECF No. 68-2, pp. 29-33).
Plaintiff also testified that all his written medical requests and grievance related to his
finger injury were responded to and addressed, but it was his verbal requests to the jailers and
nurses that were not addressed in a timely manner. (ECF No. 68-2, p. 33).
According to his Arrest-Booking sheet, Plaintiff was released from the MCDC on March
25, 2024, on a three-year probation sentence. (ECF No. 58-2).
In Plaintiff’s Second Declaration, filed in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment,
after the Medical Defendants filed their Response with the above summary judgment evidence,
Plaintiff only made denial of medical care arguments and factual allegations related to his knee
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injury. 	(ECF No. 99, pp. 2-3). 	As explained above in footnote 8, Plaintiff’s knee injury is not
properly before this Court. 	Additionally, Plaintiff attached 157 pages worth of exhibits to his
Second Declaration, however, none of these exhibits contradict the material facts presented by
Medical Defendants in their Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No.
99-1). Accordingly, the Court finds all the above enumerated material facts undisputed.
2. 	Denial of Medical Care Analysis
In prisoner litigation, courts in the Eighth Circuit analyze denial of medical care claims
under the deliberate indifference standard of the Eighth Amendment regardless of Plaintiff’s status
as a pretrial detainee or convicted inmate. See e.g., Morris v. Cradduck, 954 F.3d 1055, 1058 (8th
Cir. 2020) (pretrial detainee has the same rights to medical care under the Due Process Clause as
an inmate has under the Eighth Amendment). 	The Court therefore examines Plaintiff’s claims
under the Eighth Amendment's deliberate indifference standard. Id.
To succeed on this type of claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he had an objectively
serious medical need, and (2) that the Defendant actually knew of, but deliberately disregarded,
that serious medical need. See Ivey v. Audrain Cty., Mo., 968 F.3d 845, 848 (8th Cir. 2020). “A
serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, or one
that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention.” Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted).
“To demonstrate that a defendant actually knew of, but deliberately disregarded, a serious medical
need, the plaintiff must establish a mental state akin to criminal recklessness: disregarding a known
risk to the [detainee’s] health.” 	Barton v. Taber, 908 F.3d 1119, 1124 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal
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quotations and citations omitted). 	The Eighth Circuit has stated that this “onerous standard
requires a showing more than negligence, more than even gross negligence, but less than
purposefully causing or knowingly bringing about a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate.”
Thompson v. King, 730 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
As enumerated above, the summary judgment record here, taken in the light most favorable
to Medical Defendants, clearly indicates Plaintiff was not denied medical care for his finger.
Instead, based on the record before the Court, it is clear Plaintiff simply disagrees with the medical
treatment he was provided.
It is well settled that “[i]nmates have no constitutional right to receive a particular or
requested course of treatment, and prison doctors remain free to exercise their independent medical
judgment.” 	Dulany v. Carnaham, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997). 	Additionally, mere
disagreement with the treatment provided cannot support a finding of deliberate indifference. Jolly
v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000). 	Instead, the Plaintiff must show the Medical
Defendant’s actions were “so inappropriate as to evidence intentional maltreatment or a refusal to
provide essential care.” Dulany, 132 F.3d at 1241. Plaintiff has failed to do so here. Plaintiff was
evaluated and provided his first x-ray of his finger on the same day he first complained of pain in
his finger. (ECF No. 65-1, pp. 2, 4). The x-ray indicated the finger was not broken. (ECF No.
65-1, p. 4). Plaintiff was then prescribed pain medication to treat the pain in his finger, (ECF No.
65-1, p.9), and when he requested a different type of pain medication that was also prescribed,
(ECF No. 65-1, p. 10). Plaintiff merely disagrees with the particular treatment and evaluation he
was provided—x-ray and pain medication. As Plaintiff explained in his deposition, he believed
only a specialist outside of the MCDC could treat him, and he refused his prescribed pain
medication. (ECF No. 68-2, pp. 21-22, 24).
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Furthermore, the Constitution does not require detention facilities to provide “perfect, the
best obtainable, or even very good” medical care; rather, it requires the provision of adequate
medical care. 	Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1510 (11th Cir. 1991); see also Johnson v.
Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1013 (7th Cir. 2006) (not entitled to best medical care). “Because society
does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health care,’ [a]s long as [the
deliberate indifference threshold] is not crossed . . . doctors remain free to exercise their
independent medical judgment.’” Dulany, 132 F.3d at 1239 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 9 (1992)).
The decision to provide Plaintiff with Ibuprofen and Tylenol and wait to refer to an
orthopedic specialist was an exercise in medical judgment which the Court will not second guess.
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976).
Even after Plaintiff refused the prescribed pain medication, Medical Defendants continued
to treat him through a second x-ray and a referral to an orthopedic specialist. Which is the exact
treatment, Plaintiff requested. 	Leaving the Court to consider Plaintiff’s claim only to be a
disagreement with the initial treatment, and a delay of the referral to the orthopedic specialist.
However, there is no evidence that failing to receive the orthopedic evaluation earlier was
detrimental to Plaintiff. 	See Laughlin v. Schriro, 430 F.3d 927, 929 (8th Cir. 2005) (When an
inmate alleges a delay in medical treatment, “the objective seriousness of the deprivation should
also be measured by the effect of delay in treatment. To establish this effect, the inmate must place
verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of delay”). See also
Jenkins v. Cty. of Hennepin, Minn., 557 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Constitution does not
require jailers to handle every medical complaint as quickly as each inmate might wish.”). Plaintiff
was released from the MCDC on March 25, 2024, (ECF No. 58-2), over a year before he filed this
Motion giving him ample time to visit the orthopedic specialist in the free world. Yet, he did not
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produce any verifying medical evidence establishing a detrimental effect of the Medical
Defendants delay in obtaining a referral to an orthopedic specialist for his finger.
Lastly, to the extent Plaintiff’s argument is that the Medical Defendants committed
malpractice by not providing the specific treatment he requested, this argument fails to establish a
constitutional violation. See Crooks v. Nix, 872 F.2d 800, 805 (8th Cir.1989) (citing Estelle, 429
U.S. at 104, 97 S. Ct. 285 (“plaintiff, to make a cognizable § 1983 claim, must allege more than
medical malpractice; a prisoner must allege a constitutional violation of ‘deliberate indifference to
a serious medical need’”)
Accordingly, based on the summary judgment record, the Court finds there are no genuine
issue of material facts as to whether the Medical Defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to
Plaintiff’s serious medical needs related to his finger, and based on these undisputed facts Plaintiff
has failed to state a cognizable claim for denial of medical care against any Medical Defendants.
Therefore, claim should be dismissed with prejudice.
As to Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory allegations he should have received a cat scan of his
head and had his lung checked in his Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 7, p. 8), the Court finds
Plaintiff’s claims fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and such claims should also
be dismissed.16 Plaintiff failed to allege any facts to indicate he suffered an objectively serious
medical need related to his head or his lungs. 	Furthermore, he failed to allege any Defendants
knew of but disregarded any serious medical need. 	See Ivey, 968 F.3d at 848. 	Accordingly,
Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to meet either prong of the deliberate indifference standard
related to his head and lung assertions and such claims should be dismissed with prejudice.
16 The Court considered the law enumerated for failure to state a plausible claim as enumerated at
Section B.2.b supra at p. 26.
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3. 	Official Capacity
Plaintiff also asserts an official capacity claim against Medical Defendants based on the
denial of medical care regarding his finger, head, and lungs. However, as the Court finds Plaintiff’s
denial of medical care claim fails to state a cognizable constitutional violation, he cannot maintain
an official capacity claim based on the same facts. See McCoy v. City of Monticello, 411 F.3d 920,
922 (8th Cir. 2005) (The Eighth Circuit has consistently recognized without an underlying
substantive constitutional violation against a defendant in their individual capacity, a plaintiff
cannot be successful on an official capacity claim against that defendant’s employer).
Accordingly, all Medical Defendants, in both their individual and official capacities,
should be dismissed with prejudice from this litigation.
D. 	Claim Five – Due Process
In Claim Five,17 Plaintiff alleges Miller County Defendants Adams and Guthrie violated
his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights on December 4, 2023, by prolonging his disciplinary
sanction for 25 days without a hearing. (ECF No. 7, p. 12). Specifically, Plaintiff states:
I received a disciplinary from Hall and Gunderson on December 5, 2023 around
9:30 in Max E-Pod. 	The Disciplinary Committee has prolonged my case for 25
days. Not giving me a solution for my in-house case. No 1 has even came to talk
to me. I asked numerous of times. I even been threatened if I asked to speak to
anyone about this, I will be wrote up. Today, Capt. Adams told an officer to tell
me not to mention anything about the Protective Custody Inmates an he’ll dismiss
the disciplinary Inmates Rights & Procedure Section G-1003 says a hearing must
be held at a reasonable time. Capt. Adams told me today “Im not about to lose my
Job for you.” Then laughed in my face. They want me to lie with them I got written
up last week for disobeying staff orders. 	Which I never did because Officer
Edwards was trying to figure out what happened. I was explaining to him how they
house me with Inmates Im not suppose to. He explained that to Capt. Adams at the
disciplinary hearing, that I never did nothin. 	Capt. Adams still gave me the
disciplinary. Because I advise him I felt he wasn’t doing his job. Told other officers
I should of not mention the wrong inmate housing he would of just gave me 15
days. 	My point to him Capt. Adams is you’ll placed me on 23/1 lockdown for
17 The Court reiterates there is no Claim Four in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint or Supplement.
(ECF Nos. 7, 26).
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defending myself. 	Which I’ve been on since December 4, 2023-still going. 	He
basically acknowledge like it was okay for the guard to push me down the stairs by
stating “when he pushed you down the stairs, you shouldn’t of grabbed his shirt.” .
. . .
(ECF No. 7, pp. 12-13) (errors in original). Plaintiff alleges this Claim Five against Defendants
Adams and Guthrie in both their individual and official capacities. 	Id. at 13. 	For his official
capacity claim Plaintiff asserts these Defendants violated his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights,
Equal Right Protection rights, and ignored or failed to react to a widespread health or safety
problem of targeting. Id.
1. 	Summary Judgment Evidence
In his Motion, Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on his Claim Five for Due Process
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF No. 61, pp. 3-4). Specifically, Plaintiff argues the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees due process before liberty interest are infringed.
Incarcerated individuals are entitled to some kind of hearing before being placed in
prolonged segregation . . . Plaintiff was held in segregation for 141 days without a
timely hearing, in direct violations of due process protections. Defendants admitted
this fact through their failure to properly deny the allegations.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Defendants Adams and Guthrie specifically argue Plaintiff’s housing in administrative
segregation was not punitive under facility rules, therefore, he was not entitled to a disciplinary
hearing. (ECF No. 71, p. 4, 6). Alternatively, Miller County Defendants argue they are entitled
to qualified immunity for any due process claims because the right to a disciplinary hearing for
nonpunitive segregation was not clearly established at the time in issue. Id. at 6.18
18 Miller County Defendants also deny Plaintiff’s statement of fact that he never received a
disciplinary hearing in their response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts. 	(ECF No. 72, p. 2).
However, Miller County Defendants do not reference any summary judgment evidence in support
of this denial. 	Id. 	Further, this denial seems in direct contradiction with their argument, that
Plaintiff was not entitled to a disciplinary hearing and that is why he never received one. (ECF
No. 71, pp. 4, 6)
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Then, in Plaintiff’s Second Declaration, filed after Miller County Defendants’ Response,
Plaintiff argues he was placed in administrative segregation without receiving a fair or timely
disciplinary hearing and the prolonged confinement and lack of procedural safeguards deprived
him of liberty in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF No. 99, p. 3). Plaintiff attached
the MCDC Inmate Handbook to his Second Declaration and in this Handbook the MCDC’s
Disciplinary Procedures are enumerated:
(ECF No. 99-1, p. 53). Additionally, Plaintiff produced the MCDC’s Inmate Rules and Discipline
SOP 06.01 which reads in pertinent part:
. . .
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2. LEVELS OF RULE VIOLATIONS
a. There are four levels of Rule Violations:

1) Minor infractions: a violation or rules of such a nature that no disciplinary report
is necessary, loss of some privileges for up to 10 days;

2) Minor violations: any rule violation that goes beyond corrective effectiveness of
a verbal warning but would not warrant maximum sanctions: Loss of some or all
privileges for up to 15 days may be incurred.

3) Major violations: any rule violation of such magnitude that disciplinary action
may include loss of good time and/or disciplinary confinement up to 30 days per
incident in Disciplinary Segregation.

4) Major violations: any rule violation of an even greater magnitude that
Disciplinary action may include loss of good time and/or disciplinary
Confinement up to 60 days in Disciplinary Segregation.

b. In the case of MINOR INFRACTIONS, the Corrections Officer may elect to
verbally counsel the inappropriate behavior and note it on the incident report. The
report shall be placed in the inmate's file. However, the Correctional Officer may
elect to initiate a Disciplinary Report for any incident other than a minor infraction

and willful minor infractions. The Correctional Officer shall remember that
facility order and security must be maintained, and act accordingly.

¢. In response to minor infractions, a Correctional Officer may Impose informal
disciplinary sanctions such as the loss of an Inmate privilage for a short
duration (a.g. video visitation, telephone and voluntary lockdown In room).
All such actions shall ba documented as an 8-hour lockdown In the inmate's
comment section In Crime Star,

d. Restriction of an inmate to his or her cell for informal discipline shall be

limited to 8 hours and shall terminate at shift change. Any informal
discipline shall be notated in the inmate's comment section In Crime Star.

®. No inmate shall be the subject of informal discipline more than twice in any
seven-day period. (If the inmate commits another infraction within the 7
days, then a report shall be written, and disciplinary action shall be taken.)

f. Inmates on informal discipline shall receive the same food, clothing exchange and
television as any other inmate in the housing area.

q. Informal discipline does not require supervisor review or approval, nor does
it allow for an appeals process.

45

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3. DISCIPLINARY REPORTS
1, When a violation of Facility Rules Is alleged to have taken place the employea(s)
who witnessed the alleged violation shall prepare a disciplinary report, The

disciplinary report shall be completed and forwarded to the Detention Facility
Captain or designee (shift supervisor), The Report must contain at a minimum:

1) Date and time of violation:

2) Place of violation;

3) Date reported:

4) Specific Rute(s) violated:

5) Details of the incident; (tell a story of how it happened}
6) Actions taken by staff;

T) Names of witnesses (as security allows).

b, The Detention Facility Captain or designee (shift supervisor) shall cause an
investigation to be conducted of the alleged violation(s), with a written report

forwarded to the disciplinary committee. The investigation report shall contain ata
furunmiunn:

1) Statements obtained from witnesses or a signed form from witness(s) refusing
to make statement;

2) Charging employees account of the Incident:
3) Accused inmate’s account of the incident:

4) Response to Incident Report, if applicable.

4. PRE-HEARING ACTIONS

a. At the discretion of the shift supervisor or higher authority, the accused inmate
may be placed in Administrative Segregation for the purpose of maintaining
facility security and order, Such Administrative Segregation shall be noted on
the Investigation Report, and the inmate's pre-hearing status shall be
reviewed by classification, within 72 hours, excluding weekends and
holidays.

b. An inmate charged with a rule violation shall receive a written statement of

the charge(s}, including a description of the incident and specific rules
violated, at least 24 hours In advance of the Disciplinary Hearing.

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¢, The Correctional Officer shall document that the notification of charge(s) was
delivered. Such documentation shall be forwarded to the Disciplinary Committee
chairperson and shall become part of the Disciplinary Hearing Record.

d. The Disciplinary Committee chairperson shall be required to ensure that the
accused inmate properly understands the charges against him/her and the
possible disciplinary action that may result from the disciplinary hearing.

@, The Disciplinary Hearing may be held within 24 hours after the inmate is
formally notified of the charges, with the inmate's written consent. Such
written consent shall become part of the Disciplinary Hearing Record.

f. The accused inmate shall be present at the Disciplinary Hearing, unless the right
is waived in writing, or due to disruptive and/or unmanageable behavior on the
part of the inmate which threatens security, Inmates may be excluded during
testimony of any person whose testimony must be given in confidence. The
reasons for the accused inmate's absence or exclusion shall be documented and
made part of the Disciplinary Hearing Record.

§. DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS
a. The Disciplinary Hearing should be scheduled within (7) working days of the
incident, excluding weekends and holidays. If extenuating circumstances exist,
the hearing time may be extended to (10) working days of the incident,
excluding weekends and holidays. Examples of extenuating circumstances may
include but not be limited to the following:
1) Preparation of defense by the accused

2} Illness or other unavailability of the accused and/or witness(es) for medical
reasons

3) Further investigation of relevant factual matters
4) Unacceptable or unmanageable behavior on the part of the accused

§) Pending criminal court prosecution of the accused, conflicting dates

7. ADMINISTRATIVE/DISCIPLINARY SEGREGATION

a. Inmates may be placed in non-punitive confinement for security and safety
reasons of as prescribed by medical personnel. All such confinement shall be
considered administrative and not disciplinary in nature. IT 1S NOT TO BE
REFERRED TO AS ‘THE HOLE’,

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48
(ECF No. 99-1, pp. 58-65).19
Plaintiff also attached the MCDC’s Prohibited Acts and Disciplinary Sanctions SOP 06.02
which states: “The following list of rules and sanctions ensure fair and consistent inmate treatment
regarding rules violations and prescribed penalties . . . .” (ECF No. 99-1, p. 68). A list then follows
of many different rule violations and the corresponding maximum disciplinary days or sanctions.
The applicable rule violations listed include:
19 The Court omitted any irrelevant text from this policy and procedure and noted such omissions
with ellipses.
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(ECF No. 99-1, p. 68).
In Plaintiff’s Deposition, taken by Miller County Defendants’ counsel, Plaintiff testified
that his placement in administrative segregation was a direct punishment for the altercation with
Officer Studdard and that he received not only a written disciplinary notice for his actions but also
a criminal second degree battery charge from Miller County Prosecutor which was later dropped.
(ECF No. 58-6, pp. 46-47, 64-65). He also testified he was never afforded a disciplinary hearing
pursuant to MCDC policy and procedure or federal law. Id.
Notably, nowhere in the summary judgment record is any disciplinary documents, officer
incident reports, or documentation on criminal charges related to the altercation with Officer
Studdard, nor is there any housing records for Plaintiff before or after the altercation.20
Plaintiff did, however, attach his grievances regarding his housing at the MCDC along with
the Miller County Defendants’ responses to such grievances.
20 One exception to this is a single Management Status Record offered by Plaintiff indicating
Plaintiff was housed in “R&D H3” from February 21, 2024 to February 22, 2024, on suicide watch.
(ECF No. 99-1, p. 156).
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On December 13, 2023, Plaintiff files a Greivance specifically mentioning he signed for
an “in house case:”
(ECF No. 99-1, p. 86)21. Then on the same day Plaintiff asked why he cannot appeal any of his
cases, and Defendant Adams responded almost a month later stating Plaintiff had no disciplinary
cases:
21 All highlighting and handwritten notes on these grievances are presumably Plaintiff’s notations
as they are included in the original documents attached to Plaintiff’s Second Declaration.
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(ECF No. 99-1, p. 88). Plaintiff made the same request on December 14, 2025, and he received
the same response from Defendant Adams. Id. at 90.
On December 16, 2023, Plaintiff filed a grievance alleging cruel and unusual punishment,
and the response indicated his housing was based on his behavior:
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(ECF No. 99-1, p. 94). On December 31, 2023, when Plaintiff complained he still had not received
a disciplinary hearing the grievance was initially closed without a response but then reopened with
Plaintiff’s appeal. The response to the appeal indicated the Disciplinary Committee would review
Plaintiff’s appeal:
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(ECF No. 99-1, p. 96). On the same day, Plaintiff filed another grievance regarding his housing:
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(ECF No. 99-1, p. 97). On January 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding the conditions of
his confinement in administrative segregation and the response again indicated his housing
assignment was based on his behavior:
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(ECF No. 99-1, p. 99). Plaintiff next complains about being on lockdown on January 7, 2024, and
Defendant Adams responds telling Plaintiff he is on “cuff restriction” but has all his privileges:
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(ECF No. 99-1, p. 101). On January 10, 2024, Plaintiff complains his solitary confinement is a
violation of his due process rights:
(ECF No. 99-1, p. 102). Plaintiff again challenges his cell placement on January 12, 2024:
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(ECF No. 99-1, p. 103). Finally, on February 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed a grievance questioning his
cellmates and indicating his own confusion regarding his housing status. 	Defendant Guthrie
responded clarifying that Plaintiff was also serving disciplinary time:
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(ECF No. 99-1, p. 113).
2. 	Due Process Analysis
It is undisputed here that Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee during the time at issue. (ECF
No. 58-6, pp. 33-35). 	Pretrial detainees are presumed innocent and cannot be punished for the
crime for which they have been charged. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-37 (1979). “[T]he
effective management of the detention facility once the individual is confined is a valid objective
that may justify the imposition of conditions and restrictions of pretrial detention and dispel any
inference that such restrictions are intended as punishment.” Id. at 540. Conditions or restrictions
that are “reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective” such as institutional order and
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security do not amount to punishment. Id. at 539; see also Brown-El v. Delo, 969 F.2d 644, 647
(8th Cir. 1992) (“We do not quarrel with the prison’s need to segregate individual inmates from
the general prison population for non-punitive reasons; for example . . . where there is a threat to
the safety and security of the institution”). “Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish by
the prison officials, whether an inmate is segregated for ‘punitive’ reasons or for administrative
purposes generally will turn on whether the detention is reasonably related to a legitimate
government objective.” Brown, 969 F.2d at 648.
If the conditions or restrictions are deemed punishment, the pretrial detainee is entitled to
due process. When a detainee “is deprived of privileges or placed in a special confinement status
in order to punish him for past misconduct, then due process requires some kind of hearing
beforehand.” Brown-El, 969 F.2d at 647. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-66 (1974),
the Supreme Court held that pretrial detainees are entitled to an impartial due process hearing on
disciplinary matters. 	See also Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 830 (8th Cir. 2008). 	These
procedures include written notice of the charges, a brief period to prepare, a written statement of
the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action, and the ability for the inmate to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence. Id.; see also Dible v. Scholl, 506 F.3d 1106, 1110
(8th Cir. 2007).
While the Court agrees with the Miller County Defendants that the law does not require a
due process hearing for nonpunitive segregation, Brown-El v. Delo, 969 F.2d at 647, the issue of
whether Plaintiff’s placement here was punitive is a genuine issue of material fact. As evidenced
from the enumerated summary judgment evidence, the record is replete with conflicting
indications of Plaintiff’s housing status during the time at issue. 	Plaintiff proffered sworn
testimony he was served with a disciplinary the day after the altercation with Officer Studdard and
being placed in segregation. 	(ECF No. 58-6, pp. 46-47, 64-65). 	Additionally, the MCDC
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employee responses on Plaintiff’s grievances indicate conflicting indications of whether Plaintiff
was serving disciplinary time or was simply in administrative segregation for nonpunitive
purposes. (ECF No. 99-1, pp. 88, 94, 96, 99, 102-103, 113).
Furthermore, the summary judgment record is completely devoid of any proffered
nonpunitive reason Plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation. 	The MCDC Policy and
Procedure states that all placements in administrative segregation shall be fully documented. (ECF
No. 99-1, pp. 58-65). The Court finds the absences of this summary judgment evidence notable
as documentation of Plaintiff’s housing, should have been kept in his jail file according to MCDC’s
stated Policy and Procedures. The Court is not in the business of second guessing the management
or housing of the MCDC population as it relates to legitimate governmental objectives. However,
Miller County Defendants simply failed to proffer any summary judgment evidence to contradict
Plaintiff’s sworn testimony that he was given a disciplinary for the altercation with Officer
Studdard and placed in segregation based on this disciplinary. Moreover, some of the responses
of the MCDC employees to Plaintiff’s grievances indicate his housing status was the result of his
recent behavior or that he was serving disciplinary time.
Finally, Miller County Defendants’ argue they were not personally involved in any of
Plaintiff’s claimed of violations. 	However, Plaintiff testified in his Deposition: (1) it was
Defendants Adams and Guthrie that oversaw the Disciplinary Committee and disciplinary
hearings; (2) Defendant Guthrie that sent Plaintiff the disciplinary notice he received; and
(3) Defendant Adams that held his disciplinary notice on his desk instead of providing him a
hearing. 	(58-6, pp. 46-48, 71). 	Furthermore, Defendant Adams and Guthrie both responded to
Plaintiff’s grievances regarding his housing status. (ECF No. 99-1, pp. 88, 96, 101-02, 113). The
Court finds this sufficient to show Defendant Adams and Guthrie’s personal involvement in
Plaintiff’s due process claims.
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Despite Miller County Defendants failure to adequately support their argument in response
to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, it remains Plaintiff’s burden, as the moving party, to
prove that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Nat’l Bank of Comm., 165 F.3d at 607. Plaintiff
has failed to do so here. The summary judgment evidence currently before the Court prevents a
judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s Claim Five. The grievances on the summary judgment
record alone clearly show a genuine issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff was serving disciplinary
time or was simply on administrative segregation for a nonpunitive reason.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Claim Five should be denied
and Claim Five for violation of his due process rights, as asserted against Defendants Adams and
Guthrie, in their individual capacity claims, should proceed for further litigation.22
3. 	Official Capacity
The Court agrees with Miller County Defendants arguments that Plaintiff’s official
capacity claim in Claim Five fails as a matter of law.23
Here, Plaintiff only offers a vague and conclusory statement that Defendant Adams and
Guthrie violated his rights in their official capacities by stating in his Amended Complaint: “5 th
Amendment Due Process, Equal Right Protection, Ignoring or failing to react to a widespread
health or safety problem, targeting.” (ECF No. 7, p. 13). In his Second Declaration, Plaintiff does
not offer any further arguments or factual assertions regarding any policy or custom of the MCDC
that violated his due process rights. (ECF No. 99). Finally, in his Motion for Summary Judgment
22 The Court notes Defendant’s argument in their Response regarding qualified immunity.
However, 	the 	Court 	will 	defer 	its 	analysis 	on 	qualified 	immunity 	to 	its 	Report 	and
Recommendation on Miller County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment issued on even
date.
23 The Court applies the same law as enumerated in the retaliation analysis above. 	See Section
B.4. supra at pp. 31-32.
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Plaintiff also wholly fails to allege any facts or arguments as to a policy, procedure, or custom of
the MCDC that violated his due process rights. (ECF No. 61). Instead, the MCDC official policy
on the record indicates if Plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation for disciplinary
purposes, he should have been provided with a disciplinary hearing in compliance with due process
jurisprudence. (ECF No. 99-1, pp. 58-65). Plaintiff has failed to state any specific facts to show
anything beyond a single deviation from the written official policy in his case, and one deviation
is insufficient to state custom liability. See Johnson, 725 F.3d at 828.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state an official capacity claim in his Claim Five and
any official capacity claims asserted against Defendants Adams and Guthrie should be dismissed
with prejudice.24
E. 	Claim Six – Conditions of Confinement
In his Supplement to his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts a Claim Six for
unconstitutional conditions of confinement pursuant to the Eight Amendment against Defendants
Easley, Walker, and Adams. (ECF No. 26, p. 1). Specifically, Plaintiff states:
Since Dec 4, 2023 I’ve only had my clothes washed 3 times it is now March 10. I
literally have to hand wash my underwear and socks daily. 	My pants and shirts
hardly ever get washed. My room is nasty with extremely big roachs, water bugs,
and spiders such as Brown Luclus (deadly spiders). 	I ask several officers can I
clean my room. Officer Leamon told me and others that weren’t allowed to clean
our room. I even advised officers about the spiders. Capt. Adams has also denied
me of usage of the facility clippers several times. I haven’t cut my hair in months.
(ECF No. 26, p. 1). Plaintiff did not indicate whether he was alleging this Claim Six against these
Defendants in their individual or official capacities. 	Additionally, within Claim Two against
Defendants Easley and Walker Plaintiff alleges “widespread health or safety problem” and that he
24 The Court considered the law enumerated for failure to state a plausible claim as enumerated
at Section B.2.b supra at p. 26.
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has not had clean clothes for two weeks and the Max E cell does not have a panic button. (ECF
No. 7, p. 6). Finally, also within his Claim Two, Plaintiff complains of placement with protective
custody and disciplinary inmates. Id.
1. 	Summary Judgment Evidence
In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argues “cruel and unusual punishment”
based on conditions of confinement. 	(ECF No. 60, p.1). In his Brief in support of his Motion,
Plaintiff argues:
Plaintiff was subjected to 141 days of administrative segregation without proper
hearing, placed in unsanitary confinement, and exposed to unsafe housing with
protective custody inmates under 23-hour lockdown. These conditions rise to the
level under Hutton v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
(ECF No. 61, p. 3).
Miller County Defendants generally argue they had no personal involvement with the
events alleged by Plaintiff, they did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and they are entitled
to qualified immunity. However, Miller County Defendants did not specifically address Plaintiff’s
conditions of confinement claims in these arguments. (ECF Nos. 70-72). Additionally, as with
the previous arguments, Miller County Defendants did not cite to any specific summary judgment
evidence in support of their Response. Id.
In Plaintiffs Second Declaration, submitted in support of his Motion for Summary
Judgment but filed after Miller County Defendants’ Response, Plaintiff states under the heading
of “Cruel and Unusual Punishment/Solitary Confinement” that he was placed in solitary
confinement for 141 consecutive days. 	During this lockdown he claims he was locked down
twenty-three hours a day in unsanitary conditions including dirty clothing, filthy living quarters,
and inadequate hygiene. 	Additionally, Plaintiff claims he was placed in a cell with protective
custody inmates which created an unsafe condition for him. (ECF No. 99, p. 2).
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Plaintiff attached to his Second Declaration grievances related to his conditions of
confinement claims. First, Plaintiff filed a grievance on February 28, 2024, complaining about a
nonparty, Officer Hall, not allowing him to clean his cell or get his clothes washed:
(ECF No. 99-1, p. 126). 	Next, on March 10, 2024, Plaintiff filed a grievance complaining that
another nonparty, Officer Leamon, refused to have Plaintiff’s cell clean:
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(ECF No. 99-1, p. 127). Also on March 10, 2024, Plaintiff complains he has been asking to clean
his cell for several weeks, but he does not indicate which officer he asked for cleaning supplies:
(ECF No. 99-1, p. 128). Then on March 12 and 14, 2024, Plaintiff complains of the roaches and
ants in his cell:
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Case 4:24-cv-04002-SOH Document 100 Filed 01/28/26

Page 66 of 75 PagelD #:
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GRIEVANCE OFFICER - #18,983,755

From: MALCOLM MACK (631012635) Date Submitted:
Housing Area: Max-E (LD)

Assigned To: Guthrie J. (Lt.)
Result: None Selected

03/13/2024 12:55 PM
Date Received: 03/26/2024 12:34 PM
Status: CLOSED

Section: NIA

Request

There is a tremendous amount i eae meres ar <ccerg ene night i advised Officer hines
a rer aint gone do nothing

UL it, yesterday when i was sleep argach—

fore lunch, Can i please get moved from this cell im not even on
displanary anymore :

Response by Lt. J. Guthrie on 03/20/2024 at 3:37 PM

We appreciate your concern regarding sanitation. Please keep in mind that you are responsible for

the cleanliness of your area. We can assure you that adequate cleaning supplies are readily
available upon request from the unit officer.

Appeal by the Inmate on 03/21/2024 at 2:10 PM

0 1 has brougt me anything petaining to cleaning supplies yet I've been asking for over a month
or just move me back to the pod

Appeal response by Lt. J. Guthrie on 03/26/2024 at 12:35 PM

Designated inactive.

GRIEVANCE OFFICER - #19,006,830

From: MALCOLM MACK (631012655) Date Submitted:

03/14/2024 8:38 AM
Housing Area: Max-C

Date Received: 03/25/2024 10:10 AM

Assigned To: OFFICER G. (ADMIN) Status: CLOSED
Result: None Selected Section: NA
Request

There is roaches coming through my toilet in my room. I have ants steady coming through walls.
This is no sort of good conditions of a person to live in

Note by ADMIN G. OFFICER on 03/14/2024 at 10:18 AM

I have forwarded you request to the appropriate authority.

Response by Lt. J. Guthrie on 03/20/2024 at 3:38 PM

This is a duplicate request or the problem has already been addressed.

Appeal by the Inmate on 03/21/2024 at 2:02 PM
its a violation of my 8th amendment because this unsanitary

Appeal response by ADMIN G. OFFICER on 03/25/2024 at 10:10 AM
This is a duplicate request or the problem has already been addressed.

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(ECF No. 99-1, pp. 129-30).
On March 15, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a grievance regarding his laundry:
(ECF No. 99-1, p. 133).
In his Deposition taken by Miller County Defendants’ counsel, Plaintiff testified as to why
he believed Defendant Easley was responsible for his claims. Plaintiff testified he blamed him for
his housing in administrative segregation and “not practicing safety widespread” and not training
employees. (ECF No. 58-6, pp. 69, 84). Plaintiff testified Defendant Easley is responsible for his
claimed actions because he is the Sheriff of Miller County. 	Id. at 86. 	However, Plaintiff also
testified he never spoke with Defendant Easley and has never met him. Plaintiff’s contention is
that Defendant Easley knew of his complaints because Plaintiff sent grievances and letters to him.
Id. at 122. When asked about Defendant Walker, Plaintiff testified he only sued her for threatening
him. Id. at 89. Plaintiff also testified he did not get his laundry washed “all the time” and he never
had a haircut “the whole time I was in there.” (ECF No. 58-6, p. 131).
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2. 	Condition of Confinement Analysis
While Plaintiff references the Eighth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process clause is the appropriate constitutional right for his Claim Six. 	Under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “pretrial detainees . . . may [not] be punished . . . [T]his
prohibition against punishment encompasses conditions of confinement.” Karsjen v. Lourey, 988
F.3d 1047, 1052 (8th Cir. 2021) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). In Stearns v.
Inmate Servs. Corp., et al., 957 F.3d 902 (8th Cir. 2020), the Eighth Circuit clarified that, despite
some prior inconsistencies in the Eighth Circuit conditions of confinement jurisprudence, the
deliberate indifference standard of the Eighth Amendment did not apply to conditions of
confinement cases brought by pretrial detainees. Instead, the claims of pretrial detainees must be
analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment as set forth in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). In
Bell, the Court stated that “the proper inquiry is whether [the] conditions amount to punishment of
the detainee.” Id., 441 U.S. at 535. In short, the Eighth Circuit in Stearns stated, the Constitution
prohibits conditions for pretrial detainees that: (1) are intentionally punitive; (2) are not reasonably
related to a legitimate governmental purpose; or (3) are excessive to that stated purpose. Stearns,
957 F.3d at 907. Conditions of confinement that are reasonably related to a legitimate government
interest do not amount to punishment. 	Bell, 441 U.S. at 536-39. 	However, the Eighth Circuit
recently explained not all conditions during pretrial detention amount to punishment in the
constitutional sense. See Hall v. Higgins, 77 F.4th 1171, 1179 (8th Cir. 2023) (internal quotations
omitted). 	“In considering whether the conditions of pretrial detention are unconstitutionally
punitive, we review the totality of the circumstances of a pretrial detainee’s confinement.” Morris
v. Zefferi, 601 F.3d 805, 810 (8th Cir. 2010).
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a. 	Defendants Easley and Walker
Before the Court can consider the substance of Plaintiff’s condition of confinement claims
against Defendants Easley, Walker, and Adams, it must first determine whether Plaintiff has stated
a sufficient causal connection between these Defendants’ actions or inactions and his alleged
constitutional violations through his conditions of confinement. Miller County Defendants argue
Plaintiff has failed to allege any personal involvement by Miller County Defendants in his claims.
(ECF No. 71). The Court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient personal involvement
of Defendants Easley and Walker to state a sufficient section 1983 claim under Claim Six just as
it explained in the analysis in Claim Two.25
In his Supplement to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff only alleges he asked “several
officers” to clean his cell, a nonparty Officer Leamon advised Plaintiff he was not allowed to clean
his cell, and he advised “officers” about the spiders. 	(ECF No. 26, p. 1). 	Other than listing
Defendants Easley and Walker under the prompt of “Name each Defendant,” Plaintiff does not
make any allegations against Defendants Easley and Walker or reference them in anyway in his
Claim Six. Further, Plaintiff did not allege any facts related to Defendants Easley and Walker’s
actions or inactions in his Motion or Second Declaration past what he alleges is their supervisory
responsibilities as Sheriff and Warden. (ECF Nos. 60-62, 99). Finally, in the grievances attached
to his Second Declaration, Plaintiff speaks of only nonparty officers. Defendant Adams is the only
Defendant that responds to these grievances. (ECF Nos. 99-1, pp. 126-130, 133).
As previously explained, a claim of deprivation of a constitutional right cannot be based
on a respondeat superior theory of liability. 	See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. 	This same analysis
applies here to both Defendant Easley and Walker as Sheriff and Warden of the MCDC. Plaintiff
25 See Section B.3.c. supra at pp. 30-31.
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has failed to allege any facts in his Amended Complaint, Supplement, Motion for Summary
Judgment and supporting documents, or deposition testimony indicating Defendants Easley or
Walker had any personal involvement or responsibility for his complained of conditions of
confinement. “Liability under section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for,
the deprivation of rights. To establish personal liability of the supervisory defendants, [Plaintiff]
must allege specific facts of personal involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a deprivation of
his constitutional rights.” Clemmons, 477 F.3d at 967 (8th Cir. 2007).
Furthermore, a warden or sheriff’s general responsibility for supervising the operations of
a detention facility is insufficient to establish personal involvement in conditions inside the
detention facility. See Reynolds v. Dormier, 636 F.3d 976, 981 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotes
and citations omitted). 	Defendants Easley and Walker are not liable for the complained of
conditions simply because they are the Sheriff and Warden of the MCDC. See Mars v. Dumas,
2021 WL 5504750, at *3 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 5, 2021) (explaining personal capacity conditions of
confinement claim against the sheriff and captain of a facility because they regulate the conditions
of the facility must fail because section 1983 liability cannot rest on respondeat superior liability);
Clendening v. Roberson, 2022 WL 304704, at *2 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 14, 2022) (holding conditions
of confinement claims cannot stand against the sheriff of the county based on the assertion “it is
his jail”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claims made in both Claims Two and
Six against Defendants Easley and Walker fail as a matter of law and should be dismissed with
prejudice.
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b. 	Defendant Adams
Plaintiff does, however, specifically allege Defendant Adams denied him a haircut for four
months. 	(ECF No. 7, p. 13). 	As with most of Plaintiff’s specific arguments, Miller County
Defendants failed to respond with specific arguments or summary judgment evidence to this
particular claim. (ECF Nos. 56-58; 70-72). Plaintiff testified in his Deposition, taken by Miller
County Defendants’ counsel, that he “never had a haircut the whole time I was in there. I looked
like a cave man the whole time I was in there.” (ECF No. 58-6, p. 131). However, Plaintiff fails
to make any allegations or present any summary judgment evidence that Defendant Adams’ refusal
to allow him a haircut was punitive in nature. 	To state a condition of confinement claim upon
which relief can be granted, Plaintiff must state sufficient facts that the conditions he suffered—
denial of haircuts—were intentionally punitive. See Hall, 77 F.4th at 1179; see also Stearns, 957
F.3d at 907. The record is devoid of any such punitive intent regarding Defendant Adams’ denial
of haircuts. Additionally, the Court is unaware of any precedent providing a constitutional right
to haircuts on demand. See Meraz v. Mulvaney, 2025 WL 1195009, at *16 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 9,
2025).
Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Claim Six, as asserted against Defendant Adams,
also fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed with prejudice.26
26 The Court considered the law enumerated for failure to state a plausible claim as enumerated at
Section B.2.b supra at p. 26.
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3. 	Official Capacity
Whether Plaintiff has stated an official capacity claim for his conditions of confinement
must be analyzed separately.27 	As explained above, official capacity claims are “functionally
equivalent to a suit against the employing governmental entity,” Veatch, 627 F.3d at 1257, and
Plaintiff's official capacity claim against Defendants Easley, Walker, and Adams are treated as a
claim against Miller County. See Murray, 595 F.3d at 873. This means Plaintiff must point to
summary judgment evidence to show a policy or custom of Miller County contributed to his
claimed constitutional violation—unsafe conditions of confinement. 	Here, as argued by Miller
County Defendants, Plaintiff has failed to produce summary judgment evidence to indicate any of
Miller County’s policy caused Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement. 	Likewise, just as with
Plaintiff’s previous claims, the summary judgment record is devoid of any evidence to establish a
claim for “custom” liability pursuant to Johnson, 725 F.3d at 828. While Plaintiff used the word
“widespread” in his deposition and Amended Complaint, his statements were vague and
conclusory and did not offer any facts showing the existence of a continuing, widespread,
persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by any Defendant which caused Plaintiff’s
claimed conditions of confinement. 	(ECF Nos. 7, p. 13; 58-6, p. 116).28 	In order to establish
official capacity liability for a custom Plaintiff must present evidence showing a “pattern of
unconstitutional conduct . . . so pervasive and widespread [it has] . . . the effect and force of law.”
Hall, 77 F.4th at 1180 (internal quotes and citations omitted). Plaintiff has failed to present such
27 While Plaintiff did not indicate whether he was asserting Claim Six against the Miller County
Defendants Easley, Walker, and Adams in their individual or official capacities he did allege his
Claim Two against Defendants Walker and Ealey in both capacities. (ECF No. 7).
28 The Court notes Plaintiff gives some testimony regarding his belief that Sheriff Easley failed to
train the correctional officers at the MCDC causing his claimed unconstitutional conditions of
confinement, however, as explained above Plaintiff did not assert any such claim in his Amended
Complaint. (ECF No. 7).
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summary judgment evidence here. Plaintiff’s conclusory and bare allegations of widespread health
and safety issues is insufficient to state an official capacity claim. 	Id. 	Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
official capacity claim for conditions of confinement fails as a matter of law and should dismissed
with prejudice.29
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I hereby RECOMMEND Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 60) be DENIED and the following claims and Defendants be DISMISSED
or allowed to proceed as follows:
• 	Claim One for excessive force against Officer Studdard, in his individual and official
capacity, 	be 	DISMISSED 	WITHOUT 	PREJUDICE 	and 	Officer 	Studdard 	be
DISMISSED from this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m);
• 	Claim Two for retaliation against Defendant Walker, in her individual capacity, should
proceed for further litigation’
• 	Claim Two for retaliation against Defendant Walker, in her official capacities, be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
• 	Claim Two for retaliation against Defendant Easley, in his individual and official capacity,
be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
• 	All other miscellaneous claims in Claim Two against Defendants Walker and Easley, in
their individual and official capacities, be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
29 The Court considered the law enumerated for failure to state a plausible claim as enumerated
at Section B.2.b supra at p. 26.
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• 	Claim Three for denial of medical care against Defendants King, Leslie, and Lisa, in their
individual and official capacities, be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and Defendants
King, Leslie, and Lisa be DISMISSED from this action as no claims remain against them;
• 	Claim Five for violation of due process against Defendants Adams and Guthrie, in their
individual capacities, should proceed for further litigation;
• 	Claim Five for violation of due process against Defendants Adams and Guthrie, in their
official capacities, be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
• 	John Doe Disciplinary Committee be TERMINATED from the docket in this matter; and
• 	Claim Six for conditions of confinement against Defendants Easley, Walker, and Adams,
in their individual and official capacities, be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and
Defendant Easley be DISMISSED from this action as no claims remain against him.
This leaves only Defendants Walker, Adams and Guthrie, in their individual capacities
only, and Plaintiff’s Claim Two for retaliation against Defendant Walker in her individual capacity
only; and Claim Five as asserted against Defendants Adams and Guthrie for violation of Plaintiff’s
due process rights related to his placement in segregation for further litigation in this matter.
Additionally, the Court RECOMMENDS Medical Defendants Motion for Summary
Judgment at ECF No. 63 be DENIED as MOOT upon the adoption of this Report and
Recommendation as such adoption will dismiss all claims asserted against the Medical Defendants
and dismiss said Defendants from this case.
Referral Status: This case should remain referred at this time.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties are
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reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
DATED this 28th day of January 2026.
/s/ Spencer G. Singleton
HON. SPENCER G. SINGLETON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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