Hill v. Mobile City Council et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
REGINALD JOSEPH HILL, II,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MOBILE CITY COUNCIL, ET AL.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-0306-KD-B
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This action is before the Court1 on Defendants City of Mobile
and 	Mobile 	City 	Council’s 	joint 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	Plaintiff
Reginald 	Joseph 	Hill, 	II’s 	second 	amended 	complaint, 	Plaintiff
Hill’s 	response, 	and 	Defendants’ 	reply. 	(Docs. 	10, 	15, 	16). 	The
motion 	has 	been 	fully 	briefed 	and 	is 	ripe 	for 	resolution. 	Upon
consideration 	of 	all 	matters 	presented, 	the 	undersigned
recommends, for the reasons stated herein, that Defendants’ motion
(Doc. 	10) 	be 	granted, 	and 	that 	Plaintiff 	Hill’s 	complaint 	be
dismissed with prejudice.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On 	July 1, 	2024, 	Hill, 	proceeding 	pro 	se, 	commenced 	this
action by filing a complaint in the Circuit Court of Mobile County,
Alabama, 	against 	the 	Mobile 	City 	Council 	and 	the 	City 	of 	Mobile.
1 The motion has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge
for 	consideration 	and 	recommendation 	pursuant 	to 	28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1).
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(Doc. 	1-1 	at 	5-8). 	While 	this 	case 	was 	pending 	in 	state 	court,
Hill 	filed 	an 	amended 	complaint, 	and 	subsequent 	thereto,
Defendants 	removed 	the 	action 	to 	this 	Court, 	asserting 	federal
question 	jurisdiction 	pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 1331. 	(Doc. 	1,
Doc. 1-1 at 5-8, 51-54).
Following removal, Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss
and 	argued 	that 	Hill’s 	amended 	complaint 	contained 	pleading
deficiencies 	because 	it 	lacked 	factual 	allegations 	connecting
Defendants 	to 	any 	of 	the 	“purported 	wrongdoing” 	such 	that 	the
complaint 	should 	be 	dismissed 	for 	failure 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	upon
which 	relief 	could 	be 	granted. 	(Doc. 	3). 	Defendants 	further
asserted 	that 	Hill 	should 	be 	required 	to 	provide 	a 	more 	definite
statement in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). (Id.)
Upon 	review, 	the 	undersigned 	entered 	a 	Report 	and
Recommendation 	(“R&R”) 	finding 	that 	Hill’s 	amended 	complaint
constituted 	an 	egregious 	shotgun 	pleading 	as 	it 	contained 	vague
and 	conclusory 	allegations 	that 	were 	not 	connected 	to 	any
particular 	cause 	of 	action 	or 	claim 	for 	relief. 	(Doc. 	4). 	Thus,
Hill 	failed 	to 	provide 	adequate 	notice 	of 	his 	claims 	and 	the
factual grounds upon which his claims were based. (Id. at 7). 	The
undersigned 	further 	noted 	that 	Hill 	did 	not 	separate 	his 	claims
for 	relief 	or 	causes 	of 	action 	into 	different 	counts 	or 	include
the 	pertinent 	facts 	supporting 	each 	claim 	as 	required 	by
Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). 	(Id. 	at 10). 	Instead, 	Hill 	lumped 	his
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claims 	together 	such 	that 	he 	did 	not 	specify 	what 	each 	Defendant
did or failed to do to make them liable under each cause of action
alleged. 	The 	undersigned 	thus 	recommended 	that 	Hill’s 	complaint
be 	dismissed 	without 	prejudice 	as 	a 	shotgun 	pleading 	and 	that 	he
be 	afforded 	an 	opportunity 	to 	file 	an 	amended 	complaint 	in
compliance 	with 	Rules 8 	and 10 	of 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil
Procedure. (Id. at 9-10).
United States District Judge Kristi K. DuBose adopted the R&R
as 	the 	opinion 	of 	the 	Court 	and 	granted 	Hill 	leave 	“to 	file 	a
second 	amended 	complaint 	. . . 	that 	cure[d] 	the 	pleading
deficiencies 	identified 	in 	the 	Report 	and 	Recommendation.”
(Doc. 5). 	Hill 	timely 	filed 	his 	second 	amended 	complaint, 	which
is 	titled 	“Abuse 	of 	Power 	and 	Abuse 	of 	Process 	Complaint” 	and 	is
now 	his 	operative 	pleading. 	(Doc. 8). 	He 	also 	filed 	a 	document
titled 	“Notice 	of 	Adjudicative 	Facts” 	with 	exhibits 	thereto.
(Doc. 9). 	Per Hill, “[i]t is the intent of the Plaintiff [through
this filing] to offer the first example displaying Abuse of Power
and 	Abuse 	of 	Process 	by 	the 	Defendants, 	stemmed 	from 	irregular
practices demonstrated by the Mobile Police Department and further
obliged by the Mobile Municipal Court (i.e. Judge S. Hall).” (Id.
at 1).2
2 	Unless 	otherwise 	indicated, 	quoted 	language 	from 	Plaintiff’s
pro 	se 	filings 	is 	reproduced 	herein 	without 	modification 	or
correction 	for 	typographical, 	grammar, 	or 	spelling 	errors;
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II. 	DISCUSSION
A. Hill’s Operative Complaint
Hill’s 	second 	amended 	complaint 	consists 	of 	five 	paragraphs
that 	contain 	his 	statement 	of 	facts, 	a 	section 	entitled
“Applicability” 	that 	lists 	various 	provisions 	of 	the 	Code 	of
Alabama, 	a 	section 	entitled 	“legal 	claims” 	that 	purports 	to 	list
sixteen causes of action along with the purported related factual
paragraphs, and a prayer for relief that seeks compensatory damages
totaling 	$2,200,000.00, 	to 	be 	paid 	to 	“the 	501(c)3 	nonprofit
organization “Success 4 the Future” Charity Foundation 4 Kids Ages
3-18, 	Incorporated” 	(hereinafter 	referenced 	as 	“Success 	4 	the
Future Charity Foundation”). (Doc. 8).
In 	Hill’s 	statement 	of 	facts 	labeled 	as 	paragraphs 	6-7, 	he
asserts 	that 	he 	has 	“[b]y 	means 	of 	Abuse 	of 	Power 	and 	Abuse 	of
Process” 	been 	victim 	to 	a 	plethora 	of
“(targeted/intentional/conspired) rights violations, enforced and
conducted 	by 	Defendants”, 	that 	during 	the 	Covid 	Pandemic, 	the
Mobile 	City 	Council, 	by 	unanimous 	consent, 	on 	March 	23, 	2021,
approved 	an 	appropriation 	for 	Success 	4 	the 	Future 	Charity
Foundation, 	that 	he 	serves 	as 	the 	Founder/Executive 	Director 	of
ellipses, 	and 	words 	in 	brackets 	and 	in 	parentheses, 	are 	in
Plaintiff’s filings and are not inserted by the Court.
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the 	Foundation, 	and 	that 	the 	City 	has 	withheld 	crucial 	necessary
funding. 	(Id. 	at 	2). 	In 	Paragraph 	8, 	which 	is 	labeled
“Discriminately Withholding Federal Funds, Hill asserts that after
the 	2021 	incident, 	the 	City 	(via 	Anitra 	Henderson) 	made 	an
announcement 	seeking 	proposals 	for 	organizations 	to 	receive
resources 	allocated 	under 	the 	American 	Rescue 	Plan. 	(Id. 	at 	3).
Hill contends that Success 4 the Future Charity Foundation was the
only 	organization 	to 	submit 	the 	required 	materials, 	that 	the
deadline 	was 	extended, 	and 	that 	Success 4 	the 	Future 	Charity
Foundation 	submitted 	another 	application, 	which 	“presented 	the
most 	applicable 	qualification 	for 	said 	funding”; 	however,
Success 4 the Future Charity Foundation did not receive any of the
funds that were awarded in the Spring of 2022. 	Hill also contends
that he has applied for multiple federally funded programs through
the 	City 	of 	Mobile 	Community 	and 	Housing 	Development 	Department
for years, but he has been denied. (Id. at 3).
In 	paragraph 	9, 	which 	is 	labeled 	“Unlawful 	Use 	of 	Formal
Communications”, 	Hill 	alleges 	that 	since 	2021, 	a 	City 	of 	Mobile
Municipal Ordinance (Section 2-62) has been manipulated to target
specific 	citizens, 	especially 	those 	who 	publicly 	raise 	concerns
regarding the use of taxpayer funds. (Doc. 8 at 3). 	According to
Hill, 	the 	ordinance 	has 	been 	used 	to 	limit 	the 	topics 	for
discussions 	to 	fit 	a 	“preordained 	narrative” 	desired 	by 	City
Officials 	and 	has 	resulted 	in 	threats 	of 	suspensions 	and 	removal
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from 	meetings 	of 	the 	Mobile 	City 	Council. 	(Doc. 8 	at 	3-4). 	Hill
contends that “other Citizens” have been given baseless letters in
connection with him and/or his presentation. 	Hill further contends
that 	on 	April 2, 	2024, 	he 	was 	unlawfully 	ejected 	from 	a 	regular
meeting 	of 	the 	City 	Council, 	and 	that 	on 	August 	27, 	2024, 	the
“then” Mobile City Council Attorney “banned him from the 9th Floor
(South Tower) of the Mobile Government Plaza.” (Id. at 4).
In 	paragraph 	10, 	labeled 	as 	“Weaponized 	Law 	Enforcement”,
Hill 	contends 	that 	he 	was 	issued 	an 	unlawful 	traffic 	citation 	on
November 28, 2018, for improper vehicle headlights even though he
was in compliance with Ala. Code Section 32-5-240, which sets the
conditions 	for 	use 	of 	headlights. 	(Doc. 8 	at 	4-5). 	Hill 	also
details 	his 	alleged 	dealing 	with 	the 	Mobile 	Municipal 	Court
regarding the citation. (Id.). 	Hill further contends that he was
the 	victim 	of 	police 	brutality 	on 	July 19, 	2024. 	(Id. 	at 	5-6).
According to Hill, he was tased and unlawfully detained by Officer
Kriss, 	who 	he 	contends 	practiced 	medicine 	without 	a 	license 	by
removing taser prongs from him. 	Hill contends this was a “heinous
demonstration 	of 	POLICE 	Brutality, 	through 	a 	targeted 	effort 	on
behalf of certain individuals with the Defendant City”. (Id. at 6).
Hill also asserts that the City of Mobile offered him a plea deal
to remove all charges except those pertaining to the November 28,
2018, incident. (Id.). 	Finally, Hill alleges that Defendants had
him 	unlawfully 	escorted 	out 	of 	a 	regular 	meeting 	of 	the 	Mobile
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City 	Council 	on 	April 2, 	2024, 	for 	allegedly 	being 	disruptive.
Id.).
Paragraph 	11 	of 	Hill’s 	second 	amended 	complaint 	is 	labeled
“Applicability” 	and 	includes 	a 	listing, 	in 	bullet 	format, 	of
seventeen Alabama Code provisions. (Id. at 6-7). 	Some of the Code
sections 	concern 	causes 	of 	actions 	(see 	e.g., 	Doc. 	8 	at 	6), 	some
of 	the 	Code 	sections 	concern 	statutes 	of 	limitations 	(see 	e.g.,
id.) 	and 	some 	concern 	mayoral 	duties 	and 	responsibilities. 	(see
e.g., Id. at 7).
The next section in Hill’s amended complaint is labeled “Legal
Claims” 	and 	next 	to 	each 	legal 	claim, 	Hill 	lists 	the 	factual
paragraph(s) 	to 	which 	he 	contends 	the 	claims 	relate. 	(Id. 	at 	7-
8). Specifically, Hill asserts as follows:
Breach of Contract: Item 7.
Slander: Items 9-10.
Defamation: Items 9-10;
Fraud: Items 7-10;
Conspiring: Items 7-10;
Targeting: Items 7-10;
Mental Anguish: Items 7-10;
Loss of Opportunity: Items 7-10;
Deprivation: Items 7-10;
Harassment: Items 9-10;
Assault: Item 10;
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Police Brutality: Item 10;
Medical Malpractice: Item 10;
Malfeasance: Item 10;
Abuse of Power: Items 7-10); and
Abuse of Process: Items 7-10. (Id.).
Hill 	indicates 	that 	each 	of 	his 	claims 	are 	supported 	by 	his
factual allegations and by documents already filed with the Court.
(Id.).
B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Hill’s Response.
Similar to their first motion to dismiss, Defendants’ current
motion seeks the dismissal of Hill’s second amended complaint based
on 	alleged 	pleading 	and 	legal 	deficiencies. 	(Doc. 10).
Specifically, 	Defendants 	assert 	that 	Hill’s 	second 	amended
complaint 	remains 	a 	shotgun 	pleading 	“because 	it 	contains 	only
vague 	and 	conclusory 	allegations 	that 	are 	irrelevant 	and
unsupportive 	of 	the 	causes 	of 	action 	asserted,” 	(id. 	at 	5) 	and
“because it fails to distinguish the alleged actionable conduct of
the two separate Defendants and what each defendant did or did not
do 	to 	make 	it 	liable 	under 	each 	of 	the 	‘Legal 	Claims.’ ” 	(Id.
at 7). 	In 	addition 	to 	the 	shotgun 	pleading 	issues, 	Defendants
assert 	that 	Hill’s 	sixteen 	causes 	of 	action 	should 	be 	dismissed
for 	failure 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	upon 	which 	relief 	can 	be 	granted.
(Id. at 9-17).
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Much 	like 	his 	second 	amended 	complaint, 	Hill’s 	response 	in
opposition 	to 	Defendants’ 	motion 	(Doc. 	15) 	is 	not 	the 	model 	of
clarity and does little to address the deficiencies raised in the
motion. 	In fact, the first five pages of Hill’s nine-page response
is 	devoted 	to 	matters 	wholly 	unrelated 	to 	this 	litigation.3 	(Id.
at 1-5). 	Additionally, 	Hill 	asserts 	that 	Defendants 	are
attempting 	to 	“bamboozle” 	the 	Court, 	and 	asserts 	that 	he 	did 	not
read 	Defendants’ 	motion 	beyond 	the 	first 	mention 	therein 	of
“shotgun pleadings”:
The 	Plaintiff 	must 	directly 	inform 	This 	Court....after
reading the first indication of a “shotgun pleading” (in
the 	aforementioned 	move 	for 	dismissal) 	filed 	by 	the
Defendants, the undersigned Counsel politely folded the
defense 	document 	and 	placed 	it 	back 	in 	the 	envelope 	it
was 	delivered 	in....as 	it 	would 	be 	an 	extreme 	waste 	of
time 	to 	even 	entertain 	such 	foolishness 	from 	the
defense, beyond that point!
(Id. 	at 	2) 	(ellipses 	in 	the 	original). 	Hill 	goes 	on 	to 	assert
that 	his 	second 	amended 	complaint 	cured 	the 	previous 	shotgun
deficiencies, 	and 	it 	appears 	that 	Hill 	is 	relying 	on 	his 	filings
labeled 	as 	“Notice 	of 	Adjudicative 	Facts” 	in 	support 	of 	his
3 	For example, Hill asserts that “Thanks to the Paul Prine case,
we 	find 	that 	the 	Public 	Safety 	Director 	for 	the 	City 	of 	Mobile
resides in Baldwin County. 	This should be a conflict of interest
in 	itself. 	Even 	more 	interesting, 	that 	specific 	City 	in 	Baldwin
County has a Chief of Police who is the blood brother of the City
of 	Mobile 	Chief 	of 	Staff.” 	(Id. 	at 	4). 	Given 	that 	neither 	the
Public 	Safety 	Director 	for 	the 	City 	of 	Mobile 	nor 	the 	Chief 	of
Staff 	for 	the 	City 	of 	Mobile 	are 	named 	as 	defendants 	in 	this
action, 	it 	is 	not 	clear 	why 	their 	purported 	places 	of 	residency
are in any way relevant to the issues in this action.
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assertion. (Id. at 5). 	Hill further seems to suggest that each of
his claims are asserted against both the City and the City Council
unless stated otherwise. 	According to Hill:
Now, 	had 	the 	Plaintiff 	chosen 	to 	make 	claims 	against
individuals directly, it would have been more of a need
to produce further distinction in those direct actions.
However, 	because 	the 	Complaint 	is 	a 	reflection 	of
collective procedures, each count is based on the whole
of 	the 	unique 	instances…unless 	identified 	as 	Defendant
Council or Defendant City.
(Id. at 6).
In 	their 	reply, 	Defendants 	assert 	that 	Hill’s 	response 	does
not rebut their assertion that his operative pleading still falls
within 	the 	second 	and 	fourth 	categories 	of 	an 	improper 	shotgun
pleading 	and 	that 	Hill 	“failed 	to 	substantively 	respond 	to
Defendants’ 	argument 	for 	dismissal 	beyond 	a 	simple 	denial.”
(Doc. 16 at 4). 	With respect to the “Notice of Adjudicative Facts”
documents filed by Hill, Defendants assert that the legal standard
for ruling on a motion to dismiss requires the court to limit its
review to the four corners of the complaint. (Id.) (citing, inter
alia, 	Hayes 	v. 	U.S. 	Bank 	Nat. 	Ass’n, 	648 	F. App’x 	883, 	887 	(11th
Cir. 2016)).
C. Standard of Review
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim 	showing 	that 	the 	pleader 	is 	entitled 	to 	relief,”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), so as to “give the defendant fair notice
of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]”
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Bell 	Alt. 	Corp. 	v. 	Twombly, 	550 	U.S. 	544, 	555, 	127 	S.Ct. 	1955,
167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (citation omitted). 	In addition, “Rule 10
of 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	requires 	that 	each 	claim
be separated into separate counts and supported by distinct factual
allegations.” 	Bagley 	v. 	City 	of 	Tampa, 	2007 WL 	9723949, 	at 	*1
(M.D. 	Fla. 	Sept. 19, 	2007) 	(citing 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	10(b)).
Although a court must accept as true well pleaded allegations, it
is 	not 	bound 	to 	accept 	a 	legal 	conclusion 	couched 	as 	a 	factual
allegation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
“Complaints 	that 	violate 	either 	Rule 	8(a)(2) 	or 	Rule 	10(b),
or 	both, 	are 	often 	disparagingly 	referred 	to 	as 	'shotgun
pleadings.’ ” 	Weiland 	v. 	Palm 	Beach 	Cty. 	Sheriff’s 	Office,
792 F. 3d 1313, 1320 (llth Cir. 2015). 	Shotgun pleadings generally
present in one of four ways: (1) a complaint “containing multiple
counts 	where 	each 	count 	adopts 	the 	allegations 	of 	all 	preceding
counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came before
and 	the 	last 	count 	to 	be 	a 	combination 	of 	the 	entire 	complaint”;
(2) a 	complaint 	“replete 	with 	conclusory, 	vague, 	and 	immaterial
facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action”;
(3) a 	complaint 	that 	fails 	to 	separate 	“into 	a 	different 	count
each 	cause 	of 	action 	or 	claim 	for 	relief”; 	and 	(4) complaints
containing 	“multiple 	claims 	against 	multiple 	defendants 	without
specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts
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or 	omissions, 	or 	which 	of 	the 	defendants 	the 	claim 	is 	brought
against.” (Id. at 1321-23). 	Each of these types of pleadings fails
“to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them
and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” (Id. at 1323).
When 	presented 	with 	a 	shotgun 	pleading, 	“the 	trial 	court,
whether or not requested to do so by the party’s adversary, ought
to require the party to file a repleader.” U.S. ex rel. Atkins v.
McInteer, 	470 	F.3d 	1350, 	1354 	n.6 	(llth 	Cir. 	2006). 	“[I]f 	the
plaintiff 	fails 	to 	comply 	with 	the 	court’s 	order 	- 	by 	filing 	a
repleader 	with 	the 	same 	deficiency 	- 	the 	court 	should 	strike 	his
pleading 	or 	depending 	on 	the 	circumstances, 	dismiss 	his 	case 	and
consider the imposition of monetary sanctions.’ ” Vibe Micro, Inc.
v. 	Shabanets, 	878 	F. 	3d 	1291, 	1295 	(llth 	Cir. 	2018) 	(citation
omitted).
A pro se complaint should be construed leniently, but a court
does 	not 	have 	“license 	. 	. 	. 	to 	rewrite 	an 	otherwise 	deficient
pleading 	[by 	a 	pro 	se 	litigant] 	in 	order 	to 	sustain 	an 	action.”
GJR 	Invs. 	v. 	Cnty. 	of 	Escambia, 	132 	F.3d 	1359, 	1369 	(11th 	Cir.
1998), 	overruled 	on 	other 	grounds 	by 	Iqbal, 	556 	U.S. 	662. 	See
also 	Gilmore 	v. 	Hodges, 	738 	F.3d 	266, 	281 	(llth 	Cir. 	2013)
(“[L]iberal 	construction 	is 	not 	the 	same 	thing 	as 	wholesale
redrafting.”). 	Pro 	se 	parties 	must 	comply 	with 	the 	minimum
pleading 	standards 	set 	forth 	in 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil
Procedure and the Local Rules. Nawab v. LVNV Funding LLC, 2012 WL
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12918283, 	at 	*1, 	2012 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	190401, 	at 	*3 	(M.D. 	Fla.
Nov. 19, 2012); see also Arrington v. Green, 757 F. App’x 796, 797
(llth Cir. 2018) (“We construe pro se pleadings liberally, holding
them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys.
Nevertheless, we ‘have little tolerance for shotgun pleadings.’ ”
(citing 	Hughes 	v. 	Lott, 	350 F.3d 	1157, 	1160 	(llth 	Cir. 	2003) 	and
quoting Vibe Micro, 878 F.3d at 1295).
D. Analysis
Upon 	consideration 	of 	Hill’s 	second 	amended 	complaint, 	the
undersigned finds that while Hill made some revisions to his second
amended complaint, it still suffers from many of the deficiencies
identified 	in 	the 	Court’s 	Order 	dated 	September 	4, 	2024 	(doc. 4)
and as a result, constitutes an improper shotgun pleading. 	First,
the 	amended 	complaint 	is 	replete 	with 	conclusory, 	vague, 	and
immaterial 	facts 	not 	obviously 	connected 	to 	any 	particular 	cause
of 	action. 	For 	instance, 	in 	factual 	paragraph 	7, 	Hill 	alleges
that 	the 	Defendant 	City 	of 	Mobile 	voted 	to 	provide 	funds 	to
“Success 	4 	Future 	Charity 	Foundation” 	and 	failed 	to 	do 	so, 	and
then, 	in 	another 	section 	of 	the 	amended 	complaint, 	Hill 	lists
breach of contract, fraud, conspiring, targeting, mental anguish,
loss of opportunity, deprivation, malfeasance, abuse of power, and
abuse of process as the claims that correspond to these particular
factual 	assertions. 	(Doc. 8 	at 	2, 	7). 	Not 	only 	are 	Hill’s
assertions vague and conclusory, but they do not place Defendants
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on notice of how their actions or inactions harmed Hill or how the
factual 	allegations 	relate 	in 	any 	way 	to 	his 	purported 	causes 	of
actions. 	As such, the factual allegations fall within the second
category of improper shotgun pleading. 	Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1320
(prohibiting 	vague 	and 	conclusory 	allegations 	that 	are 	not
obviously connected to any particular cause of action or claim for
relief).
As 	noted 	supra, 	at 	paragraph 	8, 	Hill 	alleges 	discrimination
in connection with the withholding of federal funds; however, aside
from 	his 	conclusory 	assertions 	about 	various 	applications 	for
federal 	funds, 	his 	allegations 	once 	again 	fall 	within 	the 	second
category 	of 	improper 	shotgun 	pleading 	because 	they 	do 	not 	place
Defendants on notice of how their actions or inactions harmed Hill
or how the factual allegations relate in any way to his purported
causes of actions. (Doc. 8 at 3). 	Hill’s assertions also violate
Fed. R. Civ. P. 10’s 	requirement 	that 	“[a] 	party 	must 	state 	its
claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as
practical to a single set of circumstances . . . each claim founded
on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . must be stated in a
separate 	count . . . 	Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 	10(b). 	Here, 	Hill
appears 	to 	be 	attempting 	to 	improperly 	lump 	together 	different
claims regarding different funding applications spanning over the
course of several years.
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Paragraph 9 also constitutes an improper shotgun pleading as
Hill 	makes 	vague 	and 	conclusory 	allegations 	about 	letters 	that
reference him, about being unlawfully ejected from a city council
meeting in April 2024 and about being barred from going on the 9th
floor 	in 	the 	Mobile 	Government 	Plaza 	in 	August 	2024. 	(Id. 	at 3-
4). 	Although 	Hill 	lumps 	together 	various 	causes 	of 	action 	(e.g.
slander, defamation, harassment) that purportedly arise from these
factual allegations, Defendants are left to guess and speculate as
to 	the 	actions 	each 	Defendant 	is 	alleged 	to 	have 	taken 	or 	failed
to 	have 	taken 	with 	respect 	to 	the 	incidents 	as 	well 	as 	how 	the
factual assertions relate to the various asserted causes of action
that Hill has lumped together.
The same holds true with respect to Hill’s allegations about
being issued an unlawful traffic citation in 2018 and being tased
by 	Officer 	Kriss 	in 	July 	2024. 	(Id. 	at 	4-6). 	These 	allegations
are vague and conclusory, and they are devoid of facts that allege
how each Defendant, as opposed to Officer Kriss and others, harmed
Hill. 	Nor 	is 	it 	clear 	how 	the 	factual 	allegations 	are 	connected
to the various causes of action (e.g. slander, defamation, fraud,
conspiring, 	targeting, 	mental 	anguish, 	loss 	of 	opportunity,
deprivation, 	harassment, 	assault, 	police 	brutality, 	medical
malpractice, 	abuse 	of 	power, 	and 	abuse 	of 	process) 	that 	Hill 	has
lumped 	together. 	See 	Veltmann 	v. 	Walpole 	Pharmacy, 	Inc.,
958 F. Supp. 	1161, 	1164 	(M.D. 	Fla. 	1996) 	(finding 	dismissal
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appropriate when a plaintiff’s complaint made general allegations
against 	all 	named 	defendants, 	making 	it 	“virtually 	impossible 	to
ascertain . . . which defendant committed which alleged act.”).
In addition to being a shotgun pleading, Hill’s complaint is
also subject to dismissal because Hill’s claims fail to adequately
state 	a 	claim 	on 	which 	relief 	can 	be 	granted. 	For 	example, 	Hill
alleges 	slander 	and 	defamation, 	yet 	he 	has 	not 	identified 	any
statements, 	oral 	or 	written, 	that 	mentioned 	him 	unfavorably 	nor
does 	he 	allege 	any 	facts 	that 	connect 	Defendants 	to 	any 	such
statements. 	Hill also alleges breach of contract, yet his amended
complaint is devoid of any facts that suggest that he was a party
to 	a 	contract 	with 	any 	of 	the 	Defendants. 	See 	Shaffer 	v. 	Regions
Fin. 	Corp., 	29 	So.3d 	872, 	880 	(Ala. 	2009) 	(“The 	elements 	of 	a
breach-of-contract claim under Alabama law are (1) a valid contract
binding 	the 	parties; 	(2) 	the 	plaintiffs’ 	performance 	under 	the
contract; 	the 	defendant’s 	nonperformance; 	and 	(4) 	resulting
damages.”) 	(internal 	quotations 	and 	citation 	omitted). 	He
likewise 	alleges 	assault 	and 	police 	brutality; 	however, 	he 	has
failed to offer any facts that suggest conduct on behalf of either
Defendant which would support such claims. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs
of 	Bryan 	Cnty., 	Okla. 	v. 	Brown, 	520 	U.S. 	397, 	403 	(1997) 	(As 	a
general rule, a municipality cannot be held vicariously liable for
the 	actions 	of 	its 	employees 	under 	42 U.S.C. 	§ 1983); 	Monell 	v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.
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2d 	611 	(1978) 	(A 	municipality 	incurs 	liability 	only 	when 	the
execution 	of 	its 	policy 	or 	custom 	constitutes 	the 	“moving 	force”
that 	inflicts 	injury 	upon 	an 	individual 	in 	violation 	of 	her
constitutional rights.)
In sum, Hill’s listing of sixteen causes of action along with
vague, conclusory and incomplete factual allegations fail to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. 	Interestingly, following
the 	listing 	of 	his 	sixteen 	causes 	of 	action, 	Hill 	asserts 	that:
“Each of these items are supported by above sentiment articulated;
Item 	11; 	Documents 	already 	filed 	pertaining 	to 	This 	Case; 	and
future Pleadings/Testimony/Discovery; and existing court cases in
relation 	to 	the 	holistic 	Complaint...” 	(Doc. 8 	at 	8) 	(bold
removed). 	As 	the 	undersigned 	previously 	informed 	Hill, 	“[t]his
manner of pleading is entirely improper because it fails to provide
notice of what Hill is claiming. 	Hill is hereby advised that the
Court cannot grant him relief on a claim that he does not actually
plead 	in 	his 	complaint, 	nor 	can 	it 	consider 	an 	‘unpled 	factual
basis 	for 	[his] 	claims.’ 	See 	Hom 	v. 	Transunion, 	LLC, 	2024 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 86464, at *4, 2024 WL 2258320, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 14,
2024).” 	(Doc. 4 	at 	7-8). 	Vague 	references 	to 	unidentified
“Documents 	already 	filed 	pertaining 	to 	this 	Case”, 	“future
Pleadings/Testimony/Discovery”, 	and 	unidentified 	“existing 	court
cases in relation to the holistic Complaint” (whatever that means)
does not comply with the pleading requirements of Rules 8 and 10.
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Thus, 	despite 	the 	re-packaging, 	Hill 	has 	failed 	to 	correct 	the
pleading 	deficiencies 	outlined 	in 	the 	Court’s 	Order 	dated
September 4, 2024. (Doc. 4). 	Hill’s pro se status notwithstanding,
the undersigned cannot re-write his operative pleading for him to
make 	it 	legally 	sufficient 	and 	bring 	it 	within 	the 	guardrails 	of
Rules 8 and 10.
III. 	CONCLUSION
Upon 	review 	of 	Hill’s 	second 	amended 	complaint, 	the
undersigned finds that, despite the fact that Hill has reconfigured
parts of his pleading and added details, this complaint, like its
predecessors, 	violates 	the 	pleading 	requirements 	of 	Rules 8
and 10, 	constitutes 	a 	prohibited 	shotgun 	pleading, 	and 	fails 	to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 	Accordingly, the
undersigned 	RECOMMENDS 	that 	Defendants’ 	motion 	to 	dismiss
(Doc. 10) 	be 	GRANTED, 	and 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	be 	DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.4
4 Ordinarily, 	a 	pro 	se 	party 	should 	be 	given 	one 	opportunity 	to
file an amended complaint. See Sifford v. Ford, 701 F. App’x 794,
796 (llth Cir. 2017). 	Hill has been given that opportunity here,
but he has not rectified the pleading deficiencies. 	Accordingly,
the 	undersigned 	recommends 	that 	the 	matter 	be 	dismissed 	without
further opportunity to replead. See Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A.,
898 F.3d 1348, 1358-59 (llth Cir. 2018) (a district court does not
abuse 	its 	discretion 	in 	dismissing 	with 	prejudice 	a 	shotgun
pleading if the plaintiff is given an opportunity to first remedy
the defects and fails to do so).
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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS
A 	copy 	of 	this 	report 	and 	recommendation 	shall 	be 	served 	on
all parties in the manner provided by law. 	Any party who objects
to 	this 	recommendation 	or 	anything 	in 	it 	must, 	within 	fourteen
(14) 	days 	of 	the 	date 	of 	service 	of 	this 	document, 	file 	specific
written 	objections 	with 	the 	Clerk 	of 	this 	Court. 	See 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1); 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b); 	S.D. 	Ala. 	GenLR 	72(c). 	The
parties 	should 	note 	that 	under 	Eleventh 	Circuit 	Rule 	3-1, 	“[a]
party 	failing 	to 	object 	to 	a 	magistrate 	judge’s 	findings 	or
recommendations 	contained 	in 	a 	report 	and 	recommendation 	in
accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the
right 	to 	challenge 	on 	appeal 	the 	district 	court’s 	order 	based 	on
unobjected-to 	factual 	and 	legal 	conclusions 	if 	the 	party 	was
informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on
appeal 	for 	failing 	to 	object. 	In 	the 	absence 	of 	a 	proper
objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error
if necessary in the interests of justice.” 	11th Cir. R. 3-1.
In 	order 	to 	be 	specific, 	an 	objection 	must 	identify 	the
specific 	finding 	or 	recommendation 	to 	which 	objection 	is 	made,
state 	the 	basis 	for 	the 	objection, 	and 	specify 	the 	place 	in 	the
Magistrate 	Judge’s 	report 	and 	recommendation 	where 	the 	disputed
determination is found. 	An objection that merely incorporates by
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reference 	or 	refers 	to 	the 	briefing 	done 	by 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge
is not specific.
DONE this 29th day of August, 2025.
/s/ SONJA F. BIVINS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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