USA v. Alexander

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
vs. 	) 	Criminal Action No. 18-00350-KD-MU
)
RODNEY LORENZO ALEXANDER, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
ORDER
This action is before the Court on Defendant Rodney Lorenzo Alexander’s Motion for
Compassionate Release/Sentence Reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (doc. 58).
Upon consideration, and for the reasons set forth herein, the motion is denied.
I. 	Background
In 2019, Alexander pled guilty to the offenses of possession of a firearm by a prohibited
person (felon) and possession of ammunition by a prohibited person (felon). He was sentenced
to total term of imprisonment of:
120 months as to Count One and 31 months as to Count Two; said terms to run
consecutively, but concurrently (starting June 7, 2019) with the custody sentences
in CC15-5417, CC15-5418, CC15-5419, and the related state charges in CC18-
4296, CC18-4297, CC18-4298, CC18-4299; and that the state facility be
designated as the facility where he will serve his sentence.
(Doc. 31).
At present, Alexander is 35 years old. He is incarcerated at USP Victorville, a high
security federal prison in Victorville, California. His release date is February 19, 2030.
II. 	Procedural requirements
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), defendants must either exhaust their
administrative rights to appeal the Bureau of Prison’s failure to bring a motion on their behalf or
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allow 30 days to lapse from the Warden’s receipt of defendant’s request for such relief.
Alexander states that “[a]s the movant, a criminal defendant is not required to separately exhaust
his administrative remedies to the disparity issue” (doc. 58, p. 2). Thus, he admits that he has not
met this statutory prerequisite.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has “concluded that § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s
exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, but instead is a ‘claim processing rule’ that requires
us to look at whether the government argued that a given defendant has forfeited the right to seek
compassionate release by failing to exhaust administrative remedies.” United States v. Kravatz,
2025 WL 868277, at *2 (11th Cir. Mar. 19, 2025) (citing United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908,
911 (11th Cir. 2021)). However, in lieu of dismissal without prejudice for failing to comply with
this claim processing rule, or requesting a response from the United States, the Court will
address his motion.
III. Analysis
“A district court has no inherent authority to modify a defendant's sentence; it may do so
‘only when authorized by a statute or rule.’” United States v. Ratliff, No. 24-10752, 2024 WL
4371658, at *3 (11th Cir. Oct. 2, 2024) (quoting United States v. Puentes, 803 F.3d 597, 605–06
(11th Cir. 2015). Title 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)1 “authorizes a district court to reduce a term of
imprisonment when three requirements are satisfied: (1) there are ‘extraordinary and compelling
reasons’ for granting a sentence reduction; (2) ‘the § 3553(a) sentencing factors favor’ a
reduction; and (3) awarding a sentence reduction ‘wouldn't endanger any person or the
1 Not relevant in this action, the statute also provides for a reduction of sentence for defendants
who are at least 70 years old and have served at least 30 years in prison “pursuant to a sentence
imposed under section 3559(c)” and certain other conditions are met. 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(1)(A)(ii).
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community’.” Id. (quoting United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021). Also,
the statute requires that any reduction must be “consistent with applicable policy statements
issued by the Sentencing Commission” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). “If the district court finds
that a movant failed to satisfy even one of these requirements, it cannot grant relief and need not
analyze the remaining requirements.” Ratliff, 2024 WL 4372658 at *3 (citing United States v.
Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1347–48 (11th Cir. 2021).
Alexander argues that his release from prison would be consistent with Section (b)(6) of
the Policy Statement. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. He argues that the Court erred in applying three
sentencing enhancements to his sentencing guidelines calculation, because these enhancements
were based upon improper fact-finding by the Court, instead of the jury, which increased his
minimum sentence. He relies upon Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) and Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), to argue that there is a gross disparity “between the sentence
being served and the likely sentence that would be imposed today” (doc. 58, p. 3).
Section (b) provides that “Extraordinary and compelling reasons [for a reduction of
sentence] exist under any of the following circumstances or a combination thereof:
(6) Unusually Long Sentence. If a defendant received an unusually long sentence
and has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment, a change in the law
(other than an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made
retroactive) may be considered in determining whether the defendant presents an
extraordinary and compelling reason, but only where such change would produce
a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be
imposed at the time the motion is filed, and after full consideration of the
defendant's individualized circumstances.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.
Setting aside any argument whether Alexander received an “unusually long sentence” or
that his individualized circumstances could merit a reduction in sentence, he admits that he has
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not served at least 10 years of his term of imprisonment. Also, he does not rely on a change in
the law that occurred after he was sentenced. Apprendi and Alleyne were both decided before he
was sentenced. Thus, Alexander has not established an extraordinary and compelling reason for a
reduction of sentence that is consistent with the Policy Statement U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, Alexander’s motion is denied for failure to show an
extraordinary and compelling reason for a reduction of sentence. The Court need not address the
remaining two requirements: That the relevant sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weigh
in favor of a reduced sentence or that Alexander’s release would not result in a danger to any
person or the public. See Giron, 15 F. 4th at 1347.
DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of March 2025.
s / Kristi K. DuBose
KRISTI K. DuBOSE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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