Reese v. Lovegood et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MARK A. REESE, 	*
*
Plaintiff, 	*
*
vs. 	* CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-00035-KD-B
*
DR. LOVEGOOD, et al., 	*
*
Defendants. 	*
ORDER
At 	the 	direction 	of 	the 	Court, 	Plaintiff 	Mark 	A. 	Reese, 	a
Mobile 	County 	Metro 	Jail 	inmate 	proceeding 	without 	an 	attorney,
filed 	an 	amended 	complaint 	seeking 	relief 	under 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1983
(Doc. 	16). 	Because 	Reese 	was 	granted 	leave 	to 	proceed 	in 	this
action 	without 	prepayment 	of 	fees 	and 	is 	seeking 	redress 	from
officers 	or 	employees 	of 	a 	governmental 	entity, 	his 	amended
complaint is subject to review under 28 U.S.C §§ 1915 and 1915A,1
which 	require 	the 	dismissal 	of 	a 	complaint, 	or 	any 	portion 	of 	a
complaint, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on
which 	relief 	may 	be 	granted, 	or 	seeks 	monetary 	relief 	against 	a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 	After a thorough review
of Reese’s amended complaint, and for the reasons discussed below,
the 	undersigned 	finds 	that 	the 	amended 	complaint 	is 	due 	to 	be
1 This case has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge
for appropriate action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 72, and S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(b).
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dismissed 	for 	failure 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	upon 	which 	relief 	may 	be
granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
In 	lieu 	of 	dismissal, 	however, 	Reese 	will 	be 	allowed 	a 	final
opportunity 	to 	amend 	his 	complaint. 	Plaintiff 	Reese 	is 	hereby
ORDERED 	to 	file 	a 	second 	amended 	complaint 	on 	or 	before 	June 	16,
2025.
I. 	Screening Standard
Because Reese is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis who
seeks redress from officers or employees of a governmental entity,
the 	Court 	has 	conducted 	an 	initial 	screening 	review 	of 	his
complaint 	pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	1915(e)(2)(B) 	and 	1915A.
Section 1915(e)(2)(B) requires a district court to dismiss an IFP
prisoner action if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to
state 	a 	claim 	on 	which 	relief 	may 	be 	granted, 	or 	seeks 	monetary
relief 	against 	a 	defendant 	who 	is 	immune 	from 	such 	relief. 	28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). 	Similarly, under § 1915A, a court
must 	review 	a 	prisoner’s 	complaint 	to 	identify 	cognizable 	claims
and 	must 	dismiss 	the 	complaint, 	or 	any 	portion 	of 	the 	complaint,
if 	the 	complaint 	is 	frivolous, 	malicious, 	fails 	to 	state 	a 	claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant 	who 	is 	immune 	from 	such 	relief. 	Id. 	at 	§ 	1915A(b)(1)-
(2). 	Dismissal 	for 	these 	reasons 	is 	mandatory 	rather 	than
discretionary.
---
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A 	claim 	is 	frivolous 	“when 	it 	appears 	the 	plaintiff 	has
‘little or no chance of success.’” 	Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392,
393 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (citation omitted). 	A court may
conclude a claim has little or no chance of success when the claim
is 	“based 	on 	an 	indisputably 	meritless 	legal 	theory,” 	when 	its
“factual contentions are clearly baseless,” or when the defendant
is immune from suit. 	Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
A 	complaint 	may 	be 	dismissed 	for 	failure 	to 	state 	a 	claim
upon 	which 	relief 	may 	be 	granted 	when 	it 	fails 	to 	“contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief 	that 	is 	plausible 	on 	its 	face.’” 	Ashcroft 	v. 	Iqbal, 	556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). 	This means that a complaint must have sufficient
factual 	allegations 	“to 	raise 	a 	right 	to 	relief 	above 	the
speculative level,” and the allegations must “show that the pleader
is 	entitled 	to 	relief.” 	Twombly, 	550 	U.S. 	at 	555, 	557.
“Threadbare 	recitals 	of 	the 	elements 	of 	a 	cause 	of 	action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 	Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678.
In 	reviewing 	Reese’s 	amended 	complaint, 	the 	Court 	liberally
construes his allegations, holding them to a more lenient standard
than those drafted by an attorney. 	See Tannenbaum v. United States,
148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). 	However, this
leniency does not give the Court license “to rewrite an otherwise
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deficient 	pleading 	in 	order 	to 	sustain 	an 	action.” 	Campbell 	v.
Air 	Jamaica 	Ltd., 	760 	F.3d 	1165, 	1168–69 	(11th 	Cir. 	2014)
(quotation 	omitted). 	Furthermore, 	the 	Court 	“accepts 	the
complaint’s factual allegations as true,” Daker v. Ward, 999 F.3d
1300, 	1307 	(11th 	Cir. 	2021), 	but 	it 	does 	not 	treat 	as 	true
conclusory 	assertions 	or 	a 	recitation 	of 	a 	cause 	of 	action’s
elements. 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. 	As a pro se litigant, Reese is
still 	“subject 	to 	the 	relevant 	law 	and 	rules 	of 	court, 	including
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 	Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d
835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989).
II. 	Summary of the Complaint
Read broadly, Reese’s amended complaint alleges that on July
27, 2024, Officers C. Norwood, J. Ellontrson, D. Davis, Q. Brown,
and 	A. 	Brown 	used 	excessive 	force 	against 	Reese. 	(See 	Doc. 	16).
As 	best 	the 	Court 	can 	discern, 	the 	incident 	allegedly 	began 	when
Officer 	Norwood 	falsely 	accused 	Reese 	of 	“jerking” 	away 	from 	her
during 	a 	“pat 	down.” 	(Id. 	at 	5). 	Though 	Reese 	denied 	“jerking
away” from the officer, Reese insinuates that it prompted Officer
Ellontrson 	to 	“push” 	Reese 	while 	he 	was 	following 	orders 	to 	pack
his 	bag. 	(Id.). 	Thereafter, 	Officers 	Davis, 	A. 	Brown, 	and 	Q.
Brown 	punched 	him 	in 	the 	face 	and 	on 	the 	side 	of 	the 	head, 	while
forcing 	his 	hands 	into 	handcuffs. 	(Id. 	at 	7). 	Reese 	claims 	he
did 	not 	receive 	a 	body 	chart 	after 	the 	incident 	but 	was 	instead
taken straight to another housing unit. 	(Id.).
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Reese is suing Officers Norwood, Ellontrson, Davis, A. Brown,
and 	Q. 	Brown 	for 	using 	excessive 	force 	against 	him. 	(Id. 	at 	11-
13). 	He 	is 	also 	suing 	NaphCare, 	Inc. 	as 	the 	entity 	hired 	to
provide 	health 	care 	and 	medical 	treatment 	at 	the 	Mobile 	County
Metro Jail (id. at 7, 13); District One Mobile County Commissioner
Merceria 	Ludgood2 as 	the 	supervisor 	responsible 	for 	hiring 	and
paying 	NaphCare, 	Inc. 	(id. 	at 	6); 	Sheriff 	Paul 	Burch 	as 	the
supervisor 	over 	the 	Mobile 	County 	Metro 	Jail 	and 	NaphCare, 	Inc.,
who 	is 	responsible 	for 	ensuring 	adequate 	medical 	treatment 	is
provided to inmates (id.); and Warden Sam Houston as the supervisor
over 	the 	Mobile 	County 	Metro 	Jail, 	its 	employees, 	and 	NaphCare,
Inc., 	who 	is 	also 	responsible 	for 	ensuring 	adequate 	medical
treatment is provided to inmates. 	(Id. at 8).
III. Discussion
To 	state 	a 	claim 	for 	relief 	under 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1983, 	a
plaintiff 	must 	allege 	facts 	showing 	that 	a 	person 	acting 	under
color of state law violated a specific federal constitutional right
or federal statutory provision. 	Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty.,
Fla., 	604 	F.3d 	1248, 	1265 	(11th 	Cir. 	2010); 	see 	also 	Harvey 	v.
Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992) (“A successful section
1983 action requires a showing that the conduct complained of (1)
was committed by a person acting under color of state law and (2)
2 Incorrectly named in the amended complaint as “Dr. Lovegood.”
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deprived 	the 	complainant 	of 	rights, 	privileges, 	or 	immunities
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”). 	Reese,
however, 	fails 	to 	connect 	the 	actions 	of 	named 	defendants 	to 	a
constitutional violation.
A. Claims Against Supervisory Defendants
In 	his 	amended 	complaint, 	Reese 	names 	Commissioner 	Merceria
Ludgood, Sheriff Paul Burch, Warden Sam Houston, and NaphCare, Inc.
as 	defendants 	in 	this 	action. 	The 	allegations 	asserted 	against
each are vague, conclusory, and directed solely at the defendant’s
role 	as 	a 	supervisor. 	“[T]he 	standard 	by 	which 	a 	supervisor 	is
held liable in [his or her] individual capacity for the actions of
a subordinate is extremely rigorous.” 	Christmas v. Harris County,
Ga., 	51 	F.4th 	1348, 	1355 	(11th 	Cir. 	2022) 	(quotation 	omitted).
There 	is 	no 	“vicarious 	liability, 	including 	respondeat 	superior,
in 	§ 	1983 	actions.” 	Goebert 	v. 	Lee 	County, 	510 	F.3d 	1312, 	1331
(11th Cir. 2007). 	Thus, a defendant “may not be sued under Section
1983 	for 	the 	acts 	of 	others 	but, 	rather, 	only 	for 	its 	own 	acts.”
Hamilton v. City of Jackson, 508 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1056 (S.D. Ala.
2007), 	aff’d, 	261 	F. 	App’x 	182 	(11th 	Cir. 	2008). 	Accordingly, 	a
plaintiff 	asserting 	a 	claim 	against 	a 	supervisory 	official 	under
42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1983 	must 	show 	a 	causal 	connection 	between 	the
supervisory defendant’s actions, orders, customs, or policies and
the 	alleged 	violation 	of 	the 	plaintiff’s 	rights. 	Zatler 	v.
Wainwright, 	802 	F.2d 	397, 	401 	(11th 	Cir. 	1986) 	(per 	curiam). 	A
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casual connection may be established by alleging sufficient facts
to show:
(1) 	a 	history 	of 	widespread 	abuse 	puts 	the 	responsible
supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged
deprivation, 	and 	he 	or 	she 	fails 	to 	do 	so; 	(2) 	a
supervisor’s 	custom 	or 	policy 	results 	in 	deliberate
indifference 	to 	constitutional 	rights; 	or 	(3) 	facts
support 	an 	inference 	that 	the 	supervisor 	directed
subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that subordinates
would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing
so.
Myrick v. Fulton County, Ga., 69 F.4th 1277, 1297 (11th Cir. 2023)
(quotation omitted).
Reese 	claims 	that 	these 	defendants, 	as 	supervisors, 	are
responsible 	for 	hiring, 	paying 	for, 	and/or 	ensuring 	that 	jail
inmates 	receive 	adequate 	medical 	treatment. 	The 	only 	factual
allegation 	found 	in 	the 	amended 	complaint 	related 	to 	inadequate
medical care, however, is Reese’s claim that he was denied a body
chart after force was used against him on July 27, 2024. 	He does
not 	describe 	his 	injury 	with 	specificity. 	He 	does 	not 	put 	forth
facts 	demonstrating 	that 	inmates 	are 	commonly 	denied 	body 	charts
after 	force 	is 	used 	against 	them, 	such 	that 	NaphCare, 	Inc. 	would
be aware of it (or could be seen as causing, directing, or allowing
it), or that Commissioner Ludgood, Sheriff Burch, or Warden Houston
were 	aware 	of 	a 	history 	of 	such 	conduct 	(or 	could 	be 	seen 	as
causing, 	directing, 	or 	allowing 	it). 	Neither 	does 	Reese 	allege
that he requested medical attention or that he was in obvious need
of medical attention but was denied it. 	Reese does not claim that
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any 	named 	defendant 	had 	a 	policy 	or 	custom 	that 	resulted 	in
inadequate healthcare being provided. 	And Reese asserts no factual
allegations 	suggesting 	that 	any 	named 	supervisory 	defendant
directed any subordinate to act unlawfully or to deny Reese medical
treatment, or that any supervisory defendant even knew Reese needed
medical treatment. 	Nor does Reese allege how the denial of a body
chart harmed him.
As 	currently 	pleaded, 	Reese’s 	allegations 	against 	the
supervisory defendants are insufficient to state a claim upon which
relief 	may 	be 	granted 	and 	are 	due 	to 	be 	dismissed 	pursuant 	to 	28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
The 	general 	rule 	in 	this 	circuit 	for 	pro 	se 	plaintiffs 	is
that 	“[w]here 	a 	more 	carefully 	drafted 	complaint 	might 	state 	a
claim, a plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the
complaint 	before 	the 	district 	court 	dismisses 	the 	action 	with
prejudice.” 	Bank 	v. 	Pitt, 	928 	F.2d 	1108, 	1112 	(11th 	Cir. 	1991)
(per 	curiam), 	overruled 	in 	part 	by 	Wagner 	v. 	Daewoo 	Heavy 	Indus.
Am. 	Corp., 	314 	F.3d 	541, 	542 	& 	n.1 	(11th 	Cir. 	2002) 	(en 	banc)
(overruling 	Bank’s 	one-chance-to-amend 	rule 	as 	to 	counseled
parties). 	However, “a district court need not grant leave to amend
when 	either 	(1) 	‘the 	district 	court 	has 	a 	clear 	indication 	that
the 	plaintiff 	does 	not 	want 	to 	amend 	his 	complaint,’ 	or 	(2) 	‘a
more 	carefully 	drafted 	complaint 	could 	not 	state 	a 	claim.’”
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Woldeab v. Dekalb Cty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir.
2018) (quoting Bank, 928 F.2d at 1112).
Upon 	consideration, 	Reese 	will 	be 	given 	another 	opportunity
to 	amend 	his 	complaint. 	See 	Lee 	v. 	Alachua 	County, 	Fla., 	461 	F.
App’x 859, 860 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (requiring that a pro
se litigant be given one chance to amend a complaint that fails to
state 	a 	claim 	before 	dismissing 	the 	complaint, 	but 	recognizing
that 	an 	amendment 	will 	not 	be 	allowed 	if 	it 	is 	futile, 	that 	is,
subject 	to 	being 	dismissed 	or 	to 	summary 	judgment). 	While 	the
Court 	previously 	laid 	out 	deficiencies 	in 	Reese’s 	original
complaint, 	Reese 	was 	not 	instructed 	specifically 	as 	to 	his
excessive force and denial of medical care claims. 	(See Doc. 3).
For this reason, the undersigned finds that Reese may benefit from
a final opportunity to amend his complaint.
B. Claims Against Officer Defendants
To 	state 	a 	claim 	of 	excessive 	force, 	Reese 	“must 	show 	. 	. 	.
that 	the 	force 	purposely 	or 	knowingly 	used 	against 	him 	was
objectively 	unreasonable. 	. 	. 	. 	A 	court 	must 	make 	this
determination from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene, including what that officer knew at the time, not with the
20/20 vision of hindsight.” 	Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389,
396-97 (2015). 	Whether the force used against Reese is considered
objectively unreasonable turns on the “facts and circumstances of
[his] 	particular 	case.” 	Id. 	at 	397 	(quotation 	omitted). 	Courts
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use 	the 	following 	six 	nonexclusive 	factors 	for 	determining 	the
reasonableness of force used:
(1) the relationship between the need for the use of force and
the amount of force used,
(2) the extent of the plaintiff’s injury,
(3) efforts made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount
of force,
(4) the severity of the security problem at issue,
(5) the threat reasonably perceived by the officer, and
(6) whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.
Id.
Based 	on 	Reese’s 	allegations, 	it 	is 	difficult 	for 	the
undersigned 	to 	get 	a 	clear 	and 	complete 	picture 	of 	the 	July 	27,
2024 incident. 	For instance, it appears that the officers were in
Reese’s cell to move him to another cell; however, Reese does not
state this or provide the reason why the officers were in his cell.
It appears from the allegations that the officers may have ordered
Reese 	to 	“pack 	a 	bag” 	and/or 	submit 	to 	handcuffs, 	yet 	Reese 	does
not specifically state this, nor does he indicate his response(s)
to the officers’ orders. 	Furthermore, Reese does not describe his
injury 	beyond 	claiming 	“disfigurement” 	of 	his 	hand. 	In 	total,
Reese’s 	allegations 	are 	vague 	and 	fail 	to 	provide 	the 	factual
---
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context in which the incident occurred, a full description of the
incident, and the injury or injuries sustained.3
Because Reese’s amended complaint is void of pertinent facts
relating 	to 	his 	excessive 	force 	claims, 	he 	will 	be 	given 	the
opportunity to amend these claims as well. 	With the legal standard
provided above for establishing an excessive force claim, Reese is
reminded 	that 	a 	complaint 	in 	federal 	court 	must 	contain 	“enough
facts 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	to 	relief 	that 	is 	plausible 	on 	its 	face.”
Twombly, 	550 	U.S. 	at 	570. 	“A 	claim 	has 	facial 	plausibility 	when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the 	reasonable 	inference 	that 	the 	defendant 	is 	liable 	for 	the
misconduct alleged.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 	To show a defendant
is 	liable 	for 	the 	misconduct 	alleged, 	a 	plaintiff 	is 	required 	to
include factual allegations that plausibly support each essential
element 	of 	his 	claim. 	Randall 	v. 	Scott, 	610 	F.3d 	701, 	708 	n.2
(11th Cir. 2010).
3 	Notably, 	the 	undersigned 	cannot 	discern 	from 	the 	amended
complaint whether Reese received medical treatment for his hand(s)
at a later date. 	It appears from the amended complaint that an x-
ray 	may 	have 	been 	performed 	on 	July 	29, 	2024 	(see 	Doc. 	16 	at 	5),
but 	there 	are 	no 	details 	describing 	what 	the 	diagnosis 	was, 	what
treatment 	was 	provided, 	who 	treated 	him, 	or 	how 	treatment 	was
obtained.
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IV. 	Conclusion
For the reasons discussed, Plaintiff Reese is hereby ORDERED
to file a second amended complaint on or before June 16, 2025.
Reese 	must 	draft 	and 	file 	his 	second 	amended 	complaint 	on
this Court’s form complaint for a prisoner action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. 	Reese must fully complete all applicable sections of the
complaint 	form. 	If 	additional 	pages 	are 	needed, 	Reese 	must
strictly 	follow 	the 	format 	contained 	in 	the 	form 	complaint 	when
completing the additional pages.
Reese 	is 	informed 	that 	his 	second 	amended 	complaint 	will
completely replace his previous complaint. 	Therefore, the amended
complaint 	shall 	not 	rely 	upon, 	reference, 	or 	seek 	to 	incorporate
by 	reference 	any 	portion 	of 	his 	prior 	complaints. 	See 	Dresdner
Bank 	AG 	v. 	M/V 	Olympia 	Voyager, 	463 	F.3d 	1210, 	1215 	(11th 	Cir.
2006) (stating that the original complaint is considered abandoned
and 	is 	no 	longer 	a 	part 	of 	the 	pleader’s 	allegations 	against 	his
adversary when an amended complaint is filed). 	Reese must include
every 	detail 	and 	claim 	he 	wants 	to 	bring 	against 	the 	defendants
within the second amended complaint, or it will not be considered
by the Court.
Reese is cautioned that if he does not file a second amended
complaint within the ordered time, or if he files a second amended
complaint that fails to comply with the pleading standards set out
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in this order, the undersigned will recommend that this action be
dismissed.
Reese 	is 	further 	cautioned 	that 	his 	failure 	to 	immediately
notify the Court in writing of a change in his address (e.g., when
he is transferred, released, etc.) will result in the dismissal of
this action for failure to prosecute and to comply with the Court’s
orders.
The Court will screen Reese’s second amended complaint under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A once it is filed.
The 	Clerk 	is 	DIRECTED 	to 	send 	Reese 	copies 	of 	this 	Court’s
form 	for 	a 	prisoner 	complaint 	under 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1983 	and 	his
amended complaint (Doc. 16), along with a copy of this order.
ORDERED this 15th day of May, 2025.
/s/ SONJA F. BIVINS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 1:25-cv-00035-KD-B Doc# 22 Filed 05/15/25 Page 13 of 13 PageID#
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