Miller v. Oreilly Auto Parts #1084

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RHONDA MILLER, )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:24-00453-KD-N
)
O’REILLY AUTO PARTS )
#1084, )
Defendant, )
ORDER
Plaintiff, Rhonda Miller, initiated this civil action without counsel (pro se) by filing
a complaint with the Court on December 5, 2024. See (Doc. 1).1 By separate order,
Miller has been granted leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing and
administrative fees for this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The assigned District
Judge has referred the complaint to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for
appropriate action under 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)-(b), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72,
and S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a). See S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(b); (12/05/2024 electronic
reference notation). Upon due consideration, the undersigned finds that Miller must
file an amended complaint to correct the defects described below.
1 Miller also submitted her EEOC “Right to Sue” letter dated 2024.10.03 (Doc. 2.).
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I. Analysis
A. Section 1915(e)
Because Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed without the prepayment of
filing fees, her complaint is subject to § 1915(e)(2), which states that “the court shall
dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—(A) the allegation of
poverty is untrue; or (B) the action …—(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” Because the “language of section
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),” the
same standards are applied for both. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th
Cir. 1997).
In general, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In other words, the complaint must contain “factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading
must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” As the United States Supreme Court has explained, this “does not
require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. … Nor does a complaint suffice if it
tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
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677-78 (citations and some quotations omitted); see also Duty Free Americas, Inc. v.
Estee Lauder Cos., Inc., 797 F.3d at 1262 (11th Cir. 2015) (Courts “afford no
presumption of truth to legal conclusions and recitations of the basic elements of a
cause of action.” (quoting Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246, 1248 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2013)
(per curiam)).
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a
complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Put another way, “where the
well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—'that the pleader is
entitled to relief.’ ” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). “[T]o determine what
the plaintiff must plausibly allege at the outset of a lawsuit, [courts] usually ask what
the plaintiff must prove in the trial at its end.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of African
Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 332 (2020).
Moreover, “‘the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.’ ” Am. Dental Ass'n v.
Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S at 678).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Importantly, … courts
may infer from the factual allegations in the complaint ‘obvious alternative
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explanation[s],’ which suggest lawful conduct rather than the unlawful conduct the
plaintiff would ask the court to infer.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
In addition, under § 1915, courts have “not only the authority to dismiss a claim
based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce
the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless.” Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir.
2008) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)).
While courts construe pro se filings liberally and hold the allegations of a pro
se complaint to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,
this leniency “does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or
to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v.
Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014). The Federal Rules require
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Importantly, … courts may infer from the factual
allegations in the complaint ‘obvious alternative explanation[s],’ which suggest lawful
conduct rather than the unlawful conduct the plaintiff would ask the court to infer.”
Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1237, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679). As the United States Supreme Court has explained, “[a] pleading
that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid
of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78 (citations omitted); see also
Duty Free, 797 F.3d at 1262 (Courts “‘afford no presumption of truth to legal
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conclusions and recitations of the basic elements of a cause of action.’” (quoting
Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246, 1248 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam)).
The allegations indicate that Miller worked for O’Reilly Auto Parts from May
to August of 2024. During that time, the following is alleged to have occurred:
• Miller worked as a shift manager, and employees were disrespectful because
of her race and age, including extreme outlashing and unethical comments.
Two specific individuals were disrespectful, and one cursed her out.
• She filed a written complaint and received no response from her employer.
• The management team held a loss prevention meeting with Miller,
questioning the use of her store discount, which she claims was retaliation.
(Doc. 1, PageID.1-3).
Miller, utilizing the local EEOC complaint form, also indicated:
• She left the job voluntarily.
• Miller checked “Mental Disability” for an action pursuant to the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).
(Doc. 1, PageID.2)
B. Correcting the Pleading
As an initial point, there is no civil cover sheet attached, which is required for
all civil actions pursuant to S.D. Ala. CivLR 3(a).2
2 This form will be provided alongside this order, which Miller should complete and
file with her amended complaint.
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The general rule in this circuit for pro se plaintiffs is that “[w]here a more
carefully drafted complaint might state a claim, a plaintiff must be given at least one
chance to amend the complaint before the district court dismisses the action with
prejudice.” Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam), overruled
in part by Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 & n.1 (11th
Cir. 2002) (en banc) (overruling Bank's one-chance-to-amend rule as to counseled
parties). “A claim should not be dismissed … unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief.” Id. at 1111-12.
Accordingly, Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to amend her complaint to
provide enough well-pleaded factual matter plausibly stating claims for relief, in
accordance with the standards set out above. Miller’s complaint most supports a
claim for retaliation under Title VII. However, it fails to sufficiently indicate any
adverse action taken by the employer. Therefore, in addition to the above
requirements, Miller must amend her complaint to further:
• State with sufficient clarity the employment action that occurred.
• Provide well-pleaded facts of a causal connection between the protected
activity and the employment action.
“To establish a prima facia case of unlawful retaliation, a plaintiff must show
that: (1) he engaged in an activity statutorily protected under Title VII; (2) he suffered
an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the
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protected activity and the adverse action.” Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d
1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001). This requires showing an adverse change in terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment. See West v. Butler Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 2024
WL 2697987, at *2 (11th Cir. 2024)
To the extent she wishes to bring a Title VII claim, a prima facie case shows
that she is a member of a protected class, was subjected to an adverse action, and
that her employer treated similarly situated employees outside her protected class
more favorably. Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cnty., 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006).
She need not establish a “significant” or “serious” adverse action. Muldrow v. City of
St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 350, 353 (2024). But there must be some change in an
identifiable employment term or condition that left her worse off. Murray v. Learjet,
Inc., 2024 WL 4707968, at *2 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 354-55,
359).
Additionally, Miller’s use of the local form likely resulted in inadvertent
error. The checked box for “Mental Disability” pertains to the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), not Title VII (on the Court’s form, the paragraphs
correspond to the boxes below, not above). No allegations are made that would
support an ADA claim.
To the extent Miller wishes to bring any allegations of age discrimination,
those claims fall under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Under
the ADEA, it is “unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
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compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's age.” Anderson v. Embarq/Sprint, 379 F. App'x 924, 929 (11th Cir. 2010)
(citing Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir.2000)). A prima facie
case under the ADEA demonstrates that she “was (1) a member of the protected age
group, (2) subjected to an adverse employment action, (3) qualified to do the job, and
(4) replaced by or otherwise lost a position to a younger individual.” Id. at 929 (citing
Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024).
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, Plaintiff is ORDERED to file, no
later than May 14th, 2025, an amended complaint that addresses and cures the
defects discussed above. The failure to do so will result in entry by the undersigned
of a recommendation that the Court dismiss this action under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, and/or
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) and the Court's inherent authority for
failure to obey an order, see Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333,
1337 (11th Cir. 2005). The amended complaint, if filed, must reproduce the entire
complaint “as amended and may not incorporate any prior pleading by reference[,]”
S.D. Ala. CivLR 15(a), and it will become the operative complaint in this action.
For her convenience, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff a copy
of (1) the Court's EEOC Complaint Form , (2) a civil cover sheet (AO Form JS 44),
and (3) a copy of this order. However, Plaintiff is advised that neither the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Court's Local Rules require use of this form for civil
complaints.
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NOTICE TO PRO SE PLAINTIFF
The Plaintiff is advised that “[a]ll persons proceeding pro se shall be bound by,
and must comply with, all Local Rules of this Court, as well as the Federal Rules of
Civil ... Procedure, unless excused by Court order.” S.D. Ala. GenLR 83.5(a). See also
Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[O]nce a pro se IFP litigant is
in court, he is subject to the relevant law and rules of court, including the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. These rules provide for sanctions for misconduct and for
failure to comply with court orders.”); United States v. Hung Thien Ly, 646 F.3d 1307,
1315 (11th Cir. 2011) (“A pro se [party] must follow the rules of procedure and
evidence and the district court has no duty to act as his lawyer...” (citation omitted)).
For instance, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a) requires that any paper
filed with the Court be signed by a pro se party personally and provide that party's
“address, e-mail address, and telephone number.” See also S.D. Ala. GenLR 5(a)(4)
(“For filings by pro se litigants, the unrepresented party shall personally sign each
document filed and shall include, directly beneath the signature line, his or her name,
address and telephone number.”). Unless and until the Plaintiff registers with the
Clerk of Court to electronically file with the Court, see Administrative Procedure for
Electronic Filing in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Alabama, § III(B) (last revised 2/1/2019);3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d)(3), the Plaintiff must
3 (https://www.alsd.uscourts.gov/sites/alsd/files/AdminPro.pdf)
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handwrite her signature in order to satisfy Rule 11(a).4 “The court must strike an
unsigned paper unless the omission is promptly corrected after being called to the
attorney's or party's attention.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a). Repeated failures to follow this
or any other court rule or order may result in additional sanctions, up to and including
dismissal of this action. See Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333,
1337 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that a court may dismiss an action on its own
motion as a sanction for failure to obey rules and orders, under both Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(b) and the court's inherent authority); Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d
835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (“While dismissal is an extraordinary remedy, dismissal
upon disregard of an order, especially where the litigant has been forewarned,
generally is not an abuse of discretion.”).
Under this Court's local rules, “[a]ny person proceeding pro se must, at all
times during the pendency of the action to which he or she is a party, keep the Clerk
informed of his or her current address and ... must promptly notify the Clerk of any
change of address ... Failure to comply with this Rule may result in sanction,
including dismissal of a pro se plaintiff's action...” S.D. Ala. GenLR 83.5(b).
4 See Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 763–64 (2001) (“Becker maintains that
typing one's name satisfies the signature requirement and that his original notice of
appeal, containing his name typed above “(Counsel of Record),” met Civil Rule
11(a)'s instruction...[H]owever, we are not disposed to extend the meaning of the
word ‘signed,’ as that word appears in Civil Rule 11(a), to permit typed names. As
Rule 11(a) is now framed, we read the requirement of a signature to indicate, as a
signature requirement commonly does, and as it did in John Hancock's day, a name
handwritten (or a mark handplaced).”).
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Additionally, any “request for Court action must be presented by motion and may not
be presented by informal means such as a letter.” S.D. Ala. GenLR 7.5
DONE and ORDERED this the 15th Day of April 2025.
/s/ Katherine P. Nelson
KATHERINE P. NELSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
5 The Court's Local Rules and standing orders can be accessed at:
https://www.alsd.uscourts.gov/court-info/local-rules-and-orders
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