Murphy v. Collier-Sisk et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
EL DORADO DIVISION
ADAM GABRIEL MURPHY 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 1:25-cv-01089-SOH-SGS
SHANNON COLLIER SISK, Ashley County Clerk;
TOMMY STURGEON, Ashley County Sheriff; and
ROBERT BYNUM GIBSON, JR., Retired Tenth Judicial Circuit Judge 	DEFENDANT
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Adam Gabriel Murphy, currently an inmate of the Ashley County Detention
Center (“ACDC”) filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	Pursuant to the provisions of
28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1) and (3) (2011), the Honorable Susan O. Hickey, United States District
Judge, referred the instant motion to the undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and
Recommendation.
The case is before the Court for preservice screening under the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). 	Pursuant to § 1915A(a), the Court has the obligation to screen any complaint in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on December 10, 2025, along with an application to proceed
in forma pauperis (“IFP”). 	(ECF Nos. 1-2). 	Plaintiff was granted IFP status on the same day.
(ECF No. 3). 	In his Complaint, Plaintiff names three Defendants: (1) Shannon Collier Sisk, the
County Clerk for Ashley County; (2) Tommy Sturgeon, the Sheriff of Ashley County; and
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(3) Judge Robert Bynum Gibson, Jr., retired Tenth Circuit Court Judge. 	(ECF No. 1). 	Plaintiff
alleges two claims in his Complaint. 	In Claim One, Plaintiff states that Defendants Sturgeon and
Gibson violated his constitutional rights through cruel and unusual punishment regarding his
criminal case. 	Specifically, Plaintiff states:
On Oct 6th 2025 before I was set to go in the courtroom for a revocation hearing of
my suspended imposition of sentence, Sheriff Tommy Sturgeon met in the judge’s
chambers with Judge Robert Bynum Gibson, Jr. and prosecutor Sandra Bradshaw
to discuss how to “proceed” on my hearing and how I should be sentenced without
my attorney present in my defense, all that taking place before my hearing. 	I know
this because my attorney, Joseph Mazzanti, “caught them by walking in on the
meeting.” 	In which defendants Tommy Sturgeon and Judge Gibson stopped
talking. 	My attorney made myself and other witnesses aware of what he
discovered. 	Then during a very brief plea negotiation, my attorney suggested 60
days in jail and $1000 restitution to prosecutor Sandra Bradshaw and she declined
stating to my attorney “She wanted to take our offer but she was afraid of the
sheriff’s department being angry with her.” 	The $1,000 restitution was to pay for
water used from waterhose
(ECF No. 1, pp. 4-5) (errors in original). 	Plaintiff alleges this claim against Defendants Sturgeon
and Gibson in both their individual and official capacities. 	Id. at 5. 	For his official capacity
claim, Plaintiff alleges: “It is the widespread practice of these officials to do favors for one another
even if they have to commit wrongful imprisonment or judicial misconduct to do it.” 	Id.
In Claim Two, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Collier-Sisk and Defendant Sturgeon violated
his constitutional rights by defaming his character and ensuring his harsh sentence. 	Specifically,
Plaintiff stated:
On October 6th , 2025 moments after Tommy Sturgeon, the Sheriff, convinced Judge
Robert Bynum Gibson Jr. to find me guilty and sentence me to an extreme number
of years to ADC 	Hearing this news in excitement the county clerk, Shannon Sisk,
also my mother-in-law, was and I quote from eye-witness “leaping for joy.” 	Eye
witness said that Shannon was at her place of employment and stated “we finally
got him away from my daughter.” 	She was referring to her boss Sheriff Tommy
and other law enforcement officials and their role in helping her do that. 	All of
that is slander because Shannon’s husband, Chris Sisk, was a character witness in
my hearing testifying to the kind of man I am. 	A good man.
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(ECF No. 1, p. 6) (errors in original). 	Plaintiff alleges Claim Two against Defendants Collier-
Sisk and Sturgeon, in both their individual and official capacities. 	For his official capacity claim,
Plaintiff stated: “It is the custom and practice for the co-workers of Ashley County Sherrif’s
Department to gossip, slander, and do ‘favors’ for one another regardless of who they hurt or how
they do it.” 	Id. at 7.
For relief Plaintiff seeks compensatory, punitive, and injunctive relief. 	(ECF No. 1, p. 9).
II. 	APPLICABLE STANDARD
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the Court must dismiss a
complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” 	Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 	An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be
false, or it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather
than to vindicate a cognizable right. 	In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988); Spencer
v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987). 	A claim fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that the Defendants acted
under color of state law, and that the actor violated a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the
Constitution. 	West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009
(8th Cir. 1999). 	Furthermore, the deprivation must be intentional; mere negligence will not
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suffice to state a claim for deprivation of a constitutional right under section 1983. 	Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986). 	Lastly, Defendants
must have been personally involved and caused the violation alleged. 	“Liability under section
1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights. 	To establish
personal liability of the supervisory defendants, [Plaintiff] must allege specific facts of personal
involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a deprivation of his constitutional rights.” 	Clemmons
v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128,
1132 (8th Cir. 2006)). 	Plaintiff’s claims shall be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears
beyond a doubt the Plaintiff’s complaint can prove no set of facts to support the plaintiff’s
purported cause of action. 	See Schaller Tel. Co. v. Golden Sky Sys., Inc., 298 F.3d 736, 740 (8th
Cir. 2001).
“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we
hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded . . . to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” 	Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). 	However, even a pro se Plaintiff must allege specific
facts sufficient to support a claim. 	Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
III. 	DISCUSSION
First, Plaintiff’s attempts to gain relief from his conviction, sentence, and incarceration do
not state a proper claim under section 1983. 	Plaintiff may not use section 1983 as a substitute for
habeas relief; instead, he must pursue any such claims through the proper avenue of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. 	See e.g., Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1023 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Section 2254 is the
only means by which ‘a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court’ may raise
challenges to the validity of his conviction or sentence or to the execution of his sentence.”)
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(quoting Crouch v. Norris, 251 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 2001)). 	Plaintiff is plainly challenging his
sentence and incarceration as he argues the custom of “wrongful imprisonment” and that his injury
is being “harshly sentenced.” 	(ECF No. 1, pp.5-6). 	Such claims fail to state a cognizable section
1983 claim.
Additionally, Plaintiff may not recover damages for an unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, as such claims are barred unless “the conviction or sentence has been reversed on
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make
such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). 	As evidenced by Plaintiff’s Complaint and
Arkansas public records, he is still imprisoned on the sentence he complains of, and he has
produced no evidence or allegations in his Complaint to meet the Heck requirements.1 	Plaintiff
is clearly challenging his conviction and his sentencing in both claims of his Complaint.
Accordingly, both claims asserted against all Defendants are barred by Heck.
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff alleges defamation or slander claims against any of the
Defendants, 	slander, 	defamation, 	and 	humiliation 	do 	not 	state 	a 	constitutional 	violation.
“[D]efamation, per se, is not actionable under section 1983.” 	Underwood v. Pritchard, 638 F.2d
60, 62 (8th Cir. 1981). 	The Supreme Court has held that a person’s interest in his reputation is
1 Arkansas state court records show that Plaintiff was sentenced in Circuit Court of Ashley County
on October 7, 2025, his criminal case was then closed on October 10, 2025, and Plaintiff filed a
Notice of Appeal on October 22, 2025 in the criminal case of which Plaintiff complains of in his
Complaint. 	There are no further filings in Plaintiff’s criminal case. 	Available at Arkansas Court
Connect, https://caseinfo.arcourts.gov/opad/case/02CR-24-131 (Last accessed January 28, 2026.
Furthermore, the Arkansas Division of Corrections (“ADC”) website indicates Plaintiff is
currently an inmate of the ADC with his latest sentence occurring on October 6, 2025. 	Arkansas
Department of Corrections Inmate Search, https://apps.ark.org/inmate_index.php (last visited
January 28, 2026.
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not considered liberty or property protected by the due process clause. 	Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693, 711-12 (1976). 	In other words, the “Supreme Court has made clear that federal courts are
not to view defamatory acts as constitutional violations.” 	Boyanowski v. Capital Area
Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 2000).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is recommended the case be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); and that Plaintiff be warned that, in the future, this dismissal
may be counted as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Referral Status: Referral in this case should terminate at the filing of this Report and
Recommendation.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 	The failure to file
timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties
are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by
the district court.
DATED this 29th day of January 2026.
/s/ Spencer G. Singleton
HON. SPENCER G. SINGLETON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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