Easter v. Martin et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
EL DORADO DIVISION
ERVIN WADE EASTER, JR. 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 1:25-cv-01001-BAB
SHERIFF LEROY MARTIN;
JERRY MANESS; and
JAIL ADMINISTRATOR GEAN SIEGER 	DEFENDANTS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	(ECF No. 1). 	He proceeds
pro se and in forma pauperis. 	Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in the Columbia County
Detention Center (“CCDC”) in Magnolia, Arkansas.
The case was directly assigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. 	However, because
not all parties to the action have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned, and this document
will be dispositive of certain of Plaintiff’s claims, this document will be filed as a Report and
Recommendation and the case will automatically be reassigned to Chief United States District
Judge Susan O. Hickey. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
General Order 2024-02.
The case is before the Court for preservice screening of the Second Amended Complaint
(ECF No. 10) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 	Pursuant to § 1915A, the Court has the obligation to
screen any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names three Defendants: Sheriff Leroy
Martin, Jerry Maness, and Jail Administrator Gean Sieger. 	(ECF No. 10, pp. 2-3). 	Plaintiff lists
three claims against these Defendants. 	In Claim One, Plaintiff states that Sheriff Leroy Martin
violated his constitutional rights on May 6, 2024 by failing to release him or take him for a court
date. 	(ECF No. 10, p. 4). 	Plaintiff claims further that the charges against him were dropped and
Sheriff Martin refuses to release him. 	According to Plaintiff, he has been held for over seven
months with no court appearances. 	Id. at 4-5. 	However, Plaintiff does not seek release from
incarceration from the Court. 	Id. at 9.
In Claim Two, Plaintiff alleges Jail Administrator Gean Sieger violated his constitutional
rights through the conditions of his confinement at the CCDC. 	Specifically, this claim relates to
water on the floor and a fall Plaintiff experienced while housed in the CCDC. 	Id. at 6.
In Claim Three, Plaintiff alleges Jerry Maness violated his constitutional rights by both
failing to release him and through the conditions of confinement at the CCDC. 	Id. at 8-9.
Plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive damages as relief in his Second Amended
Complaint. 	Id. at 9.
On January 13, 2025, the Court entered a Severance Order in this case. 	The Court
explained to Plaintiff that his conditions of confinement claims and his claims for failure to release
had no logical relationship and could not be brought together in the same Complaint pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2). 	(ECF No. 6). 	Plaintiff’s claims were severed and he
was instructed to file an amended complaint herein alleging only his claims related to improper
imprisonment and delayed release. 	Id. 	Plaintiff was further instructed to file an amended
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complaint in the severed case at 1:25-cv-01003-BAB alleging only his conditions of confinement
claims. 	Id.
On January 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed his first Amended Complaint herein. 	(ECF No. 7).
After reviewing this Amended Complaint, the Court determined Plaintiff failed to follow the
directions in the Severance Order and included both claims regarding his conditions of
confinement and delayed release in his Amended Complaint. 	(ECF No. 7). 	The Court entered
an Order directing Plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint and again instructing him that
only claims related to his delayed release or improper imprisonment should be included in this
case. 	(ECF No. 8). 	The instant Second Amended Complaint was Plaintiff’s response.
Plaintiff has also filed a Second Amended Complaint in the severed case alleging his
conditions of confinement claims. 	Easter v. Martin, et al., Civil No. 1:25-cv-01003, ECF No. 7.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Under § 1915A, the Court is obligated to screen the case prior to service of process being
issued. 	The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are
frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 	Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 	An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be
false, or it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather
than to vindicate a cognizable right. 	In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988); Spencer
v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987). 	A claim fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
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on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we
hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” 	Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). 	This means “that if the essence of an allegation is
discernible, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe
the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal
framework.” 	Jackson, 747 F.3d at 544 (cleaned up). 	However, the complaint must still allege
specific facts sufficient to support a claim. 	Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir.
1985).
III. 	DISCUSSION
The Court recommends all of Plaintiff’s claims regarding his conditions of confinement
alleged in Claims Two and Three be dismissed without prejudice as they are currently pending in
the severed case at Civil No. 1:25-cv-01003. 	These claims will be addressed in that separate
matter and would be duplicative here.
Misjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissing an action, but the Court may at any
time drop parties or sever claims against any party. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. 	This is what the Court
has previously done here in opening Civil No. 1:25-cv-01003 for Plaintiff to pursue his conditions
of confinement claims. 	See Reinholdson v. Minnesota, 346 F.3d 847 (8th Cir. 2003).
Furthermore, Plaintiff’s Due Process claims of delayed release are not yet ripe for
consideration by this Court. 	Plaintiff’s state criminal charges resulting in his current incarceration
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are still pending before the Columbia County Circuit Court. 	See State v. Easter, 14CR-24-11,
Columbia County 13th Circuit Division 5, arcourts.gov (last visited April 24, 2025).
Pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), federal courts are required to abstain
from hearing cases when “(1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding which (2) implicates
important state interests, and when (3) that proceeding affords an adequate opportunity to raise the
federal questions presented.” 	Norwood v. Dickey, 409 F.3d 901, 903 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal
citation omitted). 	Ongoing state criminal proceedings implicate the important state interest of
enforcing state criminal law, and constitutional claims relating to that state proceeding should be
raised there. 	Meador v. Paulson, 385 F. App’x 613, 2010 WL 2793555, at *1 (8th Cir. 2010); see
also Gillette v. N. Dakota Disc. Bd. Counsel, 610 F.3d 1045, 1046 (8th Cir. 2010). 	“If all three
questions are answered affirmatively, a federal court should abstain unless it detects ‘bad faith,
harassment, or some extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate.’”
Night Clubs, Inc. v. City of Ft. Smith, Ark., 163 F.3d 475, 479 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Middlesex
Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982)).
When only equitable relief is sought, Younger “contemplates the outright dismissal of the
federal suit, and the presentation of all claims, both state and federal to the state courts.” 	Gibson
v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973) (a Section 1983 case involving only injunctive relief, and
not damages). 	In cases where damages are sought, the Eighth Circuit has noted that the Supreme
Court instructs that traditional abstention principles generally require a stay as the appropriate
mode of abstention rather than a dismissal. 	Night Clubs, Inc., 163 F. 3d at 481. 	In Quackenbush
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 730 (1996), the Court said:
In those cases in which we have applied traditional abstention principles to damages
actions, we have only permitted a federal court to withhold action until the state
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proceedings have concluded, that is, we have permitted federal courts applying
abstention principles in damages actions to enter a stay, but we have not permitted
them to dismiss the action altogether.
Here, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages for his due process claims related
to his continued incarceration. 	Plaintiff has not alleged he is prevented from bringing his due
process claims in state court. 	Accordingly, it is appropriate pursuant to the Younger doctrine, to
stay Plaintiff’s Due Process claims against Defendants Martin and Maness until his state criminal
case concludes.
Finally, while Plaintiff does not specifically seek release from CCDC in the relief section
of his Second Amended Complaint, his allegations clearly challenge his incarceration as improper.
Plaintiff may not use Section 1983 as a substitute for habeas relief, instead, he must pursue such
claims through the proper avenue of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 while he is still incarcerated. 	See e.g.,
Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1023 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Section 2254 is the only means by
which ‘a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court’ may raise challenges to the
validity of his conviction or sentence or to the execution of his sentence.”) (quoting Crouch v.
Norris, 251 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 2001)). 	Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to
gain relief from his incarceration by being released, such claim fails to state a cognizable Section
1983 claim. 	This type of claim is more properly alleged as a habeas claim rather than a Section
1983 claim since Plaintiff is still incarcerated.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons it is recommended that: (1) Plaintiff’s Due Process claims against Sheriff
Leroy Martin and Jerry Maness be administratively stayed at this time pursuant to Younger and
this case be administratively terminated; (2) Plaintiff be provided thirty (30) days from the
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resolution of his criminal case to notify this Court and move to reopen this case; and (3) Plaintiff’s
Claim Two for claims of conditions of confinement against Gean Sieger be dismissed without
prejudice.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 	The failure to file
timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties
are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by
the district court.
Status of Referral: 	The case should remain referred.
DATED this 5th day of May 2025.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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