JULIE SHADRIX v. JOSEPH D. WILLINGHAM

FIRST DIVISION
BROWN, C. J.,
BARNES, P. J., and WATKINS, J.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

February 17, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A25A2015. SHADRIX et al. v. WILLINGHAM.

BROWN, Chief Judge.

Joseph D. Willingham (“Willingham”) filed an action for fraud, deceit, and

conspiracy against his ex-wife, Julie Shadrix (“Shadrix”), her husband, Jared Shadrix

(“Jared”), and David Gray (“Gray”), whom Willingham learned was the biological

father of one of the two children born during his marriage to Shadrix. The defendants

filed motions for summary judgment on each of Willingham’s claims. The trial court

granted Jared’s motion but denied summary judgment to Shadrix and Gray, finding

that genuine issues of fact remained that precluded summary judgment. Shadrix and

Gray filed an application for interlocutory appeal, which we granted, and this appeal

followed.
“On appeal from a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we conduct a de

novo review, viewing the evidence in the record and all inferences therefrom in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Cornejo v. Allen, 367 Ga. App. 618, 618

(1) (887 SE2d 679) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). So viewed, Shadrix and

Willingham married in October of 1994 and divorced in February 2002. During their

marriage, two children were born, Taylor Willingham (“Taylor”) and Ashton

Willingham (“Ashton”). At the time of the divorce, Taylor was six years old and

Ashton was three years old. In the Amended Consent Final Judgment and Decree

entered in 2002, the parties were awarded joint legal custody of the two children, and

Willingham was ordered to pay monthly child support for both children in the amount

of $950, which included extraordinary medical expenses related to Ashton’s treatment

plan for a brain tumor diagnosed when Ashton was three years old, which payment

would be reduced at the end of Ashton’s treatment. Pursuant to modification actions

filed by Willingham, the child support amount was reduced in January 2007, and again

in February 2014, and Willingham continued to pay other child-related expenses.

In 2020, Ashton created a profile on Ancestry.com and discovered that

Willingham was not her biological father. Ashton contacted her mother to inform her

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of the results, and her mother admitted that she had sexual intercourse with defendant

Gray one time in August 1997. At Ashton’s urging, Willingham met with her, her

boyfriend, and the Shadrixes in a parking lot to discuss the matter, and Willingham

secretly recorded the meeting.1 During that meeting, Shadrix told Willingham that she

knew that Ashton could have been Gray’s daughter, but she always believed she was

Willingham’s. She also disclosed that she told Jared when they married that she had

sex with Gray while she was married to Willingham and it was possible that Gray was

Ashton’s father but she did not think he was. Also during the meeting, Willingham

commented that when Ashton was three or four years old, he thought she looked

exactly like Gray’s children, but he never took any steps to investigate his suspicions.2

In December 2020, Willingham filed his complaint against the defendants,

alleging fraud, deceit, and conspiracy to defraud, seeking damages of at least

$36,437.02, which represented the total amount expended on child support payments

and related expenses, and $250,000 in punitive damages. During discovery, all four

1
Willingham entered the transcript of the meeting as an exhibit to his
deposition. Some sections of the recording were inaudible.
2
Willingham deposed that he and Gray, whom he had considered his best
friend, had known each other since they were children, that their families were close,
and that the friendship ended when Gray took Shadrix’s side during the divorce.
3
parties were deposed. Willingham deposed that he and Shadrix were regularly

intimate before he learned that she was pregnant with Ashton, so he had no reason to

doubt that the baby was his. He also deposed that Shadrix told him at the beginning

of the meeting, during a time that was inaudible on the transcript, that she knew that

Ashton was not his child, although the transcript shows that she said “I knew in my

gut, the timing, that she could have been but I never in my heart believed she was

[Gray’s.] I’ve always believed that she is yours. You’re her dad.” When asked if he

had any evidence that Shadrix knew that Gray was Ashton’s biological father prior to

Ashton learning the DNA results, Willingham replied that he did not. When asked if

he knew when Gray discovered that Ashton was his biological child, Willingham

replied that he did not know. Willingham deposed that his claim that the Shadrixes

and Gray conspired to deceive him was based solely on the conversation in the parking

lot. When asked if he had knowledge of whether or not there was a conspiracy,

Willingham replied, “I have no factual knowledge.”

In his complaint, Willingham alleged that Jared, whom Shadrix married three

months after the divorce, knew that Ashton was not Willingham’s child when he

married Shadrix. He also alleged that the Shadrixes met with Gray soon after their

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marriage to discuss options for alerting him that Gray was Ashton’s father. However,

both the Shadrixes deposed that they discussed the infidelity but had no conversation

about concealing the possibility from Willingham. Gray deposed that he never did

anything to deceive Willingham, and in the transcript from a call he had with

Willingham in July 2020, Gray denied being present at any meeting discussing

whether to disclose the infidelity or paternity issue to Willingham and stated that he

and Shadrix only had one conversation about the possibility of Gray being Ashton’s

father when Shadrix was pregnant.

Shadrix confirmed during her deposition that she had informed Gray that she

was pregnant with Ashton but thought the baby was Willingham’s. She also confirmed

that she told Jared before their marriage that she had been unfaithful with Gray, and

although she knew there was a possibility that Ashton was Gray’s daughter, she

believed Willingham was Ashton’s biological father. Shadrix deposed that she

disclosed to Gray that Jared knew about their affair but did not say anything about

Ashton not being Willingham’s daughter. Shadrix also deposed that she did not

believe that Ashton resembled Gray’s children, with whom her children had been

friends during their childhood. Shadrix maintained that she had no factual basis to

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believe that Willingham was not the legal and biological father of Ashton before the

summer of 2020.

Consistent with Shadrix’s testimony, Jared deposed that Shadrix told him about

her affair with Gray and that there was a possibility that Ashton was not Willingham’s

biological child. Jared denied ever meeting with Shadrix and Gray to discuss disclosing

the child’s paternity to Willingham. Jared also deposed that Shadrix always believed

that Willingham was Ashton’s father and never told him that Gray was her father.

Gray acknowledged the conversation he had with Shadrix when she learned she

was pregnant but deposed that he never thought Ashton was his child. He also

deposed that Shadrix told him she had looked over the dates of her menstrual cycle

and was certain the baby was Willingham’s. Gray stated that he never did anything to

deceive Willingham with regard to Ashton’s paternity and that if he had ever been told

that Ashton was his child, he would have accepted his responsibilities, which included

telling his wife and Willingham.

Gray and the Shadrixes filed separate motions for summary judgment, arguing

that Willingham’s fraud and deceit claims failed because there was no evidence of

deliberate misrepresentation or concealment with the intent to cause harm, that

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Willingham did not reasonably rely on any alleged misrepresentations, and that there

was no evidence of an agreement to conspire. Contrary to Willingham’s version of the

facts, the Shadrixes maintained that there was no evidence that they knew Ashton was

not Willingham’s biological child or that they conspired to keep this fact from him.

The trial court granted summary judgment to Jared, finding he had no duty to disclose

Shadrix’s infidelity to Willingham, and denied Shadrix and Gray’s motions,

concluding that genuine issues of material fact remained on each of Willingham’s

claims. After the grant of Shadrix and Gray’s application for interlocutory appeal, this

appeal followed.

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).

“[T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged by pointing out by reference

to the affidavits, depositions and other documents in the record that there is an

absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Ellison v. Burger King

Corp., 294 Ga. App. 814, 819 (3) (a) (670 SE2d 469) (2008) (citation and punctuation

omitted); see OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). “If the moving party discharges this burden, the

nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, but rather must point to specific

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evidence giving rise to a triable issue.” Ellison, 294 Ga. App. at 819 (3) (a) (citation

and punctuation omitted); see OCGA § 9-11-56 (e). “[S]peculation which raises

merely a conjecture or possibility is not sufficient to create even an inference of fact

for consideration on summary judgment.” Ellison, 294 Ga. App. at 819 (3) (a) (citation

and punctuation omitted).

1. In their first two enumerations of error, Shadrix and Gray argue that the trial

court erred in denying their motions for summary judgment on Willingham’s claim

for fraud or deceit because there was no evidence they made any misrepresentation

of material fact with the intent to deceive Willingham and that he did not reasonably

rely on any alleged misrepresentations by failing to exercise due diligence concerning

his suspicions as to Ashton’s parentage. We agree.

To establish fraud and deceit,

the plaintiff must show that the defendant made a false, material
representation of an existing fact with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard as to whether it was true and that it was with the intent
that it be acted upon by the plaintiff; and, further, that the plaintiff acted
upon the misrepresentation in reasonable reliance of its truth in a manner
reasonably foreseeable by the defendant and to the plaintiff’s proximate
injury.

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Brown v. Techdata Corp., 238 Ga. 622, 625 (234 SE2d 787) (1977). Willingham’s claims

rest upon his allegation that Shadrix and Gray knew that Ashton was not his biological

daughter but chose not to disclose it to him, but when asked if he had actual evidence

to support his allegation during his deposition, he said that he did not. Shadrix and

Gray deposed that they did not know of Ashton’s parentage until June 2020, and did

not attempt to deceive Willingham. Willingham deposed that Shadrix told him at the

beginning of the parking lot meeting that she knew earlier, but the transcript of that

meeting does not support his contention.

Justus v. Justus, 198 Ga. App. 533 (402 SE2d 126) (1991) is instructive here and

supports the grant of summary judgment on Willingham’s claim for fraud and deceit.

In Justus, supra, which is procedurally different although factually analogous to the

instant case, an ex-husband filed an action for fraud and deceit against his ex-wife and

her former pastor, whom he alleged was the biological father of a child the ex-husband

thought he had fathered. Id. at 533. After the parties’ divorce, the ex-wife told the

plaintiff that she engaged in sexual relations with her former pastor more than 20 years

earlier and shortly thereafter realized she was pregnant, but she considered it a very

remote possibility that the child was the pastor’s child. Id. More than 20 years later,

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the ex-wife’s grandchild developed hematologic problems, and she reached out to the

pastor to ask that he submit to blood tests in order to help the grandchild, which tests

confirmed that he was indeed the child’s biological grandfather. Id.

Prior to filing the fraud and deceit action, the husband sought to set aside the

divorce decree, alleging fraud and deceit against the ex-wife contending that she had

committed adultery, which he argued barred an award of alimony and sought to

recover the sums he had expended on the daughter. Justus, 198 Ga. App. at 534 (1).

The trial court ruled in favor of the ex-wife, and after this Court and the Supreme

Court denied the ex-husband’s applications for discretionary appeal, he filed a

separate action for fraud and deceit. Id. The ex-wife and the pastor moved for

summary judgment, which the trial court denied, and the case proceeded to a jury

trial, but the trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of defendants at the

conclusion of plaintiff’s case. Id. at 534 (1).

On appeal, this Court held that the ex-husband’s action against the ex-wife was

barred by res judicata, thus we did not consider his fraud contentions as to the ex-wife.

Justus, 198 Ga. App. at 534 (1). However, we addressed the merits of the ex-

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husband’s claim against the pastor premised upon his alleged concealment that he was

the child’s father, holding as follows:

Suppression of a material fact which a party is under an obligation to
communicate constitutes fraud. The obligation to communicate may
arise from the confidential relations of the parties or from the particular
circumstances of the case. It cannot be denied that paternity is material
in this case. There is no indication in the record, however, that [the ex-
husband] ever inquired of [the pastor] regarding [the child’s] paternity,
and even assuming that [the pastor] possessed such knowledge as a fact,
. . . we have found [no authority] suggesting an affirmative duty on [the
pastor’s] part to disclose it to [the ex-husband]. Moreover, imposing on
[the pastor] and others in circumstances similar to those presented here
an affirmative duty to disclose their paternity of children born within
another’s marriage would hinder, rather than advance the preservation
of the family unit, which is of such utmost importance in this state that
it has recently been given stature in our state constitution: “To promote
the interest and happiness of the citizen and of the family, . . . we the
people of Georgia . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution. . . .” We
hold, therefore, that under the circumstances present here, no
affirmative duty existed on [the pastor’s] part to disclose to [the ex-
husband] that [the child] was his child. Because no duty existed, [the
pastor] could not have been guilty of a breach of duty by failing to
disclose the information[.]

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Id. at 534-535 (2) (citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted). If follows here,

therefore, that even assuming Gray knew that Ashton was his biological child, and

Willingham has offered no evidence that he did, Gray had no duty to disclose that fact

to him. Thus based on our holding in Justus, the trial court should have granted

summary judgment to Gray on Willingham’s claim for fraud and deceit.

Turning to Shadrix, she may demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of

material fact by

either presenting evidence negating an essential element of the plaintiff’s
claims or establishing from the record an absence of evidence to support
such claims. . . . [T]he rule with regard to summary judgment is that a
defendant who will not bear the burden of proof at trial need not
affirmatively disprove the nonmoving party’s case, but may point out by
reference to the evidence in the record that there is an absence of
evidence to support any essential element of the nonmoving party’s case.
Where a defendant . . . discharges this burden, the nonmoving party
cannot rest on its pleadings, but rather must point to specific evidence
giving rise to a triable issue.

Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622, 623 (1) (a) (697 SE2d 779) (2010) (citations and

punctuation omitted). The Supreme Court has explained that “speculation is not

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enough,” id. at 636 (3) (d), and although all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in

the non-movant’s favor, it does not mean that

a plaintiff may defeat a defendant’s properly supported motion for
summary judgment without offering any concrete evidence from which
a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his favor and by merely
asserting that the jury might, and legally could, disbelieve the
defendant’s denial of wrongdoing. The movant has the burden of
showing that there is no genuine issue of fact, but the plaintiff is not
thereby relieved of his own burden of producing in turn evidence that
would support a jury verdict.

Id. at 634 (3) (c) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Berry v. Hamilton, 246

Ga. App. 608, 610 (541 SE2d 428) (2000) (holding that “mere conjecture” is

insufficient to defeat summary judgment); J. Kinson Cook of Ga., Inc. v.

Heery/Mitchell, 284 Ga. App. 552, 559 (d) (644 SE2d 440) (2007) (“[a]n inference

cannot be based upon evidence which is too uncertain or speculative or which raises

merely a conjecture or possibility.”) (punctuation omitted).

Willingham has failed to establish that Shadrix “made a false, material

representation of an existing fact with knowledge that it was false or with reckless

disregard as to whether it was true” to induce him to support Ashton. See Brown, 238

13
Ga. at 625. Although Shadrix admittedly concealed her infidelity from Willingham,

she deposed that she thought Ashton was Willingham’s child until she learned

otherwise in June 2020, and Willingham has not established otherwise. Although he

deposed that he filed for divorce due to suspected infidelity, he offered no evidence

that he questioned Shadrix about whether Ashton was his child or that she

intentionally misled him. Accordingly, the trial court’s conclusion that genuine issues

of fact remained was incorrect.

2. In a separate enumeration of error, Shadrix and Gray argue that they are

entitled to summary judgment because the damages that Willingham seeks in his

action are not recoverable. Again, we agree.

Damages is an element of a claim for fraud and deceit. See Rhone v. Bolden, 270

Ga. App. 712, 719 (5) (608 SE2d 22) (2004). “[A] plaintiff’s failure to establish even

one of [the] elements [of fraud and deceit] entitles a defendant to summary

adjudication.” Sun Nurseries, Inc. v. Lake Erma, LLC, 316 Ga. App. 832, 836 (1) (730

SE2d 556) (2012). Willingham sought to recover as damages the total amount he paid

in child support and for medical expenses and testified to no other compensatory

damages. These damages, however, are not recoverable. See Grand v. Hope, 274 Ga.

14
App. 626 (617 SE2d 593) (2005). Additionally, “an award of nominal damages for

fraud is improper, as to establish a cause of action for fraud, a party must show that

actual damages, not simply nominal damages, flowed from the fraud alleged.” Stiefel

v. Schick, 260 Ga. 638, 639 (2) (398 SE2d 194) (1990) (citation and punctuation

omitted).

In Grand, supra, the husband adopted the wife’s two children, and after their

divorce, sued her for fraud based on alleged misrepresentations that she made about

her ex-husband to induce him to adopt the two children and sought damages in excess

of $100,000 for what he expended during the marriage and on child support. 274 Ga.

App. at 626. He also sought to recover punitive damages for her “willful

misrepresentations.” Id. The wife failed to answer the complaint and the trial court

entered a default judgment on liability and awarded damages for the cost of the child’s

orthodontic treatments, punitive damages (because fraud was determined by default),

and attorney fees. Id. at 627. The husband appealed, and we vacated the trial court’s

judgment.

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Because the adoption decree remained valid and the divorce decree had not

been set aside, we found “the recovery of past expenditures . . . problematic.” Grand,

274 Ga. App. at 628 (1). We explained that

All parents have a statutory duty to support their children. By law, it is
the joint and several duty of each parent to provide for the maintenance
of his or her child until the child reaches the age of majority, dies,
marries, or becomes emancipated, whichever first occurs, except as
otherwise authorized and ordered pursuant to subsection (e) of Code
Section 19-6-15[3] and except to the extent that the duty of the parents is
otherwise or further defined by court order.

Id. at 628 (1) (citation and punctuation omitted). We held that

[f]or public policy reasons, we do not believe that [the ex-husband] can
recover child rearing expenses and child support costs for which he was
under a legal obligation to pay. Nor do we believe that [the ex-husband]
is authorized to launch a collateral attack on the adoption and divorce
decrees by means of filing an action for fraud against his ex-wife.

Id. at 630 (1).

Additionally, we pointed out that OCGA § 19-7-54 involves proceedings to set

aside paternity, which the husband did not file in that case, and Willingham did not

3
OCGA § 19-6-15 (e) governs the duration of child support responsibility.
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file here. But even in that context, “the new statutory procedures specifically limit the

monetary relief available to the issues of prospective child support payments and past

due child support payments.” Grand, 274 Ga. App. at 630 (1) (citation, punctuation,

and emphasis omitted). See also Cohen v. Nudelman, 269 Ga. App. 517, 522 (4) (604

SE2d 580) (2004) (“[t]he legislature could have permitted a putative father who

successfully sets aside a paternity determination to recoup past support payments, but

it did not do so.”). See generally Roddenberry v. Roddenberry, 255 Ga. 715, 717 (342

SE2d 464) (1986) (husband not permitted to contest child paternity and child support

through filing an extraordinary motion for new trial based on newly discovered

evidence that a child was not his where he could have acquired the evidence sooner

by requesting a blood test). It follows from these cases that Willingham cannot utilize

his fraud and deceit action to collaterally attack the divorce decree and recover as

damages the amount he paid in child support and for medical expenses.4 Thus, the

trial court should have granted summary judgment to Shadrix and Gray.

4
Willingham also sought punitive damages, but punitive damages can only be
awarded if the underlying tort is proven. See Whitaker Farms v. Fitzgerald Fruit Farms,
320 Ga. 208, 218 (2) (d) (908 SE2d 531) (2024).
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3. Because Willingham failed to established the elements of the underlying torts,

his conspiracy claims fail as well.

To recover damages based on a civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must show
that two or more persons combined either to do some act which is a tort,
or else to do some lawful act by methods which constitute a tort. The
conspiracy of itself furnishes no cause of action. The gist of the action is
not the conspiracy alleged, but the tort committed against the plaintiff
and the resulting damage. The essential element of conspiracy is proof
of a common design showing that two or more persons in any manner,
either positively or tacitly, arrive at a mutual understanding as to how
they will accomplish an unlawful design. Absent the underlying tort,
there can be no liability for civil conspiracy.

Sweet City Landfill, LLC v. Lyon, 352 Ga. App. 824, 833 (3) (835 SE2d 764) (2019)

(citations and punctuation omitted). When asked if he had any evidence that the

Shadrixes and Gray conspired to deceive him, Willingham replied that he did not. By

his own deposition testimony, Willingham’s conspiracy claim was premised upon the

meeting in the parking lot, which offered no evidence of a conspiracy. Accordingly,

the trial court should have granted summary judgment on the conspiracy claims as

well.

Judgment reversed. Barnes, P. J., and Watkins, J., concur.

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