Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
IDA ALETHEA JOHNSON, 	)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:24-00202-JB-N
)
MARTIN O’MALLEY, 	)
Commissioner of Social Security, 	)
Defendant. 	)
ORDER
This civil action is before the Court on the motion for leave to proceed without
prepayment of fees and costs, or in forma pauperis (“IFP”), under 28 U.S.C. § 1915
(Doc. 2) filed by the Plaintiff, IDA ALETHEA JOHNSON. The assigned District
Judge has referred said motion to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for appropriate
action under 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)-(b), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, and S.D. Ala.
GenLR 72(a). See S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(b); (6/20/2024 electronic reference notation).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1914, “[t]he clerk of each district court shall require the
parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in such court, whether by
original process, removal or otherwise, to pay a filing fee” and “such additional
fees…as are prescribed by the Judicial Conference of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §
1914(a)-(b). However, a district court may grant a plaintiff permission to proceed
without prepayment of such fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which provides as follows:
[Generally], 	any 	court 	of 	the 	United 	States 	may 	authorize 	the
commencement, 	prosecution 	or 	defense 	of 	any 	suit, 	action 	or
proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of
fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that
includes a statement of all assets such [person] possesses [and] that the

person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. Such
affidavit shall state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and
affiant’s belief that the person is entitled to redress.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).1
“The in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, ensures that indigent persons
will have equal access to the judicial system.” Attwood v. Singletary, 105 F.3d 610,
612-613 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 446 (1962)).
However, “[t]here is no question that proceeding in forma pauperis is a privilege, not
a right,” Camp v. Oliver, 798 F.2d 434, 437 (11th Cir. 1986),2 and “should not be a
broad highway into the federal courts.” Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785
(11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). Nevertheless, “while a trial court has broad discretion
in denying an application to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915, it
must not act arbitrarily and it may not deny the application on erroneous grounds.”
Pace v. Evans, 709 F.2d 1428, 1429 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (citing Flowers v.
Turbine Support Div., 507 F.2d 1242, 1244 (5th Cir. 1975)); see also Martinez v.
Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (“[A] trial
court has wide discretion in denying an application to proceed IFP under 28 U.S.C. §
1915…However, in denying such applications a court must not act arbitrarily. Nor
1 	“Despite 	the 	statute’s 	use 	of 	the 	phrase 	‘prisoner 	possesses,’ 	the 	affidavit
requirement applies to all persons requesting leave to proceed IFP.” Martinez v.
Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306 n.1 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
2 Accord Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 722, 724 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Leave to proceed
IFP is, and always has been, the exception rather than the rule. To commence a civil
lawsuit in federal district court, the general rule is that initiating parties must
prepay a filing fee … To be sure, proceeding IFP in a civil case is a privilege, not a
right—fundamental or otherwise.”), abrogated on other grounds, Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199 (2007).

may it deny the application on erroneous grounds.” (quotation omitted)).
When 	considering 	a 	motion 	filed 	pursuant 	to 	§ 	1915(a), 	“[t]he 	only
determination to be made by the court ... is whether the statements in the
affidavit satisfy the requirement of poverty.” Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886,
891 ([5]th Cir. 1976). An affidavit addressing the statutory language should
be accepted by the court, absent a serious misrepresentation, and need not
show that the litigant is “absolutely destitute” to qualify for indigent status
under § 1915. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 338–
40, 69 S. Ct. 85, 88–89, 93 L. Ed. 43 (1948). Such an affidavit will be held
sufficient if it represents that the litigant, because of his poverty, is unable
to pay for the court fees and costs, and to support and provide necessities
for himself and his dependents. Id. at 339, 69 S. Ct. at 89. In other words,
the statute is not to be construed such that potential litigants are forced to
become public charges or abandon their claims because of the filing fee
requirements. Id. at 339–40, 69 S. Ct. at 89…The district court must
provide a sufficient explanation for its determination on IFP status to allow
for meaningful appellate review. O'Neal v. United States, 411 F.2d 131, 138
(5th Cir. 1969); Phipps v. King, 866 F.2d 824, 825 (6th Cir. 1988); Besecker
v. State of Ill., 14 F.3d 309, 310 (7th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307 (footnotes omitted).
“A court may not deny an IFP motion without first comparing the applicant's
assets and liabilities in order to determine whether he has satisfied the poverty
requirement.” Thomas v. Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit, 574 F. App'x 916, 917 (11th
Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished)3 (citing Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307-08). “The
question under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is whether the litigant is ‘unable to pay’ the costs,
and the answer has consistently depended in part on [the] litigant’s actual ability to
get funds from a spouse, a parent, an adult sibling, or other next friend.” Williams v.
Spencer, 455 F. Supp. 205, 209 (D. Md. 1978); see Fridman v. City of New York, 195
F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“In assessing an application to proceed in
3 In this Circuit, “[u]npublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but
they may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. R. 36-2.

forma pauperis, a court may consider the resources that the applicant has or ‘can get’
from those who ordinarily provide the applicant with the ‘necessities of life,’ such as
‘from a spouse, parent, adult sibling or other next friend.’ . . . If it appears that an
applicant’s ‘access to [ ] court has not been blocked by his financial condition; rather
[that] he is “merely in the position of having to weigh the financial constraints
imposed if he pursues [his position] against the merits of his case,”’ then a court
properly exercises its discretion to deny the application.”); Sellers v. United States,
881 F.2d 1061, 1063 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (funds “derived from family
sources” are relevant to IFP determination); Wilson v. Sargent, 313 F.3d 1315,
1319-20 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (same).4 “Federal Courts have frequently
4 	Most cases considering the ability of someone else to pay these costs for a
putative pauper focus on whether those costs can be borne by a close family
member—such as a spouse, parent, an adult sibling, or other next friend. 	E.g.,
Williams, 455 F. Supp. at 209; see also Pisano v. Astrue, Civil Action No. 11–30269–
KPN, 2012 WL 79188, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 10, 2012) (“A number of courts have come
to the same conclusion that the income and resources of a spouse, if not other close
family members as well, are relevant to the determination of indigency under 28
U.S.C. § 1915.”) (collecting cases); but see Fridman, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 537 (“In
assessing an application to proceed in forma pauperis, a court may consider the
resources that the applicant has or ‘can get’ from those who ordinarily provide
the applicant with the ‘necessities of life,’ such as ‘from a spouse, parent, adult
sibling or other next friend.’” (emphasis added)), Ginters v. Frazier, Civ. No. 07-4681
(JMR/RLE), 2008 WL 314701, at *2 n.1 (D. Minn. Feb. 4, 2008) (“Federal Courts
have frequently recognized that, for purposes of determining IFP eligibility, it is
appropriate to consider any support that an IFP applicant might receive from a
spouse, 	or 	from 	any 	other 	individual.” 	(emphasis 	added)), 	and 	Akkaraju 	v.
Ashcroft, No. 03 C 6447, 2003 WL 22232969, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2003) (“In
evaluating the funds available to in forma pauperis movants, courts may consider
the income or resources of interested persons, such as spouses and parents.”
(citation omitted and emphasis added)).
The undersigned requires this inquiry when it appears likely that a plaintiff’s

recognized that, for purposes of determining IFP eligibility, it is appropriate to
consider any support that an IFP applicant might receive from a spouse, or from any
other individual.” Ginters v. Frazier, Civ. No. 07-4681 (JMR/RLE), 2008 WL
314701, at *2 n.1 (D. Minn. Feb. 4, 2008) (emphasis added); accord Fridman, 195 F.
Supp. 2d at 537; Williams, 455 F. Supp. at 208-09; Akkaraju v. Ashcroft, No. 03 C
6447, 2003 WL 22232969, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2003) (“In evaluating the funds
available to in forma pauperis movants, courts may consider the income or resources
of interested persons, such as spouses and parents.” (citation omitted)).
Upon due consideration of the representations in the Plaintiff’s IFP motion
(Doc. 2), which is accompanied by an unsworn declaration by the Plaintiff made
under penalty of perjury under 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (Doc. 2-1), the undersigned finds it
is reasonably apparent that the Plaintiff lacks the means to pay the $405 filing fee
and other related costs without being deprived of the basic necessities of life. See
Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307 (one need not be “‘absolutely destitute’ to qualify for
indigent status under § 1915”). Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s IFP motion (Doc. 2) is
GRANTED.
This action shall proceed in accordance with the Court’s current Standing
Order 	4 	(effective 	January 	27, 	2023)
primary means of support is through such an individual. Cf. Escobedo v. Applebees,
787 F.3d 1226, 1228 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[I]t is an abuse of discretion to deny an IFP
application based upon a spouse's financial resources, unless there is a reasonable
inquiry into (a) whether the spouse's resources are actually available to the would-be
plaintiff and (b) whether the spouse in fact has sufficient funds, given his or her own
expenses, to assist in paying the fee.”).

(https://www.alsd.uscourts.gov/sites/alsd/files/STDO4.PDF), 	which 	adopts 	and
supplements 	the 	procedures 	set 	out 	in 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil 	Procedure,
Supplemental Rules for Social Security Actions Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (effective
Dec. 1, 2022).
DONE and ORDERED this the 21st day of June 2024.
/s/ Katherine P. Nelson
KATHERINE P. NELSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE