Hollis v. Garland et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION
KELLY RAY HOLLIS, III 	PLAINTIFF
V. 	CASE NO. 2:24-CV-2130
MERRICK GARLAND, United States Attorney General;
DAVID CLAY FOWLKES, Acting United States Attorney
for the Western District of Arkansas; and
STEFANIE TOMPKINS, Director of
the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency 	DEFENDANTS
ORDER
Now before the Court is the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 11) of the
Honorable Mark E. Ford, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of
Arkansas. The Magistrate Judge recommends granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,
or in the alternative, to Transfer Venue (Doc. 8) and dismissing the case without prejudice.
Plaintiff filed Objections to the R&R (Doc. 14) on February 6, 2025, which prompted this
Court to review the entire case file de novo.
On October 11, 2024, Plaintiff brought claims against Defendants under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), alleging that during his career in the United States Air
Force, Plaintiff was subjected to severe intentional infliction of emotional distress as part
of a non-consensual human enhancement experiment. He asserts that Defendants
exposed him to psychological hazing, mind distortions, extreme sleep deprivation,
extreme experimental regimes, and abnormal communication. In the R&R, the Magistrate
Judge explains that venue is not proper in the Western District of Arkansas, but that the
case should not be transferred to the Eastern District of Arkansas—a more appropriate
Case 2:24-cv-02130-TLB Document 15 Filed 02/20/25 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
venue—because the claims are futile. In the Magistrate Judge’s view, Plaintiff’s FTCA
claims arise out of or otherwise relate to his military service, so they are barred under the
Feres doctrine. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
Plaintiff’s first objection to the R&R is that venue is proper in the Western District
of Arkansas because he currently lives in Fort Smith. This justification is insufficient to
establish venue, given the tort claims at issue here. Second, he asserts that the Feres
doctrine should not bar his claims because he felt the effects of Defendants’ tortious
conduct after he separated from the military, when he was a civilian. (Doc. 14, p. 3). As
the R&R correctly notes, “While there is no bright-line rule for determining whether
conduct is incident to service, a suit that calls into question military management or may
intrude upon sensitive military affairs is barred by the Feres doctrine.” (Doc. 11, p. 4).
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Defendants committed tortious acts against him while he
was a soldier serving in the United States Air Force. Assuming those allegations are true,
the Feres doctrine would bar Plaintiff’s claims—even though he felt some of the effects
of Defendants’ tortious conduct after he separated from the military.
IT 	IS 	THEREFORE 	ORDERED 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	Objections 	(Doc. 	14) 	are
OVERRULED, and the R&R (Doc. 11) is ADOPTED IN ITS ENTIRETY. Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8) is GRANTED, and the Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Clerk is DIRECTED to CLOSE THE CASE.
IT IS SO ORDERED on this 20th day of February, 2025.
Timothy L. Brooks
TIMOTHY L. BROOKS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 2:24-cv-02130-TLB Document 15 Filed 02/20/25 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:
<pageID>