Smith v. Montgomery et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HARRISON DIVISION
WILLIAM E. SMITH 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 3:24-cv-03034-CDC
SHERIFF JOHN MONTGOMERY, Baxter
County, Arkansas; and DEPUTY JORDAN
IKARI 	DEFENDANTS
OPINION AND ORDER
This is a civil rights action filed by Plaintiff William E. Smith pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. 	Currently before the Court is the Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 78) filed by Defendants John Montgomery and Jordan Ikari. The
Court has also reviewed their Brief in Support (ECF No. 79) and Statement of Indisputable
Material Facts (ECF No. 80), as well as Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition (ECF No. 88). For the
reasons given below, Defendants’ Motion will be GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on July 29, 2024. His operative complaint alleges that on July
13, 2024, Defendant Deputy Jordan Ikari used excessive force when arresting him, breaking his
face and nose. See ECF No. 21, pp. 4–5. Plaintiff further claims that after he was taken to the
Baxter County Detention Center (“BCDC”), he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of
confinement and deprived of appropriate medical care for his injuries. See id. at 6–7. Additionally,
Plaintiff claims that while he was at the BCDC, his access to legal mail, legal research, and to the
courts was interfered with. See id. at 7. Finally, Plaintiff also claims that when he was arrested,
two individuals at the residence where he was arrested stole his social security disability and EBT
cards, and that subsequently no investigation or prosecution of this theft was undertaken. See id.
Case 3:24-cv-03034-CDC Document 94 Filed 01/20/26 Page 1 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
at 9–10. 	Plaintiff brought this lawsuit against Defendant Ikari, as well as Defendants Baxter
County Sheriff John Montgomery and BCDC Jail Administrator Tabitha Maze, each in their
individual capacities only. See id. at 4–9. However, in March 2025, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed
his claims against Defendant Maze. See ECF Nos. 61–64.
On June 13, 2025, Defendants Montgomery and Ikari moved for summary judgment on all
of Plaintiff’s claims against them. See ECF Nos. 78–80. The Court entered an Order directing
Plaintiff to file his response by July 7, 2025. See ECF No. 81. On July 1, Plaintiff moved for an
extension of this deadline, which the Court granted, extending it to July 22, 2025. See ECF Nos.
86–87. Plaintiff filed a Response (ECF No. 88) on July 15 which was defective in that it did not
include any response to Defendants’ Statement of Indisputable Material Facts (ECF No. 80), which
Plaintiff had previously been specifically instructed to include with his response, see ECF No. 81.
However, on July 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed an (untimely) motion for another extension of his
response deadline indicating that he had been released from custody and wished to supplement his
response with new evidence. See ECF No. 89. The Court granted this request, giving Plaintiff a
deadline by which to do so of August 15, 2025, see ECF No. 90, which was subsequently extended
to September 26, 2025, see ECF No. 92. Notwithstanding these repeated extensions of his deadline
to 	supplement 	his 	summary 	judgment 	response, 	Plaintiff 	never 	provided 	any 	such
supplementation; indeed, he has not filed anything at all in this matter since his July 28 motion.
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is now ripe for decision.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), the record “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Case 3:24-cv-03034-CDC Document 94 Filed 01/20/26 Page 2 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
“Once a party moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with
the non-moving party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a
genuine issue of material fact exists.” 	National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chemical Co., 165
F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir. 1999).
The non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. “They must show there is sufficient
evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor.” National Bank, 165 F.3d at 607 (citing Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). “A case founded on speculation or suspicion is
insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (citing Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d
621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). 	“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not
adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
III. ANALYSIS
As noted above in Section I of this Opinion and Order, Plaintiff failed to respond to
Defendants’ Statement of Indisputable Material Facts (ECF No. 80). 	Accordingly, the material
facts alleged therein are deemed admitted for purposes of this Motion. See Local Rule 56.1(b)–
(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). 	As a practical matter this is fatal to Plaintiff’s claims, but some
discussion of why, accompanied by legal analysis, is necessary.
First, with respect to Plaintiff’s claim for excessive force by Defendant Ikari during his
arrest, Defendants have placed into the record uncontroverted evidence of the following facts. On
July 13, 2024, Defendant Ikari was dispatched to the general store in Big Flat, Arkansas, where he
spoke with Dustin Honeycutt. See ECF No. 80-2, p. 37. Honeycutt told Ikari that Plaintiff was
drunk at Honeycutt’s stepfather’s house, had been threatening to shoot everyone there, had pointed
Case 3:24-cv-03034-CDC Document 94 Filed 01/20/26 Page 3 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
a handgun at Honeycutt’s temple, and had then fired two shots into the grass near Honeycutt. See
id. Ikari then went to the residence with a state trooper and Searcy County deputies. 	Id. Ikari
went to the front door, identified himself, and ordered Plaintiff to come out with his hands up. Id.
When Plaintiff opened the door to the residence, Ikari saw a gun in Plaintiff’s left hand, which
Plaintiff was attempting to hide by holding it out away from his body and behind the door. See id.
Ikari ordered Plaintiff to drop the gun and put his hands up, but Plaintiff did not comply, and
instead closed the door. See id. When Plaintiff reopened the door, the gun was no longer visible,
but Plaintiff refused to comply with repeated orders from Ikari to lay down on the ground, stating
that he was not going to do that. See id. Ikari then physically forced Plaintiff to the ground. See
id. 	The collision of Plaintiff’s face with the ground fractured his nasal bones. 	See 80-9, p. 6.
Plaintiff was then taken to Baptist Regional Medical Center, where he was treated for his injuries.
See id. at 4–9. Early the following morning, Plaintiff was transported from there to the BCDC.
See ECF No. 80-2, pp. 47–49.
When an excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest, it invokes the protections
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits “unreasonable”
seizures. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1989). The United States Supreme Court
has instructed that “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”
Id. at 396. 	The test is an objective one: “the question is whether the officers’ actions are
‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard
to their underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 397. When considering whether an officer’s use
of force in making an arrest was objectively reasonable, the Court should give careful attention to
“the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety
Case 3:24-cv-03034-CDC Document 94 Filed 01/20/26 Page 4 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
of the officers or others, and whether he [was] actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest
by flight.” Id. at 396.
Here, the undisputed facts show that at the time of his arrest, Ikari had good reason to
believe that Plaintiff had committed and was still in the process of committing violent crimes, that
Plaintiff posed an immediate threat to Ikari’s safety as well as to the safety of the other residents
at the premises, and that Plaintiff was actively resisting arrest by concealing his gun and refusing
to lay down on the ground as commanded. Accordingly, it was objectively reasonable for Ikari to
use force to subdue Plaintiff and force him to the ground. Thus no constitutional violation occurred
at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest, and the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on his claim
for excessive force.
As for Plaintiff’s remaining claims—that he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions
of confinement and deprived of appropriate medical care for his injuries at BCDC; that his access
to legal mail, legal research, and to the courts was interfered with at BCDC; and that two other
individuals were allowed to steal his social security disability and EBT cards—there is no evidence
in the record that Ikari or Montgomery had any involvement in these incidents at all. “Liability
under § 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.”
Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990). A defendant in a § 1983 suit is entitled
to summary judgment when the record contains no evidence that he had any personal connection
with the conditions of which the plaintiff complains. See id.
Plaintiff’s operative complaint never alleges that Defendant Ikari had any knowledge of
any of the incidents surrounding these three remaining claims, nor even any ability to have
participated in them. These claims do not appear to be brought against Defendant Ikari. As for
Defendant Montgomery, Plaintiff’s operative complaint also never alleges any knowledge or
Case 3:24-cv-03034-CDC Document 94 Filed 01/20/26 Page 5 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
involvement on his part with respect to Plaintiff’s access to the courts or the theft of Plaintiff’s
cards; likewise, those two claims do not appear to be brought against Defendant Montgomery.1
With respect to Plaintiff’s claim regarding the conditions of his confinement and medical
treatment, his operative complaint alleges only in vague and conclusory fashion that these
conditions were “at all times known by . . . Montgomery, having a deliberate indifference to the
safety and welfare of his inmates.” See ECF No. 21, p. 6. The specifics of Plaintiff’s conditions-
of-confinement allegations are that when he was booked into BCDC, after an overnight stay at the
hospital, he was “placed in a box car origin cell with no mattress on the concrete floor, one blanket,
no pillow,” and remained in these conditions despite multiple grievances until “medical officials
int[er]vened and advised . . . that Plaintiff should be given a mattress,” at which time he was given
one. See id. at 6–7. Plaintiff also alleges that at the time he was booked into BCDC there was no
nurse on duty. See id. at 9.
Defendants have submitted uncontroverted evidence that BCDC policy is for all inmates
to be issued a ¼-inch foam sleeping pad upon booking unless medical officials recommend that
the inmate receive a thicker “medical” mattress, and that Plaintiff was initially issued the standard
foam sleeping pad when he was booked. 	See ECF No. 80-1, ¶¶ 6–7; ECF No. 80-2, p. 48.
Plaintiff’s grievance file from BCDC shows that he submitted only one grievance requesting a
medical mattress, on July 20, 2024, and that he was told in response to “speak to the nurse.” See
ECF No. 80-3, p. 6. As already noted, Plaintiff’s operative complaint concedes that he was given
a medical mattress when medical officials advised that this be done, see ECF No. 21, p. 7, and
Defendants have submitted evidence that Plaintiff kept his medical mattress until he voluntarily
relinquished it on May 5, 2025 so that he could move to an upstairs pod, see ECF No. 80-1, ¶¶ 8–
1 As noted in Section I supra, BCDC Jail Administrator Tabitha Maze was also a Defendant
in this case, but Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his claims against her in March 2025. 	See ECF
Nos. 61–64.
Case 3:24-cv-03034-CDC Document 94 Filed 01/20/26 Page 6 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
9; ECF No. 80-8. 	Defendants have also provided Plaintiff’s medical file, showing that he was
provided medications daily, see generally ECF No. 80-4, and that he received treatment at the
hospital not only on the night he was arrested, but also a week and a half later, see ECF No. 80-1,
p. 55; ECF No. 80-1, ¶ 10. By contrast, Plaintiff has not introduced any evidence showing that his
medical needs were ignored. Most importantly, Plaintiff has not introduced any evidence showing
that Defendant Montgomery had any knowledge of, or played any role in, Plaintiff’s situation other
than having approved a general policy that inmates be given a medical mattress when medical staff
advise that it be done—a policy which was apparently adhered to in Plaintiff’s case. Put simply,
even if Plaintiff could prove that the conditions of his confinement or the quality of his medical
treatment deprived him of some federal right, he cannot prove that the deprivation was inflicted
by Defendant Montgomery.
IV. CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants John Montgomery’s and Jordan Ikari’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 78) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff William E. Smith’s
claims against them are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 	Judgment will be entered
contemporaneously with this Order.
DATED this 20th day of January 2026.
/s/ Christy Comstock
HON. CHRISTY COMSTOCK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 3:24-cv-03034-CDC Document 94 Filed 01/20/26 Page 7 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>