ATG SPORTS INDUSTRIES, INC. v. ITS SPRINTURF HOLDINGS, LLC

1

FIFTH DIVISION
MCFADDEN, P. J.,
HODGES and PIPKIN, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

March 12, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A25A1649. ATG SPORTS INDUSTRIES, INC. et al. v. ITS
SPRINTURF HOLDINGS, LLC.

MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge.

ATG Sports Industries, Inc. and ATG-RAM Industries, LLC jointly appeal

from the denial of their motions for new trial or judgment notwithstanding the jury

verdict finding that ATG-RAM was the alter ego of ATG Sports and that they were

both liable to ITS Sprinturf Holdings, LLC (“ITS”) for breach of contract. The

appellants contend that the trial court erred in denying their motions because, as two

of our opinions have stated, Georgia law has never applied the alter ego doctrine

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We have circulated this decision amongst all nondisqualified judges of the
Court to consider whether this case should be passed upon by all members of
theCourt. Fewer than the required numbers of judges, however, voted in favor
of considering this case en banc.
horizontally between sibling companies; but a review of the case law reveals that

Georgia courts have applied the doctrine in that manner. And because there was some

evidence to support the jury’s alter ego verdict, we affirm the denial of their motions

on those grounds. But in doing so, we must disapprove the language in our two

opinions that incorrectly stated that Georgia law has not recognized the alter ego

doctrine among sibling companies.

The appellants also assert two objections to the trial court’s jury instructions;

but they failed to raise those objections below and they have not shown substantial

error in the instructions. The appellants’ additional challenge to a contract issue that

was decided on summary judgment is moot after the jury verdict and entry of

judgment thereon. And there was some evidence supporting the jury’s award of

attorney fees. So we affirm.2

1. Procedural posture

ITS filed a complaint against ATG-Sports, claiming breach of contract. The

complaint alleged that ITS manufactures and supplies artificial turf; that ATG-Sports

2
Oral argument was held in this case on October 22, 2025, and is archived on
the court’s website. See Court of Appeals of Georgia, Oral Argument, Case No.
A25A1649 (October 22, 2025), available at https://vimeo.com/1129972699.
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installs and maintains artificial turf on sports fields; that ITS and ATG-Sports entered

into an agreement for ATG-Sports “to purchase substantially all of [its] turf

requirements” from ITS; and that ATG-Sports breached the agreement by

purchasing a substantial amount of its artificial turf requirements from a manufacturer

other than ITS. ITS amended the complaint to add ATG-RAM as a defendant,

claiming that it was also liable as the alter ego of ATG Sports, and to add a claim for

attorney fees under OCGA § 13-6-11. ATG-RAM filed a counterclaim alleging sale of

defective products.3

The case was tried before a jury. At the close of the plaintiff’s evidence, the trial

court denied a defense motion for directed verdict on the alter ego theory of liability.

The jury subsequently returned a verdict in favor of ITS, finding that ATG-RAM was

the alter ego of ATG Sports; that ATG Sports breached the agreement; that ITS was

entitled to $715,609 in damages, $53,860 in prejudgment interest, and $120,000 in

attorney fees and expenses; and that ITS was not liable on ATG-RAM’s counterclaim.

The trial court entered final judgment in the amounts awarded by the jury, plus post-

3
ITS points out, as it did at trial, that ATG-RAM’s counterclaim included a
claim for the return of deposits that had actually been paid by ATG Sports, but it
withdrew that claim during the trial.
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judgment interest, against ATG Sports and ATG-RAM jointly and severally. ATG

Sports and ATG-RAM filed motions for a new trial and judgment notwithstanding the

verdict (“JNOV”). The trial court denied the motions, and this appeal followed.

2. Horizontal alter ego

ATG Sports and ATG-RAM contend that the trial court erred by refusing to

grant them judgment as a matter of law because Georgia has never recognized a

“horizontal alter ego” theory of liability amongst sibling companies. Although their

contention is supported by statements in two prior opinions from this court, as

explained below, those statements were incorrect and are thus disapproved.

In Cobra 4 Enters. v. Powell-Newman, 336 Ga. App. 609 (785 SE2d 556) (2016)

(physical precedent only), this court rejected an attempt to impose liability

horizontally between a company and its sibling corporation, stating that “Georgia

courts have never applied the alter ego doctrine to impose liability in this manner.”

Id. at 614 (2). But this statement was not supported by any legal authority, and “right

after this statement, Cobra 4 expressly considered whether the two entities in that case

could be [liable as] each other’s alter egos. The Cobra 4 court concluded that, on the

facts, the two corporations were not alter egos because there was no evidence that the

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two companies were interchangeable entities.” Knieper v. Forest Group USA, No.

4:15-CV-00222-HLM, slip op. at 23 (III) (B) (6) (ND Ga. Sept. 12, 2016) (2016 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 190287) (citations and punctuation omitted).

Although the unsupported Cobra 4 statement was non-binding physical

precedent, it was later adopted by this court in Price & Co. v. Majors Mgmt., 363 Ga.

App. 427 (869 SE2d 587) (2022). See CMGRP v. Gallant, 343 Ga. App. 91, 96 (2) (a)

n. 15 (806 SE2d 16) (2017) (the fact that an opinion is only physical precedent is of no

consequence if a subsequent, unanimous panel of this court fully adopts the opinion’s

reasoning). Price & Co. quoted and emphasized the Cobra 4 statement recited above

and then declined “to incorporate the doctrine of horizontal veil piercing into Georgia

jurisprudence and to use it to impose liability on [the sibling companies in that case].”

Id. at 438 (4).

But contrary to the statements made in Cobra 4 and Price & Co., a review of

Georgia case law demonstrates, and a Georgia federal district court has concluded,

that there is “no reason to hold that Georgia does not recognize horizontal alter ego

liability. In fact ,Georgia [courts have] repeatedly considered whether one entity is the

alter ego of another.” Knieper, supra at 19 (III) (B) (6). Accord Salas v. Statebridge Co.,

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No. 1:21-CV-3959-SDG-JCF, slip op. at 45 (II) (E) (ND Ga. July 19, 2022) (2022 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 180565) (rejecting contention that Georgia courts have not recognized

horizontal alter ego and veil piercing to impose liability on sibling companies). While

some of those cases, like Cobra 4 itself, have found insufficient evidence to support

such an alter ego claim under their particular facts, others have recognized that sibling

companies may be liable as alter egos of each other. See, e. g., NEC Techs. v. Nelson,

267 Ga. 390, 397 (5) (478 SE2d 769) (1996) (reversing this court’s finding of genuine

issues of material fact as to whether one company was the alter ego of another

company because there was “an absence of any evidence establishing the existence of

fact questions regarding the alter ego issue”); TMX Fin. v. Goldsmith, 352 Ga. App.

190, 209-210 (6)(833 SE2d 317) (2019) (under alter ego doctrine, the corporate veil

may be pierced to hold a family of corporations liable for the debts of each other)

(punctuation omitted); Renee Unlimited v. City of Atlanta, 301 Ga. App. 254, 259-260

(2) (b) (687 SE2d 233) (2009) (evidence supported jury finding that two corporations

and their owner “were alter egos of each other”); Anthony v. Gator Cochran Const.,

299 Ga. App. 126, 127-128 (1) (682 SE2d 140) (2009) (affirming denial of motion for

new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict because some evidence supported

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the jury’s disregard of the corporate form under alter ego theory and the entry of

judgment against all the defendant companies jointly and severally), vacated on other

grounds by Anthony v. Gator Cochran Constr., 288 Ga. 79 (702 SE2d 139) (2010); Am.

Cas. Co. v. Schafer, 204 Ga. App. 906, 908 (3) (420 SE2d 820) (1992) (reversing grant

of summary judgment to a Georgia company on claim that it was the alter ego of a

Louisiana company because lost financial records were “material to the allegation that

the Georgia company is an alter ego of the Louisiana company”); Derbyshire v. United

Builders Supplies, 194 Ga. App. 840, 843-845 (2) (a) (392 SE2d 37) (1990) (affirming

verdict finding sibling corporations and their owner liable for breach of a lease signed

by only one of the companies under alter ego and veil piercing doctrines); Estes Equip.

Co. v. Corp. Steel, 192 Ga. App. 818, 819 (3) (386 SE2d 553) (1989) (affirming trial

court’s finding at a bench trial that one company was the alter ego of another

company). See also Lowery v. Noodle Life, 363 Ga. App. 1, 3-5 (a) (869 SE2d 600)

(2022) (decided one day after Price & Co., considering merits of horizontal alter ego

claim regarding sibling companies and affirming grant of summary judgment on that

claim because there was no evidence that the two companies were interchangeable

entities).

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Because Georgia courts have regularly considered whether one entity is the alter

ego of another and have applied the alter ego doctrine to determine liability between

sibling companies, we reject the contention of ATG Sports and ATG-RAM that

Georgia law does not recognize the horizontal alter ego theory of liability between

sibling companies. The trial court thus did not err in denying their motions for new

trial or JNOV on this basis. And any statements to the contrary in both Cobra 4 and

Price & Co. must be, and hereby are, disapproved.

3. Evidence supporting alter ego verdict

ATG Sports and ATG-RAM argue that the trial court erred in denying their

motions for new trial or JNOV because there was no evidence supporting the jury’s

alter ego verdict. We disagree.

When reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion for JNOV or
new trial, this [c]ourt determines if there is any evidence to support the
jury’s verdict. If a jury returns a verdict and it has the approval of the
trial judge, the same must be affirmed on appeal if there is any evidence
to support it as the jurors are the sole and exclusive judges of the weight
and credit given the evidence. The appellate court must construe the
evidence with every inference and presumption in favor of upholding the
verdict, and after judgment, the evidence must be construed to uphold
the verdict even where the evidence is in conflict. As long as there is
some evidence to support the verdict, the denial of [a] defendant’s
motions for new trial and JNOV will not be disturbed.

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Harris v. Martin, 373 Ga. App. 158, 158-159 (908 SE2d 17) (2024) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

So construed, the evidence showed that Paul Driver is the chief executive

officer and owner of both ATG Sports and ATG-RAM. The companies, which are

headquartered together, share the same address, telephone number, office space, and

some employees. Both companies are engaged in the design and installation of athletic

fields and tracks, primarily for educational institutions located in the Midwest. Both

companies hold the same type of contractor’s license, are licensed to do business in

the same five states, and use the same individuals to perform turf installation jobs.

ATG Sports has a website listing its field installations, but the list also includes ATG-

RAM fields without identifying them as such or otherwise distinguishing between the

companies.

ATG Sports entered into the supply agreement with ITS, while ATG-RAM was

not identified as a party to the contract signed by Driver. The contract included an

exception for a pre-existing contractual obligation that ATG Sports had with other

suppliers “in the amount of $600,000” and provided that ATG Sports could fulfill

that obligation before “switching most of its turf requirements to ITS.” Evidence

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presented at trial, however, authorized the finding that ATG-RAM, not ATG Sports,

had actually made the $600,000 payment that was excepted under the contract.

That evidence showed that the exception concerned a $600,000 deposit for

various fields, including a YMCA field, that ATG Sports had ordered from turf

manufacturer Turfstore. But there was no such payment from ATG Sports to

Turfstore in that amount. Instead, the evidence showed that one month before the

contract was executed by ATG Sports, ATG-RAM made the $600,000 payment to

Turfstore for, among other things, a YMCA job.

ATG-RAM also bought turf from ITS on numerous occasions during the term

of the contract. For those purchases, ATG-RAM paid the same discounted price

provided by the contract to ATG Sports. As Driver admitted, throughout his

companies’ relationship with ITS, ATG-RAM always paid the same price that ATG

Sports paid under the contract.

In addition to purchasing turf from ITS while the contract was in effect, ATG-

RAM also bought turf from other suppliers. When ITS confronted ATG Sports in

emails and letters about such purchases constituting breaches of their supply

agreement, ATG Sports never responded that ATG-RAM was a separate company

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not bound by the contract. According to the testimony of ITS’ former chief operating

officer, ATG Sports never claimed to ITS that there were separate ATG companies;

rather, the parties operated under the agreement as if ATG was one company, all the

pricing was done as if it were one company, and that contract pricing was accepted

“all under the ATG umbrella.”

The contract further granted permission to ATG Sports to use ITS’ patented

technology “involving a woven/non woven backing with an all rubber infill” for “as

long as the terms of this agreement are met by ATG.” ITS issued a certificate of

authority to ATG Sports for use of the patent. Despite the certificate authorizing only

ATG Sports to use the patent, ITS presented evidence showing that ATG-RAM had

won a project bid that required submission of the certificate authorizing the use of the

patent.

That evidence authorized the jury to find that ATG Sports abused the corporate

form by using ATG-RAM to avail itself of the contract when it was beneficial but then

to evade supply requirements under the agreement when it was not beneficial, and so

authorized them to to apply the alter ego doctrine.

Under the alter ego doctrine, equitable principles are used to disregard
the separate and distinct legal existence possessed by a corporation

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where it is established that the corporation served as a mere alter ego or
business conduit of another. The concept of piercing the corporate veil
is applied in Georgia to remedy injustices which arise where a party has
over extended his privilege in the use of a corporate entity in order to
defeat justice, perpetuate fraud or to evade contractual or tort
responsibility. Plaintiff must show that the defendant disregarded the
separateness of legal entities by commingling on an interchangeable or
joint basis or confusing the otherwise separate properties, records or
control. Additionally, when the elements of the doctrine are satisfied, the
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil also can be used to hold a family
of corporations liable for the debts of each other. In order to pierce the
corporate veil, however, there must be some evidence of abuse of the
corporate form, and sole ownership of a corporation is not a factor.

Lowery, supra at 3-4 (a) (citations and punctuation omitted).

The evidence authorized the jury to find that ATG Sports and ATG-RAM held

themselves out to ITS as one entity; that they commingled and confused otherwise

separate assets by using the $600,000 ATG-RAM payment to another supplier as the

basis for an exception in the supply contract for ATG Sports; that they acted as

interchangeable entities by ATG-RAM taking advantage of the same favorable pricing

and use of the ITS patent given to ATG Sports under the contract with ITS; and that

ATG Sports failed to answer and deny ITS business communications asserting that

turf purchases from other suppliers by ATG-RAM violated the supply contract. See

OCGA § 24-14-23 (“In the ordinary course of business, when good faith requires an

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answer, it is the duty of the party receiving a letter from another to answer within a

reasonable time. Otherwise, the party shall be presumed to admit the propriety of the

acts mentioned in the letter of the party’s correspondent and to adopt them.”). In

short, there was evidence supporting a jury finding that the ATG defendants

“disregarded the separateness of [their] legal entities by commingling on an

interchangeable or joint basis or confusing the otherwise separate properties, records

or control.” Lowery, supra at 4 (a) (citation and punctuation omitted).

In arguing otherwise, ATG Sports and ATG-RAM point to purported

inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence which supported their contention that

they were separate entities that did not act as alter egos, such as Driver’s testimony

that the companies kept separate books, had separate bank accounts, had separate

insurance for vehicles and equipment, and performed different functions. But any

such inconsistencies and conflicts were matters for the jury to resolve.

It is not the role of this [c]ourt, but is the role of a jury to sort through the
evidence, resolve conflicts, and make findings of fact based on the
evidence it finds credible. A jury in arriving at a conclusion upon
disputed issues of fact may believe a part of the testimony of a witness or
witnesses, and reject another part thereof, it being their duty to ascertain
the truth of the case from the opinion they entertain of all the evidence
submitted for their consideration. Indeed, . . . it is a jury’s prerogative to
accept or reject, in whole or in part, the evidence submitted[.]

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Carlisle v. Broe, 363 Ga. App. 238, 250-251 (870 SE2d 792) (2022) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

In resolving any evidentiary conflicts in this case, “[t]here was at least some

evidence for the jury to conclude that [ATG-Sports and ATG-RAM] were alter egos

of each other.” Renee Unlimited, supra at 260 (2) (b). Because “we cannot say that no

evidence exists to support the jury’s verdict on this issue[,]” we affirm the denial of

the motions for new trial and JNOV. Id. (citation and punctuation omitted),

4. Jury instructions

ATG Sports and ATG-RAM contend that the trial court’s jury instruction on

alter ego was erroneous and that the court erred in failing to give a statute of limitation

instruction. But after the jury instructions were given, the appellants “failed to object

to the trial court’s charge on [either] basis. That failure constitutes waiver.” Prime

Retail Dev. v. Marbury Eng’g Co., 270 Ga. App. 548, 554 (3) (608 SE2d 534) (2004).

See OCGA § 5-5-24 (a) (“in all civil cases, no party may complain of the giving or the

failure to give an instruction to the jury unless he objects thereto before the jury

returns its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds

of his objection”). Compare McDowell v. Hartzog, 292 Ga. 300, 302 (736 SE2d 395)

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(2013) (objection to a jury charge preserved for appeal where, after the charge was

given, counsel referenced a previous objection for which the grounds were distinctly

stated and that objection was noted by the trial court).

Nevertheless, we still “consider and review erroneous charges where there has

been a substantial error in the charge which was harmful as a matter of law, regardless

of whether objection was made hereunder or not.” OCGA § 5-5-24 (c).

Instances of reversal under [OCGA § 5-5-24] (c) are very rare. A charge
constituting substantial error harmful as a matter of law is one that is
blatantly apparent and prejudicial to the extent that it raises the question
of whether the losing party has, to some extent at least, been deprived of
a fair trial because of it, or a gross injustice is about to result or has
resulted directly attributable to the alleged errors.

Smith v. Norfolk S. Ry., 337 Ga. App. 604, 612 (2) (788 SE2d 508) (2016) (citations

and punctuation omitted). Neither of the alleged errors in this case constitute the rare

instance in which reversal is mandated.

(a) Alter ego

Contrary to the appellants’ contention, the trial correctly instructed the jury on

the alter ego doctrine. The court charged the jury that the plaintiff must show that

there was an abuse of the corporate form and that the “defendant disregarded the

separateness of legal entities by co[m]mingling on an interchangeable or joint basis or

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confusing the otherwise separate properties, records or control.” See Lowery, supra

at 4 (a). The court also properly instructed the jury that ATG Sports and ATG-RAM

are companies that “possess legal existence separate and apart from one another” and

that unless the jury found that ATG-RAM was the alter ego of ATG Sports, then they

“are considered separate and distinct legal entities, which are not interchangeably

responsible for” each other’s debts.

Despite the trial court’s correct jury charges on alter ego, the appellants argue

that the court should have also given their proposed instruction that certain factors

standing alone, such as sole ownership or overlapping areas of business, are

insufficient to invoke the alter ego doctrine. But the evidence did not merely show

such fact-specific factors standing alone, and the jury instructions as a whole

adequately covered the alter ego doctrine. Accordingly, the appellants have “failed to

show that the trial court erred, much less substantially erred, by failing to include

[their] proposed instruction.” Georgia CVS Pharm. v. Carmichael, 362 Ga. App. 59,

69 (2) (865 SE2d 559) (2021).

(b) Statute of limitation

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ATG Sports and ATG-RAM claim that they were harmed by the court’s failure

to give a requested statute of limitation charge because it led the jury to award

damages for breaches of contract committed outside the statute of limitation. At the

charge conference, they raised no objection when the court indicated it would not give

the charge and they likewise raised no such objection after the jury instructions. So as

noted above, we review only for substantial error. See OCGA § 5-5-24 (c)

The appellants have not identified any specific breaches of contract occurring

outside the statute of limitation that the jury may have considered. Indeed, they have

not supported this claim with any citations to the record, including evidence that

might have supported such a jury charge. See Court of Appeals Rule 25 (d) (1) (i)

(“Each enumerated error shall be supported in the brief by specific reference to the

record or transcript. In the absence of a specific reference, the Court will not search

for and may not consider that enumeration.”); Dillard v. Schilke,352 Ga. App. 158,

160-161 ((3) (834 SE2d 278) (2019) (“It is not the function of this [c]ourt to cull the

record on behalf of a party in search of instances of error. The burden is upon the

party alleging error to show it affirmatively in the record.”) (citation and punctuation

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omitted). Under these circumstances, ATG Sports and ATG-RAM have failed to

show substantial error by the record.

5. Termination date of contract

Appellants enumerate that the trial court should have found that the contract,

by its terms, terminated in January 2014. This issue was decided on summary

judgment. ATG Sports moved for summary judgment on this ground and the trial

court denied the motion, finding that there was a contractual ambiguity as to the

termination date that needed to be resolved by a jury. To the extent this enumeration

challenges the trial court’s denial of summary judgment on this ground — by arguing

that the court erred in finding an ambiguity in the contract and in allowing the jury to

decide the issue — it provides nothing for review. “[A]fter verdict and judgment, it

is too late to review a judgment denying a summary judgment, for that judgment

becomes moot when the court reviews the evidence upon the trial of the case.” Moore

v. Moore, 281 Ga. 81, 85 (6) (635 SE2d 107) (2006) (citation and punctuation omitted).

To the extent this enumeration challenges the denial of a directed verdict on the

issue of the termination date of the contract, the any evidence “standard[] of review

for directed verdict and JNOV [is] the same.” Ga. Trails & Rentals v. Rogers, 359 Ga.

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App. 207, 208 (1) (855 SE2d 103) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also

Whitaker Farms v. Fitzgerald Fruit Farms, 347 Ga. App. 381, 385 (1) (819 SE2d 666)

(2018) (“The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s denial of a motion for a

directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict is the any evidence test.”)

(citation and punctuation omitted). Under that standard, we “must construe the

evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party in the court below” and

“determine whether there is any evidence to support the jury’s verdict.” Patterson-

Fowlkes v. Chancey, 291 Ga. 601, 602 (732 SE2d 252) (2012).

Here, the jury was not required to accept ATG Sports and ATG-RAM’s

evidence concerning the alleged January 2014 termination date of the contract and

instead was authorized to find from other evidence presented by ITS, including a 2016

email from Driver to ITS asserting that “there is a contract between us[,]” that the

supply contract remained in effect after January 2014, that the parties operated under

the contract after that date, and that they did not terminate it until 2016. See Carlisle,

supra at 251 (“it is a jury’s prerogative to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the

evidence submitted”) (citation and punctuation omitted). Because there were

conflicts in the evidence and the evidence did not demand a particular verdict, the trial

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court did not err in denying a directed verdict or JNOV on this issue. See Jones v.

Bebee, 353 Ga. App. 689 (839 SE2d 189) (2020) (“a directed verdict is proper only

when there are no conflicts in the evidence as to any material issue, and the evidence

— with all reasonable deductions — demands a particular verdict”).

6. Attorney fees

ATG Sports and ATG-RAM contest the sufficiency of the evidence supporting

the jury’s award of attorney fees under OCGA § 13-6-11, which authorizes such an

award where a defendant has acted in bad faith. “[T]he element of bad faith that will

support a claim for litigation expenses under OCGA § 13-6-11 must relate to the acts

in the transaction itself prior to the litigation, not to the conduct during or motive with

which a party proceeds in the litigation.” Fresh Floors v. Forrest Cambridge Apts., 257

Ga. App. 270, 271 (570 SE2d 590) (2002). “If . . . there is bad faith in the transaction,

OCGA § 13-6-11 attorney fees are authorized regardless of whether a bona fide

controversy otherwise existed between the parties.” Kopp v. First Bank, 235 Ga. App.

520, 524 (3) (509 SE2d 384) (1998) (citations and punctuation omitted). “Bad faith

authorizing an award of attorney’s fees in a contract action must relate to the conduct

of entering the contract or to the transaction and dealings out of which the cause of

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action arose, which includes not only the negotiations and formulation of the contract

but also performance of the contractual provisions.” Beall v. F. H. H. Constr., 193 Ga.

App. 544, 547 (5) (388 SE2d 342) (1989) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Here, the jury was authorized to find from the evidence recounted above that

ATG Sports entered into the contract in bad faith by including a misleading exception

in its favor based on a $600,000 payment that it had not made and that was instead

made by ATG-RAM. And thereafter, the jury could have found that ATG Sports and

ATG-RAM acted interchangeably under the contract terms when it was to their

benefit, but breached it when it was not.”The issue of attorney fees under OCGA §

13-6-11 is a question for the jury, and an award will be upheld if any evidence is

presented to support the award.” Wilson v. Wernowsky, 355 Ga. App. 834, 847 (4) (846

SE2d 101) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Gorin v. FPA 2, 184 Ga.

App. 239, 241 (361 SE2d 193) (1987) (bad faith under OCGA § 13-6-11 is a jury

question). Because the award in this case was supported by some evidence, it must be

upheld.

Judgment affirmed. Hodges and Pipkin, JJ., concur.

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