Culberson v. El Dorado Police Department et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION
MELTON CULBERSON 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 1:25-CV-01085-SOH-MEF
OFFICER ANDREW REYNOLDS, et. al. 	DEFENDANTS
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and a supporting brief. (ECF Nos. 86, 87). The instant Motion
seeks to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s individual capacity and official capacity claims against the
Separate Defendants, Officer Andrew Reynolds and Officer Houston Bradshaw. 	Plaintiff has
responded. 	(ECF No. 88). 	The Motion has been referred to the undersigned and is ripe for
disposition. 	For the reasons set forth below, it is RECOMMENDED that the Motion be
GRANTED.
I. 	RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 11, 2025, Culberson filed a Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights in Case 1:25-
cv-01045 (“Case I”), and on June 25, 2025, he filed the same in Case 1:25-cv-01052 (“Case II”).
In the Case I Complaint, Culberson named only Officer Andrew Reynolds and Officer Houston
Bradshaw (the “Separate Defendants”) as Defendants and asserted claims for illegal search and
seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (Case I, ECF No. 1)0F
1 . These claims were asserted
1 Not all the filings in Case I and Case II are docketed in the lead case (Case III). When reference
is made to any such filing, the docket number used in the earlier case will be used.
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against the Separate Defendants in both their individual and official capacities and were based on
the October 18, 2023, traffic stop of Culberson initiated by Separate Defendants. In his Case II
Complaint, Culberson again named only the Separate Defendants, but he asserted claims for
wrongful arrest, undue hardship, and harassment against them, in both their individual and official
capacities, also arising from the same traffic stop. (Case II, ECF No. 1).
On July 28, 2025, the Separate Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the official capacity
claims levied against them in Case I, arguing that they were agents of the 13 th Judicial District
Drug Task Force (“DTF”), which is an entity not amenable to suit. 	(Case I, ECF No. 10). 	On
August 7, 2025, the Separate Defendants filed a similar Motion to Dismiss, challenging the official
capacity claims levied against them on the same grounds, in Case II. (Case II, ECF No. 10).
On October 14, 2025, the undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation, determining
that the Separate Defendants were indeed agents of the DTF—an entity not amenable to suit—and
thereby concluding that the Separate Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in Case I should be granted.
(Case I, ECF No. 55). One day later, the undersigned issued another Report and Recommendation,
determining that the Separate Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in Case II should also be granted on
the same grounds. 	(Case II, ECF No. 27). 	On November 4, 2025, the Court adopted the first
Report and Recommendation in toto. 	(Case I, ECF No. 71). 	Likewise, the Court adopted the
Report and Recommendation in Case II on December 10, 2025. (Case II, ECF No. 34).
Between the Court’s adoption of the Report and Recommendations made in Case I and
Case II, Culberson filed his Complaint in the instant case (“Case III”), which is now the lead case
in this litigation1F
2 . 	(ECF No. 1). 	In this Complaint, Culberson again named the Separate
Defendants, but he also added the City of El Dorado and the El Dorado Police Department as
2 All three cases were consolidated on January 8, 2026. (ECF No. 65).
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Defendants. 	As for the Separate Defendants, Culberson asserted both individual capacity and
official capacity claims of unreasonable search and seizure, due process violation, and privacy
violation.
After a series of amendments to the Complaint in this case, the operative Complaint no
longer names as a Defendant the El Dorado Police Department, and it now pleads both individual
capacity and official capacity claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence,
and denial of due process. 	(ECF No. 75). 	On January 22, 2026, the Separate Defendants filed
their Answer to the operative Complaint. 	(ECF No. 85). 	One day later, they filed the instant
Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support, again arguing that the official capacity claims should be
dismissed because they are members of the DTF, which is an entity not amenable to suit. (ECF
No. 86). 	In addition to this now familiar argument, they also now contend that the individual
capacity claims are insufficiently pleaded under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and should be dismissed
as well.
On January 27, 2026, Culberson filed a Response to the instant Motion, conceding that the
DTF is an entity not amenable to suit, but maintaining that his individual capacity claims are
sufficiently pleaded and should not be dismissed. (ECF No. 88).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure provides that every defense to a claim
for relief “must be asserted in the responsive pleading if one is required,” and that a motion
asserting any of the 12(b) defenses “must be made before pleading if a responsive pleading is
allowed.” We note that although the Separate Defendants did assert a Rule 12(b)(6) defense in
their responsive pleading, their Motion asserting such did not come until the day after their
responsive pleading was filed. The Eight Circuit has ruled, however, and premised upon the fact
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that a Rule 12(b)(6) defense can be asserted in a Rule 12(c) motion, that post-responsive-pleading
Rule 12(b)(6) motions are to be treated as Rule 12(c) motions. See Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901
F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990). This distinction is purely formal, because Rule 12(c) motions are
analyzed under the same standard as Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Id.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), and thus, a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(c), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint states a plausible claim for relief if
its “factual content … allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
When evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded his claims, the court
should hold a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, … to less stringent standards than
formal pleading drafted by lawyers.” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014). Even
despite this relaxed standard, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	The Official Capacity Claims
In his Response, Culberson concedes that his official capacity claims fail because the DTF
is an entity not amenable to suit, and he, therefore, explicitly relinquishes any claims against such.
Considering this, and the Court’s earlier rulings consistent with this concession, Culberson’s
official capacity claims should be dismissed.
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B. 	The Individual Capacity Claims
1. 	False Arrest
In the operative Complaint, Culberson pleads a claim for false arrest, in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. 	The constitutional violation behind a Fourth Amendment claim for false
arrest is unlawful seizure, more specifically, an arrest made without probable cause. See Manuel
v. City of Joliet, Ill., 580 U.S. 357, 366-68 (2017). In the operative Complaint, Culberson never
alleges that the Separate Defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him, but rather, he simply
states that he was detained and arrested. By merely alleging that he was arrested, with no mention
as to the invalidity of said arrest, Culberson does not provide a sufficient basis for the Court to
infer that he has been falsely arrested. This claim should be dismissed.
2. 	Malicious Prosecution
Culberson pleads a claim for malicious prosecution, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The essence of a malicious prosecution claim is “the wrongful initiation of charges without
probable cause.” 	Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 43 (2022). 	In the operative Complaint,
however, Culberson factually asserts two separate times that no formal criminal charges arising
from the traffic stop incident were ever initiated against him. 	Taken as true, this fact directly
undercuts his malicious prosecution claim.
In his Response, Culberson attempts to explicitly walk-back this assertion, now claiming
that formal criminal charges arising from the traffic stop incident were indeed initiated against
him. 	But a response to a motion to dismiss is not a tool to amend insufficient pleadings.
Considering his operative Complaint as is, Culberson has not alleged facts sufficient to draw the
inference that Separate Defendants are liable for malicious prosecution, and the claim should be
dismissed.
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3. 	Fabrication of Evidence
Culberson also pleads a claim for fabrication of evidence. 	Such a claim is ultimately
premised on the idea that a defendant’s liberty interests were infringed based upon the usage of
false evidence or evidence derived from a reckless investigation. Winslow v. Smith, 696 F.3d 716,
735 (8th Cir. 2012). 	But in pleading this claim, Culberson asserts only that, “Defendants later
made assertions regarding evidence allegedly associated with Plaintiff. Plaintiff disputes those
assertions[,]” and that “Defendants relied on assertions to justify the detention.” At no point does
he cite any facts to indicate that the evidence in question was false in nature, nor that the
investigation itself was conducted recklessly. In the absence of those assertions, the Court cannot
reasonably infer that the Separate Defendants are liable for fabrication of evidence, and this claim
should be dismissed.
4. 	Denial of Due Process
Culberson’s claim for denial of due process and his claim for fabrication of evidence claim
are effectively stylizations of the same claim, with both comprising separate parts of the same
theory of injury. Whereas fabrication of evidence was allegedly the method of violation, denial of
due process is allegedly the resulting violation. Culberson pleads no denial of due process theory
outside of his fabrication of evidence theory.
So, considering that Culberson failed to sufficiently plead fabrication of evidence—the
method by which his right to due process was allegedly violated—he likewise has not sufficiently
pleaded facts that enable this Court to infer his right to due process was denied. 	No factual
assertions pertaining to denial of due process are asserted otherwise. 	Accordingly, this claim
should also be dismissed.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Separate Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 86) be GRANTED.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in a waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
DATED this 13th day of February 2026.
/s/ Mark E. Ford
HON. MARK E. FORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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