Calhoun v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the
Supreme Court of Georgia
No. S26A0145
James Calhoun
v.
The State

On appeal from the Superior Court of Fulton County
No. 16SC143159

Decided: June 16, 2026

ELLINGTON, Justice.
A Fulton County jury found appellant James Calhoun, as
well as his co-defendants James Sims and Jonathan Banks
(together, “the defendants”), guilty of malice murder and other
crimes in connection with the shooting death of Pamela Williams
and the burglary of her home. 1 Calhoun contends that the trial

1 The crimes occurred on November 30, 2013. On April 12, 2016,
Calhoun was indicted along with his co-defendants, Banks and Sims, by a
Fulton County grand jury for malice murder (Count 1); felony murder
predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2); felony murder predicated on
burglary (Count 3); aggravated assault (Count 5); burglary in the first degree
of Pamela Williams’s home (Count 6); and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (Count 9). Banks was charged individually with felony
murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 4)
and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 10). Sims was charged
individually with burglary in the first degree of the home of Deborah
Huddleston (Count 8), and Calhoun was charged individually with burglary
in the first degree of the home of Corey Robinson (Count 7). The court severed
Counts 7 and 8, and those charges were not presented to the jury.
court erred in admitting certain evidence, in denying motions for
mistrial and to sever the defendants’ trials, in charging the jury,
and in allowing cameras in the courtroom. He also argues that he
received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. As we
explain further below, with respect to some of these claims of
error, Calhoun has not made any meaningful argument for why
the claim should prevail based on the applicable law and the
specific facts of the case, and so he has not carried his burden of

After a joint jury trial that began on September 27, 2016, Calhoun was
found guilty on all charges. (The jury also returned guilty verdicts against Sims
and Banks, both of whom filed separate appeals. See Sims v. State, ___Ga. ___,
S26A0143 (June 2, 2026); Banks v. State, ___Ga. ___, S26A0144 (June __,
2026)). On December 15, 2016, the trial court sentenced Calhoun to life in
prison with the possibility of parole for malice murder (Count 1); 20 years’
probation, consecutive to Count 1, for burglary (Count 6); and five years’
probation, consecutive to Count 6, for the firearm offense (Count 9). The
remaining counts (Counts 2, 3 and 5) were vacated by operation of law or
merged for sentencing purposes.
On December 1, 2016, Calhoun filed a premature motion for new trial,
which ripened upon entry of the final disposition order. See, e.g., Fripp v. State,
322 Ga. 269, 269 n.1 (2025). Calhoun amended his motion for new trial on
November 4, 2020. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying
the motion for new trial on July 27, 2023. The trial court then vacated and re-
entered the order with respect to Calhoun only on September 25, 2023.
Calhoun timely filed a notice of appeal on October 2, 2023. On September 3,
2025, this appeal was docketed to the term beginning in December 2025, and
the case was submitted for a decision on the briefs.
We note the almost seven-year delay in resolving Calhoun’s motion for
new trial and another two-year delay for the appeal to be docketed in this
Court. The trial court apparently had not ruled on Calhoun’s first new trial
motion, filed in 2016, when Calhoun amended that motion in 2020. We
“reiterate that it is the duty of all those involved in the criminal justice system,
including trial courts and prosecutors as well as defense counsel and
defendants, to ensure that the appropriate post-conviction motions are filed,
litigated, and decided without unnecessary delay.” Owens v. State, 303 Ga. 254,
258 (2018) (quotation marks omitted).

2
showing error on appeal. As to those claims of error that Calhoun
does support with argument, they fail for the reasons set out
below.
In Sims v. State, ___ Ga. ___, S26A0143, slip op. at 2-8 (Ga.
June 2, 2026), wherein we affirmed the convictions of one of
Calhoun’s co-defendants, we set forth the facts of this case as
follows:
Viewed in the light most favorable to the
jury’s verdicts, the trial transcript shows the
following. On the evening of November 30, 2013, the
defendants met in front of Sims’s house in the
Amhurst subdivision in Fulton County. The
defendants’ movements in and through the
neighborhood that evening were witnessed by Jerry
Link, the subdivision’s security officer. At dusk, the
defendants walked the short distance from Sims’s
house to Williams’s house along a “cut,” a makeshift
footpath through neighboring yards in the Amhurst
subdivision. At this point, Link lost sight of the
defendants. Williams, who was home alone, called
911 at 8:07 p.m. to report suspicious activity outside
her home. While she was on the phone with the 911
operator and his supervisor, she reported hearing
people ringing her doorbell repeatedly, her dog
barking, and then people entering her home.
Williams hid in the closet of her master bedroom,
crouching low and whispering to the 911 operator as
the defendants searched her home for valuables.
Then the 911 operator heard Williams scream.
Shortly thereafter, the telephone connection was
lost. Williams screamed because Banks had

3
discovered her hiding in the closet. Banks pressed
his gun to Williams’s head and shot her.

Although Williams’s alarm system was
armed, it was not triggered when the defendants
entered her home because the patio window through
which they entered did not have an alarm sensor.
Instead, the alarm was triggered at 8:20 p.m.,
shortly after the police arrived and entered the
house. Officer Michael Guin arrived at Williams’s
home at 8:14 p.m. and waited for backup to arrive.
When Corporal Willis Reed arrived, they entered the
home and found Williams breathing but
unconscious, slumped to the floor in her bedroom
closet with a gunshot wound to the head. Guin
noticed that Williams had been hiding in a smaller
“closet within the closet” and that her phone had
fallen between her knees. Paramedics transported
Williams to Grady Hospital. She died there on
December 2, 2013. The cause of death was a single,
contact gunshot wound to the head. The medical
examiner testified that Williams likely would have
been sitting on the floor, looking up at Banks, when
he pressed the gun’s muzzle to her forehead and shot
her.

After Banks shot Williams, he and the others
fled from the house on foot and, shortly thereafter,
sped out of the neighborhood in their cars. Banks hid
at the home of Sims’s cousins, Cassandra and Joseph
Hockaday. According to the Hockadays, who gave
statements to the police and testified at trial, Banks
admitted to them that he, Calhoun, and Sims had

4
broken into Williams’s home. Banks confessed that,
when he discovered Williams in her closet, he
“accidentally” shot her. Banks also said he hid the
murder weapon “somewhere around the
[Hockadays’] house” but, later, he and Calhoun
moved it.

In the following days, Banks called his mother
several times. Banks’s mother asked him whether he
had been involved in the shooting, and Banks
admitted that he “was back there.” After the
shooting, Banks told his father that “me and my
crew f***** up.” Banks’s father reported this
statement to an investigator. When Banks’s father
asked Banks whether he had shot and killed
someone, Banks responded “I don’t know.” Banks
also asked his parents for money so that he could
“get out of town.” Banks’s father gave the police the
street names of five people in his son’s “crew.”
Shortly thereafter, the police obtained warrants for
Banks, Calhoun and Sims, and they were arrested
in mid-December of 2013.

Link, the subdivision’s security officer,
testified that, during the evening of November 30, as
he patrolled the neighborhood in his car, he saw a
group of young men, including Calhoun, Banks, and
Sims, standing in front of Sims’s house. Sims’s and
Calhoun’s houses are near each other on the same
street, and Banks was staying with Sims. Link saw
Calhoun, Banks, and Sims enter a silver-gray car
with two other people at around 7:40 p.m. He
watched the car leave but did not follow it. About ten

5
minutes later, while Link was patrolling the
subdivision, he saw the same silver-gray car parked
on the side of the road near Williams’s house. Link
testified that he saw the car’s interior lights turn on
as several people exited the car. Then the car sped
away. Given that the neighborhood had experienced
“[w]ell over 150” burglaries, Link was suspicious of
what he was seeing. He began scanning the area and
saw Banks standing near a retention pond by
Williams’s house. He also spotted a group of young
men, including Calhoun and Sims, standing behind
her house.

Believing that the young men were returning
to either Sims’s or Calhoun’s house by way of the
path through the woods, Link drove back to Sims’s
home. When he got there, he did not see the men,
but he saw a red Pontiac and a blue Chevy parked
in front of Calhoun’s house. Link had seen the
defendants in those cars earlier in the day. He
testified that he had recorded the tag numbers of
those cars as well as the tag numbers for the silver-
gray car. After a few minutes, Link returned to
Williams’s street to see if he could find the young
men. As he passed by the home of Eddie
Muhammad, he spotted a group of young men,
including Calhoun, Banks, and Sims, running
through the neighborhood toward the path that led
back to their homes. Then, at 8:22 pm, Link saw the
red and blue cars that had been parked in front of
Calhoun’s and Sims’s houses speed out of the
subdivision. Later that evening, Link shared this

6
information with the police.

The following day, Link discovered a jewelry
box lying on the ground along the path he had seen
Calhoun, Banks, and Sims use to flee after the
shooting. Believing that the box may have been
stolen from Williams, he called the police to collect
it. In addition to the jewelry box, the police collected
a ring box, a black hooded sweatshirt, and a black
skull cap along the path through the woods near
Williams’s home. Link testified that, also on the day
following the shooting, he saw Sims’s mother
cleaning out the garage and disposing of clothing,
including an orange jacket matching one he had seen
Sims wearing on the night of the shooting. Link also
saw Calhoun “roaming around[,] looking at the
ground” in the area where Link had discovered the
jewelry box. Link testified that much of what he had
seen concerning the defendants’ movements from
the night of the shooting had been recorded on his
car’s dash camera and that he turned those
recordings over to the police. Several of those
recordings were admitted in evidence and played for
the jury.

Williams’s immediate neighbors also testified
concerning events on the night of the shooting. Louis
Lindo testified that, as he was standing at the end of
his driveway, he saw a group of young men walking
toward Williams’s house. Muhammad testified that
his dogs were barking that evening like someone
was walking by his house. Joshua Williams, who
lived next door to Williams, saw a group of five

7
young men run from behind her house along the cut
between their houses as he was getting clothes out
of the trunk of his car. Yvens Resilard, whose home
was located between Williams’s and Sim’s homes,
testified that around 8:00 p.m., he heard his dogs
barking excessively, and when he went downstairs
to check on them, he noticed that his motion sensor
lights were on. Derrick McKnight, who was visiting
his sister, testified that he spotted a group of five
young men lurking outside his sister’s home.
McKnight’s sister’s home was also located between
Williams’s and Sims’s homes. When McKnight
turned on the outside floodlights, he saw five young
men wearing dark clothing. One wore a skull cap.
McKnight observed the men “scatter” and try to
“hide.” The men then all ran off together in the same
direction.

The State also admitted evidence of prior acts
involving Calhoun and Sims. Marcus Greer, who
was given immunity from prosecution in exchange
for his cooperation, testified that he, Calhoun, Sims,
and two others broke into Melissa Burke’s home on
January 13, 2013. Burke had been home alone when
she heard the doorbell ring. From her upstairs
window, she saw two young men at her front door.
When they continued to ring her doorbell, Burke
called 911. As she did so, the young men climbed
through a second-floor window on the back of her
home. They began searching for things to steal.
Burke testified that she hid in the closet, but one of
the young men found her. She saw the closet door

8
swing open, heard a gunshot, and realized that she
had been shot. The shooter kept firing until his gun
ran out of ammunition. Burke testified that someone
said: “Man, she’s dead. Let’s just get out of here.” As
the young men left her home, they triggered her
alarm system. The alarm system did not go off when
they entered the home because they had entered
through a window that did not have an alarm sensor.
Burke identified Calhoun at trial as the man who
shot her.

Monica Salinas, who lived in the Cooks
Landing subdivision in Fulton County, testified that
on September 18, 2013, she heard a doorbell ring
and saw two young men standing outside her front
door. When she did not answer the door, they rang
her doorbell “20, 15 times consistently, just
constantly ringing the doorbell.” Moments later, her
dogs started barking in the back yard. She called
911, and while she was on the phone, one of the men
threw a rock through her window, shattering the
glass. When the men spotted Salinas in the upstairs
window, one threw a rock at her and then fled.
Shortly thereafter, the two men were apprehended
by the police. Salinas and a sanitation worker who
saw the men fleeing from Salinas’s home identified
one of them as Calhoun.

On October 30, 2013, Corey Robinson’s home
in the Amhurst subdivision was burglarized. The
burglars stole laptop computers, watches, a
television, and a jewelry box. The police recovered a
palm print from the home and later matched it to

9
Calhoun’s palm print.

1. Calhoun argues that the trial court abused its discretion
when it admitted over objection “other acts” evidence pursuant to
OCGA § 24-4-404(b) (“Rule 404(b)”), which impermissibly placed
Calhoun’s character in evidence. Specifically, Calhoun contends
that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Greer’s
testimony concerning the January 3, 2013, shooting of Burke and
the burglary of her home because the prejudicial effect of the
evidence outweighed its probative value and because there was
insufficient evidence of Calhoun’s involvement. 2 For the following
reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the evidence.
Rule 404(b) provides, in pertinent part, that
[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not
be admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes,
including, but not limited to, proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

OCGA § 24-4-404(b); State v. Jones, 297 Ga. 156, 159 (2015) (Rule
404(b) “is, on its face, an evidentiary rule of inclusion which

2 Although Calhoun asserted in one sentence that the trial court
“allowed the introduction of at least two non-relevant acts extrinsic to the case
at bar,” he discusses only the January 3, 2013, shooting. Because he has
presented no argument with respect to a second extrinsic act, he has not
carried his burden of proof with respect to it. See Sims, slip op. at 14 (“As a
general matter, a legal argument in support of a claim of error on appeal
involves the presentation of reasoning based on the law and the specific facts
of the case aimed at persuading a court that the claim of error has merit.”).

10
contains a non-exhaustive list of purposes other than bad
character for which other acts evidence is deemed relevant and
may be properly offered into evidence.”). A party offering Rule
404(b) evidence must show that (1) it is relevant to an issue in the
case other than the defendant’s character; (2) its probative value
is not substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudice under
OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”); and (3) there is sufficient proof for
a jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant committed the other act. See Jones v. State, 301 Ga.
544, 545 (2017). We review the trial court’s decision to admit Rule
404(b) evidence for an abuse of discretion. See Kirby v. State, 304
Ga. 472, 479 (2018).
The State filed a notice of intent to admit evidence of the
January 13, 2013, acts. 3 It sought to admit this evidence to show
motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, and absence of
mistake or accident. At a pretrial motions hearing, the State
argued that the January 13 crime was “identical ... with the
exception of the specific location.” Burke, like Williams, hid in
her bedroom closet and spoke with a 911 operator while Calhoun,
Sims, Greer, and others burglarized her house. Calhoun, upon
discovering Burke, shot her. The State argued:
[W]e wish to show their motive and intent of
obtaining money and items of value[,] that they plan
and prepare and have knowledge that this is what is
going on because they have a modus operandi:
Knocking on that front door, ringing the bell, and
when no one answers, coming in through the back.
They found both women in the closets, and there is

3 This notice was not included in Calhoun’s record, but it is in the
record in co-defendant Banks’s case.

11
no mistake or accident both women were shot.

In a written pre-trial order, the trial court set out its Rule
404(b) analysis and addressed all three prongs of the Rule 404(b)
test. The trial court admitted the January 2013 act for purposes
of showing “motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, and
absence of mistake or accident.” It also ruled that the probative
value of the evidence would not be substantially outweighed by
any unfair prejudice and that there was sufficient proof of
Calhoun’s involvement in the acts. The trial court instructed the
jury that it was to consider the prior acts evidence solely for the
limited purposes for which it was admitted “and not for any other
purpose.”
With respect to the first part of the three-part Rule 404(b)
test, “relevant evidence” is defined as that evidence which has
“any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.” OCGA § 24-
4-401. See Strong v. State, 309 Ga. 295, 300–01 (2020). Although
Calhoun argued that the Burke shooting “had little to no
connection with the facts [of] the case he was being tried on,” the
record shows that it was relevant for the purposes for which it
was admitted. It showed a similar intent to burglarize a home.
Hood v. State, 309 Ga. 493, 500 (2020) (“[T]he relevance of other
acts evidence offered to show intent is established when the prior
act was committed with the same state of mind as the charged
crime.”). This prior act was also relevant to show absence of
mistake or accident, as it was clear that, in both the charged
crime and the prior act, the crew shot their victims as soon as they
were discovered hiding. That members of the crew eliminate
witnesses was relevant to rebut Banks’s claim to the Hockadays
that he shot Williams by accident. See Hall v. State, 322 Ga. 378,

12
383 (2025) (holding that evidence was properly admitted to show
intent and absence of mistake or accident because the defendant
claimed the shooting was accidental or in self-defense, making
intent a material issue).
Rule 403, which governs the second part of the test,
provides that “[r]elevant evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.” Rule 403 “is designed to
exclude matter of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in
by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.” Strong, 309 Ga.
at 301 (quotation marks omitted). In this case, the probative value
of the prior act was not outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.
In his appellate brief, Calhoun asserts that the evidence is
inculpatory, but he makes no argument beyond that concerning
the danger of unfair prejudice from this evidence. See Anglin v.
State, 302 Ga. 333, 337 (2017) (“[I]n a criminal trial, inculpatory
evidence is inherently prejudicial; it is only when unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs probative value that the rule permits
exclusion.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
On the other hand, the State argued that the evidence was
probative of Calhoun’s criminal intent. “Factors to be considered
in determining the probative value of other act evidence offered
to prove intent include its overall similarity to the charged crime,
its temporal remoteness, and the prosecutorial need for it.” Hood,
309 Ga. at 501 (citation omitted.) The charged crimes and the
Burke incident bear striking similarities: Both show a burglary
crew entering a home its members believed to be unoccupied,
through a window unsecured by an alarm sensor, and then

13
stealing items from the home. In both instances, the armed
burglars rang the doorbell multiple times to determine if anyone
was home before climbing through an unsecured window in the
back of the house. In both instances, a member of the crew
discovered a homeowner hiding in a closet and shot her. Thus, the
Burke incident had high probative value based on the number of
similarities. See id. As for temporal proximity, the Burke incident
was probative in that it occurred less than a year prior to the
charged crimes. See id. With respect to prosecutorial need, the
State needed the Burke incident to prove the defendants’ shared
criminal intent, as members of a burglary crew, to burglarize
homes and eliminate witnesses. See Hood, 309 Ga. at 501 (“As we
have explained, if the principal in the killing was not the
defendant, … a question then would have arisen about whether
the defendant was a party to the crime as an accomplice, which
would have depended substantially upon [his] intent.” (quotation
marks omitted)). Further, the State had a strong need to use the
evidence to rebut Banks’s claim that he accidentally shot
Williams. See Hall, 322 Ga. at. 383. Thus, even if the evidence
contained some unfair prejudice to Calhoun as it showed that he
was a person who had committed another crime, “we cannot say
that the high probative value of this evidence was so outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice that the trial court abused its
discretion when it admitted it.” Hood, 309 Ga. at 501 (citation
omitted).
Finally, the other acts evidence “may be admitted if the
court concludes that the evidence is sufficient for the jury to find
by a preponderance of the evidence that the other act was
committed.” Strong, 309 Ga. at 301 (quotation marks omitted)).
Here, as the trial court correctly concluded, there was sufficient
evidence to prove that the prior burglary and shooting occurred
and that Sims and Calhoun participated, given that Greer, who

14
was part of the robbery crew, testified to the events he witnessed.
See Harrison v. State, 310 Ga. 862, 869 (2021). Consequently, we
see no abuse of discretion in the admission of the other acts
evidence.
2. Calhoun contends the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion to sever the defendants’ trials because the
evidence offered against the other defendants pursuant to Rule
404(b) had a prejudicial “spillover effect” on him. We considered
whether the defendants’ trial should have been severed in Sims,
slip op. at 19-21. Calhoun makes arguments similar to those
raised by Sims, complaining generally about antagonistic
defenses and the admission of prior acts evidence. However,
Calhoun does not cite to specific facts in the record or make
meaningful legal analysis tethering those facts to his contentions.
In Sims, we concluded that the primary evidence against the
three co-defendants came from the same sources: Link’s
testimony concerning his observations on the night of the
shooting and Banks’s admissions to the Hockadays. Further, the
jury was instructed on the law concerning mere presence, mere
association, and parties to a crime, and the defendants’ defenses
were not antagonistic to each other. All three denied being
present and did not shift the blame to each other. Id. Finally, like
Sims, Calhoun failed to carry his burden on appeal of showing
that he was clearly prejudiced by a joint trial. Thus, for the same
reasons that we rejected this claim of error in Sims, we reject it
with respect to Calhoun. See id.
3. Calhoun contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in allowing television cameras in the courtroom to
cover the trial. In his appellate brief, he devotes one short
paragraph to this claim of error, asserting that allowing media
access caused the “due process and truth finding function of the

15
judicial” system to be “usurped by the presence of media, who
were there for the main purpose of evoking sympathy for the
victim and contaminating the potential jury pool.” However,
Calhoun does not cite to any record evidence or make meaningful
legal argument with reference to the applicable law as to how the
trial court abused its discretion in permitting television media
access. 4 As we explained in Sims, “[a]s a general matter, a legal
argument in support of a claim of error on appeal involves the
presentation of reasoning based on the law and the specific facts
of the case aimed at persuading a court that the claim of error has
merit.” Slip op. at 14. Calhoun has not made such an argument;
therefore he has not carried his burden of showing any abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s ruling. See Sims, slip op. at 14-16.
4. Calhoun contends that the trial court erred in denying
his motions for mistrial after the admission of the following
evidence: (a) Link’s testimony that the red and blue cars parked
in front of Sims’s and Calhoun’s homes were allegedly engaged in
criminal activity in the neighborhood; (b) Link’s testimony
concerning the “negative activities” in which the red and blue cars
were allegedly involved; and (c) a life-sized replica of the victim’s
closet (a demonstrative aid constructed in the courtroom), which

4 The record reveals that the trial court entered an order granting
television media access to the court room after “having considered Superior
Court Rule 22 and OCGA § 15-1-10.1.” The trial transcript also shows that,
although Calhoun objected to the cameras being present as they were being set
up in the courtroom, he made no legal argument expressly contesting the basis
for the court’s order. Instead, counsel simply stated: “We know that it’s up to
the Judge regarding if all the factors have been met under Rule 22.” Although
Calhoun references OCGA § 15-1-10.1 in his appellate brief, he does not
present any argument explaining how “in utilizing” that statute, the “court
erred in allowing the trial to be filmed.” And Calhoun does not discuss Superior
Court Rule 22 at all.

16
Calhoun was unable to see into as Officer Guin testified about it.
Whether to grant a motion for mistrial is within the trial court’s
sound discretion, and the trial court’s exercise of that discretion
will not be disturbed on appeal unless a mistrial is essential to
preserve the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Wilkerson v. State,
317 Ga. 242, 249 (2023) (quotation marks omitted). As explained
below, Calhoun has not carried his burden of showing that the
trial court abused its discretion.
(a) Link testified that he “called Fulton County to have the
tags run because, again, I had reports on a vehicle that matched
that from other residence[s] that were involved.” Banks’ attorney
interrupted Link’s testimony and moved for a mistrial on the
ground that Link “brought out yet more incidents that are
allegedly involving the red [car] and blue car ... which
impermissibly place[d] his character in issue because [Banks] is
supposedly the driver of the red car.” Calhoun joined in the
motion without further argument. Outside the presence of the
jury, the State explained that the other incidents were not
connected to the defendants, and the State did not expect Link to
testify about the other incidents involving those vehicles. The
court denied the motion and, before the jury was called back into
the courtroom, the prosecutor instructed Link that he was “not to
talk about other crimes for which the red [car] and the blue car
might be associated with that you know about.”
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying this
motion for a mistrial. The objection cut Link’s testimony short,
and he did not discuss any specific prior criminal incidents
involving the two cars. Assuming there was any implication
concerning Calhoun’s involvement in any prior incidents
involving the cars, it was a brief and passing reference. See
Richardson v. State, 308 Ga. 70, 71 (2020) (“[A] passing reference

17
to a defendant’s incarceration does not place his character in
evidence.” (cleaned up)). Under these circumstances, we see no
abuse of discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial.
(b) Calhoun also appears to argue that the trial court
abused its discretion when it denied Banks’ motion for a mistrial
(which Calhoun joined) concerning Link’s testimony in response
to a question about reports Link had made to the police. Link
testified that he told the police he had seen the cars associated
with “negative activities” in the subdivision on the day of the
shooting.
The trial court denied the motion but agreed to give
curative instructions. The court drafted a curative instruction
with input from defense counsel. The court instructed the jury: “I
want you to completely disregard the witness’s testimony about
other negative activities. So you are to disregard that testimony.”
Calhoun did not renew his motion for a mistrial. Consequently,
this claim of error has been waived. Hartsfield v. State, 294 Ga.
883, 886 (2014) (concluding appellate review was waived when a
renewed motion for mistrial was not made after the trial court
gave a curative instruction).
(c) After the life-sized replica of Burke’s closet had been
removed from the courtroom following Officer Guin’s direct
testimony regarding the replica and before his cross-examination
began, the defendants moved for a mistrial on the ground that
they could not see the closet during the officer’s testimony and
this “possibly gave the jury the impression that [they] did not
care” or that they were “in custody.” The trial court denied the
motion. On appeal, however, Calhoun asserts that a mistrial was
required because, given that he could not see the closet replica,
he was unable to assist his attorney “regarding the credibility of
the State’s presentation.” Because Calhoun did not move for a

18
mistrial on this basis below, he has not preserved this argument
for appeal. See Jones v. State, 317 Ga. 466, 472 (2023) (explaining
that the failure to raise a timely motion for mistrial on the specific
grounds challenged on appeal waives for appellate review any
alleged error in the trial court’s denial of the motion.).
5. Calhoun contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting in evidence the life-sized replica of
Williams’s bedroom closet because, even if it was relevant to any
issue at trial, its probative value was “substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” See Rule
403. He also contends that the replica was “tantamount to
impermissible bolstering” because the defendants “were not able
to come around and look and see the closet” replica, which gave
the jury the impression they were “indifferent to the whole
proceeding.” We disagree.
With respect to the admissibility of the replica under Rules
404(b) and 403, we resolved this claim in Sims, slip op. at 16-18,
holding that the probative value of the closet replica was not
outweighed by any unfair prejudice. Here, Calhoun makes similar
arguments and cites to the same evidence. For the same reasons
that we rejected this claim of error in Sims, we reject it with
respect to Calhoun. See id. With respect to Calhoun’s bald
assertion that the “evidence was tantamount to impermissible
bolstering,” he has failed to carry his burden on appeal of showing
that the trial court abused its discretion because he has made no
legal argument in support of this claim nor has he cited to any
legal authority. Consequently, this claim of error fails. See id. at
14 (“As a general matter, a legal argument in support of a claim
of error on appeal involves the presentation of reasoning based on

19
the law and the specific facts of the case aimed at persuading a
court that the claim of error has merit.”).
6. Calhoun contends the trial court abused its discretion in
overruling his objections to the admission of evidence on hearsay
grounds. As explained below, Calhoun has not shown that the
trial court’s rulings warrant reversal.
(a) Calhoun argues that the 911 operator, Sheila Hayes,
should not have been allowed to testify that State’s Exhibit 141
was a record documenting a call that she took regarding
“suspicious activity that someone saw in the Amherst
subdivision.” Calhoun argues that the witness’s statement that
the call was about “suspicious activity” constituted inadmissible
hearsay.
“The admission of evidence is committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s decision whether
to admit or exclude evidence will not be disturbed on appeal
absent an abuse of discretion.” Anglin v. State, 302 Ga. 333, 335
(2017). “And the erroneous admission of hearsay is harmless
where substantial, cumulative, legally admissible evidence of the
same fact is introduced.” Id. at 336 (2); see also Campbell v. State,
320 Ga. 333, 343 (2024) (holding that non-constitutional error is
harmless when “it is highly probable that the error did not
contribute to the verdict” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
Assuming without deciding that Hayes’s statement
constitutes inadmissible hearsay, 5 its admission was harmless
because the jury had already heard Link testify that he called the
911 operator on November 25 to report his observations

5 “‘Hearsay’ means a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted.” OCGA § 24-8-801(c).

20
concerning people he had seen driving a car that he believed was
a stolen. In fact, as Link testified, the State played portions of
State’s Exhibit 37, a video recording from Link’s dash camera that
documented him following and interacting with several people,
including Banks and Calhoun, on November 25. Link testified
that he was concerned about certain activities in the
neighborhood, including “gambling” and “weed smoking,” and
that he had just seen two people get out of the car he thought
might be stolen and “run back through the cut,” the footpath
through the woods between Sims’s home and Williams’s home.
Finally, State’s Exhibits 140 and 141 had already been admitted
in evidence. State’s Exhibit 140 is the recording of the 911 call.
State’s Exhibit 141 is a report that Hayes personally created and
which categorized the call at issue as “54-Investigate Suspicious
Person.” We see no indication in the record that these exhibits
were not published to the jury or that they were published in a
redacted form. Thus, assuming that the testimony about which
Calhoun complains contained inadmissible hearsay, any error in
admitting it was harmless. See Anglin, 302 Ga. at 335-336; see
also Rutledge v. State, 298 Ga. 37, 40 (2) (779 SE2d 275) (2015)
(no harm from admission of hearsay that was “largely
cumulative” of other, properly admitted testimony).
(b) Calhoun contends that the following testimony from
Detective Smith contained inadmissible hearsay:
Q: Yes. You can say what Ms. Vance said.

A: Okay. Ms. Vance explained that Marcus
[Debarrios] was there that Saturday from 3:00 till
9:00 and did not leave, playing with her son and
what not.

Q: Okay. Did you find that to be consistent with

21
what Marcus said to you?

A: No.

In his appellate brief, Calhoun does not take issue with
Detective Smith repeating what Vance told him, asserting that
Vance had already testified and been cross-examined on the
content of her statements. However, Calhoun argued below and
on appeal that it was improper for the Detective to reference “the
content of [Debarrios’s] conversation” with him because Debarrios
had not yet testified. By responding to the prosecutor’s question
with “No,” the Detective implied that the information he gathered
from Vance about Debarrios having been at Vance’s house on
Saturday was inconsistent with what Debarrios told him.
Although the Detective did not repeat any specific statement
made by Debarrios, counsel argued at trial that the jury could
infer that Debarrios had told the detective something different.
In its written order, the trial court concluded that, because “this
testimony did not convey what Debarrios said,” the testimony did
not recount “a statement” and therefore was not hearsay. The
trial court also concluded that, even if the testimony was hearsay,
its admission was harmless.
Pretermitting whether the trial court correctly concluded
that the detective’s “No” was not hearsay, we agree that its
admission was harmless. “In determining whether the error was
harmless, we review the record de novo and weigh the evidence
as we would expect reasonable jurors to have done[.] The test for
determining nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is
highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.”
Kitchens v. State, 310 Ga. 698, 702 (2021) (citations and quotation
marks omitted).
In his appellate brief, Calhoun does not mention Debarrios

22
in his statement of facts, explain who he is or why his
whereabouts on that particular Saturday were significant to his
defense, or explain what harmful inferences the jury may have
drawn from the detective’s testimony that Vance and Debarrios
told him inconsistent things. We see no indication in the
transcript that Debarrios testified. We see nothing in either
Calhoun’s appellate brief or the trial transcript that sheds any
light on how the admission of this testimony could have harmed
Calhoun. Consequently, given the compelling evidence of
Calhoun’s guilt in this case, we conclude that it is highly probable
that the detective’s exceedingly brief testimony did not contribute
to the verdict and, thus, was harmless. See id.
7. Calhoun argues that the trial “court erred in admitting
business records as the records were irrelevant to any issue at
trial.” However, in his appellate brief, Calhoun does not identify
the business records that he claims the trial court erred in
admitting. His transcript citation does not reference a business
record; rather, it references State’s Exhibit 150, which is a
diagram of the Amhurst subdivision. In addition, because
Calhoun makes no legal argument in support of this claim of
error, he has failed to carry his burden of showing error on appeal.
See, e.g., Sims, slip op. at 14.
8. Calhoun argues that the trial court “erred in allowing
witnesses to testify in violation of the rules of reciprocal
discovery” of the Georgia Criminal Procedure Discovery Act,
OCGA § 17-16-1 et seq. 6 Specifically, he contends that the court

6 OCGA § 17-16-6 provides, in pertinent part:
If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought
to the attention of the court that the state has failed to comply
with the requirements of this article, the court may order the

23
should have granted a mistrial after a witness testified with
respect to State’s Exhibit 421, a photographic lineup that had not
been produced during discovery and which contained a narrative
that stated: “The facial structure and age are familiar to me of the
boy who shot me.” Calhoun does not identify the witness by name
in his appellate brief, but it appears that he is referring to Burke
because she testified about the exhibit.
The State did not question Burke on direct examination
about any photographic lineups. Instead, the prosecutor only did
so on re-direct after defense counsel examined Burke on her
failure to make a positive identification from those lineups.
During the State’s redirect examination, the prosecutor showed
Burke State’s Exhibit 421, a photographic lineup that
investigators had previously shown her on January 5, 2013. When
she was shown the lineup in January, Burke was unable to
positively identify the person in State’s Exhibit 421 as the
shooter. However, she wrote on the lineup that “the facial
structure [and] age are familiar to me of the boy who shot me.
Picture [No.] 5.” Picture No. 5 was a photograph of Calhoun.
Calhoun was given the opportunity to review the photographic
lineup at trial and he had no objection to its admission.
When the trial resumed following a weekend break,
Calhoun moved for a mistrial on the basis that, while multiple
lineups had been turned over in discovery, State’s Exhibit 421 had
not. Because Calhoun did not move for a mistrial

state to permit the discovery or inspection, interview of the
witness, grant a continuance, or, upon a showing of prejudice
and bad faith, prohibit the state from introducing the evidence
not disclosed or presenting the witness not disclosed, or may
enter such other order as it deems just under the
circumstances.

24
at the earliest opportunity in the trial court his claim
that the trial court abused its discretion by denying
his mistrial motion is not preserved for appeal. It is
well settled that, to preserve a motion for mistrial
for appellate review, an appellant must make a
contemporaneous motion at the time he becomes
aware of the matter giving rise to the motion.

Compton v. State, ___ Ga. ___, S26A0227, slip op. at 4-6 (Ga. June
2, 2025) (explaining that, failing to move for a mistrial when
improper testimony is first uttered and, instead, allowing the
State to continue questioning the witness about an unrelated
subject before eventually objecting to the testimony and moving
for a mistrial, is not “contemporaneous” under this Court’s
precedent (citations omitted)).
9. In two separate claims of error, which Calhoun listed as
items “I” and “J” in his enumeration of errors, he asserts that the
trial court “erred in allowing character evidence outside the scope
of 404(b) evidence” and “erred in failing to grant the defendant’s
non-pattern jury charge” request. However, Calhoun did not
present any briefing on these claims of error. Consequently, he
has not carried his burden of demonstrating error on appeal. See,
e.g., Sims, slip op. at 15 (“Because [the appellant] has failed to
identify what evidence he claims should not have been admitted
or to present a legal argument in support of this claim of error, he
has not met his burden of showing that the trial court erred in
this respect.”). See also Supreme Court Rule 22(1) (“Any
enumerated error or subpart of an enumerated error not
supported by argument, citations to authority, and citations to
the record shall be deemed abandoned.”).
10. Calhoun contends that his trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective for failing to request a continuance to

25
thoroughly investigate and file a motion to prevent Burke’s in-
court identification of Calhoun as the person who shot her. 7 For
following reasons, we disagree.
To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
Calhoun must demonstrate both that his trial counsel’s
performance was professionally deficient and that he was
prejudiced by this deficient performance. See Bates v. State, 313
Ga. 57, 62 (2022) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668,
687 (1984)). To establish deficient performance, Calhoun must
show that trial counsel performed his duties in an objectively
unreasonable way, considering all the circumstances and in the
light of prevailing professional norms. See id.
At trial, counsel argued that because Burke had not been
able to identify Calhoun from a photographic lineup, she should
not be allowed to attempt an in-court identification. The record
shows that, during direct examination, the prosecutor elicited the
following testimony from Burke:
Q: Now, do you recall close in time to this event
having an opportunity to sit down with someone to
have them draw a sketch—

7 We note that it appears from Calhoun’s appellate brief that he
intended to raise additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
However, those claims were not briefed. Consequently, Calhoun has not
carried his burden of demonstrating error on appeal with respect to those
claims. See Sims, slip op. at 15 (“Because [the appellant] has failed to identify
what evidence he claims should not have been admitted or to present a legal
argument in support of this claim of error, he has not met his burden of
showing that the trial court erred in this respect.”). See also Supreme Court
Rule 22(1) (“Any enumerated error or subpart of an enumerated error not
supported by argument, citations to authority, and citations to the record shall
be deemed abandoned.”).

26
A: I do.

Q. —with the facial features of the person who
actually came into the closet and shot you?

A: Yes, I do. I do remember that.

Q: The person that you saw who came into your
closet, as you sit here now and try to picture his face
in your mind, can you tell the jurors, does he
resemble anyone that you have seen or know or
anything like that?

A. You mean up to this point?

Q: Up to this point.

A: Are you asking me if I see him in the courtroom?

Q: Do you?

A: I think I do.

Calhoun’s counsel objected to any further testimony
regarding the shooter’s identity, as Burke had not made a positive
out-of-court identification of her shooter. After hearing argument
from the prosecutor, Calhoun’s counsel asked for a recess to
research and respond to the State’s argument. Following the
break, counsel responded and requested that Burke be questioned
outside of the presence of the jury regarding whether there was
any potential taint to her in-court identification. The State
objected, relying on Jackson v. State, 335 Ga. App. 500 (2016),
which held that challenges to in-court identification are to occur
through cross-examination rather than being subject to court

27
review for reliability. The trial court recessed to consider the
cases cited and, thereafter, ruled that Burke could testify and
make an in-court identification if she were able, and that she
would be subject to cross-examination by Calhoun. Burke then
identified Calhoun as the person who shot her.
As is applicable here, a witness’s in-court identification of
a defendant “is subject to the same rules of evidence, witness
credibility, and cross-examination as all testimony in a criminal
trial.” Thorpe v. State, 304 Ga. 266, 270 (2018) (explaining that
the extra safeguards applicable to pretrial identification are not
applicable to a witness’s in-court identification of a defendant).
Thus, a witness’ failure to make a pretrial identification of the
accused is not a ground for striking a subsequent in-court
identification. See id.
Under the circumstances here, Calhoun has failed to show
that he was entitled to a continuance in order to file a motion to
prevent the in-court identification of him as Burke’s shooter, nor
has he shown that the trial court’s ruling would have changed had
a written motion been filed. Thus, Calhoun has not shown that
trial counsel’s performance was deficient in this respect. As we
have explained, “the failure to make a meritless motion or
objection does not provide a basis upon which to find ineffective
assistance of counsel.” Hampton v. State, 295 Ga. 665, 670 (2014).
11. Calhoun does not argue that the errors we have
assumed or pretermitted for purposes of analysis and determined
individually to be harmless—the admission of hearsay testimony
from a 911 operator and a detective—cumulatively resulted in
prejudice mandating a new trial, and in light of the other evidence
in the case, and from our review of the record, we discern no
cumulative prejudice warranting reversal. See Guyton v. State,
321 Ga. 57, 64 n.7 (2025); see also State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 18

28
(2020) (“[A] defendant who wishes to take advantage of the
[cumulative error rule] should explain to the reviewing court just
how he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of multiple
errors.”).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

29