Springhill Avenue United Methodist Church, Inc. v. Lloyd's of London et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SPRINGHILL AVENUE UNITED 	*
METHODIST CHURCH, INC., 	*
*
Plaintiff, 	*
* CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-00375-KD-B
vs. 	*
*
LLOYD’S OF LONDON, et al., 	*
*
Defendants. 	*
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This action is before the Court on Plaintiff Springhill Avenue
United 	Methodist 	Church, 	Inc.’s 	motion 	to 	remand 	(Doc. 	5). 	The
motion, 	which 	has 	been 	fully 	briefed, 	has 	been 	referred 	to 	the
undersigned Magistrate Judge for consideration and recommendation
pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	636(b)(1). 	Upon 	consideration 	of 	all
matters 	presented, 	the 	undersigned 	recommends, 	for 	the 	reasons
stated herein, that Plaintiff’s motion to remand be DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Complaint and Answer
On May 23, 2024, Plaintiff Springhill Avenue United Methodist
Church, 	Inc. 	(“Plaintiff”) 	commenced 	this 	action 	in 	the 	Circuit
Court 	of 	Mobile 	County, 	Alabama, 	by 	filing 	a 	complaint 	against
Defendants 	Lloyd’s 	of 	London, 	Lloyd’s 	Market 	Association, 	The
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London (collectively, “Lloyd’s”),
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and Nations Roof Gulf Coast, LLC (“Nations Roof”).1 	(Doc. 1-2 at
8-95).
In 	the 	complaint, 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	it 	hired 	Nations
Roof 	to 	replace 	the 	roofs 	of 	its 	sanctuary 	and
administration/education 	buildings 	after 	Hurricane 	Sally 	caused
extensive 	damage 	to 	its 	church 	property 	in 	September 	2020. 	(Id.
at 	9, 	13). 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	it 	“began 	to 	observe 	moisture
damage and leaking on the interior” of the buildings shortly after
Nations 	Roof 	completed 	its 	work, 	and 	subsequent 	inspection
revealed 	that 	Nations 	Roof 	had 	“failed 	to 	properly 	install 	the
roof systems and associated components.” 	(Id. at 14). 	Plaintiff
states that Nations Roof “was provided with multiple opportunities
to 	correct 	the 	deficiencies 	with 	both 	roof 	systems,” 	but 	it
“refused 	to 	address 	and/or 	correct 	the 	deficiencies.” 	(Id. 	at
15). 	Plaintiff asserts causes of action against Nations Roof for
negligence, 	wantonness, 	and 	violation 	of 	the 	Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. 	(Id. at
17-21).
Plaintiff 	further 	asserts 	that 	it 	notified 	Lloyd’s 	of 	the
water 	issues, 	but 	Lloyd’s 	“blamed 	the 	damage 	on 	Nations 	Roof 	. 	.
1 	The 	complaint 	also 	names 	several 	fictitious 	defendants, 	“a
practice 	which 	is 	allowed 	under 	the 	[Alabama] 	state 	procedural
rules” but “is not generally recognized under the Federal Rules of
Civil 	Procedure.” 	Collins 	v. 	Fingerhut 	Companies, 	Inc., 	117 	F.
Supp. 2d 1283, 1285 n.1 (S.D. Ala. 2000).
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. 	and 	failed 	to 	compensate 	Plaintiff 	under 	the 	Hurricane 	Sally
insurance 	claim 	and/or 	a 	supplemental 	claim.” 	(Id. 	at 	14).
Plaintiff alleges that Lloyd’s failed to investigate its claim and
failed 	to 	compensate 	it 	for 	the 	losses 	sustained 	as 	a 	result 	of
Hurricane 	Sally. 	(Id. 	at 	10-13). 	Plaintiff 	states 	that 	it
“suffered substantial damage” as a result of the improper conduct
of Lloyd’s, including “loss of benefits owed under the Policy, the
value of the monies due and loss of use and income.” 	(Id. at 16).
Plaintiff 	asserts 	causes 	of 	action 	against 	Lloyd’s 	for 	breach 	of
contract 	and 	bad 	faith 	failure 	to 	pay 	insurance 	proceeds 	and
failure to investigate, seeking compensatory and punitive damages.
(Id. at 15-17).
On 	July 	3, 	2024, 	Lloyd’s 	filed 	an 	answer 	to 	Plaintiff’s
complaint 	in 	state 	court, 	which 	noted 	that 	“Defendants 	Certain
Underwriters 	at 	Lloyd’s, 	London 	Subscribing 	to 	Certificate 	No.
RSK008907” were “improperly named in the Complaint as ‘Lloyd’s of
London,’ 	‘Lloyd’s 	Market 	Association,’ 	and 	‘the 	Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London.’” 	(Id. at 148-61).
B. 	Removal
On October 9, 2024, Nations Roof removed this case to federal
court 	with 	the 	consent 	of 	Lloyd’s. 	(Doc. 	1). 	In 	the 	notice 	of
removal, 	Nations 	Roof 	asserts 	the 	existence 	of 	federal 	question
jurisdiction 	pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1331, 	“because 	this 	action
arises 	under 	the 	Magnuson-Moss 	Warranty 	Act 	and 	the 	amount 	in
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controversy exceeds $50,000, as required by the Act.” 	(Id. at 4-
7). 	Nations Roof further asserts that this Court has supplemental
jurisdiction 	over 	Plaintiff’s 	state 	law 	claims 	pursuant 	to 	28
U.S.C. § 1367. 	(Id. at 7-8). 	Nations Roof states that its removal
is 	“timely 	pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1446(b) 	because 	Nations 	Roof
has not been properly served.” 	(Id. at 9).
C. 	Motion to Remand
On 	November 	7, 	2024, 	Plaintiff 	filed 	the 	instant 	motion 	to
remand 	this 	action 	to 	state 	court. 	(Doc. 	5). 	In 	the 	motion 	to
remand, 	Plaintiff 	asserts 	that 	this 	action 	is 	due 	to 	be 	remanded
(1) because Nations Roof’s notice of removal was “untimely filed”
more 	than 	thirty 	days 	after 	Nations 	Roof 	was 	“properly 	served”
with the summons and complaint in accordance with Alabama law, and
(2) because Nations Roof failed to show that this Court has federal
question 	jurisdiction 	over 	this 	action 	pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
1331. 	(Id. at 1-2).
Plaintiff 	contends 	that 	it 	served 	Nations 	Roof 	by 	certified
mail 	on 	May 	31, 	2024, 	via 	Nations 	Roof’s 	registered 	agent 	for
service 	of 	process 	- 	“CSC 	Lawyers 	Incorporating 	Service, 	Inc.
located 	at 	150 	South 	Perry 	Street, 	Montgomery, 	Alabama 	36104.”
(Id. 	at 	2, 	5). 	Plaintiff 	states 	that 	“proof 	of 	such 	service 	was
provided 	to 	Nations 	Roof’s 	counsel, 	David 	Gersh, 	via 	e-mail 	on
August 	19, 	2024,” 	and 	“Nations 	Roof’s 	attorney 	confirmed
acceptance 	of 	the 	Summons 	and 	Complaint 	via 	email” 	on 	the 	same
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day. 	(Id. 	at 	6). 	Thus, 	Plaintiff 	posits 	that 	Nations 	Roof 	was
also 	“properly 	served 	via 	its 	‘corporate 	counsel’ 	on 	August 	19,
2024.” 	(Id.). 	Plaintiff 	states 	that 	its 	“counsel 	provided
numerous extensions of time to [Nations Roof] to file an Answer to
the 	Complaint” 	and 	“was 	extremely 	patient 	with 	Defendant 	Nations
Roof 	and 	their 	attorneys 	by 	providing 	several 	extension 	of 	time
for the Defendant to file an Answer or other responsive pleading.”
(Id.).
Plaintiff further argues in the motion to remand that Nations
Roof has not shown the existence of federal question jurisdiction
under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1331 	because 	it 	has 	not 	demonstrated 	a
“substantial federal question . . . so as to confer subject matter
jurisdiction 	on 	this 	Court.” 	(Id. 	at 	7). 	Plaintiff 	posits 	that
the 	“simple 	fact 	that 	the 	Plaintiff 	alleged 	the 	Magnuson-Moss
Warranty 	Act 	in 	addition 	to 	state 	law 	causes 	of 	action 	does 	not
confer substantial federal question jurisdiction upon this Court.”
(Id. 	at 	8). 	Thus, 	Plaintiff 	maintains 	that 	“Nations 	Roof 	has
failed 	to 	meet 	its 	burden 	of 	showing 	the 	existence 	of 	subject
matter jurisdiction over a substantial federal question involving
interpretation 	of 	federal 	law 	and 	this 	matter 	was 	improperly
removed.” 	(Id. at 9).
Plaintiff 	requests 	that 	the 	Court 	enter 	an 	order 	“remanding
this 	matter 	to 	the 	Circuit 	Court 	of 	Mobile 	County, 	Alabama 	and
further 	tax 	costs, 	expenses, 	and 	attorney’s 	fees 	to 	Defendant
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Nations 	Roof 	which 	were 	incurred 	by 	the 	Plaintiff 	as 	a 	result 	of
this obviously improper removal.” 	(Id.).
D. 	Response in Opposition to Motion to Remand
In 	its 	response 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	motion, 	Nations 	Roof 	denies
that it was ever properly served with the summons and complaint in
this case. 	(Doc. 7 at 1-2). 	Nations Roof asserts that “on April
28, 	2017, 	Nations 	Roof 	changed 	the 	name 	and 	address 	of 	its
registered 	agent 	to 	Corporation 	Service 	Company, 	Inc., 	641 	South
Lawrence Street, Montgomery, Alabama 36104.” 	(Id. at 3). 	Nations
Roof 	states 	that 	“Plaintiff 	attempted 	to 	serve 	Nations 	Roof 	by
serving CSC Lawyers Incorporating Service, Inc. at 150 South Perry
Street, Montgomery, Alabama 36104, but that was not Nations Roof’s
registered 	agent 	address 	at 	the 	time.” 	(Id. 	at 	2-3 	(emphasis 	in
original)). 	Thus, Nations Roof contends that Plaintiff’s May 31,
2024 service attempt was ineffective because it was made on Nations
Roof’s 	former 	registered 	agent 	at 	its 	former 	registered 	office
address. 	(Id. at 6). 	Nations Roof states: “By contending that it
attempted to serve Nations Roof through its registered agent at a
former address, Plaintiff concedes that it did not properly serve
Nations Roof . . . .” 	(Id.).
Nations Roof likewise contends that “emailing Nations Roof’s
general counsel a copy of the summons and complaint is not proper
service 	of 	process.” 	(Id.). 	Nations 	Roof 	notes 	that 	“‘strict
compliance 	with 	the 	rules 	regarding 	service 	of 	process 	is
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required’” under Alabama law, and it contends that Plaintiff cannot
meet 	its 	burden 	of 	establishing 	proper 	service 	of 	process. 	(Id.
at 	7 	(citation 	omitted)). 	Nations 	Roof 	asserts 	that 	its 	mere
awareness 	of 	this 	“lawsuit 	does 	not 	constitute 	proper 	service 	of
process under Alabama law, nor is that awareness a waiver of proper
service.” 	(Id. 	at 	6). 	Nations 	Roof 	contends 	that 	it 	“was 	never
properly 	served 	with 	a 	copy 	of 	the 	summons 	and 	the 	complaint, 	so
its 30-day window to file a notice of removal was never triggered,”
and its removal was therefore not untimely. 	(Id. at 8).
Nations Roof further argues that “courts routinely hold that
a 	claim 	under 	the 	Magnuson-Moss 	Warranty 	Act 	[creates] 	federal
question 	jurisdiction 	under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1331.” 	(Id. 	at 	9-10
(collecting 	cases)). 	Nations 	Roof 	states 	that 	the 	substantial
federal 	question 	doctrine 	“arises 	only 	when 	there 	is 	a 	state-law
cause of action that turns on a question of federal law.” 	(Id. at
12-13 	(emphasis 	in 	original)). 	Thus, 	Nations 	Roof 	contends 	that
“the substantial federal question doctrine does not apply in this
case” 	because 	Plaintiff’s 	complaint 	“asserted 	a 	cause 	of 	action
under 	the 	Magnuson-Moss 	Warranty 	Act, 	which 	is 	a 	federal 	statute
that creates this Court’s federal question jurisdiction.” 	(Id. at
12).
E. 	Reply in Support of Motion to Remand
In its reply brief, Plaintiff maintains its position that it
properly served Nations Roof by certified mail via its registered
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agent 	on 	May 	31, 	2024. 	Plaintiff 	states 	that 	Nations 	Roof’s
“Annual 	Report 	which 	was 	filed 	on 	March 	27, 	2024, 	approximately
two 	(2) 	months 	prior 	to 	the 	filing 	of 	the 	present 	Complaint,
identified the registered agent as CSC Lawyers Incorporating SRVC
INC, located at 150 South Perry Street, Montgomery, Alabama 36104.”
(Doc. 	10 	at 	4). 	Thus, 	Plaintiff 	contends 	that 	“the 	Summons 	and
Complaint were properly served upon the registered agent Defendant
Nations 	Roof 	had 	designated 	in 	its 	most 	recent 	filed 	Annual
Report.” 	(Id.). 	Plaintiff 	further 	argues 	that 	“at 	a 	minimum,”
Nations 	Roof 	was 	properly 	served 	in 	accordance 	with 	Federal 	Rule
of 	Civil 	Procedure 	4(h)(1)(B) 	when 	“the 	Summons, 	Complaint 	and
Service Documents” were “delivered [by email] to [Nations Roof’s]
corporate counsel, as its general agent, on August 19, 2024.” 	(Id.
at 5). 	Thus, Plaintiff maintains that remand is warranted because
it 	properly 	served 	Nations 	Roof 	more 	than 	thirty 	days 	prior 	to
Nations 	Roof’s 	“untimely 	filing” 	of 	the 	notice 	of 	removal. 	(Id.
at 7).
F. 	Surreply in Opposition to Motion to Remand
The 	Court 	granted 	Nations 	Roof 	leave 	to 	file 	a 	surreply 	to
address 	the 	new 	law 	and 	arguments 	raised 	in 	Plaintiff’s 	reply
brief. 	(See 	Docs. 	11, 	12). 	In 	its 	surreply, 	Nations 	Roof 	first
disputes 	Plaintiff’s 	contention 	that 	it 	perfected 	service 	on
Nations Roof by emailing Nations Roof’s general counsel copies of
the summons and complaint. 	(Doc. 13 at 1-3). 	Nations Roof asserts
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that “[t]his is not proper service of process” because: (1) “Rule
4 	of 	the 	Federal 	and 	Alabama 	Rules 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	do 	not
provide for service of process by email”; (2) “the Eleventh Circuit
has 	made 	it 	abundantly 	clear 	that 	merely 	sending 	a 	copy 	of 	the
complaint and summons by email does not constitute proper service
of process”; and (3) “the Eleventh Circuit has also made it clear
that 	a 	defendant’s 	actual 	notice 	of 	the 	lawsuit 	does 	not 	itself
excuse 	or 	establish 	valid 	service 	under 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	4 	. 	. 	.
[and] notice to a defendant’s attorney does not either.” 	(Id. at
1-2 (emphasis in original) (quotations omitted)).
Nations 	Roof 	further 	asserts 	that 	a 	“cursory 	review 	of 	the
Alabama 	Secretary 	of 	State 	website 	confirms” 	that 	its 	current
registered 	agent 	name 	and 	registered 	office 	address 	are 	“readily
and 	publicly 	available.” 	(Id. 	at 	3). 	Nations 	Roof 	provides 	a
screenshot 	from 	the 	Alabama 	Secretary 	of 	State’s 	online 	business
entity records, which list the registered agent name and registered
office 	address 	for 	Nations 	Roof 	as 	“CORPORATION 	SERVICE 	COMPANY
INC, 	641 	SOUTH 	LAWRENCE 	STREET, 	MONTGOMERY, 	AL 	36104.” 	(Id. 	at
4). 	Nations 	Roof 	provides 	a 	screenshot 	from 	the 	same 	business
entity 	records 	reflecting 	that 	Nations 	Roof’s 	“Registered 	Agent
Changed From” “CSC-LAWYERS INCORPORATING SRVC INC, 150 SOUTH PERRY
STREET, 	MONTGOMERY, 	AL 	36104” 	on 	“04/28/2017.” 	(Id.). 	Nations
Roof 	also 	includes 	a 	screenshot 	from 	the 	same 	business 	entity
records indicating that “the Registered Agent Change Form has been
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available 	publicly 	since 	April 	28, 	2017,” 	and 	is 	available 	for
purchase 	online. 	(Id. 	at 	5). 	Thus, 	Nations 	Roof 	contends 	that
“Plaintiff 	had 	all 	the 	information 	necessary 	to 	properly 	serve
Nations Roof but failed to do so.” 	(Id.).
Having 	been 	fully 	briefed, 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	to 	remand 	is
ripe for resolution.
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Plaintiff’s motion to remand challenges this Court’s subject
matter 	jurisdiction, 	so 	the 	undersigned 	must 	address 	this 	issue
first. 	Removal 	of 	a 	civil 	case 	from 	state 	to 	federal 	court 	is
proper 	only 	if 	the 	case 	could 	have 	originally 	been 	brought 	in
federal 	court. 	See 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1441(a). 	“A 	removing 	defendant
must 	establish 	the 	propriety 	of 	removal 	under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1441
and, 	therefore, 	must 	demonstrate 	the 	existence 	of 	federal
jurisdiction.” 	Whitney 	Nat. 	Bank 	v. 	Lakewood 	Invs., 	2011 	U.S.
Dist. 	LEXIS 	83775, 	at 	*7, 	2011 	WL 	3267160, 	at 	*2 	(S.D. 	Ala. 	July
28, 	2011); 	see 	Adventure 	Outdoors, 	Inc. 	v. 	Bloomberg, 	552 	F.3d
1290, 	1294 	(11th Cir. 	2008); 	Friedman 	v. 	New 	York 	Life 	Ins. 	Co.,
410 	F.3d 	1350, 	1353 	(11th 	Cir. 	2005). 	“Because 	removal
jurisdiction 	raises 	significant 	federalism 	concerns, 	federal
courts are directed to construe removal statutes strictly.” 	Univ.
of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999).
“Indeed, all doubts about jurisdiction should be resolved in favor
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of remand to state court.” 	Id.
“Absent 	diversity 	of 	citizenship, 	federal-question
jurisdiction is required.” 	Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S.
386, 	392 	(1987). 	Federal 	district 	courts 	have 	original
jurisdiction 	over 	“all 	civil 	actions 	arising 	under 	the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 	28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. 	“The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction
is 	governed 	by 	the 	‘well-pleaded 	complaint 	rule,’ 	which 	provides
that 	federal 	jurisdiction 	exists 	only 	when 	a 	federal 	question 	is
presented 	on 	the 	face 	of 	the 	plaintiff’s 	properly 	pleaded
complaint.” 	Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. 	“As a general rule, a
case 	arises 	under 	federal 	law 	only 	if 	it 	is 	federal 	law 	that
creates 	the 	cause 	of 	action.” 	Diaz 	v. 	Sheppard, 	85 	F.3d 	1502,
1505 (11th Cir. 1996); see also Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292,
1310 (11th Cir. 2001) (“A well-pleaded complaint presents a federal
question where it establishes either that federal law creates the
cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily
depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.”)
(quotation omitted). 	“These principles apply with equal force in
the 	removal 	context.” 	Smith 	v. 	Pickens, 	2017 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS
178954, at *4, 2017 WL 4876785, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 27, 2017).
As noted previously, Nations Roof removed this case based on
its 	contention 	that 	there 	is 	federal 	question 	jurisdiction 	under
28 U.S.C. § 1331 because count five of Plaintiff’s complaint claims
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that 	Nations 	Roof 	violated 	the 	Magnuson-Moss 	Warranty 	Act, 	15
U.S.C. 	§ 	2301 	et 	seq. 	(“MMWA”). 	“The 	MMWA 	creates 	two 	causes 	of
action: (1) a federal right of action for breach of an express or
implied warranty, and (2) a right of action for violations of the
Act’s requirements, such as not disclosing terms and conditions or
improperly disclaiming implied warranties.” 	Sorrentino v. FCA, US
LLC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 246193, at *5, 2019 WL 13224961, at *2
(S.D. Fla. July 29, 2019) (quoting Kuns v. Ford Motor Co., 926 F.
Supp. 	2d 	976, 	983 	(N.D. 	Ohio), 	aff’d, 	543 	F. 	App’x 	572 	(6th 	Cir.
2013)). 	“The 	MMWA 	is 	a 	somewhat 	unique 	federal 	statute 	in 	that
merely 	alleging 	a 	violation 	of 	the 	act 	is 	insufficient 	to 	confer
federal 	question 	jurisdiction; 	a 	separate 	$50,000 	amount 	in
controversy requirement must also be satisfied.” 	Schultz v. Gen.
R.V. Ctr., 512 F.3d 754, 757 (6th Cir. 2008).2
2 According to the MMWA: “No claim shall be cognizable [in federal
court] . . . if the amount in controversy is less than the sum or
value 	of 	$50,000 	(exclusive 	of 	interests 	and 	costs) 	computed 	on
the 	basis 	of 	all 	claims 	to 	be 	determined 	in 	this 	suit.” 	See 	15
U.S.C. 	§ 	2310(d)(3)(B). 	The 	“relevant 	amount 	in 	controversy 	is
that 	applicable 	to 	[Plaintiff’s] 	MMWA 	cause 	of 	action, 	not 	that
for 	[its] 	pendent 	state-law 	claims.” 	Parker 	v. 	Exterior
Restorations, Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 240280, at *10, 2021 WL
6335336, at *4 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 16, 2021).
[T]o 	calculate 	the 	amount 	in 	controversy 	for 	an 	MMWA
claim, 	courts 	must 	“resort 	to 	state 	law 	. 	. 	. 	in
determining 	the 	applicable 	measure 	of 	damages.”
MacKenzie 	v. 	Chrysler 	Corp., 	607 	F.2d 	1162, 	1166 	(5th
Cir. 1979). 	And, under Alabama law, damages recoverable
under 	a 	breach 	of 	warranty 	claim 	are 	measured 	by 	“the
difference . . . between the value of the goods accepted
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In its motion to remand, Plaintiff asserts that its cause of
action under the MMWA does not confer federal question jurisdiction
under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1331 	because 	it 	does 	not 	require 	resolution 	of
a 	“substantial 	federal 	question.” 	(See 	Doc. 	5 	at 	7-9). 	In 	its
response, 	Nations 	Roof 	argues 	that 	“the 	substantial 	federal
question 	doctrine 	does 	not 	apply 	in 	this 	case” 	because 	Plaintiff
“asserted 	a 	cause 	of 	action 	under 	the 	[MMWA], 	which 	is 	a 	federal
statute that creates this Court’s federal question jurisdiction.”
(Doc. 	7 	at 	12). 	Nations 	Roof 	expounds 	that 	the 	“substantial
federal 	question 	doctrine 	arises 	only 	when 	there 	is 	a 	state-law
and 	the 	value 	they 	would 	have 	had 	if 	they 	had 	been 	as
warranted,” 	though 	“any 	incidental 	and 	consequential
damages . . . may also be recovered.” 	Ala. Code § 7-2-
714(2)-(3).
Brown v. Ford Motor Co., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115113, at *13 n.4,
2021 WL 2533020, at *5 n.4 (N.D. Ala. June 21, 2021).
Nations 	Roof 	asserts 	that 	the 	requisite 	amount 	in 	controversy
for 	a 	claim 	under 	the 	MMWA 	“is 	readily 	met” 	in 	this 	case,
“considering that (1) the value of the roofs installed by Nations
Roof 	exceeded 	$324,386, 	and 	Plaintiff 	claims 	the 	roofs 	were 	not
installed 	as 	warranted; 	(2) 	Plaintiff 	claims 	it 	suffered
‘significant damages’ as a result of the work performed by Nations
Roof, 	including 	‘subsequent 	damage 	on 	the 	interior’ 	of 	the
property; (3) Plaintiff claims it has incurred loss of income ‘due
to 	the 	inability 	of 	the 	Church 	to 	host 	weddings, 	receptions 	and
other events for which the Church previously received compensation
compensated 	for, 	as 	well 	as 	a 	substantial 	loss 	of 	tithes 	and
offerings 	due 	to 	a 	significant 	reduction 	in 	attendance 	and
members’; 	and 	(4) 	Plaintiff 	demands 	a 	judgment 	against 	[Nations
Roof] under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act as a result of the work
performed 	by 	Nations 	Roof.” 	(Doc. 	1 	at 	6-7 	(citing 	Doc. 	1-2 	at
11, 	14, 	18-20); 	see 	also 	Doc. 	1-2 	at 	94). 	Plaintiff 	does 	not
appear 	to 	dispute 	that 	its 	claim 	exceeds 	the 	MMWA’s 	$50,000
jurisdictional threshold. 	(See Doc. 5).
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cause of action that turns on a question of federal law” and “does
not 	apply 	when, 	like 	here, 	there 	is 	a 	federally 	created 	cause 	of
action, 	pleaded 	independent 	of 	the 	other 	state 	law 	causes 	of
action.” 	(Id. at 12-13 (emphasis in original) (citing Jairath v.
Dyer, 	154 	F.3d 	1280, 	1282 	(11th 	Cir. 	1998))). 	Plaintiff 	appears
to 	concede 	the 	correctness 	of 	Nations 	Roof’s 	argument, 	since 	it
does not even mention the jurisdictional issue in its reply. 	(See
Doc. 10).3
As argued by Nations Roof, the “substantial federal question
doctrine” 	relied 	on 	by 	Plaintiff 	does 	not 	apply 	in 	this 	case
because Plaintiff’s complaint asserts a cause of action created by
a federal statute. 	Cf. Edwards v. Mashego, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
96448, 	at 	*11 	n.2, 	2019 	WL 	2409068, 	at 	*3 	n.2 	(N.D. 	Ala. 	June 	7,
2019) 	(“In 	their 	Motion 	to 	Remand, 	Plaintiffs 	cite 	several 	cases
discussing 	the 	‘substantial-federal-question’ 	jurisdiction
doctrine. 	However, the ‘substantial-federal-question’ doctrine is
3 Plaintiff’s 	failure 	to 	address 	Nations 	Roof’s 	jurisdictional
arguments 	altogether 	on 	reply 	arguably 	amounts 	to 	an 	abandonment
of 	its 	initial 	argument 	that 	federal 	question 	jurisdiction 	is
absent. 	See Gibbons v. McBride, 124 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1373 (S.D.
Ga. 2015) (“Defendants abandoned any challenge to the [plaintiff’s
argument] when they failed to address it in their reply brief.”);
West Flagler Assocs., Ltd. v. City of Miami, 407 F. Supp. 3d 1291,
1297 	(S.D. 	Fla. 	2019) 	(“The 	Defendant 	abandoned 	its 	argument
regarding 	the 	Plaintiff’s 	standing 	because 	its 	Reply 	failed 	to
address 	any 	of 	the 	Defendant’s 	[sic] 	arguments 	or 	authority.”).
In any event, regardless of whether or not it has been abandoned,
Plaintiff’s 	contention 	that 	federal 	question 	jurisdiction 	is
absent is without merit.
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inapplicable in this case because the face of Plaintiffs’ complaint
presents 	a 	federal 	question 	under 	Section 	1983.”) 	(internal
citations omitted). 	Indeed, as Nations Roof notes (see Doc. 7 at
9-11), 	courts 	routinely 	hold 	that 	a 	claim 	under 	the 	MMWA 	gives
rise 	to 	federal 	question 	jurisdiction 	under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1331,
provided that the MMWA’s $50,000 amount in controversy is met, as
it 	undisputedly 	is 	here. 	See, 	e.g., 	Murphy 	v. 	S. 	Energy 	Homes,
Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19839, at *1-2, 2008 WL 652902, at *1
(M.D. 	Ala. 	Mar. 	6, 	2008) 	(“The 	Court 	has 	federal 	question
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the Plaintiff’s
claims 	arise 	under 	a 	law 	of 	the 	United 	States, 	specifically 	the
Magnuson-Moss 	Warranty 	Federal 	Trade 	Commission 	Improvement 	Act,
15 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2310, 	et 	seq. 	. 	. 	. 	.”); 	Hicks 	v. 	CMH 	Homes, 	Inc.,
2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147532, at *2, 2022 WL 3221287, at *1 (M.D.
Ala. Aug. 9, 2022) (“The Court has jurisdiction over the MMWA claim
pursuant 	to 	its 	federal 	question 	jurisdiction, 	see 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
1331 	. 	. 	. 	.”); 	Watkins 	v. 	Great 	S. 	Wood 	Preserving, 	Inc., 	2022
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176061, at *5, 2022 WL 4538833, at *2 (N.D. Ala.
Sept. 	28, 	2022) 	(“Jurisdiction 	is 	proper 	under 	the 	MMWA 	when 	the
plaintiff 	alleges 	noncompliance 	with 	the 	Act 	and 	the 	amount 	in
controversy exceeds $50,000.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 15 U.S.C.
§ 	2301-2312); 	Nebus 	Fam. 	Ltd. 	P’ship 	v. 	Newmar 	Corp., 	2011 	U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7925, at *2, 2011 WL 308175, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 27,
2011) 	(“While 	a 	claim 	under 	the 	Magnuson–Moss 	Warranty 	Act 	would
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normally ‘arise under’ a federal statute for purposes of 28 U.S.C.
§ 	1331, 	the 	specific 	jurisdictional 	provision 	precludes 	federal
jurisdiction 	in 	the 	absence 	of 	an 	amount 	in 	controversy 	over
$50,000.00.”); 	Sparger 	v. 	Newmar 	Corp., 	2013 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS
198763, 	at 	*3, 	2013 	WL 	12084297, 	at 	*1 	(S.D. 	Fla. 	Jan. 	31, 	2013)
(concluding 	that 	the 	court 	had 	original 	jurisdiction 	over 	action
under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1331 	“based 	on 	Plaintiffs’ 	federal 	causes 	of
action 	under 	the 	Magnuson-Moss 	Warranty 	Act” 	when 	it 	was 	clear
from the record that the amount in controversy exceeded $50,000);
Parker v. Exterior Restorations, Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 240280,
at 	*3, 	13, 	2021 	WL 	6335336, 	at 	*1, 	6 	(S.D. 	Ala. 	Dec. 	16, 	2021)
(denying 	motion 	to 	remand 	where 	the 	defendant’s 	“jurisdictional
theory for removal was that plaintiffs’ claim under the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act supports federal question jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331, and [where defendant] removed the action to federal
court 	within 	30 	days 	after 	it 	was 	first 	ascertainable 	that
plaintiffs’ Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim satisfies the $50,000
threshold 	for 	removal 	jurisdiction 	over 	such 	a 	claim”).
Accordingly, Nations Roof has met its burden of demonstrating this
Court’s 	original 	jurisdiction 	over 	this 	action 	under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
1331.
B. 	Timeliness of Removal
Plaintiff 	also 	contends 	that 	Nations 	Roof’s 	removal 	of 	this
action 	was 	untimely 	because 	the 	notice 	of 	removal 	was 	filed 	more
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than 	thirty 	days 	after 	Nations 	Roof 	was 	served 	with 	the 	summons
and 	complaint. 	(Doc. 	5 	at 	5-6). 	According 	to 	Plaintiff, 	it
properly 	served 	Nations 	Roof 	with 	the 	summons 	and 	complaint 	by
certified 	mail 	via 	its 	registered 	agent 	on 	May 	31, 	2024, 	and 	by
email 	via 	its 	“corporate 	counsel” 	on 	August 	19, 	2024. 	(Id.).
Because Nations Roof did not remove this action within thirty days
of 	either 	of 	those 	dates, 	Plaintiff 	asserts 	that 	Nations 	Roof’s
removal 	was 	untimely, 	and 	that 	remand 	is 	therefore 	warranted.
(Id.). 	Nations 	Roof 	counters 	that 	its 	removal 	was 	not 	untimely
because it was never properly served with process, and the thirty-
day 	time 	limit 	for 	removal 	was 	therefore 	never 	triggered. 	(Doc.
7 at 7-8).
When 	a 	case 	is 	removable 	based 	on 	the 	allegations 	of 	the
initial 	complaint, 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1446(b)(1) 	imposes 	a 	thirty-day
time limit for removal:
The 	notice 	of 	removal 	of 	a 	civil 	action 	or 	proceeding
shall 	be 	filed 	within 	30 	days 	after 	the 	receipt 	by 	the
defendant, 	through 	service 	or 	otherwise, 	of 	a 	copy 	of
the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief
upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within
30 days after the service of summons upon the defendant
if 	such 	initial 	pleading 	has 	then 	been 	filed 	in 	court
and 	is 	not 	required 	to 	be 	served 	on 	the 	defendant,
whichever period is shorter.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) (emphasis added).4 	Although “§ 1446’s time
4 	Under 	the 	“last-served” 	defendant 	rule, 	codified 	under 	§
1446(b)(2)(B)-(C), 	each 	defendant 	may 	“file 	a 	timely 	motion 	for
removal 	within 	thirty 	days 	of 	receipt 	of 	service 	by 	that 	. 	. 	.
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requirement 	is 	not 	jurisdictional,” 	a 	“[t]imely 	objection 	to 	a
late 	petition 	for 	removal 	will 	. 	. 	. 	result 	in 	remand.” 	Webster
v. Dow United Techs. Composite Prods., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 727, 729
(M.D. Ala. 1996).5
The Supreme Court has made clear that the removal deadline in
§ 1446(b) “is triggered by simultaneous service of the summons and
complaint,” and that the statute’s “through service or otherwise”
language 	“was 	not 	intended 	to 	bypass 	service 	as 	a 	starter 	for 	§
1446’s 	clock.” 	Murphy 	Bros., 	Inc. 	v. 	Michetti 	Pipe 	Stringing,
Inc., 	526 	U.S. 	344, 	347-48, 	355 	(1999). 	Thus, 	“mere 	receipt 	of
the complaint unattended by any formal service” is not sufficient
to trigger a defendant’s time to remove. 	Id. at 348. 	“[T]he 30-
day 	period 	for 	removal 	does 	not 	commence 	until 	a 	plaintiff 	has
properly served process.” 	Colvin v. Brennan, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
215914, 	at 	*4, 	2020 	WL 	7265934, 	*2 	(M.D. 	Ala. 	Nov. 	17, 	2020),
report 	and 	recommendation 	adopted, 	2020 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	232300,
2020 WL 7265365 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 10, 2020). 	“Even where a defendant
defendant.” 	Bailey v. Janssen Pharmaceutica Inc., 536 F.3d 1202,
1204 (11th Cir. 2008). 	In other words, “earlier-served defendants
who may have waived their right to independently seek removal . .
. 	may 	nevertheless 	consent 	to 	a 	timely 	motion 	by 	a 	later-served
defendant.” 	Id. 	“In effect, a new thirty-day period begins when
each defendant receives service.” 	Chakra 5, Inc. v. City of Miami
Beach, 968 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1212 (S.D. Fla. 2013).
5 An objection and request for remand is timely if “made within 30
days 	after 	the 	filing 	of 	the 	notice 	of 	removal 	under 	section
1446(a).” 	28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
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has 	actual 	notice 	of 	the 	filing 	of 	a 	suit, 	service 	of 	process 	is
ineffective 	where 	it 	does 	not 	comply 	with 	the 	rules 	of 	service.”
Hunt 	v. 	Nationstar 	Mortg., 	LLC, 	782 	F. 	App’x 	762, 	764 	(11th 	Cir.
2019) (per curiam).
“[W]hen 	the 	propriety 	of 	removal 	is 	contingent 	upon 	the
adequacy of service, ‘the issue is really not one of removal, but
rather 	is 	one 	of 	service.’” 	Jefferson 	Loft, 	LLC 	v. 	Constr.
Enterprises, 	Inc., 	2022 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	243965, 	at 	*8, 	2022 	WL
20437155, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 3, 2022) (quoting Davis v. Country
Cas. 	Ins. 	Co., 	2013 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	104149, 	at 	*14-15, 	2013 	WL
3874709, 	at 	*3 	(N.D. 	Ala. 	July 	25, 	2013)). 	“State 	law 	governs
service of process that occurs before removal.” 	Davis, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 104149, at *15, 2013 WL 3874709, at *3; see Usatorres
v. 	Marina 	Mercante 	Nicaraguenses, 	S.A., 	768 	F.2d 	1285, 	1286 	n.1
(11th Cir. 1985) (“A federal court may consider the sufficiency of
process 	after 	removal 	and 	does 	so 	by 	looking 	to 	the 	state 	law
governing process.”); Racquet Club Apartments at Bonaventure 4 S.
Condo. 	Ass’n 	v. 	U.S. 	Sec’y 	of 	Hous. 	& 	Urb. 	Dev., 	2012 	U.S. 	Dist.
LEXIS 	111835, 	at 	*10, 	2012 	WL 	3244656, 	at 	*3 	(S.D. 	Fla. 	Aug. 	9,
2012) (noting that “the Federal Rules expressly provide that they
apply 	to 	matters 	of 	procedure 	only 	after 	a 	case 	enters 	federal
court”) 	(emphasis 	in 	original) 	(citing 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	81(c)(1)
(“These 	rules 	apply 	to 	a 	civil 	action 	after 	it 	is 	removed 	from 	a
state 	court.”); 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	4, 	Practice 	Commentary 	(pre-
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removal, 	“service 	in 	the 	state 	court 	action 	will 	of 	course 	have
followed 	state 	law”)). 	“Therefore, 	state 	law 	must 	guide 	the
inquiry 	into 	adequacy 	of 	service 	of 	process” 	prior 	to 	removal.
Jefferson 	Loft, 	2022 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	243965, 	at 	*7, 	2022 	WL
20437155, at *2.6
Section 	“1446(b)(1) 	sets 	a 	deadline 	for 	removal, 	not 	a
‘window’ 	for 	removal.” 	Mayes 	v. 	Am. 	Hallmark 	Ins. 	Co. 	of 	Texas,
114 F.4th 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 2024). 	Thus, a party is permitted
to remove an action to federal court prior to being formally served
with 	process. 	See 	Whitehurst 	v. 	Wal-Mart, 	306 	F. 	App’x 	446, 	448
(11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“[N]othing in the removal statute,
or any other legal provision, requires that a defendant be served
with 	the 	complaint 	before 	filing 	a 	notice 	of 	removal.”); 	Mayes,
114 F.4th at 1079 (“Even though § 1446(b)(1)’s 30-day removal time
limit does not start to run until the defendant has both received
the complaint and been formally served, that does not mean that a
defendant 	cannot 	remove 	until 	it 	has 	both 	received 	the 	complaint
and 	been 	formally 	served 	. 	. 	. 	.”); 	Novak 	v. 	Bank 	of 	New 	York
Mellon Tr. Co., NA., 783 F.3d 910, 911 (1st Cir. 2015) (per curiam)
6 “Although 	the 	removing 	party 	bears 	the 	initial 	burden 	to 	show
removal 	is 	proper, 	‘[o]nce 	the 	sufficiency 	of 	service 	is 	brought
into 	question, 	the 	plaintiff 	has 	the 	burden 	[to 	prove] 	proper
service of process.’” 	First Sw. Fin. Servs., LLC v. Dawkins Home,
Inc., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227540, at *6 n.2, 2019 WL 7945684, at
*2 n.2 (S.D. Fla. July 3, 2019) (quoting Hyundai Merch. Marine Co.
Ltd. v. Grand China Shipping (Hong Kong) Co. Ltd., 878 F. Supp. 2d
1252, 1263 (S.D. Ala. 2012)).
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(concluding 	“that 	service 	is 	generally 	not 	a 	prerequisite 	for
removal 	and 	that 	a 	defendant 	may 	remove 	a 	state-court 	action 	to
federal 	court 	any 	time 	after 	the 	lawsuit 	is 	filed 	but 	before 	the
statutorily-defined 	period 	for 	removal 	ends”); 	La 	Russo 	v. 	St.
George’s 	Univ. 	Sch. 	of 	Med., 	747 	F.3d 	90, 	97 	(2d 	Cir. 	2014)
(“Service 	of 	process 	upon 	a 	removing 	defendant 	is 	not 	a
prerequisite 	to 	removal.”); 	Delgado 	v. 	Shell 	Oil 	Co., 	231 	F.3d
165, 177 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Generally, service of process is not an
absolute 	prerequisite 	to 	removal.”); 	Bowman 	v. 	PHH 	Mortg. 	Corp.,
423 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	1286, 	1290 	(N.D. 	Ala. 	2019) 	(“This 	court 	accepts
that, generally, a defendant may remove before service.”); Sasser
v. 	Fla. 	Pond 	Trucking, 	L.L.C., 	2016 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	91602, 	at
*14, 2016 WL 3774125, at *5 (M.D. Ala. June 24, 2016) (“[T]he fact
that ETC, an out-of-state defendant, was not formally served with
the 	complaint 	does 	not 	preclude 	him 	from 	filing 	a 	notice 	of
removal.”), 	report 	and 	recommendation 	adopted, 	2016 	U.S. 	Dist.
LEXIS 91434, 2016 WL 3769754 (M.D. Ala. July 14, 2016).
Accordingly, the Court must determine in this action whether
Plaintiff’s 	attempts 	to 	serve 	process 	on 	Nations 	Roof 	were
sufficient under Alabama law in order to determine whether Nations
Roof’s subsequent removal was timely. 	See Davis, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 104149, at *15, 2013 WL 3874709, at *3.
1. 	Attempted Service Via Registered Agent
Alabama 	Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	4(i)(2) 	permits 	service 	of
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process 	by 	certified 	mail. 	Alabama 	Rule 	4(i)(2)(B)(ii) 	states
that 	“[i]n 	the 	case 	of 	an 	entity 	within 	the 	scope 	of 	one 	of 	the
subdivisions of [Alabama] Rule 4(c),” an attorney or party making
service 	by 	certified 	mail 	must 	address 	the 	summons 	and 	complaint
to 	“a 	person 	described 	in 	the 	appropriate 	subdivision.” 	Ala. 	R.
Civ. 	P. 	4(i)(2)(B)(ii). 	The 	“appropriate 	subdivision” 	– 	Alabama
Rule 	4(c)(6) 	– 	provides 	that 	service 	of 	process 	on 	a 	limited
liability 	company 	“shall 	be 	made 	. 	. 	. 	by 	serving 	an 	officer, 	a
partner 	(other 	than 	a 	limited 	partner), 	a 	managing 	or 	general
agent, or any agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive
service of process.” 	Ala. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(6).
Alabama 	Rule 	4(i)(2)(C) 	governs 	when 	service 	by 	certified
mail is effective:
Service 	by 	certified 	mail 	shall 	be 	deemed 	complete 	and
the 	time 	for 	answering 	shall 	run 	from 	the 	date 	of
delivery to the named addressee or the addressee’s agent
as evidenced by signature on the return receipt. 	Within
the meaning of this subdivision, “agent” means a person
or 	entity 	specifically 	authorized 	by 	the 	addressee 	to
receive the addressee’s mail and to deliver that mail to
the 	addressee. 	Such 	agent’s 	authority 	shall 	be
conclusively established when the addressee acknowledges
actual receipt of the summons and complaint or the court
determines 	that 	the 	evidence 	proves 	the 	addressee 	did
actually 	receive 	the 	summons 	and 	complaint 	in 	time 	to
avoid a default.
Ala. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(2)(C).
Thus, Alabama “Rule 4 plainly and specifically provides that
service on a business entity by certified mail requires the mailing
to 	be 	addressed 	to 	an 	‘officer, 	a 	partner 	(other 	than 	a 	limited
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partner), a managing or general agent, or any agent authorized by
appointment 	or 	by 	law 	to 	receive 	service 	of 	process.’” 	Ex 	parte
LERETA, 	LLC, 	226 	So. 	3d 	140, 	145 	(Ala. 	2016). 	“To 	be 	effective,
the 	certified 	mail 	must 	be 	delivered 	to 	that 	addressee 	or 	that
addressee’s authorized agent.” 	Id.
“Under 	Alabama 	law, 	a 	registered 	agent 	‘is 	an 	agent 	of 	the
entity 	on 	which 	may 	be 	served 	any 	process, 	notice, 	or 	demand
required or permitted by law to be served on the entity.’” 	Hancock
Whitney Bank v. FLC Living, LLC, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221055, at
*9, 2024 WL 5010843, at *4 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 6, 2024) (quoting Ala.
Code § 10A-1-5.31(b)(1)). 	As noted previously, service of process
on a limited liability company may be made by serving, inter alia,
“any agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service
of 	process.” 	Ala. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	4(c)(6). 	“Thus, 	the 	summons 	and
complaint may be addressed to the registered agent of a [company],”
and 	“service 	may 	be 	deemed 	complete 	when 	signed 	for 	by 	a 	person
authorized to receive the registered agent’s mail.” 	SJS, Inc. v.
Recticel N. Am., Inc., 2009 WL 10689104, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 23,
2009).
“In interpreting Rule 4, the Alabama Supreme Court has given
a clear admonishment: ‘strict compliance with the rules regarding
service of process is required.’” 	Jefferson Loft, 2022 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 243965, at *9-10, 2022 WL 20437155, at *3 (quoting Ex Parte
Pate, 	673 	So. 	2d 	427, 	429 	(Ala. 	1995)). 	“Reflecting 	the 	gravity
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of 	Rule 	4’s 	command, 	even 	actual 	knowledge 	of 	an 	action 	will 	not
confer 	personal 	jurisdiction 	if 	the 	plaintiff 	neglects 	a 	rigid
adherence 	to 	Rule 	4.” 	Jefferson 	Loft, 	2022 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS
243965, 	at 	*10, 	2022 	WL 	20437155, 	at 	*3 	(citing 	Ex 	Parte 	Sawyer,
984 So. 2d 1100, 1111 (Ala. 2007)).
Plaintiff 	asserts 	that 	on 	May 	31, 	2024, 	it 	served 	a 	copy 	of
the 	summons 	and 	complaint 	on 	Nations 	Roof 	by 	certified 	mail 	“via
its registered agent [CSC Lawyers Incorporating Service, Inc.] at
150 South Perry Street, Montgomery, Alabama 36104.” 	(Doc. 5 at 5;
Doc. 	10 	at 	2; 	see 	Doc. 	5-1). 	Nations 	Roof 	counters 	that 	CSC
Lawyers 	Incorporating 	Service, 	Inc. 	was 	not 	the 	name 	of 	its
registered agent at the time Plaintiff attempted service, nor was
150 South Perry Street, Montgomery, Alabama 36104, the address of
its 	registered 	office. 	(Doc. 	7 	at 	5). 	Rather, 	Nations 	Roof
maintains 	that 	on 	April 	28, 	2017, 	it 	“properly 	changed 	the 	name
and address of its registered agent with the Alabama Secretary of
State” 	from 	CSC 	Lawyers 	Incorporating 	Service, 	Inc., 	150 	South
Perry 	Street, 	Montgomery, 	Alabama 	36104, 	to 	Corporation 	Service
Company, 	Inc., 	641 	South 	Lawrence 	Street, 	Montgomery, 	Alabama
36104. 	(Id.; 	see 	Doc. 	7-1). 	According 	to 	Nations 	Roof,
Plaintiff’s 	assertion 	that 	“it 	attempted 	to 	serve 	Nations 	Roof
through 	its 	registered 	agent 	at 	a 	former 	address” 	amounts 	to 	a
concession 	that 	it 	did 	not 	properly 	serve 	Nations 	Roof 	in 	strict
compliance with the Alabama service rules. 	(Doc. 7 at 6).
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In response to Nations Roof’s argument, Plaintiff states:
A review of the business entity records on file with the
Alabama 	Secretary 	of 	State 	indicates 	that 	Nations 	Roof
identified 	three 	(3) 	different 	registered 	agents 	from
2016 	through 	2017. 	. 	. 	. 	In 	that 	regard, 	Nations 	Roof
has previously identified the following three different
registered 	agents 	for 	service 	of 	process 	– 	(1)
Corporation Service, Company, Inc., located at 641 South
Lawrence Street, Montgomery, Alabama 36104; (2) Business
Filings, Incorporated located at 2 North Jackson Street,
Suite 	605, 	Montgomery, 	Alabama 	36104; 	and 	(3) 	CSC-
Lawyers 	Incorporating 	SRVC 	INC., 	located 	at 	150 	South
Perry 	Street, 	Montgomery, 	Alabama 	36104. 	It 	appeared
the 	most 	recent 	registered 	agent 	change 	took 	place 	on
April 	28, 	2017. 	Accordingly, 	at 	the 	time 	the 	present
Complaint was filed, [Plaintiff’s] counsel accessed the
most 	recently 	filed 	Annual 	Report 	to 	ensure 	that 	the
proper agency was served with the Summons and Complaint.
As 	noted 	herein, 	the 	Annual 	Report 	which 	was 	filed 	on
March 	27, 	2024, 	approximately 	two 	(2) 	months 	prior 	to
the 	filing 	of 	the 	present 	complaint, 	identified 	the
registered agent as CSC Lawyers Incorporating SRVC INC,
located 	at 	150 	South 	Perry 	Street, 	Montgomery, 	Alabama
36104. 	Thus, 	the 	Summons 	and 	Complaint 	were 	properly
served upon the registered agent Defendant Nations Roof
had designated in its most recently filed Annual Report.
Defendant 	Nations 	Roof 	created 	an 	ambiguity 	by
identifying two different agents for service of process
in its filings with the Alabama Secretary of State, i.e.
via 	its 	Registered 	Agent 	Change 	Form 	which 	is 	not
accessible on the Secretary of State website and via the
Annual 	Report 	which 	is 	accessible 	on 	the 	Secretary 	of
State website and was more recently filed approximately
two months prior to the filing of the present Complaint.
(Doc. 10 at 3-4 (emphasis in original)). 	Plaintiff contends that
“[t]his 	ambiguity 	should 	be 	construed 	against 	Nations 	Roof,” 	and
that 	Plaintiff 	should 	be 	deemed 	to 	have 	properly 	served 	Nations
Roof on May 31, 2024, via “the registered agent . . . Nations Roof
had designated in its most recently filed Annual Report.” 	(Id. at
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4).
Nations 	Roof 	replies 	that 	a 	“cursory 	review 	of 	the 	Alabama
Secretary of State website” contradicts Plaintiff’s assertion that
Nations 	Roof’s 	“Registered 	Agent 	Change 	Form 	is 	. 	. 	. 	not
accessible on the Secretary of State website” and instead “confirms
that 	this 	information 	is 	readily 	and 	publicly 	available.” 	(Doc.
13 	at 	3 	(emphasis 	in 	original)). 	Nations 	Roof 	states 	that 	the
Alabama 	Secretary 	of 	State’s 	website 	“confirms 	that 	Nations 	Roof
filed 	a 	Registered 	Agent 	Change 	Form 	on 	April 	28, 	2017,” 	which
“has 	been 	available 	publicly 	since 	April 	28, 	2017.” 	(Id. 	at 	4-5
(emphasis 	in 	original)). 	Nations 	Roof 	further 	asserts 	that 	the
Alabama 	Secretary 	of 	State’s 	website 	“clearly 	identifies 	Nations
Roof’s registered agent name and address” as “Corporation Service
Company, 	Inc. 	at 	641 	South 	Lawrence 	Street, 	Montgomery, 	Alabama
36104.” 	(Id. at 3-4).
Having considered the parties’ arguments and the record, the
Court 	finds 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	attempt 	to 	serve 	Nations 	Roof 	by
certified 	mail 	on 	May 	31, 	2024, 	was 	ineffective. 	The 	record
reflects 	that 	a 	“Change 	By 	Agent 	of 	Agent 	Name 	and/or 	Registered
Office 	Address” 	form 	was 	filed 	and 	accepted 	by 	the 	Alabama
Secretary of State’s office on April 28, 2017.7 	This resulted in
7 Alabama 	Code 	§ 	10A-1-5.33 	provides 	that 	an 	entity’s 	registered
agent 	“may 	change 	its 	name, 	its 	address 	as 	the 	address 	of 	the
entity’s registered office, or both, by delivering to the Secretary
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the registered agent name and registered office address for Nations
Roof 	being 	changed 	from 	“CSC-LAWYERS 	INCORPORATING 	SRVC 	INC, 	150
SOUTH PERRY STREET, MONTGOMERY, AL 36104” to “Corporation Service
Company, 	Inc., 	641 	South 	Lawrence 	Street, 	Montgomery, 	AL 	36104.”
(See 	Doc. 	7-1). 	This 	change 	is 	clearly 	reflected 	in 	the 	Alabama
Secretary 	of 	State’s 	business 	entity 	records 	for 	Nations 	Roof,8
which confirm that (1) Nations Roof’s most recent registered agent
change took place on April 28, 2017;9 (2) Nations Roof’s registered
agent changed from “CSC-LAWYERS INCORPORATING SRVC INC, 150 SOUTH
of State for filing a statement of the change” which complies with
specific 	statutory 	requirements. 	See 	Ala. 	Code 	§ 	10A-1-5.33(a)-
(b). 	The 	change 	is 	effective 	“on 	acceptance 	of 	the 	statement 	by
the Secretary of State.” 	Id. at § 10A-1-5.33(c).
8 For 	the 	Alabama 	Secretary 	of 	State’s 	records 	for 	Nations 	Roof,
see 	“Business 	Entity 	Records,” 	at 	https://arc-
sos.state.al.us/cgi/corpdetail.mbr/detail?corp=000346806&page=na
me&file=&type=ALL&status=ALL&place=ALL&city= 	(last 	visited 	Jan.
8, 2025). 	The Court takes judicial notice of the Alabama Secretary
of 	State’s 	public 	business 	entity 	records. 	See 	United 	States 	ex
rel. 	McCutcheon 	v. 	QBR, 	LLC, 	2024 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	181014, 	at 	*3
n.2, 	2024 	WL 	4403709, 	at 	*1 	n.2 	(N.D. 	Ala. 	Oct. 	3, 	2024);
Birmingham Plumbers v. Iron Mountain Constr., Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 	102202, 	at 	*8-9 	n.2, 	2016 	WL 	4137972, 	at 	*3 	n.2 	(N.D. 	Ala.
Aug. 4, 2016) (“Federal Rule of Evidence 201 provides that a court
may 	take 	judicial 	notice 	of 	a 	fact 	that 	is 	not 	subject 	to
reasonable dispute if it “can be accurately and readily determined
from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed.
R. 	Evid. 	201(b)(2). 	The 	information 	found 	on 	the 	website 	of 	the
Alabama 	Secretary 	of 	State 	falls 	within 	the 	purview 	of 	Rule
201(b)(2).”).
9 Plaintiff acknowledges that at the time it attempted service on
Nations Roof in May 2024, “[i]t appeared the most recent registered
agent 	change 	[for 	Nations 	Roof] 	took 	place 	on 	April 	28, 	2017.”
(See Doc. 10 at 4).
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PERRY STREET, MONTGOMERY, AL 36104” on April 28, 2017; (3) Nations
Roof’s 	current 	registered 	agent 	name 	is 	“CORPORATION 	SERVICE
COMPANY 	INC”; 	and 	(4) 	Nations 	Roof’s 	current 	registered 	office
street 	and 	mailing 	address 	is 	“641 	SOUTH 	LAWRENCE 	STREET,
MONTGOMERY, 	AL 	36104.” 	(See 	Doc. 	7-2 	at 	2; 	Doc. 	10-1 	at 	1; 	Doc.
13 at 4).10
In 	support 	of 	its 	assertion 	that 	it 	properly 	served 	Nations
Roof in May 2024, Plaintiff relies heavily on the fact that Nations
Roof’s 	most 	recent 	annual 	report 	erroneously 	listed 	“CSC-LAWYERS
INCORPORATING 	SRVC 	INC” 	as 	the 	company’s 	agent 	and 	thereby
allegedly 	“created 	an 	ambiguity 	by 	identifying 	two 	different
agents 	for 	service 	of 	process 	in 	its 	filings 	with 	the 	Alabama
Secretary 	of 	State.” 	(Doc. 	10 	at 	4; 	see 	Doc. 	5-2). 	As 	outlined
above, however, the name and address for Nations Roof’s registered
agent 	changed 	on 	April 	28, 	2017, 	when 	Nations 	Roof 	or 	its 	agent
delivered to the Alabama Secretary of State for filing a statement
of the change pursuant to Alabama Code § 10A-1-5.33. 	(See Doc. 7-
1). 	Plaintiff 	does 	not 	dispute 	that 	this 	filing 	effectively
changed 	the 	registered 	agent 	name 	and 	registered 	office 	address
for Nations Roof to “Corporation Service Company, Inc., 641 South
Lawrence Street, Montgomery, AL 36104.” 	Nor does Plaintiff offer
10 	There 	is 	no 	indication 	or 	assertion 	that 	the 	relevant
information 	listed 	in 	the 	Alabama 	Secretary 	of 	State’s 	business
entity 	records 	for 	Nations 	Roof 	filed 	by 	the 	parties 	has 	changed
since Plaintiff attempted service on Nations Roof in May 2024.
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any authority to support the proposition that annual reports filed
by 	Nations 	Roof 	after 	April 	28, 	2017, 	were 	legally 	sufficient 	to
effect 	a 	change 	of 	the 	company’s 	registered 	agent 	name 	and
registered office address.
Plaintiff’s 	assertion 	that 	Nations 	Roof’s 	erroneous 	annual
report “created an ambiguity” as to the proper name and address of
its 	registered 	agent 	is 	unpersuasive, 	given 	that 	the 	Alabama
Secretary of State’s online business entity records plainly listed
the correct registered agent and registered office information for
Nations Roof. 	Nor has Plaintiff proffered anything that suggests
that 	the 	registered 	agent 	information 	contained 	in 	Nation 	Roof’s
annual 	report 	somehow 	trumps 	the 	registered 	agent 	information
prominently 	displayed 	in 	the 	Alabama 	Secretary 	of 	State’s 	online
business 	entity 	records 	for 	the 	company.11 	Moreover, 	contrary 	to
Plaintiff’s 	assertion 	that 	Nations 	Roof’s 	April 	28, 	2017
“Registered 	Agent 	Change 	Form 	. 	. 	. 	is 	not 	accessible 	on 	the
Secretary 	of 	State 	website” 	(see 	Doc. 	10 	at 	4 	(emphasis 	in
original)), 	copies 	of 	the 	document 	are 	readily 	available 	for
11 The 	Court 	also 	notes 	that 	the 	Alabama 	Secretary 	of 	State’s
business 	entity 	records 	do 	not 	list 	CSC-Lawyers 	Incorporating
Service Incorporated as an existing company. 	Rather, those records
reflect that CSC-Lawyers Incorporating Service Incorporated was a
previous 	fictitious 	name 	for 	Corporation 	Service 	Company, 	which
was 	changed 	on 	March 	20, 	2017. 	See 	https://arc-
sos.state.al.us/cgi/corpdetail.mbr/detail?corp=000895085&page=na
me&file=V&type=ALL&status=ALL&place=ALL&city= 	(last 	visited 	Jan.
8, 2025).
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purchase on the Alabama Secretary of State’s website.
In 	sum, 	Nations 	Roof’s 	current 	registered 	agent 	information
was readily accessible to Plaintiff through the Alabama Secretary
of State’s publicly available business entity records at the time
Plaintiff 	attempted 	service. 	Thus, 	Plaintiff 	cannot 	credibly
claim 	that 	it 	should 	be 	deemed 	to 	have 	properly 	served 	Nations
Roof 	by 	mailing 	a 	copy 	of 	the 	summons 	and 	complaint 	to 	Nations
Roof’s former registered office address. 	See Jefferson Loft, 2022
U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	243965, 	at 	*11, 	2022 	WL 	20437155, 	at 	*3 	(noting
that “attempted service is not service”).
2. 	Attempted Service Via Corporate Counsel
Plaintiff 	also 	asserts 	that 	it 	properly 	served 	Nations 	Roof
on 	August 	19, 	2024, 	when 	Plaintiff’s 	counsel’s 	paralegal 	emailed
copies 	of 	the 	complaint 	and 	purported 	proof 	of 	service 	documents
to 	Nations 	Roof’s 	“corporate 	counsel,” 	who 	confirmed 	receipt.
(Doc. 	5 	at 	6; 	Doc. 	10 	at 	5). 	Plaintiff 	contends 	that 	this
constituted 	proper 	service 	of 	Nations 	Roof 	under 	Federal 	Rule 	of
Civil Procedure 4(h)(1)(B). 	(Doc. 10 at 5). 	Nations Roof counters
that 	this 	was 	not 	proper 	service 	because 	the 	Federal 	and 	Alabama
Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for service of process by
email, and a defendant or its attorney’s actual notice of a lawsuit
does 	not 	excuse 	or 	establish 	valid 	service 	of 	process. 	(Doc. 	13
at 1-2).
Plaintiff’s 	assertion 	that 	it 	properly 	served 	Nations 	Roof
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through 	its 	corporate 	counsel 	fails 	for 	several 	reasons. 	First,
Plaintiff’s 	reliance 	on 	Federal 	Rule 	4(h)(1)(B) 	to 	establish
proper 	service 	of 	process 	prior 	to 	removal 	is 	misplaced 	because
state 	law 	governs 	whether 	pre-removal 	service 	was 	proper. 	Cf.
Wasowicz v. United States, 2008 WL 4097794, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept.
2, 2008) (“The Government assumes that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 	applied 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	state-court 	action 	against 	Mr.
Foster. 	It cites no authority for this proposition, and the Court
has found none. 	Therefore, the failure-to-serve argument will be
rejected 	as 	Florida 	rules 	of 	procedure 	applied 	to 	this 	action
during its pendency in Florida state court.”). 	Plaintiff neither
asserts 	nor 	cites 	any 	authority 	suggesting 	that 	Alabama 	law
generally permits service of process on a limited liability company
by 	email, 	whether 	sent 	to 	the 	company’s 	general 	counsel 	or
otherwise. 	See 	Ala. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	4; 	Potomac 	Insulation 	& 	Drywall,
LLC v. Capitol Mach. Int’l, LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 243833, at
*16, 	2018 	WL 	11318743, 	at 	*6 	(N.D. 	Ala. 	July 	31, 	2018) 	(“Potomac
does not cite, nor is the court otherwise aware of, any federal or
Alabama procedural rule generally allowing service of process upon
a domestic defendant by email, whether sent to defense counsel or
otherwise.”). 	The 	Court 	notes 	that 	Alabama 	Rule 	4(h) 	provides
that 	“[a] 	defendant 	may 	accept 	or 	waive 	service 	of 	process 	by 	a
document signed by the defendant and filed with the clerk of court
from 	which 	the 	process 	issued.” 	Ala. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	4(h). 	However,
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there is no evidence that Nations Roof, whether through its general
counsel 	or 	otherwise,12 accepted 	or 	waived 	service 	of 	process 	in
conformity with Alabama Rule 4(h). 	(See Doc. 1-2).
Further, Federal Rule 4(h)(1)(B) allows a plaintiff to serve
a limited liability company such as Nations Roof “by delivering a
copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing
or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or
by 	law 	to 	receive 	service 	of 	process 	and--if 	the 	agent 	is 	one
authorized by statute and the statute so requires--by also mailing
a 	copy 	of 	each 	to 	the 	defendant.” 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	4(h)(1)(B)
(emphasis 	added). 	Courts 	have 	found 	that 	“delivering” 	under
Federal Rule 4 requires personal delivery, not mailing. 	See, e.g.,
E. 	Shore 	Marine, 	Inc. 	v. 	Smith, 	2008 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	18795, 	at
*4, 	2008 	WL 	697716, 	at 	*2 	(S.D. 	Ala. 	Mar. 	10, 	2008) 	(“‘Delivery’
under Rule 4 requires personal delivery, not mailing.”); Morris v.
City 	of 	Orlando, 	2010 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	72367, 	at 	*6, 	2010 	WL
2836623, 	at 	*2 	(M.D. 	Fla. 	July 	19, 	2010) 	(“Mailing 	is 	not
‘delivering’ 	under 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	4.”); 	Dyer 	v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 318 F. App’x 843, 844 (11th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam) (stating that the term “delivering” in Federal Rule 4(h)(1)
“appears to refer to personal service,” and upholding dismissal of
12 “[A]s of August 1, 2004, [Alabama Rule 4(h)] was amended so that
it no longer explicitly authorizes an attorney to accept or waive
service of process on behalf of a defendant.” 	Looney v. State, 60
So. 3d 293, 299 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010).
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pro 	se 	action 	on 	grounds 	of 	imperfect 	service 	where 	plaintiff’s
only 	attempt 	at 	service 	was 	sending 	a 	copy 	of 	the 	summons 	and
complaint 	to 	the 	corporate 	defendant’s 	registered 	agent 	by
certified mail); Daugherty v. Kagan, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 260846,
at 	*6, 	2020 	WL 	12762595, 	at 	*3 	(N.D. 	Ga. 	June 	8, 	2020) 	(“Federal
. 	. 	. 	law 	on 	service 	of 	process 	require[s] 	‘personal 	service’ 	–
service 	by 	hand 	delivery 	of 	the 	complaint 	and 	summons.”); 	Thorpe
v. 	Dumas, 	788 	F. 	App’x 	644, 	648 	(11th 	Cir. 	2019) 	(per 	curiam)
(“Service 	by 	certified 	mail 	generally 	does 	not 	constitute
‘delivery’ 	under 	subsections 	of 	Rule 	4.”). 	Therefore, 	Federal
“Rule 	4(h)(1)(B) 	does 	not 	permit 	service 	via 	email.” 	Shafik 	v.
Aston 	Martin 	Lagonda 	of 	N. 	Am., 	2024 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	43038, 	at
*11, 2024 WL 1072868, at *4 (D. Conn. Mar. 12, 2024).
Additionally, 	the 	record 	does 	not 	reflect 	that 	Plaintiff
emailed a copy of the summons to Nations Roof’s corporate counsel
along 	with 	the 	complaint 	and 	purported 	proof 	of 	service
documents,13 and 	service 	of 	the 	complaint 	without 	a 	summons 	is
13 Plaintiff 	states 	that 	“a 	copy 	of 	the 	Summons, 	Complaint 	and
service 	documents 	were 	delivered” 	to 	Nations 	Roof’s 	corporate
counsel 	on 	August 	19, 	2024. 	(Doc. 	10 	at 	2 	(emphasis 	added)).
However, 	the 	exhibits 	attached 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	to 	remand
reflect 	that 	the 	documents 	emailed 	to 	Nations 	Roof’s 	counsel 	on
August 	19, 	2024, 	were: 	(1) 	a 	copy 	of 	the 	complaint 	including
exhibits; (2) a certified mail return receipt reflecting delivery
to Nations Roof’s former registered office address on May 31, 2024;
and (3) a state court notice of service dated May 31, 2024. 	(See
Docs. 5-3, 5-4, 5-5). 	The exhibits do not reflect that a copy of
the 	summons 	was 	attached 	to 	the 	email 	sent 	to 	Nations 	Roof’s
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insufficient 	to 	effect 	service 	of 	process 	under 	Federal 	Rule 	4.
See 	Daniels 	v. 	U.S. 	Dep’t 	of 	Educ., 	2009 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	81145,
at *2, 2009 WL 2579363, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 2009) (“Service
of 	the 	complaint 	alone 	is 	insufficient 	to 	effect 	service 	of
process.”); 	Battle 	v. 	Burdeaux 	Steak 	& 	Seafood 	Inc., 	2023 	U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 158626, at *5, 2023 WL 5810484, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Sept.
7, 	2023) 	(finding 	service 	insufficient 	partly 	“because 	Plaintiff
did 	not 	report 	including 	a 	summons 	with 	the 	pleadings”); 	Fed. 	R.
Civ. 	P. 	4(c)(1) 	(“A 	summons 	must 	be 	served 	with 	a 	copy 	of 	the
complaint.”); Fed R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B) (requiring delivery of “a
copy of the summons and of the complaint”). 	Thus, even if Federal
Rule 4(h)(1)(B) did apply prior to removal, Plaintiff’s purported
attempt 	to 	serve 	Nations 	Roof 	by 	email 	through 	its 	corporate
counsel would be insufficient.14
counsel 	on 	August 	19, 	2024. 	(See 	Doc. 	5-4 	at 	1 	(“Attachments:
2024.05.23 	Plaintiff 	(Complaint 	and 	Exhibit 	A 	and 	B).pdf;
2024.05.31 	Notice 	of 	Service 	Nations 	Roof.pdf; 	2024.05.31 	SIGNED
Notice of Service Nations Roof.pdf”); Doc. 5-4 at 2 (“Cristi will
email 	you 	a 	courtesy 	copy 	of 	the 	Complaint 	with 	exhibits 	and 	the
proof of service in a moment.”); Doc. 5-4 at 9-98). 	Nor do those
exhibits 	reflect 	that 	Nations 	Roof’s 	counsel 	specifically
“confirmed 	acceptance 	of 	the 	Summons 	and 	Complaint 	via 	email” 	or
“confirmed receipt of the Summons, Complaint and service documents
via 	email 	on 	August 	19, 	2024,” 	as 	Plaintiff 	suggests. 	(See 	Doc.
5 at 6; Doc. 5-3 at 1; Doc. 5-4 at 1-2, 9-98; Doc. 10 at 3).
14 The case Plaintiff offers as “authority” for its assertion that
it 	properly 	served 	Nations 	Roof 	in 	accordance 	with 	Federal 	Rule
4(h)(1)(B), United States v. Cornwell, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23409,
2020 	WL 	674092, 	(M.D. 	Fla. 	Feb. 	11, 	2020), 	is 	plainly 	inapposite
to 	the 	circumstances 	of 	this 	case. 	Most 	obviously, 	Cornwell 	was
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Accordingly, 	the 	record 	does 	not 	reflect 	that 	Plaintiff
perfected 	service 	on 	Nations 	Roof 	prior 	to 	the 	removal 	of 	this
action. 	Because Nations Roof was not properly served, the removal
clock 	under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1446(b)(1) 	had 	not 	started 	to 	run 	at 	the
time this action was removed to federal court on October 9, 2024.
Thus, 	Nations 	Roof’s 	removal 	was 	not 	untimely, 	and 	Plaintiff’s
motion to remand is due to be denied.15
a 	case 	filed 	in 	federal 	court, 	where 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil
Procedure govern matters of service of process, whereas the instant
dispute involves the sufficiency of pre-removal service in a case
filed 	in 	Alabama 	state 	court 	and 	is 	thus 	governed 	by 	state 	law.
See Cornwell, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23409, at *2, 2020 WL 674092,
at 	*1. 	Cornwell 	is 	also 	distinguishable 	because 	it 	involved
service 	by 	a 	certified 	process 	server 	at 	a 	defendant’s 	place 	of
business, as opposed to the purported email service in this case.
(See Doc. 13 at 8); Cornwell, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23409, at *14,
2020 	WL 	674092, 	at 	*5 	(“Service 	of 	process 	on 	the 	potential
claimant, 	Defendant 	Dr. 	Phillips 	Community 	Association, 	was
completed on February 19, 2019 at its place of business located at
7400 Dr. Phillips Boulevard, Orlando, Florida 32819, by service on
Troy Finnegan as General Counsel for the Association.”). 	Finally,
the process server in Cornwell delivered copies of both the summons
and complaint to the defendant’s general counsel, while the record
in 	this 	case 	does 	not 	reflect 	that 	a 	copy 	of 	the 	summons 	was
attached 	to 	the 	August 	19, 	2024 	email 	to 	Nations 	Roof’s 	counsel.
(See Doc. 13 at 8).
15 The 	Court 	notes 	that 	notwithstanding 	a 	“deficient 	attempt 	at
service of process under state law,” a plaintiff “may still perfect
service after removal, under the provisions of federal law.” 	Rentz
v. Swift Transp. Co., 185 F.R.D. 693, 697 (M.D. Ga. 1998). 	In all
cases 	removed 	from 	a 	state 	court 	to 	a 	federal 	district 	court 	“in
which 	any 	one 	or 	more 	of 	the 	defendants 	has 	not 	been 	served 	with
process 	or 	in 	which 	the 	service 	has 	not 	been 	perfected 	prior 	to
removal, 	or 	in 	which 	process 	served 	proves 	to 	be 	defective, 	such
process 	or 	service 	may 	be 	completed 	or 	new 	process 	issued 	in 	the
same manner as in cases originally filed in such district court.”
28 U.S.C. § 1448.
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III. CONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	stated 	above, 	it 	is 	recommended 	that
Plaintiff’s motion to remand and request for costs, expenses, and
attorney’s fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (Doc. 5) be DENIED.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS
A 	copy 	of 	this 	report 	and 	recommendation 	shall 	be 	served 	on
all parties in the manner provided by law. 	Any party who objects
to 	this 	recommendation 	or 	anything 	in 	it 	must, 	within 	fourteen
(14) 	days 	of 	the 	date 	of 	service 	of 	this 	document, 	file 	specific
written objections with the Clerk of this Court. 	See 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1); 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b); 	S.D. 	Ala. 	GenLR 	72(c). 	The
parties 	should 	note 	that 	under 	Eleventh 	Circuit 	Rule 	3-1, 	“[a]
party 	failing 	to 	object 	to 	a 	magistrate 	judge’s 	findings 	or
recommendations 	contained 	in 	a 	report 	and 	recommendation 	in
accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the
right 	to 	challenge 	on 	appeal 	the 	district 	court’s 	order 	based 	on
unobjected-to 	factual 	and 	legal 	conclusions 	if 	the 	party 	was
informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on
appeal 	for 	failing 	to 	object. 	In 	the 	absence 	of 	a 	proper
objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error
if necessary in the interests of justice.” 	11th Cir. R. 3-1.
In 	order 	to 	be 	specific, 	an 	objection 	must 	identify 	the
specific 	finding 	or 	recommendation 	to 	which 	objection 	is 	made,
state 	the 	basis 	for 	the 	objection, 	and 	specify 	the 	place 	in 	the
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Magistrate 	Judge’s 	report 	and 	recommendation 	where 	the 	disputed
determination is found. 	An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate Judge is
not specific.
DONE this 10th day of January, 2025.
/s/ SONJA F. BIVINS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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