Jackson v. Payne et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
CENTRAL DIVISION
CHRISTIAN JACKSON 	PLAINTIFF
ADC #161090
V. 	NO. 4:25-cv-01045-LPR-ERE
DEXTER PAYNE, et al. 	DEFENDANTS
RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
I. 	Procedure for Filing Objections
This Recommendation has been sent to United States District Judge Lee P.
Rudofsky. You may file written objections to all or part of this Recommendation.
Any objections filed must: (1) specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for
the objection; and (2) be received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14)
days of the date of this Recommendation. If you do not object, you risk waiving the
right to appeal questions of fact.
II. 	Background
Pro se 	plaintiff Christian Jackson, an Arkansas Division of Correction
(“ADC’) inmate, originally filed this lawsuit on behalf of himself and inmate
Demarius Manning under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Doc. 2. Because Mr. Jackson’s original
1 Pursuant to Court policy governing multi-plaintiff prisoner cases, the Court
directed the Clerk’s office to open two separate cases. See Manning v. Payne, No. 4:25-
cv-01046-LPR-ERE (Mr. Manning’s case).
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complaint was deficient, I provided him an opportunity to file an amended complaint
clarifying his constitutional claims. Doc. 5. Mr. Jackson has now filed an amended
complaint containing some of the same claims raised in his original complaint and
additional claims against new Defendants. Doc. 6. For the following reasons, I now
recommend that Mr. Jackson’s amended complaint be dismissed, without prejudice,
for failure to state a plausible constitutional claim for relief.
III. 	Screening
A. 	Mr. Jackson’s Amended Complaint Allegations2
In his amended complaint, Mr. Jackson names the following Defendants:
Warden James Gibson, Director Dexter Payne, Major Joi Eboni Harris, Deputy
Warden 	Maurice 	Culclager, 	Lieutenant 	Jordan 	Slayden, 	and 	Captain/Kitchen
2 	Mr. 	Jackson’s 	original 	complaint 	alleged: 	(1) 	in 	March 	2025, 	Kitchen
Captain/Supervisor LeKenya Jackson cursed at him and threatened him (Id. at 6, 8); (2)
when Mr. Jackson complained about Defendant Jackson’s conduct, former Deputy Warden
Maurice Culclager and Major/Chief of Security Eboni Joi Harris “neglected” his complaint
in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights (Id. at 7); (3) unidentified ADC officers
retaliated against him by housing him in administrative segregation for over seven months;
(4) unidentified ADC officers violated ADC policy by holding him in administrative
segregation for over seven months for a non-violent disciplinary offense; (5) he engaged
in protected First Amendment activity by verbally responding to Defendant Jackson’s
threats (Id. at 8); (6) Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to his health and safety
by allowing him to remain housed in administrative segregation; (7) Defendant Jackson
has violated his equal protection rights because she has treated other inmates less harshly
than him for similar conduct; (8) all Defendants have falsely imprisoned him; and (9) he
has suffered physical injuries and defamation as a result of Defendants’ conduct.
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Supervisor Lekenya Jackson.3 He alleges that: (1) in February 2025, Defendants
Culclager and Harris violated his due process rights by assigning him to a kitchen
duty even though they knew he had a difficult relationship with Defendant Jackson,
the kitchen supervisor; (2) Defendants Culclager and Harris violated his due process
rights by denying or ignoring his request for a job reassignment; (3) Defendant
Harris violated his equal protection rights by denying his request for a new job
assignment, but providing another inmate a new job assignment; (4) Defendants
Culclager, 	Gibson,4 Harris, 	Jordan 	Slayden, 	and 	Jackson 	were 	deliberately
indifferent to his health and safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment by housing
him in isolation for seven months, initially housing him in a contaminated cell, and
denying 	him 	yard 	call; 	(5) 	Defendant 	Jackson 	verbally 	threatened 	him; 	(6)
Defendant Slayden “aggressively” escorted him to isolation in retaliation for his
previous lawsuit against Defendant Slayden (Doc. 6 at 6); (7) all Defendants
defamed him; (8) Defendants Culclager and Harris violated his due process rights
3 In his amended complaint, Mr. Jackson does not name Defendant James Shipman
as a party Defendant. As a result, he has abandoned his claims against Defendant Shipman.
Doc. 5 at 9. See also In re Atlas Lines, Inc., 209 F.3d 1064, 1067 (8th Cir. 2000) (an
amended complaint supersedes an original complaint and renders the original complaint
without legal effect).
4 In his amended complaint, Mr. Jackson initially spells this name “Gipson.” Doc.
6 at 2. However, he later refers to Defendant “Gibson.” Doc. 6 at 7-8. I will refer to this
Defendant as Defendant Gibson. The Clerk is also instructed to update the docket sheet
to reflect the correct spelling of Defendant Gibson’s name.
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by sentencing him to an additional six months in isolation; (9) Defendants Culclager
and Harris falsely imprisoned him; (10) Defendants Gibson and Harris violated the
Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause by holding him in isolation; and (11)
Defendants Gibson, Harris, Jackson, and Culclager violated his equal protection
rights by treating other inmates more favorably than him. Each Defendant is sued in
his or her individual and official capacities for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary
relief.
B. 	Standard
Screening is mandated by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which requires
federal courts to screen prisoner complaints seeking relief against a governmental
entity, officer, or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a
complaint or a portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that: (a) are legally
frivolous or malicious; (b) fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or
(c) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b). When making this determination, the Court must accept the truth of the
factual allegations contained in the complaint, and it may consider the documents
attached to the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Reynolds v.
Dormire, 636 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir. 2011).
To state a claim that can survive screening, Mr. Jackson must set forth
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic
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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
For the reasons explained below, Mr. Jackson’s amended complaint fails to
assert a plausible constitutional or federal claim against any Defendant. And the
Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over any proposed state law claims. See
Gibson v. Weber, 433 F.3d 642, 647 (8th Cir. 2006) (Congress unambiguously gave
district courts discretion in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) to dismiss supplemental state law
claims when all federal claims have been dismissed).
1. 	Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims
To state a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, a prisoner “must first
demonstrate that he was deprived of life, liberty, or property by government action.”
See Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 846 (8th Cir. 2003). In support of his due
process claims, Mr. Jackson alleges that: (1) Defendants Culclager and Harris
assigned him to kitchen duty, knowing he had a difficult relationship with Defendant
Jackson; (2) Defendants Culclager and Harris denied or ignored his request for a
different job; and (3) Defendant Culclager and Harris sentenced him to an additional
six months in isolation.
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The facts alleged fail to support a plausible due process claim. First, Mr.
Jackson does not have a protected property or liberty interest in any particular job
assignment. Battle v. Minnesota Dep’t of Corr., 40 F. App’x 308, 310 (8th Cir. 2002)
(no protected liberty interest in job assignment). Second, his assignment to isolation
for an additional six months is not sufficient punishment to trigger due process
protections. See Rhaman X v. Morgan, 300 F.3d 970, 974 (8th Cir. 2002) (inmate’s
placement in administrative segregation for 26 months without a disciplinary charge
or conviction did not “demonstrate that his liberty interest was curtailed”); Orr v.
Larkins, 610 F.3d 1032, 1034 (8th Cir. 2010) (inmate not deprived of liberty interest
during nine months in administrative segregation); Scott v. Coleman, 439 Fed. Appx.
810 (8th Cir. 2012) (unpublished decision) (upholding district court’s finding that
plaintiff inmate failed to state a due process claim after assigned to punitive isolation
for 158 days without a hearing); Furlough v. Brandon, 2009 WL 4898418 (E.D. Ark.
2009) 	(inmate 	failed 	to 	state 	a 	due 	process 	claim 	after 	being 	assigned 	to
administrative segregation for nearly nine months).
2. 	Equal Protection Claims
Mr. Jackson claims that his equal protection rights were violated when: (1)
Defendant Harris refused to provide him a new job assignment but granted another
inmate’s request to be reassigned; and (2) Defendants Gibson, Harris, Jackson, and
Culclager treated other inmates more favorably than him. Mr. Jackson’s allegations
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do not involve the violation of a fundamental right or membership in a protected
class. As a result, to state a plausible equal protection claim, he must allege facts
which, accepted as true, support a reasonable inference that “similarly situated
inmates were treated differently and that this difference in treatment bore no rational
relationship to any legitimate penal interest.” Weiler v. Purkett, 137 F.3d 1047, 1051
(8th Cir. 1998) (citing Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1103 (8th Cir. 1990)); see
also Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 848 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating that absent
assertion of membership in a protected class or violation of a fundamental right, an
inmate must show that similarly situated inmates received different treatment and
that the difference in treatment had no rational relation to any legitimate penal
interest).
Mr. Jackson’s speculative, conclusory, and unsubstantiated allegations are
insufficient to state a plausible equal protection claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that “labels and conclusions,” a “formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” and “naked assertions devoid of
further factual enhancement” are insufficient to plead a § 1983 claim; and, instead,
a prisoner must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face”).
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3. 	Eighth Amendment Claims
Mr. Jackson alleges that all Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights
by: (1) housing him in isolation for seven months; (2) initially housing him in a cell
that had not yet been cleaned and was contaminated with pepper spray; and (3)
denying him yard call for an unspecified amount of time while he was housed in
isolation.
To state an Eighth Amendment unconstitutional conditions of confinement
claim, Mr. Jackson must allege facts suggesting that: (1) objectively, the conditions
endured constituted a substantial risk of serious harm to his health or safety; and (2)
subjectively, Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm posed by
those conditions. Hamner v. Burls, 937 F.3d 1171, 1178 (8th Cir. 2019). “[O]nly
those deprivations denying ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities’ are
sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298
(1991)). Mr. Jackson’s Eighth Amendment claims fail for the following reasons.
First, Mr. Jackson fails to allege that he was denied any of life’s necessities
while housed in isolation. Although Mr. Jackson’s housing conditions may not have
been ideal, the Constitution does not mandate “comfortable” prisons. See Hudson,
503 U.S. at 9.
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Second, although Mr. Jackson’s amended complaint alleges that he was
initially housed in a cell that had not been decontaminated, “discomfort compelled
by conditions of confinement, without more, does not violate the amendment.” Smith
v. Coughlin, 748 F.2d 783, 787 (2nd Cir. 1984) (quoting Jackson v. Meachum, 699
F.2d 578, 581 (1st Cir. 1983)). Notably, Mr. Jackson does not allege that he was
exposed to any unconstitutional condition for a prolonged period. Smith v. Copeland,
87 F.3d 265, 269 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that “[c]onditions such as a filthy cell that
may be tolerable for a few days are intolerably cruel for weeks or months”).
Third, although Mr. Jackson alleges that he was denied yard call for seven
months while housed in isolation, he fails to explain: (1) how often he was denied
the opportunity to participate in yard call; (2) who was responsible for providing him
yard call; and (3) what injuries he suffered as a result of being denied the opportunity
to participate in yard call. Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Eighth
Circuit has recognized a per se constitutional right to yard call. See Roos v. Clark,
2022 WL 4229981, at *10 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 26, 2022), rec. adopted, 2022 WL
4225965 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 13, 2022); Morris v. King, 2022 WL 9833541, at *14
(W.D. Ark. July 29, 2022), rec. adopted 2022 WL 4594995 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 30,
2022).
Mr. Jackson’s vague allegations about the denial of yard call during a seven-
month period does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. See
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Rahman X. v. Morgan, 300 F.3d 970, 974 (8th Cir. 2002) (lack of yard call for three
months was not a constitutional violation when prisoner was allowed out of his
individual punitive cell for three hours each week); Morris, 2002 WL 98333541
(lack of yard call for eleven months was not a constitutional violation when prisoner
was allowed out of his cell an hour each day); Raper v. Minors, 2022 WL 17352569
(W.D. Ark. Dec. 1, 2022) (yard call three times in “over 6 months” was not a
constitutional violation), aff’d, 2023 WL 2857253 (8th Cir. Apr. 10, 2023).
4. 	First Amendment Retaliation Claim
Mr. Jackson alleges that Defendant Slayden “aggressively” escorted him to
isolation in retaliation because Mr. Jackson filed a lawsuit against him.
To state a retaliation claim, Mr. Jackson must allege that: (1) he engaged in
constitutionally protected activity; (2) Defendant Slayden took adverse action
against him that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that
activity; and (3) retaliation was a motivating factor for the adverse action. Lewis v.
Jacks, 486 F.3d 1025, 1028 (8th Cir. 2007); Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876
(8th Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted) (holding that an inmate “must show that
impermissible retaliation was the actual motivating factor for his transfer”). In
addition, to survive screening, a retaliation claim must be supported by more than
speculative and conclusory allegations. Atkinson v. Bohn, 2009 WL 4825169, *904
(8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (holding that plaintiff “failed to state a retaliation claim
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because he . . . failed to allege which defendants were involved in or affected by his
grievances.”).
Assuming that Mr. Jackson engaged in constitutionally protected activity by
filing a lawsuit, the amended complaint contains no factual allegations to support his
conclusory and speculative assertion that Defendant Slayden was motivated by
unlawful retaliation. As a result, Mr. Jackson’s proposed retaliation claim is not
plausible.
5. 	Verbal Threats
Mr. Jackson alleges that Defendant Jackson verbally threatened and cursed at
him. 	However 	offensive, 	“[v]erbal 	threats 	do 	not 	constitute 	a 	constitutional
violation.” Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1339 (8th Cir. 1985). Similarly, taunts,
name calling, and the use of offensive language does not state a claim of
constitutional dimension. McDowell v. Jones, 990 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1993)
(inmate’s claims of general harassment and of verbal harassment were not actionable
under ' 1983); O’Donnell v. Thomas, 826 F.2d 788, 790 (8th Cir. 1987) (verbal
threats and abuse by jail officials did not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation).
6. 	Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy
Mr. Jackson alleges that Defendants Gibson and Harris violated the Fifth
Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause by holding him in isolation following his
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disciplinary conviction. However, the Double Jeopardy Clause is applicable to
proceedings that are “essentially criminal” in nature, Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519,
528 (1975), and prison disciplinary proceedings, which are not part of a criminal
prosecution, do not trigger double jeopardy protections. Kerns v. Parratt, 672 F.2d
690, 691–92 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding prison disciplinary proceedings implicate due
process protections but “do not place an offender in jeopardy for purposes of the
double jeopardy clause”); Matter of Caranchini, 160 F.3d 420, 423 (8th Cir. 1998)
(citing Mississippi State Bar v. Young, 509 So. 2d 210, 214 n.1 (Miss. 1987)) (“Most
states which have addressed the matter have held that disciplinary proceedings are
not so criminal in nature as to evoke double jeopardy protections”). The Double
Jeopardy Clause has no application to any harm Mr. Jackson suffered as a result of
his disciplinary conviction.
7. 	Defendant Payne
Mr. Jackson’s complaint fails to allege facts to show how Defendant Payne
personally participated in any unconstitutional conduct or was directly responsible
for a constitutional violation. “Liability under section 1983 requires a causal link to,
and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.” Clemmons v. Armontrout,
477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007).
The law is well-settled that an official’s supervisory role alone is not enough
to not make him legally responsible for the unconstitutional conduct of the
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employees 	he 	supervises. 	See 	Ashcroft 	v. 	Iqbal, 556 	U.S. 	662, 	676 	(2009)
(explaining that, because there is no vicarious liability in § 1983 actions, a prisoner
“must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution”); Saylor v. Nebraska, 812 F3.3d
637, 644-45 (8th Cir. 2016) (because a supervisor cannot be held vicariously liable
for the constitutional violations of a subordinate, prisoner must “show that the
supervisor personally participated in or had direct responsibility for the alleged
violations” or “that the supervisor actually knew of, and was deliberately indifferent
to or tacitly authorized, the unconstitutional acts”); Keeper v. King, 130 F.3d 1309,
1314 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the “general responsibility for supervising the
operations of a prison in insufficient to establish the personal involvement required
to support [§ 1983] liability”).
8. 	State Law Claims
Mr. Jackson alleges that he was charged and convicted with a disciplinary
violation and received punishment including thirty days in punitive isolation for
“banding together.” Doc. 6 at 7. He asserts: “This is a defamation violation against
all Defendants listed because [I] never banded together.” Doc. 6 at 7. These vague
allegations (which seem to imply that Mr. Jackson’s disciplinary conviction was
based on false information provided by Defendants) may give rise to a state law
claim for defamation, but they do not involve a violation of due process or other
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federal rights actionable under § 1983. Underwood v. Pritchard, 638 F.2d 60, 62
(8th Cir. 1981) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-02 (1976) (noting allegation
that 	prisoner’s 	parole 	was 	revoked 	based 	on 	false 	information 	provided 	by
defendants failed to “could give rise to a cause of action for defamation however,
defamation, per se, is not actionable under section 1983.”)
Mr. 	Jackson 	also 	alleges 	that 	following 	his 	disciplinary 	conviction,
Defendants Culclager and Harris imposed an additional six months in isolation,
which he states amounted to “false imprisonment.” Doc. 6 at 7. As previously
explained, Mr. Jackson’s additional six months in isolation confinement did not
amount to a violation of due process cognizable under § 1983, nor did it implicate
any other federal right.
Because I recommend that each claim over which the Court has original
jurisdiction be dismissed, to the extent Mr. Jackson brings state law claims for
defamation 	and 	false 	imprisonment, 	the 	Court 	should 	decline 	to 	exercise
supplemental jurisdiction and dismiss the state law claims without prejudice. See 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
IV. 	Conclusion
Mr. Jackson’s amended complaint fails to state a plausible constitutional or
federal claim, and the Court should exercise its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)
to decline to exercise jurisdiction over any proposed state law claims.
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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. 	Mr. Jackson’s amended complaint be DISMISSED, without prejudice.
2. 	The Clerk be instructed to close this case.
3. 	The Court certify that an in forma pauperis appeal of this dismissal
would be frivolous and not taken in good faith.
4. 	In the future, this dismissal be considered a “strike” for purposes of 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Dated 27 October 2025.
____________________________________
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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