Lewis v. Hatley et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
DON EARL LEWIS 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 4:23-CV-04047-SOH-CDC
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER HATLEY
(Miller County Detention Center),
SHANE JOHNSON (Miller County Sheriff’s
Department),
JOHN OR JANE DOE (Medical Staff,
Wadley Medical Center),
WADLEY MEDICAL CENTER
NURSE DOE (Wadley Medical Center) and
TWO JOHN DOE MILLER COUNTY
DEPUTIES
DEFENDANTS
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to the provisions
of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Susan O. Hickey, Chief United States District
Judge, 	referred 	this 	case 	to 	the 	undersigned 	for 	the 	purpose 	of 	making 	a 	Report 	and
Recommendation.
The case is before the Court for preservice screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.0F
1
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to screen any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress
from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on April 24, 2023. (ECF No. 1). That same day, the Court
entered an Order provisionally filing the case and directing Plaintiff to file a completed in forma
pauperis (“IFP”) application. 	(ECF No. 4). 	Plaintiff was granted IFP status on June 6, 2023.
1 Enacted as part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).
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(ECF No. 6). The Court then entered an Order directing Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint
by June 27, 2023. 	(ECF No. 7). 	This Order was returned undeliverable on June 13, 2023,
indicating Plaintiff had been transferred from the Miller County Detention Center (“MCDC”) to
the Arkansas Division of Correction (“ADC”). (ECF No. 9). The Order was resent to the ADC
Ouachita River Unit. (Id.). On June 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed a notice of address change indicating
he was in the ADC Ouachita River Unit. (ECF No. 10). On June 30, 2023, the Court entered a
Show Cause Order directing Plaintiff to respond by July 21, 2023. (ECF No. 11). On July 5, 2023,
the docketed copy of the Notice of Address change sent to the ADC Ouachita River Unit was
returned undeliverable with a notation stating “East Arkansas Unit: (ECF No. 12). It was resent
to the ADC East Arkansas Regional Unit. (Id.). Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on July 6,
2023. (ECF No. 13). The return address indicated he was in the ADC East Arkansas Regional
Unit. On July 10, 2023, the Show Cause Order sent to the ADC Ouachita River Unit was resent
to the ADC East Arkansas Regional Unit.
For his first claim, Plaintiff alleges that on or about March 3, 2023, Miller County Deputies
Shane Johnson and Two John Does utilized excessive force against him and denied him medical
care. (ECF No. 13 at 5). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges he was sleeping and his housekeeper woke
him at 3:00am to tell him someone was trying to break into the house by way of her bedroom
window. (Id. at 5). (Id.). Plaintiff alleges he was heavily medicated and confined to his bed, and
his medical phone had been stolen by the robbers. (Id.). The Sheriff’s Department was called, as
he had been the victim of a robbery. When they arrived, Defendant Johnson assaulted him:
twisting my arm and pushing me into a wall, triggering my heart to start skipping a
beat. I tried to inform Deputy Johnson that I needed my nitro pills. Officer Johnson
advise me that the medical attention he had for me was take me to jail.
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(Id.). Plaintiff alleges he was refused medical treatment at his home. (Id. at 4). He was arrested
and taken to the Miller County Detention Center (“MCDC”). While in the booking area, he again
requested medical attention, but Defendant Johnson told MCDC staff that there was nothing wrong
with him medically. As a result, he was again refused medical treatment. (Id.). Plaintiff proceeds
against Johnson and the Doe Deputies in their official and individual capacities. (Id. at 5). As his
official capacity claim, he states MCDC has “no training with medical emergencies, the
widespread practice of no seeking a warrant, very poor supervision and tactic training.” (Id.).
For his second claim, Plaintiff alleges that on or about March 21, 2023, he was in a hospital
bed in the Emergency Room Intensive Care Unit of Wadley Medical Center “hooked to a number
of medical monitors and devices” and “fighting for my life.” (Id. at 6). Plaintiff was told he had
a heart attack “identified as a[trial] fibrillation.” (Id.). While he lay in the bed, Defendant Hatley
kicked his hospital bed repeatedly, which interfered with his medical data and kept triggering his
heart rate into the “danger zone.” Plaintiff believes Hatley was trying to kill him. (Id.). Unknown
medical staff were made aware of Hatley’s actions, but did nothing. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges Hatley
also took pictures of him while he was in the hospital. (Id.). Plaintiff proceeds against Hatley and
Wadley Medical Center and their medical staff in their official and individual capacities. (Id. at
5). 	As his official capacity claim, he states “employing individuals that was fired from other
agencies for bad conduct. 	Poor to no supervision and training.” 	The Court will infer that this
refers to Defendant Hatley and MCDC.
Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 9). He alleges his entire life
was “shut down” the night of his arrest. He was in the middle of two contracts and was unable to
complete them. He references title loans in process and equipment, and states that $2500 will have
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to be returned to the Hooks Texas Project. 	He owes his housekeeper $600. 	He states he also
suffered physical pain and suffering from all Defendants in the amount of $250,000 each. (Id.).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under § 1915A, the Court is obliged to screen the case prior to service of process being
issued. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are
frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be false, or
it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather than to
vindicate a cognizable right. 	Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987); In re
Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we
hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded . . . to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” 	Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). This means “that if the essence of an allegation is
discernable, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe
the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal
framework.” 	Jackson, 747 F.3d at 544 (cleaned up). 	However, the complaint must still allege
specific facts sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
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III. ANALYSIS
Based on Plaintiff’s allegations, the Wadley Medical Center and its staff were not state
actors. Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of
a citizen's “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United
States. In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant
acted under color of state law and violated a right secured by the Constitution. West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir. 1999). The deprivation must
be intentional; mere negligence will not suffice to state a claim for deprivation of a constitutional
right under § 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344
(1986).
In Montano v. Hedgepeth, 120 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 1997), the Eighth Circuit set forth the
analysis to be applied in determining whether state action exists for purposes of § 1983.
Specifically, the Court said:
In ascertaining the presence of state action, we must examine the record to
determine whether “the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right
[is] fairly attributable to the State.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,
937, 102 S. Ct. 2744, 2753, 73 L. Ed. 2d 482 (1982). Resolving this question entails
a journey down a particularly fact-bound path, see id. at 939, 102 S. Ct. at 2754-55,
but the Supreme Court has identified two legal touchstones to provide guidance
along the way. To begin with, there can be no “fair attribution” unless the alleged
constitutional violation was “caused by the exercise of some right or privilege
created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for
whom the State is responsible.” Id. at 937, 102 S. Ct. at 2753. Furthermore, “the
party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a
state actor. This may be because he is a state official, because he has acted together
with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is
otherwise chargeable to the State.” Id.; see also Roudybush v. Zabel, 813 F.2d 173,
176-77 (8th Cir. 1987) (repeating two-part test).
Montano, 120 F.3d at 848.
Here, Plaintiff’s only allegation against Wadley Medical Center is that some of its staff did
not make Defendant Hatley stop kicking his bed in the intensive care unit. 	Plaintiff does not
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indicate how long he was at the Wadley Medical Center on March 21, 2023, but only provides that
single day at the Center in his Complaint. Nothing in these allegations permits the inference that
the Wadley Medical Center or its staff were state actors.1F
2 	“[P]rivate conduct, no matter how
egregious, discriminatory, or harmful, is beyond the reach of § 1983.” 	Wickersham v. City of
Columbia, 481 F.3d 591, 597 (8th Cir. 2007). Further, mere negligence or medical malpractice is
insufficient to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234,
1239 (8th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). At most, Plaintiff’s allegation that the Defendants failed
to make Hatley stop kicking the hospital bed test states a claim for negligence. Thus, Plaintiff's
allegations against the Wadley Medical Center and its staff fails to state a plausible claim under §
1983 and is subject to dismissal.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is recommended that Wadley Medical Center, Nurse Doe and John or Jane
Doe Medical staff be terminated as Defendants in this case. 	It is further recommended that
Plaintiff’s claims against MCDC Defendants Hatley, Johnson, and Two John Doe Miller County
Deputies remain for service and further review.
The parties have fourteen days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation in
which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties are
2 A recent decision by the Eighth Circuit found that a private residential psychiatric hospital could be
considered a state actor when it provided medical care for juvenile in state custody at the request of the
state for a period of several months, the state division of juvenile services had sole discretion to choose
child's medical providers, the facility took complete day-to-day responsibility for every aspect of her care
under a medical treatment plan with division's input after her suicide attempt at state's youth correctional
center, and the facility had state employees involved in the child's treatment plan. Roberson v. Dakota Boys
& Girls Ranch, 42 F.4th 924 (8th Cir. 2022). Roberson is factually distinguishable from this case.
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reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
DATED this 31st day of July 2023.
/s/ Christy Comstock
HON. CHRISTY COMSTOCK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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